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PREFACE
This book has been a long time in the making, and I’ve incurred many debts 
along the way. I would not have started or continued this project without the 
encouragement of editors (often also good friends) who included my essays 
on Bachmann in journals and collections: Monika Albrecht, Ute Brandes, 
Gisela Brinker-Gabler, Jeanette Clausen, Susan Cocalis, Donald Daviau, Elke 
Fredericksen, the late Marilyn Sibley Fries, Rainer Nägele, the late Henry 
Schmidt, Inge von Weidenbaum, and Sigrid Weigel. I would also like to thank 
fellow Bachmann scholars Karen Achberger, Robert Pichl, Karen Remmler, 
and Leslie Morris for their generosity with information and materials. Hanna 
Schnedl-Bubenicek and Ursula Kubes-Hofmann offered me hospitality and 
good company in Vienna. Dr. Heinz Bachmann gave me permission to pub-
lish material from the Bachmann archive. Early stages of my research were 
supported by the Research Council of the University of Massachusetts and the 
Austrian-American Association of Boston.
Many friends and colleagues accompanied me on the intellectual journey that 
this book records, and I thank them for their counsel and comradeship along 
the way. My feminist sisters in Women in German stood behind me through 
the hard decades during which early feminists in German Studies like me 
established themselves in the U.S. academy, and I thank them for being there. 
The long years of friendship with Wiggies like Angelika Bammer, Sara Fried-
richsmeyer, and Patricia Herminghouse, along with those mentioned above 
and many others, have been especially important for me. I thank my colleagues 
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in the German Studies Association, especially the women historians, for help-
ing me learn to think historically. The support of senior male colleagues Peter 
Uwe Hohendahl and Frank Trommler also emboldened me to elaborate some-
times iconoclastic ideas. My colleagues in the former Department of Germanic 
Languages and Literatures, now the Program in German and Scandinavian 
Studies, especially Barton Byg, have contributed to the transformation of our 
field and my own thinking which made this book possible. Over many years 
my friend Arlene Avakian and other UMass Women’s Studies colleagues have 
been central to my learning to think of gender as always complexly inflected by 
many other changing social categories, particularly ethnicity and race, and my 
friend Sabine Broeck helped me to understand how to think about gender and 
race in German-speaking contexts. Though John Bracey often disagreed with 
me, his ideas have left a strong imprint on these pages. I thank Julia Demmin 
for understanding and encouragement at many crucial moments. In the early 
years of this book my son, Jonathan, patiently listened to me talk through my 
ideas about Bachmann over many a meal and helped me to weather many cri-
ses of confidence; as an adult he kindly saved me from many a computer catas-
trophe. Finally, for over twenty-five years the staff and students of the Social 
Thought and Political Economy Program helped me to acquire the education 
in interdiscplinarity that, I hope, informs this book and also to remember what 
my real priorities are. They and countless other activist friends and allies again 
and again demonstrated their political steadfastness on the occasions I discuss 
in Part Two and continue to the present day. I thank them for their principled 
solidarity, which keeps hope alive in these hard times.
Somewhat or substantially revised, the chapters of this book first appeared in 
the following books and journals: chapter 1 as “Ingeborg Bachmann,” German-
Language Women Writers: A Bio-Critical Sourcebook, ed. Elke Fredericksen and 
Elizabeth Ametsbichler (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishers, 1998), 56–68;
a much earlier version of chapter 2 as “The Feminist Reception of Ingeborg 
Bachmann,” Women in German Yearbook 8, ed. Jeanette Clausen and Sara 
Friedrichsmeyer (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 73–111; chapter 3
as “In the Cemetery of the Murdered Daughters: Ingeborg Bachmann’s 
Malina,” Studies in Twentieth Century Literature 5.1 (Fall 1980), 75–105; chapter 
4 as “Christa Wolf and Ingeborg Bachmann: The Difficulties of Writing the 
Truth,” Responses to Christa Wolf: Critical Essays, ed. Marilyn Sibley Fries 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 128–148; chapter 5 as “Geschlecht, 
Rasse und Geschichte in ‘Der Fall Franza,’” text + kritik Sonderband Ingeborg 
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Bachmann, ed. Sigrid Weigel (München: edition text + kritik, 1984), 156–179;
chapter 6 as “Bachmann and Wittgenstein,” Modern Austrian Literature 18 3/4
(1985), 239–259; chapter 7 as “Bachmann Reading/Reading Bachmann: Wilkie 
Collins’ The Woman in White in the Todesarten,” German Quarterly 61.2 (Spring 
1988), 183–92; chapter 8 as “Representing Femininity in Ingeborg Bachmann’s 
Der gute Gott von Manhattan,” Thalia’s Daughters: German Women Dramatists 
from the Eighteenth Century to the Present, ed. Susan Cocalis and Ferrel Rose 
(Tübingen: Francke Verlag, 1996), 191–220; parts of chapter 9 as “White Ladies 
and Dark Continents in Ingeborg Bachmann’s Todesarten,” The Imperialist Imag-
ination: German Colonialism and Its Legacy, ed. Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Len-
nox, and Susanne Zantop (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 
247–63; parts of chapter 9 as “The Woman Who Rode Away: Postcoloniality and 
Gender in ‘Three Paths to the Lake,’” If We Had the Word: Ingeborg Bachmann. 
Views and Reviews, ed. Gisela Brinker-Gabler and Markus Zisselsberger 
(Riverside, CA: Ariadne, 2004), 208–20; and parts of chapter 10 as “Gender, 
Kalter Krieg und Ingeborg Bachmann,” “Über die Zeit schreiben” 3: Literatur- 
und kulturwissenschaftliche Essays zum Werk Ingeborg Bachmanns, ed. Monika 
Albrecht and Dirk Göttsche (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2004), 
15–54.
My father, Hayes Sidney King, no longer a patriarch but now a beloved friend, 
is responsible for my becoming a politically aware and engaged feminist, and 
I am happy that I can dedicate my book to him. Sigrid Brauner and Susanne 
Zantop, dear friends whom I have lost, inspired me again and again by their 
example, and I also dedicate this book to their memory. 
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INTRODUCTION
As readers familiar with Ingeborg Bachmann’s writing will 
recognize, the title of this book, Cemetery of the Murdered Daughters, is bor-
rowed from an episode that appears both in Bachmann’s novel fragment The 
Book of Franza and in her only finished novel, Malina (1971)—the “overture,” 
as she termed it, to the novel cycle “Ways of Death,” an anatomy of contempo-
rary Austrian society left uncompleted when she died in 1973. In both Franza
and Malina, the “cemetery of the murdered daughters” is an image that occurs 
in a dream of the protagonist. In Malina, it is the first of the many “dreams of 
this night” recounted in the novel’s second chapter:
A large window opens, larger than all the windows I have seen, however not onto 
the courtyard of our house in the Ungargasse, but onto a gloomy field of clouds. A 
lake might lie below the clouds. I have a suspicion as to what lake it could be. But 
it’s no longer frozen over, it’s no longer Carnival and the hearty men’s glee clubs 
which once stood on the ice in the middle of the lake have disappeared. And the 
lake, which cannot be seen, is hemmed by the many cemeteries. There are no 
crosses, but over every grave the sky is heavily and darkly overcast; the gravestones, 
the plaques with their inscriptions are scarcely recognizable. My father is standing 
next to me and takes his hand off my shoulder, since the gravedigger is heading 
our way. My father looks at the old man commandingly; fearful of my father’s 
gaze, the gravedigger turns to me. He wants to speak, but merely moves his lips for 
a long time in silence, and I only hear his last sentence:
This is the cemetery of the murdered daughters.
He shouldn’t have said that to me, and I weep bitterly. (Malina 113–14)
{ 1 }
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How should this multivalenced image be interpreted? This book’s title gestures 
toward its multiple meanings: it points not just toward Bachmann’s texts but 
also toward the reading strategies that feminists, among others, have elaborated 
in order to understand those texts and the various factors that enable those strat-
egies. Specifically, it directs attention to some of the various ways I want to 
address “Feminism, History, and Ingeborg Bachmann,” my subtitle.
In a 1953 poem, “Message,” Bachmann wrote: “Our godhead, / History, has 
reserved us a grave / from which there is no resurrection” (Storm 55). My title 
first connects the death and destruction of almost all of Bachmann’s female fig-
ures to their historical situation and insists upon historical causes for their dev-
astation. Or, as Bachmann put it in a 1971 interview, “It is such a big error to 
believe that people are only murdered in a war or in a concentration camp—
people are murdered in the midst of peace” (GuI 89). This is a point I elaborate 
at length in subsequent chapters. As well, “In the Cemetery of the Murdered 
Daughters” was the title of my first scholarly tussle with Bachmann’s writing in 
1980 (an article included here as chapter 3). The title thus also points to this 
book’s concern with the historicity of reading practices and to the use of my own 
scholarship as an exemplum to demonstrate that historicity. Politically, from the 
perspective of feminism, “cemetery of the murdered daughters” designates the 
“woman-as-victim-of-patriarchy” stance that not only informed my own 1980
article on Bachmann but also inflected those of many other feminists, who 
viewed Bachmann’s texts and her life (which they sometimes conflated) as evi-
dence for the legitimacy of their own position.
From a later, rather different, and somewhat more historically specific femi-
nist perspective, the “murdered daughters” can be viewed as a synecdochal rep-
resentative of all victims, either of “the whites” (as The Book of Franza seems to 
suggest) or more particularly of National Socialism. From yet another feminist 
perspective, the very conception of a “cemetery of the murdered daughters” can 
become the target of a far-reaching feminist critique of white women who, while 
denying their own racial privilege, arrogate the status of victims to themselves—
or, in the German/Austrian context, targets of a similar critique of white Chris-
tian (“Aryan”) women who consider women’s subordination by the National 
Socialist regime (which many of them supported) to parallel the treatment of the 
millions the Nazis murdered. From that standpoint, the title of my book could 
(and does) represent a repudiation of that feminist posture, banishing to the 
graveyard of history any notion that the “daughters” tout court are always and 
everywhere victims of the fathers tout court.
To come, finally, to the position I would take at the moment (and expand 
upon below), one might regard the dream image of the cemetery of the mur-
dered daughters as a device to illustrate how fascism and an ostensibly postfascist 
era could configure the psyches of female figures, a conception at which Bach-
mann could arrive as a consequence of her encounter with Frankfurt School 
theory, which showed her how deeply domination is anchored within the psyche. 
Thus, perhaps only Bachmann’s figures (and not Bachmann herself) imagine 
themselves as consigned to the “cemetery of the murdered daughters,” like real-
life Austrians and Germans after 1945 regarding themselves as entirely victims 
of a regime which they in fact helped to sustain. 
I have begun by invoking these various interpretations of a central image in 
Bachmann’s work not just to justify the book’s title, but also to broach some of 
the themes that account for its subtitle, “Feminism, History, and Ingeborg Bach-
mann.” This volume is not just one of the first English-language book-length 
examinations of the texts of a twentieth-century woman writer of world stature. 
I intend it also as a methodological experiment that stresses the varieties of inter-
pretations enabled by a reader’s “positionality”: that is, her political stance, her 
social location, and the questions that emerge from the historical moment at 
which she writes. In its entirety, the study aims not just to illuminate Bach-
mann’s writing but also to read her texts through a variety of feminist lenses in 
order to make at least three points: to show, first, that the questions feminist 
scholars pose to texts (or to any object of analysis) derive from a specific sociohis-
torical context and from particular “determinate” (that is, historically specific) 
political needs; second, that asking different kinds of feminist questions about 
an object of study can produce different, potentially conflicting, feminist 
answers; and, third, that the analyses that emerge have different kinds of impli-
cations for feminist theory and practice. 
This book is thus very deliberately anything but a unified monograph. On 
the contrary, here I try to present a range of varied, perhaps even contradictory 
readings of Bachmann which, I argue, are neither right nor wrong but simply 
different. Further, I maintain, each of the readings that follows and the method-
ological experiment in its entirety are enabled by particular historical circum-
stances. Doubts about the universal applicability of the conclusions at which 
scholars arrived have emerged in a number of disciplines (such developments 
themselves a consequence of a changed historical situation), but oddly, to my 
mind, the concrete consequences for scholarly research of such demands for 
greater epistemological modesty have rarely been explored, and in practice most 
Western scholars continue to make truth claims as unabashedly as ever. More-
over, even scholars who call for a recognition of scholarly “situatedness” have 
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frequently failed to conceive of “situatedness” also as an ever changing position 
within time. Indeed, the entire question of the epistemological implications of 
change over time (in scholarly approaches and elsewhere) seems to have disap-
peared even as a blip on theorists’ radar screens since Marxism’s crise de confi-
ance, the abandonment of universal history, and the recognition of the rhetoric-
ity of history writing. Scholars seem now rarely to ponder the ways that their 
own scholarly frameworks may be historically specific (that is, how the ques-
tions they ask may ultimately relate to their own historical situations). The 
methodological experiment of this book is in contrast premised upon the asser-
tion that situatedness in time has epistemological consequences similar to those 
of situatedness in space. In this introduction I want to elaborate at greater length 
the theoretical justification for that experiment and end by explaining how I 
propose to present my analyses of Bachmann’s texts as a vehicle for addressing 
the methodological conundrums the book poses. I hope that the experiment 
will be seen not as instrumentalizing Bachmann’s texts for purposes foreign to 
them but rather as continuing my long-term project of elaborating feminist 
readings of Bachmann’s texts that address the needs of successive generations of 
feminist readers.
Why have challenges to universalism and claims for the situatedness of 
knowledge emerged now? Many scholars now concede that the skepticism 
toward universalizing paradigms (aka “metanarratives”) which began to emerge 
in the mid-1960s can finally be traced to decolonization movements after 1945
(among many other impulses, of course) and to other efforts that decolonization 
inspired (including the U.S. civil rights movements and, indirectly, feminism). 
Such struggles enabled the emergence of political subjects in the non-Western 
world and in the West for whose subjectivity universalist Western paradigms 
had not provided. Though the voices of those new subjects were heard in a wide 
variety of venues—from debates about the content of school textbooks to battles 
over canon formation to postcolonial cultural production—at the loftiest theo-
retical levels the relationship between new theoretical permutations and the 
real-life political changes that may have underwritten them was less often rec-
ognized. (It is startling, for instance, that in her extended introduction to Jacques 
Derrida’s Of Grammatology, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak never thematizes 
how her own intellectual formation as a Western-educated Indian woman 
might have shaped her understanding of the new French theory.) Robert Young’s 
White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (1990) was among the first schol-
arly investigations to discern that decolonization struggles like those of the 
Algerian war of independence (1954–1962) produced the intellectual reverber-
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ations that led to the rise of French poststructuralism and related developments 
grouped together under the rubric “postmodernism.” Young put it succinctly: 
“Postmodernism can best be defined as European culture’s awareness that it is 
no longer the unquestioned and dominant center of the world” (19). Despite 
the transformations that postmodernism has called forth in many areas of the 
U.S. academy, it remains surprising that at the levels of abstraction at which 
debates about “incredulity toward [Western] metanarratives” (Lyotard xxiv) 
have been conducted, scarcely a theorist has ventured to investigate whether 
alternative models might exist elsewhere or in what ways postmodern theory 
might pertain to the non-Western world. Enrique Dussel observes, for instance: 
“Although [postmodern philosophers] theoretically affirm difference, they do 
not reflect on the origins of these systems that are the fruit of a rationalization 
proper to the management of the European centrality in the world-system, 
before which they are profoundly uncritical, and, because of this, they do not 
attempt to contribute valid alternatives (cultural, economic, political, etc.) for 
the peripheral nations, or the peoples or great majorities who are dominated by 
the center and/or the periphery” (18). Subsequent thinkers may have to tease 
out from postmodern theory those elements relevant for understanding post-
Eurocentric political, social, and cultural arrangements which postmodern 
theorists themselves did not consider.
Another group of scholars, however, many of non-Western origin though 
frequently teaching in departments of history and anthropology at U.S. univer-
sities, have more recently probed the relationship between challenges to univer-
salist paradigms and situatedness from another perspective. These scholars 
argue that recent historical developments in non-Western societies have given 
the lie to the universalizing postulations of Western theory. Though nineteenth-
century European social theorists conceived modernity to be a phenomenon 
that would assume identical forms everywhere (cf. Marx’s proclamation that a 
triumphant capitalist bourgeoisie would create “a world after its own image” 
[Tucker 477]), these scholars have shown that the diffusion of capitalism 
throughout the globe (i.e., the phenomenon now known as globalization) has 
produced heterogeneous, not homogeneous, political, social, and cultural effects, 
bringing into being other parts of the world that are just as modern as the West 
but differently so. In the mid-1980s Arjun Appadurai called the forms of social 
organization he had observed in contemporary Latin American, India, and East 
Asia “alternative modernities,” and Arif Dirlik argues: “Modernity may no lon-
ger be approached as a dialogue internal to Europe or EuroAmerica but as a 
global discourse in which many participate, producing different formulations 
{ 6 }   introduction
of the modern as lived and envisaged within their local social environments” 
(“Modernity” 17). Such scholars conclude that categories of European theory 
may be necessary but are not sufficient to grasp such new realities. Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, for instance, comments on political modernity in India, his own 
country of origin: “European thought has a contradictory relationship to such 
an instance of political modernity. It is both indispensable and inadequate in 
helping us think through the various life practices that constitute the political 
and the historical in India” (Provincializing 6). As he underlines, it is European 
theory’s untenable extrapolations from the experiences of a particular cultural 
grouping to all of humanity, the blindness of European theorists to their own 
situatedness, that now calls that theory into question: “The shadow of cultural 
diversity . . . now falls across all universalistic assumptions about the history of 
human nature that often underlie propositions of modern political philoso-
phies. Their inherent Eurocentrism is what makes these assumptions suspect 
in the eyes of practitioners today” (“Universalism” 653). At least some scholars 
of “alternative modernities” are quite aware of the epistemological consequences 
of renouncing universalisms, potentially calling into question, warns Dirlik, 
“the very notion of science, and the claims of the social and cultural sciences to 
scientificity” (“Globalization” 19). Within the framework of his project of “pro-
vincializing Europe,” Chakrabarty has been among the most inventive in pro-
posing alternative models. But, as it is far from clear to these scholars how to 
understand the phenomenon of globalization itself, so the issue of what ana-
lytic paradigms will or should succeed European theory is far from resolved. 
Moreover, though these scholars have determinedly drawn universal frame-
works into question, to the best of my knowledge they have less directly thema-
tized in what ways a recognition of the situatedness and partiality of all per-
spectives also demands an acknowledgment of the drastic reduction in the 
truth claims that their own scholarly investigations are entitled to make.
U.S. feminist theorists, on the other hand, arrived at their critique of univer-
salism via a different route, one that from the outset necessitated a recognition 
of the partiality and provisionality of feminist analysis (although the majority 
of feminist scholars have still not taken that critique to heart when their own 
work is in question). Of necessity, feminist thought must assert the masculin-
ist partiality of theories that purport to be universal but denigrate women. In 
the early 1980s, some feminist theorists tried to elaborate an alternative female/
feminist perspective. Adapting Georg Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness
for feminist purposes, they argued that speakers who assumed the standpoint of 
women (analogous to Lukács’s standpoint of the proletariat) would be capable 
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of articulating truths about and for women (cf., for instance, Hartsock). But 
unfortunately for such “standpoint theorists,” at about the same time the vigor-
ous interventions of American women of color, at a series of explosive confer-
ences and in a variety of influential anthologies, were forcing white feminists 
to recognize how frequently their allegations about “all women” were based 
in fact on false extrapolations from their own white, middle-class experience. 
In Donna Haraway’s oft-quoted words, “White women . . . discovered (that is, 
were forced kicking and screaming to notice) the non-innocence of the category 
‘woman’” (Simians 157).
In the wake of these highly charged encounters, various feminist thinkers 
turned to postmodern theory for tools that could help them understand differ-
ences among women. Attempting to adjudicate between cultural feminism and 
postmodernism, and responding to the demand to identify the social location of 
the individual or group speaking for feminism, in 1988 Linda Alcoff advanced 
the term “positionality” to describe the specificity of the position from which any 
individual feminist (or, by extension, any other person) acts and speaks: “The 
concept of positionality includes two points: first, . . . that the concept of woman 
is a relational term identifiable only within a (constantly moving) context; but, 
second, that the position that women find themselves in can be actively utilized 
(rather than transcended) as a location for the construction of meaning, a place 
from where meaning is constructed, rather than simply the place where a mean-
ing can be discovered” (434, emphasis in original). Feminist standpoint theory 
still survives as an important perspective within feminist thought, though now 
transmuted into “an influential part of a more general paradigmatic shift, in 
both political and scientific thought, away from universalistic theoretical frame-
works that would neither account for the particular location of the social sub-
ject, nor would they usually accept that it is relevant to do so,” as two feminist 
commentators observe (Stoelzler/Yuval-Davis 317). Subsequent theorists have 
refined Alcoff’s definition by showing how female identity comes into being at 
“the intersection of different and often competing cultural formations of race, 
ethnicity, class, sexuality, religion, and national origin, et cetera, and so forth” 
(Friedman, Mappings 21), and her position is now generally accepted by most 
academic feminists. Because women are variously situated, many feminists con-
clude that it is impossible for any observer to assume a “God’s-eye view” that 
would permit her to speak on behalf of all women, let alone to make allegations 
claiming more general, even universal, validity. This is, for instance, the basis 
of Iris M. Young’s critique of Seyla Benhabib’s attempt “to articulate a post-
metaphysical defense of moral and political universalism” (Benhabib 174). 
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Benhabib’s model “support[s] a conceptual projection of sameness among peo-
ple and perspectives at the expense of their differences,” Young argues (168). 
Because feminist theorists have generally been more immediately concerned 
than other scholars with producing knowledge that can authorize and legiti-
mate praxis, the question of how to ground feminist truth claims has seemed a 
particularly urgent one. Many feminist thinkers have struggled with the 
dilemma of how to reconcile an insistence on knowledge’s situatedness and par-
tiality with a recognition that some kinds of knowledge seem more “true” (or at 
least “less false” [Harding 185]) to feminists than others. Susan Hekman 
observes: “If there are multiple feminist standpoints, then there must be multiple 
truths and multiple realities. This is a difficult position for those who want to 
change the world according to a new image” (351). This is an issue that I con-
sider later in this introduction.
How might we factor history into these critiques of universalism? That will, I 
hope, be the contribution of this book, as I make a plea here for a more emphati-
cally historicized conception of positionality. Though Alcoff invoked the ever 
changing context within which women are positioned, change over time has 
received very little attention in recent theorizing. Most theorists of situatedness 
and positionality have failed to emphasize that knowledge production varies not 
just synchronically, as a consequence of the social categories that construct the 
knower or the social location he or she occupies, but also diachronically, because 
of the changing historical forces that act upon him/her. Though we would surely 
wish to jettison Marxism’s certainty about what direction history is moving, it 
may nonetheless be salutary to recall Marxism’s emphasis on the inevitability of 
historical change. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels queried rhe-
torically: “Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man’s ideas, views 
and conceptions, in one word, man’s consciousness, changes with every change in 
the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social 
life?”(Tucker 489). As they emphasize, knowledge produced at any moment by 
a situated human subject, producer and product of those processes, will necessar-
ily change over time. Bertolt Brecht put it even more pithily: “Da es so ist, bleibt 
es nicht so” (3: 1233): because it’s like that now, it won’t stay that way.
Adding such an understanding of history to arguments for situatedness or 
positionality makes it possible to emphasize that the determinants shaping the 
situated subject are constantly in the process of change and that the knowledge 
he or she produces will change both in response to changing constellations of 
determinants and as a consequence of the emergence of new historical problems 
which his or her knowledge production is intended to address. A focus on the 
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activity of meaning-making undertaken by a historically situated subject (that is, 
meaning as actively produced from the perspective of a particular positionality) 
may make the concrete implications of this historicizing of positionality easier to 
grasp. In Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse, Rosemary Hennessy 
uses the term “reading” to denote knowledge production under such conditions, 
extending the definition “to include all of those meaning-making practices 
which enable one to act and which shape how one makes her way through the 
world” (91). For Hennessy (as for many other contemporary feminist scholars), 
“reading,” knowledge production, or meaning-making is never a practice exte-
rior to discourse or ideology (defined in Louis Althusser’s sense as “the imagi-
nary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” [162]) but is 
instead patched together from the interpretive frameworks (i.e., preexisting 
grids of meaning) ready to hand. Each new reading, and all readings in the 
conglomerate, are interventions into discourse/ideology which potentially, and 
to a lesser or greater degree, change all available systems of interpretation. Thus 
each new reading is produced within a historical context that is potentially at 
least slightly different from the one that went before. As Marx might have put it, 
people are simultaneously changed by history and change it. Contesting read-
ings of all sorts can thus be conceived of as historically situated struggles over 
time to determine whose meanings are going to prevail. 
One might thus understand this process of reading (in this case, of texts, to 
bring the issue closer to the specific concerns of this book) as analogous in some 
ways to Walter Benjamin’s conception, in his “Theses on the Philosophy of His-
tory,” of how the “historical materialist” appropriates the past. For Benjamin, a 
narrative of the past is not given for all time but is, rather, actively constructed to 
meet current political needs. He contrasts the position of the historical material-
ist to that of the historicist, whose ambitions for historiography are encapsulated 
in the famous phrase of the nineteenth-century historian Leopold von Ranke, 
history “as it really was”: “wie es eigentlich gewesen” (Ranke 7). But since, for 
Benjamin, any narrative of history is always interpretation from a particular 
standpoint, there exists no representation of the past that is a perfect reflection of 
“what really happened” or that would be valid for all time. On the contrary, the 
story we tell about the past is the story that is important to us in the present: as 
Benjamin puts it, “To articulate the past historically . . . means to seize hold of a 
memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger. Historical materialism wishes to 
retain that image of the past which unexpectedly appears to man singled out by 
history at a moment of danger.” And, as the present constantly changes, so does 
our version of the past: “As flowers turn toward the sun, by dint of a secret 
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heliotropism the past strives to turn toward that sun which is rising in the sky of 
history.” Our constructions of the past are thus as transient as the present: “The 
true picture of the past flits by. The past can be seized only as an image which 
flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again.” 
Moreover, since at any moment constructing the past is a highly politicized 
undertaking, the project of reading the past also involves a struggle over whose 
meaning will prevail. As Benjamin puts it, “Only that historian will have the 
gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that even 
the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not 
ceased to be victorious” (255).
Without mentioning Benjamin at all, Elizabeth Grosz has provided a more 
recent gloss on this position that underlines its relevance for contemporary fem-
inism. In the millennium issue of Signs, she writes: “What counts as history, 
what is regarded as constituting the past, is that which is deemed to be of rele-
vance to concerns of the present. . . . [I]t is only the interests of the present that 
serve to vivify or reinvigorate the past. The past is always propelled, in virtual 
form, in a state of compression or contraction, to futures beyond the present. . . . 
The past cannot be exhausted through its transcription in the present because it 
is also the ongoing possibility (or virtuality) that makes future histories, the con-
tinuous writing of histories, necessary. History is made an inexhaustible enter-
prise only because of the ongoing movement of time, the precession of futurity, 
and the multiplicity of positions from which this writing can and will occur” 
(1019–1021). What Benjamin and Grosz have alleged to be true of history is 
true, I would maintain, of all interpretive practices, all reading, which also 
becomes an inexhaustible enterprise that comprises contending interpretations 
undertaken from a multiplicity of positions across the ongoing movement of 
time. Out of the abundance of what is present in the text, we appropriate what 
is most useful to us “in a moment of danger.” 
Despite feminists’ intense theoretical interest in “readings” in the broader 
and narrower sense, to the best of my knowledge only Donna Haraway has 
concretely explored the clash of interpretations that is a consequence of readings 
undertaken from different feminist positionalities. In a 1988 article, “Reading 
Buchi Emecheta: Contests for Women’s Experience in Women’s Studies,” Har-
away examines readings, this time in the narrower sense, of Nigerian novelist 
Buchi Emecheta’s texts by a Nigerian woman, an African American woman, 
and herself, a Euro-American woman. Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi, the 
Nigerian, is critical of Emecheta’s works for their failure to affirm the commu-
nity of African women as powerful, self-sufficient heterosexual women who can 
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be conceptualized as “co-wives with an absent husband.” Barbara Christian, an 
African American lesbian, praises Emecheta’s writing for according with her 
own “agenda of affirming lesbianism within Black feminism and within the 
model of the inheritance from Africa of the tie between mother and daughter” 
(“Reading” 118). Haraway herself stresses the aspects of Emecheta’s writing in 
which she perceives “a space for political accountability and for cherishing ambi-
guities, multiplicities and affinities without freezing identities” (“Reading” 120). 
Haraway emphasizes that none of these readings can be faulted for its hostility 
toward women’s interests, for “all are part of a contemporary struggle to articu-
late sensitively-specific and powerfully-collective women’s liberatory discourses.” 
These readings are neither right nor wrong but merely different, each under-
taken from the perspective of the specific positionality of the reader. “All read-
ings,” Haraway avers, “are also mis-readings, re-readings, partial readings, 
imposed readings, and imagined readings of a text that is originally and finally 
never simply there. Just as the world is originally fallen apart, the text is always 
already enmeshed in contending practices and hopes” (“Reading” 122–23).
Though Haraway here celebrates the different readings that even differently 
positioned feminist readers can produce, it is obvious that such partiality and 
provisionality pose multiple problems for theory and practice. What guarantees 
that “situated knowledges” (cf. Haraway, “Situated Knowledges”) possess any 
validity at all? On what basis could one knowledge-claim be judged better than 
another? What criteria could we conceivably use? Or is it perhaps impossible to 
adjudicate between contending truth-claims at all? Might these varied stand-
points make communication impossible even among groups potentially sharing 
common interests? Dirlik observes, for instance; “To abandon [claims to univer-
sal knowledge] is also to resign to the parochialness—and hence the relativ-
ity—of all knowledge, which not only abolishes the commonalities born of cen-
turies of global interactions, but also rules out communication across societal 
boundaries (wherever those may be drawn at any one time and place)” (“Our 
Ways”). Kathleen Lennon and Margaret Whitford note: “The problem of legit-
imation remains, so long as the only alternative to a discredited value-free objec-
tivity appears to be a postmodern pluralist free-for-all” (4). And such a post-
modern free-for-all (cf. Jane Flax: “We set differences to play across boundaries” 
[91]) does not in any sense guarantee a transformation in feminists’ interest. 
Even should feminist theory, as Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson counsel, 
drastically reduce its claims and its reach, “tailor[ing] its methods and its catego-
ries to the specific task at hand, using multiple categories when appropriate and 
forswearing the metaphysical comfort of a single feminist method or feminist 
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epistemology” (35), how do we know that this theory is the most adequate to the 
“task at hand”? Why does this analysis rather than some other best enable femi-
nist action? On what basis could we ever choose among them?
I would like to propose that Marx, with a little help from Georg Lukács, can 
assist us in finding a solution to these dilemmas. In his second Feuerbach thesis, 
Marx writes: “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human 
thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove 
the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in 
practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated 
from practice is a purely scholastic question” (Tucker 144). Lukács, a neo-Kan-
tian before he became a Marxist, continued to ponder the dilemma of how to 
discern the truth about the external world and in 1922 published History and 
Class Consciousness, regarded as orthodox Marxism’s classical solution to the 
problem. Lukács argued that members of the bourgeoisie, whose consciousness 
is a product of their social location and interests (“social being determines con-
sciousness”)‚ are incapable of understanding the nature of a social reality whose 
indwelling tendencies are moving history in a direction that demands the aboli-
tion of the bourgeoisie as a class. Indeed, Lukács writes: “From a very early stage 
the ideological history of the bourgeoisie was nothing but a desperate resistance to 
every insight into the true nature of the society it had created and thus to a real under-
standing of its class situation” (66, emphasis in original). The proletariat, however, 
which in Lukács’s Hegelian Marxist narrative constitutes the identical subject/
object of history, has the capacity both to understand society correctly and to 
change it (which is after all the point, as Marx emphasizes). Thus Lukács 
observes: “As the bourgeoisie has the intellectual, organisational and every other 
advantage, the superiority of the proletariat must lie exclusively in its ability to 
see society from the centre, as a coherent whole. This means that it is able to act 
in such a way as to change reality; in the class consciousness of the proletariat 
theory and practice coincide and so it can consciously throw the weight of its 
actions onto the scales of history—and this is the deciding factor” (69). Of 
course, Lukács recognizes that not every member of the working class possesses 
an identical or accurate understanding of the processes that inform social real-
ity; fatefully, he attributes true class consciousness only to the most advanced 
members of the working class, the so-called “conscious vanguard” that in his 
view would of necessity choose the organizational form of the Communist 
Party. Given the harmony of theory and practice that is the proletariat’s achieve-
ment, the continued success or even survival of the Party conversely provides the 
assurance that the Party’s view of reality is true. As Lukács puts it: “The pre-
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eminently practical nature of the Communist Party, the fact that it is a fighting 
party presupposes its possession of a correct theory, for otherwise the conse-
quences of a false theory would soon destroy it” (327). The chorus of the party 
anthem of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) compressed into a single 
sentence the philosophical consequences to be drawn from Lukács’s argument: 
“The Party, the Party, the Party is always right.”
Fortunately (or not), the Party no longer provides such epistemological reas-
surance, but that does not mean that what Marx maintains in his second thesis 
is wrong. What Richard Wolff observes about postmodern Marxist theory 
might also be true of feminist theory: “The point about theories is not whether 
they conform to some absolute standard or test of truth; rather it is that they 
reflect and transform society differently. On that difference rests their value and 
their significance for Marxists. Upon their differences Marxists must base their 
decisions to support, reject, attack, or transform alternative theories” (182). Posi-
tionality describes not just feminists’ (or others’) “subjective” choice of politics 
but also their “objective” social location. Those are both postures they share 
with many others, and postulations of various sorts undertaken from that posi-
tionality may be construed not as universally or eternally true but as potentially 
valid, hence also as a possible foundation for practice, for those so situated at that 
point in time. The “truth” (now understood of course in a much more limited 
and restricted sense) for that grouping might be determined by exploring the 
degree to which the postulation serves the grouping’s interests. (For instance, 
the allegation that men are superior to women could never be “true” for femi-
nists—though it might be “true” for some groups of men!) Action on the basis 
of a particular postulation—praxis—might then act as a kind of touchstone to 
determine whether the purported utility of the postulation in fact stands up in 
practice. “Truth” in this sense would have to be understood as a political, not an 
epistemological, variable, and the validity of any particular assertion would be a 
political achievement, not a given. Moreover, in epistemology as in real practical 
politics, feminists would be compelled to alter their “truths” if what they asserted 
they believed (e.g., “men can never be relied upon”) prevented them from col-
laborating with other political groupings to accomplish what they needed. In 
this sense, the quest for feminist (or other) “truth” would be an undertaking 
something like the process of coalition-building that Bernice Johnson Reagon 
describes: 
Coalition work is not work done in your home. Coalition work has to be done in 
the streets. And it is some of the most dangerous work you can do. And you 
shouldn’t look for comfort. Some people will come to a coalition and they rate the 
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success of the coalition on whether or not they feel good when they get there. 
They’re not looking for a coalition; they’re looking for a home! They’re looking 
for a bottle with some milk in it and a nipple, which does not happen in a coalition. 
You don’t get a lot of food in a coalition. You don’t get fed a lot in a coalition. In a 
coalition you have to give, and it is different from your home. You can’t stay there 
all the time. You go to the coalition for a few hours and then you go back and take 
your bottle wherever it is, and then you go back and coalesce some more. (359)
Truth arrived at via coalition-building—a political, not a philosophical, accom-
plishment: this could provide the epistemological basis on which we might, as 
Susan Stanford Friedman suggests, “reinvent a singular feminism that incorpo-
rates myriad and often conflicting cultural and political formations in a global 
context” (Mappings 4)
Especially under conditions of globalization, cooperation on the basis of self-
interest also furnishes a much more reliable sticking compound for political 
alliance than moralizing demands for mutual recognition. As Satya Mohanty 
puts it, “a simple recognition of differences across cultures” leads only “to a senti-
mental charity, for there is nothing in its logic that necessitates our attention to 
the other” (21). And, should enough participants in such a coalition decide that, 
politically, certain “truths” or values are in the interest of everyone, we might 
arrive at something like universalisms after all, as Anthony Giddens proposes: 
“Humankind in some respects becomes a ‘we,’ facing problems and opportuni-
ties where there are no ‘others’” (27). Perhaps that might be a vehicle that could 
allow us in some nonhomogenizing way or other, via a very roundabout route, 
to arrive at the utopia evoked by Marx in the Communist Manifesto: “In the place 
of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have 
an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the 
free development of all” (Tucker 491), or, similarly, in that stirring line from the 
“Internationale”: “We have been naught, we shall be all!”
What is the relevance of this theoretical excursus for this book? Its applica-
tions are, I think, multiple. First, the readings of Bachmann’s texts at which I 
arrive by Part Three address what seems to me a major lacuna in feminist anal-
ysis today. To vary the metaphor, I think feminist theorists have, so to speak, 
painted themselves into a corner. Through its absolutely essential analysis of 
white women’s obliviousness to their own privilege, feminism created in white 
women an attitude of obligation and guilt, though not particularly of solidarity, 
toward women of color domestically and internationally. Otherwise, feminism 
has focused on the one hand upon women’s equal rights with men and, on the 
other, upon the damage inflicted by men on women: rape, battering, sexual 
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harassment, and so on. The practical consequence has been a liberal feminist 
politics that envisions women’s integration into the existing society as soon as 
men learn (or are compelled) to behave. What is missing in feminist analyses of 
contemporary society (though very visible in contemporary feminist analyses of 
other historical periods) is how the present order of globalized capitalism is det-
rimental, in gender-specific ways, even to privileged women. An analysis of how 
“we”—Northern, First World, white women—are also profoundly damaged, 
though much less obviously and visibly than Southern women and Northern 
women of color, by a social order that is not just patriarchal could motivate and 
energize feminist practice. The absence of this analysis may explain why femi-
nists are absent, as feminists, from the contemporary antiglobalization move-
ment. In my view (that is, from the perspective of my current reading of Bach-
mann), it is precisely such an understanding of First World (in this case, Central 
European) women’s situatedness within an analogous social order at a some-
what earlier period of history (though one also dominated by the U.S. promo-
tion of capitalism’s global sway) which informs Bachmann’s writing. Bachmann’s 
analysis of her period and of the situation of women within it is enabled by her 
profound appropriation of a Frankfurt School analysis, whose leading theorist, 
Theodor W. Adorno, declared: “There’s no right way to live when the world is 
wrong” (“Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im falschen” [Minima Moralia 42]). Like 
many other great modernist writers—Kafka’s name springs most immediately 
to mind—Bachmann reveals the deformities, scars, and wounds we might not 
see without her help. In her Frankfurt lectures of 1959-1960 she maintained: 
“But change is indeed possible. And the transforming effect of new works edu-
cates us to new perception, new feeling, new consciousness” (W 4: 195). This is 
the kind of reading of Bachmann’s texts—addressing current political issues, 
transforming consciousness in order to promote change—that I want to mobi-
lize for feminist readers.
More specifically, I argue that Bachmann quite deliberately writes from the 
perspective of a “historicized positionality,” and that is also how she portrays her 
characters. In her Frankfurt lectures she declares that twentieth-century writ-
ing like that of the European modernists differs from nineteenth-century real-
ism because the great nineteenth-century novelists portrayed figures acting 
within history, whereas twentieth-century writers displayed “history/story 
within the I/psyche” (“die Geschichte im Ich” [W 4: 230])—a phrase I often 
invoke in this volume. Bachmann’s great accomplishment in the “Ways of 
Death,” the unfinished novel cycle she left behind, was the representational 
strategy she devised to portray those historically induced deformations of con-
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sciousness. As I detail in subsequent chapters, she chose in the “Ways of Death”
to construct female figures who are completely products of the discourses of 
femininity of their era and then to reveal the consequences for women. Though 
these female figures are rarely wives, they inhabit a world in which masculinity 
and femininity, defined by notions of extreme gender polarity, are entirely irrec-
oncilable; they prefer the domestic sphere (or ostentatiously assume the roles of 
men when they leave it); the cosmetic disciplining of the female body is second 
nature to them. But though the focus of the “Ways of Death” is on women’s 
realm, the private sphere and intimate relations, Bachmann also insists that 
women’s domestic circumstances are informed by a larger political context, one 
that did not suddenly disappear from the world in 1945: “The massacres may be 
over, but the murderers are still among us” (W 3: 341). Or, as she maintained in 
a 1971 interview, “If, for example, I say nothing in this book Malina about the 
Vietnam War, nothing about so-and-so many catastrophic conditions of our 
society, then I know how to say it in a different way” (GuI 90–91)—another of 
my favorite quotes. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that because these female figures are 
entirely constructed as merely the point at which discourses of femininity inter-
sect, they have access to no language whatsoever that would allow them to speak 
either about their own condition or about circumstances outside the purview of 
women. In Malina, the novel that constitutes the “overture” to “Ways of Death,” 
Bachmann instead displays the costs of this historical situation, the psychic dis-
integration of an unnamed protagonist torn between an indifferent lover and 
a cerebral and passionless housemate, Malina. By the end of that novel the 
unnamed woman disappears, and only Malina, now revealed as her male dop-
pelgänger and the embodiment of masculine rationality, is left to narrate the 
later volumes in the cycle, which are presented as apparently realistic accounts of 
the everyday lives of female figures completely in compliance with dominant 
discourses on femininity. Only by way of a somber subtext that disrupts the 
realistic surface does Bachmann ironically reveal her figures’ destruction—their 
“Ways of Death—by their male-dominant society and their particular male lov-
ers. Given her project, it is more than a little ironic that many of her earliest 
feminist readers (including me!—see chapter 3) identified with Bachmann’s 
figures. But now the reading of their historicized positionality at which this 
book arrives instead understands the positionality of these entirely socially con-
structed figures as situated within and inflected by all the other social determi-
nants of the period about which Bachmann wrote. 
At the same time, readings derived from this notion of historicized position-
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ality must direct attention to the ways Bachmann also packages her analysis of 
femininity in historically determinate forms: that is, in the terms that were avail-
able to her. That is to say, her critical portrait of the situation of Central Euro-
pean women is itself a historical construct confined within the discourses of her 
time. In her radio plays and fiction of the 1950s, Bachmann both reproduces and 
challenges the dominant gender discourses of her period but always within the 
framework of the gender dichotomies that the decade provided. Certainly her 
focus on male figures during this period can be understood as an exploration of 
masculine (or “generically human”) identity under siege, destabilized by the 
anomie of a mass consumer society and its absence of a coherent value system—
a common lament of 1950s intellectuals throughout the West. In this regard 
these texts may be understood as Bachmann’s far-reaching critique of the cul-
ture of Germany’s “economic miracle,” while her male figures’ frequent attrac-
tion to female seductresses can be read as a protest against the 1950s reimposi-
tion of domestic order and bourgeois respectability. But by exploring masculine 
insecurities as they are played out within their relationships to women, by solv-
ing men’s problems at women’s cost, Bachmann also shows herself to be both 
influenced by and contributing to the reassertion of male control over women at 
which the decade’s gender discourses aimed. Even in the “Ways of Death” she 
continued to draw upon the analyses of oppression available to her in the decade 
before the emergence of the second wave of feminism, particularly those of the 
Frankfurt School, to understand the oppression of women. As a consequence of 
her reliance on those approaches, themselves not unimplicated in male domi-
nance, her texts display a number of features that feminists now would regard 
as problematic: on the one hand an elision of masculinity, instrumental rational-
ity, totalitarian control, fascism, European imperialism, and patriarchy; on the 
other hand, the postulation of a rebellious female otherness that can express 
itself only in eroticism, hysteria, psychosomatic symptoms, parapraxes, dreams, 
or madness. The historicized positionality of these texts (and their author) thus 
also becomes apparent in the incompatibilities between their positions and our 
own, and readings undertaken from the standpoint of the (feminist) reader’s 
historicized positionality must also reveal the ways in which Bachmann is speak-
ing about and from an era that is no longer (like) our own.
Apart from this new approach to specific Bachmann texts, I hope my book 
will also be considered valuable for its attentiveness to the newest research in 
women’s history, a reach across disciplinary boundaries far too seldom attempted 
by feminist literary scholars, and for its attempt to read Bachmann as simultane-
ously useful for our time and limited by her own. But these are not the reasons 
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I term the book an experiment in feminist methodology. What makes it experi-
mental is my self-reflexive attention to myself as a reader and my effort to explain 
why it is that I read as I do. Three different developments in feminist methodol-
ogy led me to undertake this experiment. First, I was dissatisfied with the 1990s
methodology of “confessional criticism” in English and American literature as 
well as the explosion of feminist memoirs in the last decade (see Nancy Miller). 
Fascinating as I found those texts, I perceived a disjuncture between their 
authors’ emphasis on their own uniqueness and the general feminist agreement 
that the subject was socially constructed. What was missing was an exploration 
of how those writers were like everyone else who was similarly situated, not how 
they were different. Second, though Jane Gallop’s Around 1981 was quite useful 
for formulating my project (see chapter 3), I also considered her critique of the 
feminist literary theory written in 1981, undertaken from her own later perspec-
tive, rather unfair. Of course, her historical hindsight allowed her to discern 
what she believed those earlier writers had overlooked (especially attention to 
race and the writing of women of color), but that was a general failing of the 
white academic feminism of the period, and it is likely that “around 1981” Gal-
lop herself would have done no better. (It also appeared to me that directing such 
critiques at what I now considered the omissions of my own work might be a 
way of addressing these issues without incurring the charge of trashing other 
feminists’ work that was leveled at Gallop in the volume Conflicts in Feminism
[Gallop/Hirsch/Miller].) An investigation of how and why feminist literary 
theory changed seemed to me more useful than self-righteous indignation after 
the fact about what it had once done wrong. Third, I was very taken by the 
Haraway analysis of feminist responses to Emecheta’s texts (explored above); but 
Haraway examined feminist readers who were differently positioned in “space,” 
so to speak. Certainly, I too can identify some of the social determinants or dis-
cursive axes (shared with many others) of my positionality or the location from 
which I read and write. I am (in no particular order) U.S.-American, female, 
white, of North European heritage, heterosexual, of lower-middle-class mid-
western origin but now of middle-class income and tastes, a home owner, 
divorced, mother of a grown son, in my early sixties, raised a Methodist, influ-
enced by the U.S. and German student movement, trained in comparative lit-
erature and professionally active in the discipline of German Studies, full profes-
sor at an underfunded state university located in a very white, quite genteel 
small town in New England, director of an interdisciplinary program for under-
graduates, “et cetera, and so forth” as Friedman puts it (Mappings 21). Though 
surely those different social and cultural formations “interpellate” me into a 
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range of (frequently contradictory) subject positions (as Althusser would have 
it), I cannot hope to trace their implications here. My own interest in the 
neglected category of “history” led me, however, to ponder what the results 
might be if the spatial determinants remained the same and I examined changes 
over time. And these considerations led me to the experiment I undertake in 
Part II of this book: situating essays on Bachmann that I wrote in the 1980s in 
the context of the historical factors that acted on me then.
I thus investigate “Feminism, History, and Ingeborg Bachmann” in a variety 
of ways. The book’s three sections undertake somewhat different projects. Part 
I, “Bachmann and History,” consists of two chapters. The first, “Bachmann in 
History: An Overview,” briefly situates Bachmann herself and her writing in 
the history of her period (my final chapter addresses the historical situatedness 
of both Bachmann and her texts at much greater length). Chapter 1 is intended 
as an introduction and general orientation for English-language readers, who 
may not be completely familiar either with Bachmann’s writing or with the 
Austrian/German context within which she wrote. It provides basic informa-
tion about her biography and a chronology and brief description of her publica-
tions. In effect, this chapter establishes a baseline upon which my subsequent 
efforts to read Bachmann’s texts and readings of Bachmann’s texts historically 
may be understood (or: “read”).
Chapter 2, “Bachmann’s Feminist Reception,” begins the process of histori-
cizing by examining how other feminist scholars and critics have read Bach-
mann. In the 1950s, she gained her fame as the author of two poetry volumes, 
but her prose texts of the 1960s and early 1970s were much less favorably received 
during her lifetime. Her reputation today as one of German literature’s out-
standing twentieth-century writers is due to her feminist reception from the 
mid-1970s onward. This chapter explores how the feminist rediscovery of Bach-
mann was enabled by the particular theoretical assumptions of German (and 
later U.S.) feminism, itself a product of the cultural climate out of which the 
women’s movement grew, and reads those and subsequent feminist readings of 
Bachmann against the backdrop of developments in feminist theory and the 
larger historical changes that influenced feminist transformations. From the late 
1970s to the mid-1980s, feminist readings of Bachmann were dominated by a 
radical feminist analysis alleging that all women were victims of all men. Patri-
archy had been responsible not only for the oppression of women but also for the 
repression of femininity, which could “speak” only in venues exterior to male 
control. It was feminists’ task to retrieve elements of women’s culture previously 
“hidden from history” and develop alternatives to patriarchal culture. The theo-
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retical texts of Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva enabled feminist 
scholars to discover such alternatives in expressions of femininity that disrupted 
a phallogocentric symbolic order as well as “in our mothers’ gardens.” Bach-
mann’s texts were read as a contribution to that endeavor, sometimes even as an 
anticipation of French feminist theory avant la lettre. By the mid-1980s this read-
ing had expressed itself in a veritable explosion of feminist Bachmann scholar-
ship, as chapter 2 demonstrates. However, once the radical feminist model was 
drawn into question (primarily because of critiques of its implicit racism), I 
identify several years of uncertainty in feminists’ readings of Bachmann, as if 
they were now unsure how to proceed, and a number of well-known feminist 
scholars examine Bachmann from a perspective in which gender and feminist 
issues play no role. In Germany, as I show, that approach continues to some 
degree into the present, though the German editors of the critical edition of the 
“Ways of Death” have invested a great deal of energy into promoting excellent 
Bachmann scholarship that is both feminist and historically specific. Meanwhile, 
once a new, more historically based feminist method influenced by cultural 
studies became established in U.S. literary studies, U.S.-trained scholars pro-
duced quite innovative new readings of Bachmann by viewing her texts through 
the lens of feminist variants of the new theoretical paradigms (e.g., postcolonial 
theory, queer theory) that emerged in the course of the 1990s.
Part II, “A History of Reading Bachmann,” focuses on my experiment in 
historicizing positionality. I wrote the five essays included there between 1980
and 1987. All of them, I hope, offer interesting and useful readings of Bach-
mann’s works; several have played quite an influential role within Bachmann 
research; and each, I think, provides insights into Bachmann’s work that no 
subsequent scholar has drawn into question. For these reasons, I am very happy 
to make these essays accessible to a broader readership. Each one, however, is 
also very clearly a product of its time; were I to address the same questions now, 
I would write a quite different essay. So here is where the experiment comes in. 
To frame each essay (that is, to historicize the positionality that informed the 
perspective from which I wrote it) I have composed a brief, perhaps rather idio-
syncratic, historical preface that details the context relevant for me at the time 
the essay was written. (En passant, these frames also form an intellectual history 
of U.S. academic feminism in the context of the larger political developments 
impacting upon it.) At the conclusion of each essay I have then undertaken a 
reading (a reading of the reading, so to speak) that explains in what ways my 
older essay can be understood as a product of and a feminist response to that 
historical situation. That is, my current reading understands the older reading 
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as stressing those aspects of Bachmann’s text that “flash up at a moment of dan-
ger,” “at an instant when [they] can be recognized and [are] never seen again.” 
My readings of Bachmann from the 1980s are, I would now argue, appropriate 
for their historical moment—neither worse nor better than the ones I would 
write today but simply different.
Chapter 3, “In the Cemetery of the Murdered Daughters: Malina,” reads the 
“overture” to Bachmann’s “Ways of Death” through the lens of the cultural 
feminist approach that dominated U.S. and German feminist theory and prac-
tice in 1981, when my essay appeared. That approach is responsible for Bach-
mann’s feminist rediscovery and for a shift in scholarly emphasis from her poetry 
to her prose. My essay is also the first to connect Bachmann, psychoanalysis, and 
French feminist theory (and can thus also serve as a baseline against which to 
measure subsequent developments in feminist Bachmann scholarship). In it, I 
understand Malina as an endeavor to explain why women have no authentic 
voice of their own and in what ways they can “speak” nonetheless. The essay 
understands Bachmann’s interest in Wittgenstein, psychoanalysis and love/erot-
icism to derive from her attempt to identify forms of speech outside the catego-
ries of Western reason (an explanation of Bachmann’s intentions I still think is 
true, though today I would judge it differently). Although the essay concludes 
that Bachmann herself finds no way to concretize the utopian vision of sensual 
pleasure and erotic joy that Malina also contains, it proposes that what we as 
feminists learn from this text may allow the “murdered daughters” to turn men’s 
knowledge against them and realize Bachmann’s utopia yet.
Chapter 4, “Christa Wolf and Ingeborg Bachmann: Difficulties of Writing 
the Truth,” written in 1983, offers a reading that gives expression to the shifts in 
feminist emphasis accompanying the early days of the Ronald Reagan and 
Helmut Kohl regimes. In my reading of Christa Wolf’s reading of Bachmann, 
I continue to emphasize the search for a feminist alternative to male dominance, 
but patriarchy is now seen to express itself quite concretely in masculinist war-
mongering, a special concern for peace-loving women. Drawing on a very sensi-
tive but still quite Marxist 1966 essay by Wolf, I also now read Bachmann’s texts 
as a social critique directed specifically at fascism, imperialism, and other 
destructive elements of twentieth-century society. (In this essay, Wittgenstein’s 
thought is evidence of insoluble dilemmas of Western culture.) I also use Wolf’s 
analysis to argue that Bachmann’s limitations were rooted in her sociohistorical 
context. Conversely, I trace Wolf’s indebtedness to Bachmann as far as her Cas-
sandra lectures (published the same year I wrote the essay), showing how Bach-
mann’s anatomy of the status of subjectivity in her society increasingly enabled 
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Wolf’s own examination of alienation within GDR socialism. I finally deter-
mine that Bachmann’s and Wolf’s analyses were converging, as Wolf came to 
accept the cultural feminist approach very apparent in her novel Cassandra (and 
also to propagate a cultural feminist reading of Bachmann) just as U.S. feminists 
were moving in other directions. In a year of great anxiety about the stationing 
of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe, I note both Bachmann’s and Wolf’s 
pessimism about the possibility of change but also propose (rather gloomily 
myself) that the texts of these writers may nonetheless help us to forestall the 
worst. 
Chapter 5, “Gender, Race, and History in The Book of Franza,” appeared in 
the landmark 1984 special Bachmann issue of text + kritik that proclaimed the 
(cultural) feminist discovery of “the other Ingeborg Bachmann.” Under the 
influence of the new U.S. feminist attentiveness to race, however, and my own 
involvement in Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaign, my essay, published here 
for the first time in English, takes a somewhat different tack. I believe I was the 
first Bachmann scholar to propose that her protagonist’s imprecations against 
“the whites” might in fact be directed at the crimes of European imperialism. 
U.S. feminists’ attention to differences among women also encouraged me to 
insist upon the historical specificity of Bachmann’s critique (and, by exploring 
via the New York Times the historical background of the events to which the 
novel alludes, to discover that it takes place at a particular moment of Cold War 
tension). In fact, beginning with something of a polemic directed at the sins and 
omissions of ahistorical feminist scholarship, my essay reads Bachmann’s novel 
via the (also rather gloomy) optic of German Critical Theory, maintaining that 
Bachmann extends the Frankfurt School analysis to address colonialism as well 
as fascism. Though I continue to regard Bachmann’s protagonist mainly as an 
innocent victim of (white) men, I also stress that as a white woman she belongs 
and has acceded to the oppressor culture and thus has no access to a location 
exterior to male power (a position that represented something of a sea change in 
feminist analysis). In perceiving the only utopian moment of the novel to be one 
where white, brown, and black hands dip silently into the same bowl of food, I 
also show how strongly I had been influenced by the coalition politics towards 
which U.S. feminism increasingly moved in the mid-1980s.
I am sure I could not have written chapter 6, “Bachmann and Wittgenstein,” 
without my background in feminist theory, but I remain uncertain about 
whether or not it is a feminist essay. Its lack of attention to gender certainly bears 
witness to a widespread loss of confidence in feminist theory and practice and 
my own dubiousness about the continuing utility of feminist scholarship on 
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Bachmann. The essay continues my polemic against extracting Bachmann’s 
writing from history and proposes my examination of her indebtedness to Witt-
genstein as one way to explore her connections to the Austrian tradition. Though 
I am far from being a Wittgenstein expert, I think that reading him through 
Bachmann’s eyes also helped me to provide insights into his thought somewhat 
different from those of professional philosophers. Both my Frankfurt School 
training and my more recent encounter with poststructuralism (via feminism) 
allowed me to understand Wittgenstein’s thought (and Bachmann’s interest in 
it) as deriving from a critique of totalizing (European) theories. By examining 
Bachmann’s dissertation on Heidegger, I could also demonstrate her ability to 
connect very abstract philosophical postulations to their concrete political mani-
festations (e.g., Heidegger’s support for National Socialism) and to show why 
she might have considered Wittgenstein’s thought to be an antidote to Hei-
degger’s. Bachmann, my essay argues, is able to grasp the connections between 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and his later Philosophical Investigations, which renounce 
the quest for a totalizing linguistic paradigm altogether and content themselves 
with a range of heterogeneous “language games.” Wittgenstein, I maintain, also 
helped Bachmann to understand the relationship of universal truth-claims to 
the triumphs of Western imperialism, but both, I conclude, were unable to 
imagine a mediation between their far-reaching critique and a practice that 
might realize it. And perhaps it is here, after the last sentence of my essay, that 
feminism might enter after all.
In chapter 7, “Bachmann Reading/Reading Bachmann: The Woman in White
in the ‘Ways of Death,’” a certain corner is turned—in my own work, in Bach-
mann research, in literary scholarship, in feminist theory and practice. Though 
I was certainly not aware then how weighted the concept would become in my 
own thinking, it is nonetheless no coincidence that the term “reading” appears—
twice!—in the title. In my own scholarship, the essay signals my feminist appro-
priation of the new cultural-materialist/new-historicist/materialist-feminist/cul-
tural-studies methodology that had more generally taken hold of U.S. literary 
scholarship around 1987. The essay also marks a change in my own reading of 
Bachmann, catalyzed by the discovery that she had borrowed the name of the 
heroic English captain in The Book of Franza from the villain in a novel by the 
prolific Victorian writer Wilkie Collins. This and other intertextual allusions in 
Bachmann’s writing forced me to recognize that all was not as it seemed in 
Bachmann’s texts. Once I understood that her narrative stance in the “Ways of 
Death” was almost always ironic, I could grasp how her figures are constrained 
by (or constructs of) the discursive context to which her writing alludes or from 
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which it borrows. The characters’ self-presentation, judgment, and conscious-
ness of themselves is configured by that context, but we readers must see further. 
In particular, this essay argues that Franza’s belief that her beloved captain is 
freeing her is itself a product of the discourse upon which the Victorian romance 
also draws, while the apparently innocent whiteness of Wilkie Collins’s title is 
transmuted into the European imperialists against whose power Franza 
inveighs. Writing this essay taught me to think more complexly about reading 
itself, showing me how to be more attentive to the politics of literary forms and 
to recognize the clash of contradictory paradigms within a single text. It also 
showed me how readings that rather evidently have nothing to do with an 
author’s intentions (the “white” of Wilkie Collins’s title as a racial category) can 
nonetheless be legitimate and useful (especially when they flash up in a moment 
of danger!). In my work and in feminist literary scholarship as a whole, this 
essay is representative of the emergence of an entirely new approach—a method 
that provides the foundation for the essays of this book’s third section, “Reading 
Bachmann Historically.”
Written from the perspective of the new historically based theory, the essays 
of Part Three explore a positionality of a different kind. Through them I want 
to explode once and for all the claim that there can ever be a single correct read-
ing by showing that even a single reader, writing at (approximately) the same 
point in history but asking different kinds of questions about a text, will still 
come up with quite different, even potentially contradictory answers. Part Three 
thus emphasizes the second half of Alcoff’s definition of positionality, “the posi-
tion that women find themselves in . . . actively utilized as a location for the 
construction of meaning.” Here I investigate what happens when the perspec-
tive assumed by a particularly positioned reader is deliberately chosen, and the 
three chapters employ, respectively, methods enabled by theories of sexuality, by 
postcolonial theory, and by materialist feminism, to ask three quite different 
kinds of questions about Bachmann texts. Of course, the fact that I am able to 
utilize different perspectives does not of course mean that my choice of perspec-
tives and methods is not itself historically constrained. Obviously, I did not 
invent these theoretical approaches (though I believe I am the first to apply them 
to Bachmann’s texts); all three approaches (which, at least as I apply them, could 
probably all find a home under the more general rubric “cultural studies”) 
gained widespread currency in U.S. literary studies during the 1990s. Moreover, 
a 1997 PMLA forum on “the actual or potential relations between cultural stud-
ies and the literary” (“Forum” 257) seems to suggest that the turn to cultural 
studies is no longer even controversial. Most participants in the forum agree that 
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at a historical point when literature divorced from its cultural context seems 
increasingly overspecialized, supportive of dominant ideologies, and irrelevant, 
a cultural studies approach is the appropriate course for departments of literary 
studies to pursue. As well, occasional caviling aside, the forum seems to attest to 
a particular U.S. appropriation of cultural studies that marks a shift away from 
the sociological and mass and popular culture emphases of its earlier British 
practitioners and now sees little difficulty in applying the techniques of cultural 
studies to literary texts (and, conversely, literary techniques of close reading to 
cultural phenomena). As Lutz Koepnick, a forum participant from my own 
field of German Studies, puts it, “Literary culture is an essential part of the force 
field of institutions, meanings, and practices that cultural studies takes as its 
object; there is no reason that the works of, say, Shakespeare or Goethe cannot 
be examined from a cultural studies perspective” (266). In the same forum, Lily 
Phillips proposes that the preeminence of cultural studies may derive from a 
growing acknowledgment of the importance of the positionality for which this 
introduction has argued: “Cultural studies has emerged forcefully because the 
awareness of positionality, context, and difference is endemic to this historical 
period. The need to acknowledge that there are limits to our models of the 
world and to think paradigmatically is a gauntlet thrown down by our historical 
situation, not just by cultural studies” (274). For historical reasons that we will 
doubtless comprehend entirely only after the fact, the project of “reading [an 
author’s texts] historically” seems to have become virtually de rigeur. As Antony 
Easthope puts it in his book Literary into Cultural Studies, “the old paradigm has 
collapsed, . . . the moment of crisis symptomatically registered in concern with 
theory is now passing, and . . . a fresh paradigm has emerged, its status as such 
proven because we can more or less agree on its terms and use them” (5).
Of the final three chapters, chapter eight, “Bachmann and Theories of Gen-
der/Sexuality: Femininity in ‘The Good God of Manhattan,’” is most able to 
borrow its methodology from an established corpus of feminist scholarship. Pre-
mised upon the contemporary feminist assumption that both gender and sexu-
ality are cultural constructs rather than biological givens, this essay sets out to 
discover how Bachmann undertook such constructions in a radio play written in 
1957 and in what relationship those constructions might stand to other historical 
developments of the period. As well, in my approach to this radio play I attempt 
to explore the postulate that cultural productions are patched together out of 
heterogeneous materials and discover that a reading emphasizing this text’s con-
tradictory representations of femininity and sexuality can be especially illumi-
nating. Specifically, I argue that in this play Bachmann relies on notions of sexu-
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ality and femininity like those that Herbert Marcuse advanced in Eros and 
Civilization (which Bachmann probably read shortly after it was published in 
1955, possibly during her visit to the United States in summer 1955, which pro-
vides the setting for this play). Like Marcuse, Bachmann represents both Eros 
and women as potent forces hostile to civilization, thus also a powerful source of 
civilizational critique. At the height of the Cold War in the one-dimensional 
society of “Manhattan,” I maintain, these may have seemed the only sites at 
which any subversion at all could have been imagined. But as I myself critique, 
from a Foucauldian perspective, Marcuse’s and Bachmann’s conception of a 
form of opposition exterior to a single, totalitarian, and repressive order, I argue 
that it is also possible to discern a second and somewhat submerged discourse of 
gender and sexuality in Bachmann’s radio play. Within that discourse, feminin-
ity and female sexuality are seen to be products of the power that calls them into 
being. Though Bachmann’s earlier feminist readers, I finally conclude, stressed 
the most obvious reading of her play and similar aspects of later texts, a reading 
that emphasizes their contradictory elements and understands the historical rea-
sons for them may be of more use to feminists of the present day.
Whereas chapter 8 is informed by a very substantial body of feminist analy-
sis, the feminist postcolonial theory that underwrites chapter 9, “Bachmann and 
Postcolonial Theory: White Ladies and Dark Continents,” has emerged only in 
very recent years. In fact, it was back in 1984 that I first discovered the episode 
of the “White Lady” among Bachmann’s unpublished papers in the Vienna 
archive. Though I believe that even then I grasped something of the reading of 
that fragment that I have elaborated here, I had to wait fifteen years for the 
theory to be developed that would allow me to explain it to others. This chapter 
provides the strongest substantiation for my argument that Bachmann’s “Ways 
of Death” cycle constructs the female psyche in terms (often borrowed from 
other literary texts) that their society makes available. I examine Bachmann’s 
treatment of the representation of femininity, race, and exotic otherness, and I 
also show how she conveys to careful readers that they should read her texts 
against the grain. The Book of Franza might be read, I suggest, as the story of a 
typical European tourist’s conviction that the exotic and uncontaminated orient 
can assuage the depredations wrought upon her by Western civilization (though 
that tourist drinks Coca-Cola all throughout her journey). Countess Kottwitz’s 
sexuality is “awakened” only when she is “raped” by an African student with 
proverbially prodigious sexual capabilities, and Bachmann tells us how to read 
this scene when the countess, in the scene immediately preceding the rape, 
orders a cocktail called a “White Lady.” In the long story “Three Paths to the 
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Lake,” Elisabeth, a good liberal who believes she supports justice for all, is taken 
aback when people formerly subject to the Austro-Hungarian empire and post-
colonials now inhabiting Europe act in ways contrary to her sentimental precon-
ceptions of them—an exoticizing perspective quite like that of D. H. Lawrence’s 
story “The Woman Who Rode Away,” to which Bachmann’s text alludes. I 
finally ask how feminists should read such very complex anticolonialist texts of 
the sort that Bachmann has written and whether, in placing postcolonial figures 
at the service of an exploration of the White Lady’s psyche, Bachmann reveals 
that she has not entirely jettisoned Eurocentrism after all.
My designation for the method employed in chapter 10, “Bachmann and 
Materialist Feminism,” is something of a Verlegenheitslösung, as the Germans 
put it—a solution arrived at for want of anything better—for I’m not sure that 
the method I employ here has been christened yet. (Since other self-designated 
materialist feminists are decidedly more orthodoxly Marxist than I, I might also 
have called my method “cultural materialism” or, even more generically, “cul-
tural studies,” a term now almost a catchall for any method whatsoever that 
connects texts and contexts.) In this chapter I read Bachmann’s portrait of 
women (choosing to be) confined to the private arena during the Cold War era 
as itself a symptom and reflex of the Cold War. To theorize the importance of 
gender within Cold War politics, I draw on very recent texts by feminist and 
other sorts of historians of Germany and Austria. Expanding on my brief his-
torical overview in chapter 1, I also respond to Monika Albrecht’s and Dirk 
Göttsche’s injunction to treat Bachmann more historically (Albrecht, “Vor-
wort” vii) by showing that Bachmann herself was not entirely untainted by Cold 
War politics. This chapter explores Bachmann’s evolving critique of the Cold 
War era and women’s situation within it, but it also shows how she was forced 
to package her critique in materials available to her. That inevitably meant, as 
Bachmann herself observed in her Frankfurt lectures, that some of her readers 
would believe she sanctioned the conditions she was trying to decry. The essay 
also explores the variety of formal methods she employed to represent the psy-
chic damage wrought by her society and speculates about why those methods 
were so frequently misunderstood as un- or even antipolitical. The chapter 
includes an analysis of the almost completed story “Sterben für Berlin” (To die 
for Berlin) that Bachmann wrote three months after the Berlin Wall went up, 
and it connects the narrative strategies employed there to those of the “Ways of 
Death.” In its reprise of and expansion on topics broached in chapter 1, my book 
refuses, like Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (253–264), a 
linear and progressive historical narrative. In ending with a quite different 
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reading of Malina than that of chapter 3—the first study of Bachmann I pub-
lished—my book also once more argues for the “historicized positionality” of 
this Bachmann reader. 
In offering readings of my readings of my readings, I feel at times as if I had 
entered a hall of mirrors or some tunnel of infinite regress. On the other hand, 
each new self-reflexive move, I think, makes my point even more emphatically. 
Where the feminist reader stands, in space and in time, determines what she 
sees. In all likelihood, her readings will hold true (which is to say, given my 
definition of “truth,” be politically useful) only for those of us similarly situated. 
Of course, what is to count as “we” and as “similarly situated” can also be shaped 
at least in part not just by our “objective” situation but also by how we con-
sciously and deliberately conceive of our political visions and political needs. 
Whatever the “cemetery of the murdered daughters” means, it is probably not a 
place to which we wish to be consigned; we too seek intellectual tools that can, 
in Kafka’s words, function as “the axe for the frozen sea inside us” (16), a sea 
much like the icy lake on which Bachmann’s cemetery borders. The various 
readings of Bachmann’s texts in this volume are intended finally to assist femi-
nists in understanding why and in what ways the daughters were murdered and 
how we ourselves might avoid that fate and envision, even realize, a happier one. 
That is the importance of Bachmann’s writing—and feminist readings of it.
To demonstrate finally that “historicized positionality” does not condemn 
feminist or other readers to hapless political isolation, let me conclude this intro-
duction by again invoking Susan Stanford Friedman, a fellow graduate student 
at the University of Wisconsin at Madison thirty-some years ago, whose recent 
book Mappings I have already cited. In concluding her introduction of Mappings,
she assumes a political stance so similar to my own (because we are both white 
U.S. women academics “of a certain age”? because of that formative experience 
in Madison? because we were then “similarly situated”? because we, as engaged 
feminist literary scholars, still are?) that it can also serve as my conclusion: 
“While attempting to respect their rich complexity and unresolved contradic-
tions, I have turned to these texts with a frankly instrumentalist intent—for 
what they have to teach academic feminism, for their potential interventions in 
the great debates of the day, and for their collective wisdom and pleasure. The 
stories they tell matter. So do the stories we tell about them” (13).  
PART I
Bachmann and History
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CHAPTER 1
Bachmann in History
AN OVERVIEW
Avec ma main brulée, j’écris 
sur la nature du feu.
—Ingeborg Bachmann, 
Malina, quoting Flaubert
History left its scars on Ingeborg Bachmann’s life and work. 
She was the product of a turbulent period of Austrian history that included 
depression, Austro-fascism, National Socialism, defeat and occupation, eco-
nomic recovery, and political restoration. She hated and condemned the political 
course that Austria and Germany had taken but, as a member of a generation 
before the emergence of the student movement and the second wave of femi-
nism, felt powerless to influence the direction of political events. Although she 
rebelled against her era’s conceptions of femininity, she was also entrapped by 
them; an independent woman who lived by her writing, she suffered through 
self-destructive love affairs and numbed her pain with alcohol and tranquiliz-
ers. Like the female figures of her fiction, Bachmann was often a victim of her 
inability to resolve her own contradictions. 
Born in 1926 in the small city of Klagenfurt in the province of Carinthia, 
Austria, Bachmann was the eldest daughter of a local high school teacher and 
a housewife. Her petty bourgeois family experienced firsthand the economic 
straits that made many Austrians, still mired in the depression, welcome their 
country’s annexation by a more prosperous Germany. Bachmann recalled the 
entry of Hitler’s troops into Klagenfurt in April 1938 as a traumatic moment 
that shattered her childhood. During her lifetime, however, she never revealed 
that her own father had joined the Nazi party in 1932, even before Hitler came 
to power in Germany. Drafted into defense work for the Nazis in the last year of 
the war, Bachmann swiftly abandoned Klagenfurt after the German defeat in 
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order to begin her university studies. After a semester spent in Innsbruck and in 
Graz, she continued her study of philosophy at the University of Vienna, receiv-
ing her doctorate in 1950 with a dissertation on Heidegger. From 1951 to 1953
she worked first as a secretary, then as a scriptwriter for Rot-Weiss-Rot, the radio 
station of the American occupation forces. There she coauthored Die Radiofami-
lie (The radio family), a comic radio series designed to ease Austrians’ transition 
to postwar, postfascist society. She published poetry and prose in Vienna, enjoy-
ing the mentorship of an older generation of Viennese literary figures, including 
Jewish émigrés returned from exile, and began her close friendship with the 
poet Paul Celan. Nevertheless,she found the political and literary atmosphere 
of Vienna corrupt, stagnant, and stifling. Preferring self-imposed exile, she left 
Vienna in July 1953 to take up residence in Italy with her gay friend, the com-
poser Hans Werner Henze, and never again lived permanently in Austria.
Bachmann was encouraged in her resistance to Austria’s restoration of pre-
war power structures by her encounter with the Gruppe 47, the influential 
group of young antifascist authors who dominated West Germany’s literary 
scene (though they failed to affect its politics) until the early 1960s. First invited 
to the Gruppe 47’s semiannual meetings in 1952, she won its first prize for the 
four poems she read there in 1953. Her first volume of poetry, Die gestundete Zeit
(Mortgaged time), was published at the end of that year. In August 1954 the 
news magazine Der Spiegel featured Bachmann on its title page, depicting her 
as a poet whose accomplishment proved that Germany could once more com-
pete on the stage of world literature, and she achieved literary prominence over-
night. In spring 1954, Bachmann moved to Rome, which would remain her 
semi-permanent residence for the rest of her life. Italy left its imprint on many 
poems in her second lyric volume, Anrufung des Großen Bären (Invocation of the 
great bear; 1956). Under the pseudonym Ruth Keller she also reported on polit-
ical and cultural events in Italy for Radio Bremen and the Westdeutsche Allge-
meine Zeitung. Her first radio play, “Ein Geschäft mit Träumen” (A business 
with dreams; 1952), had been completed in Vienna and originally broadcast by 
Rot-Weiss-Rot. In a second radio play, “Die Zikaden” ( The cicadas; 1954), she 
drew on her contacts with the artists’ colony on the Italian island of Ischia, where 
she had lived with Henze. In 1955 she attended an international summer school, 
led by Henry Kissinger at Harvard, for young European artists and intellectu-
als, and that encounter with the United States laid the foundation for her most 
successful radio play, “Der gute Gott von Manhattan” (The good God of Man-
hattan; 1957). During the 1950s, Henze set a number of Bachmann’s poems to 
music, and she produced several opera libretti for him. Their close collaboration 
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ended in 1958 when Bachmann met the Swiss author Max Frisch, and her 
intense and painful relationship with Frisch lasted until 1962.
In the late 1950s Bachmann turned away from poetry, suspicious of her own 
easy facility with language. In 1959–1960, holding the first chair for poetics at 
the University of Frankfurt, she delivered a series of badly received lectures on 
problems of contemporary literature. In 1961 she published her first volume of 
short stories, Das dreißigste Jahr (The thirtieth year), and her previously enthu-
siastic critics responded skeptically, terming Bachmann a “fallen poetess” who 
could no longer meet the standards of her early work. Devastated by negative 
reviews and her separation from Frisch the next year, Bachmann suffered a 
physical and psychic collapse from which she never completely recovered. In
1963–1964 she spent a year in Berlin on a Ford Foundation fellowship and, 
increasingly dependent on tranquilizers, sleeping pills, and painkillers, trav-
eled to Prague, Egypt, and the Sudan in an attempt to regain her health. As
a younger generation of Germans and Austrians took politics to the streets, 
Bachmann withdrew into her art. From the early 1960s onward she worked on 
a novel cycle she called “Todesarten” (Ways of death). She finished the cycle’s 
“overture,” the novel Malina (1971) and a volume of short stories drawn from 
the “Ways of Death” milieu, Simultan (Three paths to the lake; 1972) before 
her death, leaving behind in various stages of completion several novel frag-
ments (including Requiem für Fanny Goldmann (Requiem for Fanny Gold-
mann) and Das Buch Franza (The book of Franza; published in 1978). In fall 
1973 Bachmann incurred burns over a third of her body when she apparently 
fell asleep with a burning cigarette. On 17 October 1973 she died in a Roman 
hospital from her burns and the convulsions brought on by withdrawal from a 
drug that her doctors could not identify.
In her 1959 “Frankfurt Lectures on Poetics,” Bachmann insisted that litera-
ture was always a product of its historical conditions: “Probably no one believes 
any more that writing literature takes place outside of the historical situation—
that even a single writer exists whose starting point isn’t determined by the con-
ditions of the time.” It was the task of the writer to confront historical circum-
stances and to envision alternatives to them: “In the happiest of cases he can 
succeed at two things: at representing, representing his time, and at presenting 
something for which the time has not yet come” (W 4: 196). Bachmann’s lec-
tures on the problems of contemporary literature may also be read as a statement 
of her own project: whatever its genre, her writing always attempted to illumi-
nate the problems of the present and to envision utopian realms where those 
problems would be resolved. Her writing is rooted in history in several ways. 
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Her success with readers of her poetry in the 1950s and feminist readers of her 
fiction after her death derived from their perception that her texts captured their 
own contemporary concerns, though the avant-garde complexity of her texts 
(itself a historical product) also allowed them to interpret her treatment of social 
problems in a variety of ways compatible with their own political positions. The 
limitations of Bachmann’s writing were also a consequence of her historical situ-
ation: though she could portray alternatives to the social forms that destroy her 
female figures, in the era before the second wave of feminism she could never 
imagine any means of moving those figures from here to there.
In its famous 1954 lead story, Der Spiegel called Bachmann’s poetry a “steno-
gram of its time.” Bachmann’s poems, along with those of her friend Paul Celan, 
signaled a turning point for postwar German literature. Until Bachmann and 
Celan, only two lyrical avenues seemed open to postwar German poets: either 
to escape the contemporary situation via a retreat into religion, nature, or aes-
theticism, or—the route initially chosen by the antifascist authors of the Gruppe 
47—to focus on the trials of the postwar period using the plain, unadorned lan-
guage of everyday life. But by 1953, Germans were ready to put their tribula-
tions behind them. Through their appropriation of an astonishing repertoire of 
lyric traditions and techniques, Bachmann and Celan reestablished the connec-
tions of German poetry to the European tradition and to its own problematic 
past. Bachmann’s poetry seemed clearly located in the context of postwar con-
cerns, acknowledging a German history that included National Socialism and 
its aftermath, a social order that had restored “yesterday’s hangmen” to places 
of honor. But, as Der Spiegel noted, the message of those poems could seem 
both very concrete and also shadowy and imprecise. Thus some readers could 
consider poems that treated such themes as loss, isolation, fear, or flight as a 
response to the historical situation; others could call them existentialist accounts 
of the condition of man in the modern world; and still others could regard them 
as beautiful evocations of timeless universal concerns. 
The title poem of Bachmann’s first collection, Die gestundete Zeit, already 
strikes a new literary note. “Harder days are coming” (Storm 43), it warns, urg-
ing watchfulness and caution. The poems often give voice to the desire to flee a 
compromised reality, but they almost always combine the impulse toward flight 
with a sober recognition of the impossibility of escape. Some of her most political 
poems speak directly about the cultural atmosphere of the postwar period, as in 
the poem “Every Day”: “War is no longer declared, / only continued” (Storm 53). 
In “Leaving Port,” the poem with which the collection opens, a ship embarks on 
a perilous voyage for an uncertain destination, and the poet counsels steadfast-
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ness, even defiance: “Stay calm on deck” (Storm 27). And in “Wood Chips” she 
cautions, “Make sure you stay awake!” (Storm 45). Sometimes Bachmann draws 
upon an alternative utopian imagery derived from nature, love, or art: “But like 
Orpheus I know of / life on the side of death” (Storm 35). Mainly, however, hope 
is sustained through the will of the poet alone, often through the power of her 
language to state what is true: “As long as [the bile]’s bitter, I intend / to write 
the word of the beginning” (Storm 45).
Bachmann’s unmistakable tone, her ability to find concrete and sensuous 
expression for abstract concerns, continued into her second volume, Anrufung 
des Großen Bären. This collection is generally considered to be stronger poeti-
cally and more regular metrically, employing simpler language and more com-
plex symbolism drawn from a variety of Western traditions. Contrasts between 
Germanic coldness and Mediterranean light, warmth, and vibrancy often shape 
the poems. Many are less explicitly political, less obviously defiant. Yet the world 
of this collection is still an imperiled one, the poet proclaiming apocalyptically, 
for instance, that “a torrent is coming over the earth. / We shall be witnesses” 
(Storm 123). The collection oscillates between danger and a destructive empti-
ness on the one hand, and on the other a powerful invocation of utopia, often 
figured as fairy-tale, love, or an intact natural world. Here, too, the poet’s lan-
guage is often the vehicle for her redemption, and she proclaims; “Yet the song 
above the dust / one day will rise above us” (Storm 153), and “You, my word, 
deliver me!” (Storm 113).
It was parallel to her poems, with which they shared many themes and 
motifs, that Bachmann produced a series of radio plays (a popular genre in the 
decade after the war because Germans still owned the radios the Nazis had 
given them) as well as “radio essays,” dramatized discussions of figures whose 
influence was discernible elsewhere in Bachmann’s work: Robert Musil, Lud-
wig Wittgenstein, Marcel Proust, Simone Weil, the logical positivists of the 
Vienna Circle. Especially in their emphasis on dream, illusion, irreality, and 
interiority, Bachmann’s radio plays displayed many of the characteristics typical 
of a literary form also employed by many other German authors of the period. 
Laurenz, the protagonist of “A Business with Dreams,” is a meek and docile 
office worker who discovers a store that will sell him the secret fantasies for 
which he’s always longed: riches, power, romance. But in the dream store the 
currency is time, and extravagant dreams may cost a whole lifetime. Laurenz 
has so thoroughly internalized the norms of his joyless life that even though 
the time at his disposal is empty, he’s unwilling to pay so high a price. When 
he returns to reality, he is fired, so now he has plenty of time, but “Time for 
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what?” (W 2: 47). In “The Cicadas,” six figures have sought asylum from society 
on a southern island, but Bachmann offers them no opportunity to fulfill their 
concrete wishes there. She warns that escape from reality, especially into art, can 
produce people like cicadas, so dried out from their lack of contact with real life 
that their singing becomes inhuman. In “The Good God of Manhattan,” Bach-
mann turned for the first time to the constellation of themes that would shape 
her later prose. The Good God represents domination as an all-powerful social 
principle that refuses to tolerate anything inimical to its rule and is prepared to 
resort to violence in order to enforce its dictates. In this radio play, Bachmann 
connects domination to the question of gender relations: the God persecutes 
a pair of lovers because their passion threatens the quotidian order that is his 
domain. Bachmann endows her female figure, Jennifer, with a greater capacity 
for love than her partner but also shows that, for women, love can lead simul-
taneously to bliss and (self-)destruction. The utopian power of Jennifer’s love is 
not mighty enough to overcome the temptations of everyday life to which her 
lover Jan succumbs, and the God blows Jennifer to bits while sparing Jan, who 
has taken a break from ecstasy to catch up on the news in a bar. 
It is now easy to recognize that all three radio plays were intended as critiques 
of the crass and ugly consumer culture of the 1950s and that they advanced their 
challenge from the vantage point of a utopian alternative to the bad present—
though one that could be presented in the plays only as tentative, partial, and 
finally unachievable. But as in the case of her poems, the form of Bachmann’s 
radio plays, itself a product of the 1950s, could allow her audience to ignore the 
intensity of her social criticism and instead regard the plays as treatments of 
Being, myth, or timeless and unchanging human dilemmas.
Although she had always written occasional short stories, in the late 1950s
Bachmann began a more total transition from poetry and radio plays to prose. 
The seven stories of The Thirtieth Year (1961) continue to explore many of the 
same themes: the consequences of fascism for the postwar period; the conflict 
between individual happiness and a hostile social order; the search for a utopian 
alternative to the present order; language as a vehicle of co-optation or redemp-
tion; and the connection of gender issues to other forms of social control. The 
volume’s first story, “Youth in an Austrian Town,” is a semiautobiographical 
account that reveals the psychic cost of growing up in the 1930s and 1940s in 
the Austrian provinces. “Among Murderers and Madmen,” set in Vienna ten 
years after war’s end, shows how latent and overt allegiances to fascism continue 
to shape postwar intellectual life. In the title story, an unnamed thirty-year-old 
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male protagonist negotiates an existential crisis: he rebels against a social reality 
he suddenly perceives as intolerable; he questions the stability of his own iden-
tity, the meaning of the world, and his own ability to grasp it through language; 
and finally he again reconciles himself to everyday life. Like “The Thirtieth 
Year,” two other stories thematize language’s incapacity to convey truth: in “A
Wildermuth,” a trial judge seeks complete linguistic accuracy and ends in mad-
ness, and the father of “Everything” tries to preserve his son from contamina-
tion by corrupt everyday language but succeeds only in abandoning him to the 
imperfect reality that his mother represents. 
The two stories most popular with feminists link women’s accommodation 
to gender norms with all other aspects of an oppressive social order. In “A Step 
towards Gomorrah,” Charlotte hopes that her challenge to gender roles in a les-
bian relationship with Mara will shatter all other social conventions, including 
language, and inaugurate a counterorder. But the love affair founders before 
it begins because she merely reverses the roles she wants to repudiate, assum-
ing the same kind of domination over Mara that men have exercised over her. 
“Undine Goes” is an even more radical invocation of a utopian arena outside 
the social reality ruled by men. Unlike Hans Christian Andersen’s “Little Mer-
maid” and other figures in the ondine tradition, this Undine admires the world 
men have made but refuses to sacrifice her own principles to accommodate 
herself to their order. She renounces the love of men and, as language fails her, 
returns to her own watery realm. 
Although Bachmann thereafter published almost nothing new until the early 
1970s, she had begun to work on the “Ways of Death” novel cycle even before 
The Thirtieth Year appeared. The multivolume cycle she planned was intended 
as an anatomy of her entire society, a portrait of the twenty years since 1945 from 
the vantage point of Vienna and Austria, and, like many great European novels 
of the nineteenth century, it would use a series of female figures to investigate the 
mores of the time. In previous centuries, such an examination of the situation of 
individuals within society might have been undertaken via a grand narrative of 
action in the external world. But now, Bachmann argued, those dramas of suf-
fering and passion must be portrayed as intrapsychic, as “history/story within the 
I/psyche” (“die Geschichte im Ich” [W 4: 230]), so that in the “Ways of Death” 
“the real settings” are “interior ones” (Franza 4). Premised on an understanding 
of the constitution of the human psyche with some affinities to the analyses of 
the Frankfurt School, the “Ways of Death” would show how a single principle of 
social domination produced human subjects that voluntarily yield to its destruc-
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tive power. It is probably possible to read the female protagonists as figures for 
the state of subjectivity in Bachmann’s time, as Madame Bovary or Anna Kar-
enina figured subjectivity in the nineteenth century. But feminist scholars have 
argued that it is more productive to read the “Ways of Death” as an exploration 
of the damage done to female subjectivity in a society founded on the principles 
of male dominance and female subordination. Despite the contemporary setting 
of the “Ways of Death,” Bachmann’s avant-garde techniques sometimes made 
it difficult even for feminists to recognize that her novels addressed the social 
construction of femininity of a particular era, and some feminist readings of 
Bachmann have been as ahistorical as those of her earlier critics.
The first of Bachmann’s “Ways of Death” remained a fragment, and her edi-
tors named it Der Fall Franza (The Franza case) when they published it in 1978
in Bachmann’s Werke (Works); the editors of the “Todesarten”-Projekt now term 
it Das Buch Franza (The book of Franza). The status of the novel is contested in 
Bachmann criticism: while some scholars have regarded it as the most complex 
of the “Ways of Death” novels, central to the cycle, others maintain that Bach-
mann abandoned Franza altogether, perhaps considering it too obvious, and 
integrated most of its material into Malina. In a foreword to Franza, Bachmann 
argued that the “virus of crime” (Franza 3) had not vanished from the world 
after 1945 and explained that her book would show that the murderers, still 
among us, were now wreaking a havoc no longer even termed criminal. In this 
fragment, one of those murderers is the famous Viennese psychiatrist Leopold 
Jordan, who has deliberately set about to drive his wife, Franza, mad, and she 
flees from Vienna to join her beloved brother Martin on a trip to Egypt and the 
Sudan. Within the logic of the novel, Egypt is a site outside the boundaries of 
the West and also stands for a stage of psychic development before “the Greeks” 
(i.e., the oedipus complex, patriarchy) assume control. Jordan is a figure for the 
reigning principle of white male reason; Franza terms his treatment of her fas-
cist and identifies with other victims of white men, including Jews and people 
“from a lower race” (Franza 79). Franza’s childhood relationship to her brother 
had seemed a utopian alternative to the present gender order, and at war’s end in 
their village of Galicien she had imagined that fascism was forever vanquished. 
But now Martin has become a white man too and can no longer understand 
or help his sister. In Egypt, Franza proclaims that she is beyond the power of 
whites but continues to deteriorate physically and mentally, a “decomposition” 
(Franza 119) that finally allows her to draw the structures of Western thought 
into question but cannot undo the devastation that Jordan has caused. She dis-
covers in Cairo a German doctor who had carried out medical experiments in 
concentration camps and begs him to put her out of her misery, but he refuses 
indignantly, and Franza is surprised to discover that he is afraid of her. Later, as 
Martin climbs the Great Pyramid, a white exhibitionist rapes Franza. Remem-
bering that she’d also been raped by Jordan, she smashes her head against stones 
of the pyramid while shouting “No!” in her “other voice” (Franza 140, transla-
tion modified). She dies the next day. Although Franza resists at the end, she 
can’t move beyond victimhood. The novel builds a monument to her destruc-
tion, however, by showing why it happened: the murderers are men (fascists, 
whites, Enlightenment reason) who refuse to tolerate forms of female subjectiv-
ity that challenge the limits they have set. Yet Franza’s absence also speaks; she 
is like the Egyptian queen Hatshepsut, whose successor had tried to eradicate all 
traces of her from the walls of her Theban temple but forgot that though he had 
eradicated her, she was still there: “It can still be read, because nothing is there 
where in fact something should be” (Franza 109).
In the late 1960s, Bachmann laid Franza aside when she devised a new plan 
for her novel cycle. The overarching narrator of all the “Ways of Death” was 
now to be a man, Malina, who would tell the stories of female figures so con-
gruent with the gender norms of their time that they couldn’t even recognize 
the damage that had been done to them. The novel Malina would inaugurate 
her cycle, showing why its unnamed female protagonist narrator (the “I”) can’t 
write her own book called “Ways of Death” because she can’t remember or tell 
what’s happened to her. She vanishes into the wall at the end of the novel, leav-
ing Malina behind. There is little dramatic exterior action in this novel; history 
is present in the form of the psychic deformations for which it is responsible. 
The protagonist’s clearest insight into her situation takes place in her dreams, 
the focus of the novel’s second chapter (called “The Third Man,” a title bor-
rowed from Orson Welles’ film about corruption in postwar Vienna), in which 
an all-powerful father figure torments and persecutes her, often in scenes that 
recall concentration camps. By the end of the dream chapter the protagonist can 
acknowledge: “Here there is always violence. Here there is always struggle. It’s 
the eternal war” (Malina 155). 
In waking life, the protagonist seems initially to be entangled in a conven-
tional triangle, torn between her lover Ivan and the man who shares her apart-
ment in the Ungargasse, Malina. But although the novel is set in contemporary 
Vienna amid characters who also recur, in Balzacian fashion, in Franza and Three 
Paths to the Lake, its experimental form—a mix of dialogues, musical scores, 
arias, interviews, letters, literary quotations, and long stream-of-consciousness 
passages—soon makes clear that the stage for this action is really intrapsychic. 
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Each man represents one inadequate option for women. In love with sadistic 
Ivan, the protagonist withdraws entirely into the private realm, embraces her 
dependence upon him, frantically tries to please, and believes she’s happy—as 
he mistreats, neglects, and finally abandons her. Calm, steady, colorless Malina 
is, Bachmann acknowledges, the frenetic and anxiety-ridden protagonist’s dop-
pelgänger, who can take control of the details of her chaotic daily life only at the 
cost of the ecstasy and passion that reason can’t comprehend and that the protag-
onist associates with femininity. Says the protagonist: “I have lived in Ivan and 
die in Malina” (Malina 223). A utopian narrative that threads its way through 
this novel, “The Secrets of the Princess of Kagran,” is a fairy-tale of a love affair 
with a stranger in ancient times. But at the end of this tale the princess dies too, 
and, even though the fairy-tale narrative proclaims that “a day will come” when 
conflict is resolved and happiness is achieved, such fulfillment remains in the 
realm of fantasy. If this protagonist represents another voice for women, it’s one 
that can’t as yet explain its own condition or even offer an account of it, except 
in the distorted and disguised language of dreams, parapraxes, and hysterical 
symptoms. After the end of Malina, the “Ways of Death” will be told from the 
dispassionate perspective of reasonable, reliable Malina and seem to take the 
form of realistic narratives, though a somber subtext will always undercut their 
conventional surface. 
The narrative stance of the five stories of Three Paths to the Lake is similarly 
ironic. The protagonists of the middle three stories are so utterly absorbed by 
the intensely feminine concerns of the private realm that they can’t recognize 
the disastrous consequences for themselves. In “Problems Problems,” Beatrix 
has withdrawn so completely from all external concerns that she’s succumbed 
to narcissism and spends her time either sleeping or at the beauty parlor. Near-
sighted Miranda of “Eyes to Wonder” refuses to wear her glasses so she can 
avoid seeing anything unpleasant (including her lover’s unfaithfulness). By 
dedicating her story to Georg Groddeck, whose Book of the It argues that all 
physical symptoms have psychic causes, Bachmann underlines the pathological 
costs of Miranda’s cheery feminine inability to engage with reality. Franza Jor-
dan reappears in “The Barking,” attempting to care for her husband’s neglected 
elderly mother; the two women collude in their refusal to acknowledge Jordan’s 
ruthlessness and brutality. Only when senility overtakes old Mrs. Jordan can she 
find expression for her rage: she imagines herself surrounded by the barking of 
innumerable dogs, her revenge for her son’s refusal to let her keep a pet because 
the dog couldn’t stand him. 
The middle stories are framed by two longer stories about gifted career 
women whose professional activities in the public arena help to secure Western 
hegemony over the rest of the world, though in the female realm of reproduc-
tion: one a translator, the other a photographer, both function as media through 
which the activities of others pass. Though each meets every objective criterion 
for female autonomy and success, both are emotionally distraught and on the 
verge of psychic breakdown. In “Word for Word,” Nadja leaves the international 
conference where she’s been working as a simultaneous translator for an unsuc-
cessful fling with a married bureaucrat. She’s finally consoled when, in a Bible 
in a hotel desk drawer, she finds a sentence she can’t translate, a sign she has 
not been completely subsumed by her function. In “Three Paths to the Lake,” 
a companion piece to “Youth in an Austrian Town,” Elisabeth, a fifty-year-old 
photojournalist, returns to her hometown, a thinly disguised Klagenfurt, and 
tries to figure out what’s gone wrong with her life. Both frame stories thema-
tize language’s inability to convey what is really important, and Elizabeth rages, 
“Hasn’t it ever occurred to anyone that you kill people when you deprive them of 
the power of speech and with it the power to experience and think” (Paths 173). 
Her passionate and destructive love affairs with men have all ended badly, and 
she concludes, “It would be best if men and women kept their distance and had 
nothing to do with each other until both had found their way out of the tangle 
and confusion, the discrepancy inherent in all relationships” (Paths 175). At the 
story’s end, she decides helplessly to accept an assignment in Vietnam in the vain 
hope that something she does can make the world a little better.
When Bachmann died, she left behind several unfinished “Ways of Death” 
(mostly written before Malina), of which Requiem for Fanny Goldmann, pub-
lished in 1978, and Gier (Greed), published in 1982, were the most nearly com-
plete. The protagonists of these fragments, realistic texts with an ironic subtext 
more like Three Paths to the Lake than Malina, are also represented as products 
of a male-dominated social order to which they accommodate themselves and 
which finally destroys them. Some of Bachmann’s readers have succumbed to 
the temptation to conflate Bachmann’s unhappy life and her writing, viewing 
her, like her female figures, as merely a victim of the social system that produced 
her. Bachmann’s own words may provide more guidance to her readers. In 1972
she responded emphatically to an interviewer, “I myself am a person who never 
resigned herself, never ever resigned herself, who can’t even conceive of that” 
(GuI 118). In the last year of her life she could still maintain: “And I don’t believe 
in this materialism, in this consumer society, in this capitalism, in this monstros-
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ity that’s taking place here, and people who enrich themselves on us without 
having any right to do so. I really do believe in something, and I call it ‘A Day 
Will Come.’ And one day it will come. Well, probably it won’t come, because it’s 
been destroyed for us so many times, for thousands of years it’s been destroyed. 
It won’t come, but I believe in it nonetheless. For if I weren’t able to believe in it, 
then I couldn’t write any more” (GuI 145).
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CHAPTER 2
Bachmann’s Feminist Reception
One must in general be able 
to read a book in different
ways and to read it 
differently today than
tomorrow.
(Ingeborg Bachmann, 
Wir müssen wahre Sätze finden)
Every reader, when he reads, 
is in reality a reader of 
himself.
—Ingeborg Bachmann, 
Werke, quoting Proust
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Since the late 1970s, the enthusiastic response of feminist readers, 
critics, and scholars to the writing of Ingeborg Bachmann has produced a radical 
reassessment of her work. As I explained in chapter 1, she owed her reputation 
during her lifetime to the two highly accomplished volumes of lyric poetry she 
published in the 1950s, Die gestundete Zeit and Anrufung des Großen Bären. Her 
critics responded more negatively to her subsequent attempts at prose fiction, 
The Thirtieth Year (1961) and the first finished volumes of her “Ways of Death” 
cycle, Malina (1971) and Three Paths to the Lake (1972). But after her death in 
1973, feminist readers rediscovered her fiction, now focusing their attention on 
representations of femininity in the “Ways of Death,” augmented in 1978 by the 
posthumous publication of two novel fragments, The Franza Case (now called 
The Book of Franza) and Requiem for Fanny Goldmann. By the 1980s “the other 
Ingeborg Bachmann,” as Sigrid Weigel termed her (“Andere” 5), had achieved 
the status of cult figure within German feminism; feminist literary scholars’ 
spirited and subtle reinterpretations of her writing had produced a renaissance 
in Bachmann scholarship; and Bachmann’s texts had become central to the Ger-
man feminist literary canon.
In a study of Bachmann’s reception before 1973, Constance Hotz argues that 
1950s journalists constructed an image of her that met the political needs of their 
era, turning Bachmann into an “exemplum for [Germany’s] reconstruction, its 
reattainment of international standards, its reachievement of recognition in the 
world” (72). Here I want to advance a similar thesis about Bachmann’s recep-
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tion by German (and some American) feminists. The feminist reading that pro-
duced “the other Ingeborg Bachmann” is, I maintain, also a product of its time, 
emerging from the cultural climate out of which the German feminist move-
ment grew to advance an interpretation of Bachmann consistent with the move-
ment’s theoretical assumptions. This chapter is thus intended to illustrate two of 
my central theses about the historicity of literary production and reception: that 
readings of a text, as well as the text itself, are responses to the discursive and 
other pressures of the historical period from which they emerge; and that since 
different kinds of readings serve different political ends, disagreements about 
interpretations in fact are very often the consequence of the different political 
“positionalities” of those who advance them. After sketching out the political 
landscape that produced German feminism, I trace the steps by which a particu-
lar feminist reading of Bachmann, with affinities to American radical feminism 
and allegiances to its own version of French feminist poststructuralism, came 
into being. As I demonstrate, by the mid-1980s that feminist approach had pro-
duced an outpouring of Bachmann studies and gained an almost hegemonic 
control over Bachmann scholarship. 
By the end of the 1980s, however, some uncertainty had become apparent 
in approaches to Bachmann’s writing, deriving from a more general confusion 
about what now counted as a feminist perspective. The course henceforth pur-
sued by feminist Bachmann scholars corresponded generally to the different 
directions taken by feminist literary scholarship in Germany and Austria, on the 
one hand, and in English-speaking countries, on the other. Especially in Ger-
man-speaking countries a number of mostly younger, mostly women scholars 
continued to apply a feminist-poststructuralist method mainly to Bachmann’s 
prose works. But at least an equal number of both younger and more estab-
lished scholars in Germany and Austria, even those who had previously iden-
tified as feminists, now pursued other aspects of Bachmann’s works without 
making gender a central category of their analysis, even in cases where questions 
about gender might easily have been posed. Particularly in Britain and North 
America, in contrast, both younger and more established scholars responded to 
the critiques of early 1980s feminism to advance more differentiated, histori-
cally and culturally specific notions of femininity and gender. They elaborated 
feminist versions of the many new methods (cultural studies, new historicism, 
minority studies, postcolonial studies, queer theory) now employed in English-
speaking German Studies and also advanced new and creative approaches to 
Bachmann’s writing. At the end of this chapter I argue that feminist Bachmann 
scholars today confront the challenge of continuing to assert the necessity of 
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gender-based approaches to Bachmann’s works while also pursuing new femi-
nist approaches that are adequate to the scholarly and political demands of the 
new millennium.
When Malina and Three Paths to the Lake appeared in the early 1970s, they 
were scarcely acknowledged by the West German women who would soon 
become feminists, for within the charged political climate of that time, reading 
novels was a sign of complicity with the bourgeois establishment. The West 
German student movement had emerged full blown after the June 1967 demon-
stration against the Shah of Iran, during which a Berlin student was killed. 
Many New Left activists of that period were convinced that students could 
become the vanguard of worldwide revolution, joining their efforts to those of 
their comrades in Third World countries such as Cuba, the Congo, and Viet-
nam. “A specter is haunting Europe, the specter of revolution,” German author 
Hans Magnus Enzensberger proclaimed in Kursbuch in January 1968, and ten 
months later he declared, again in Kursbuch, that bourgeois literature was quite 
irrelevant to the tasks German revolutionaries then confronted: “In our situa-
tion, it is not possible to determine a significant social function for literary works 
of art” (7, 51). For, as Hazel E. Hazel has explained, that exuberant period 
around 1968 was “the time when literature was deemed superfluous and even in 
part was, since we no longer expected literature, but rather reality, to fulfill our 
desires” (129–30). Or as Michael Schneider put it, “Everyday life itself was to 
become a work of art within which the human instinct to play, freed from inte-
rior and exterior necessity, from fear, exploitation, and alienated labor, could 
finally realize itself” (147). But as the student movement waned, the New Left 
abandoned its earlier antiauthoritarianism, maintaining that the proper form of 
revolutionary self-organization was the highly disciplined cadre group orga-
nized along the Leninist model, and enjoined its adherents to go into the facto-
ries to organize the real revolutionary subject, the German proletariat. By sub-
ordinating individual needs to the purposes of the collective, the “K-Groups,” 
which “around 1969/70 sprang up like mushrooms,” as Schneider (151) later 
recalled, put an end to earlier New Left attempts to combine the personal and 
the political. The dogmatic and economistic appropriation of Marxism by the 
K-Groups throttled hopes for the development of an analysis and a form of 
political activism that would have demanded the transformation of both per-
sonal life and of the larger worldwide structures of domination that had origi-
nally called the New Left into being.
Objective and subjective factors combined to produce West Germany’s much-
heralded Tendenzwende (change of political direction) in the mid-1970s. An 
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economic downturn, the Radikalenerlaß (decree against radicals) of 1972, and 
the subsequent Berufsverbot (ban on careers) later in the decade caused many 
erstwhile revolutionaries to have second thoughts about the wisdom of their 
commitment to revolution. The self-denial demanded by their commitment to 
a doctrinaire Marxism now turned into its opposite, as Schneider has explained: 
“If for five years they hadn’t acknowledged anything else but the rigorous logic 
of Capital, now they projected their loathing of their own rigorousness onto the 
theorist of Capital, that is, onto Marxism. And of course in the same moment 
they rediscovered their old love for beauty, for art, and for sensuality. . . . And 
if for five years happiness consisted solely of socking it to the class enemy, now 
happiness again consisted solely of the happiness of the individual” (155).
This is the moment at which West German feminism emerged, simultane-
ously a critique of the male left’s theoretical and practical subordination of 
women and personal needs to its own purposes and an expression of the larger 
cultural move away from politics to a new sensibility and new subjectivity. West 
German women from the left determined that the study of Marx did not allow 
them to address their own condition, as one woman from the socialist women’s 
group in Frankfurt, the Weiberrat (Dames’ Council) recalled in the first Frauen-
jahrbuch (Women’s yearbook): “So it came about that the longer we dealt with 
Marxist theory, the less attention we paid to the fact of women’s oppression” 
(Frauenjahrbuch 21). Instead, West German women of the early 1970s increas-
ingly organized in autonomous groups around issues of immediate relevance to 
their lives: they joined the campaign against paragraph 218 (the antiabortion 
clause of the Federal Republic’s Basic Law), addressed issues of sexual prefer-
ence, motherhood, and contraception, founded women’s centers and Selbsterfah-
rungsgruppen (“self-experiencing groups,” the German term for consciousness-
raising groups); organized Frauenfeste (large women-only parties); and celebrated 
sisterhood. The striking political shift that the new politics of self-affirmation 
and self-discovery represented was captured by a cartoon from the Frauenjahr-
buch in which a female figure proclaimed: “The most wonderful day of my life 
was the day I discovered my clitoris” (Frauenjahrbuch 77).
For a variety of reasons West German feminists thus focused their political 
analysis primarily on women’s oppression in the private sphere and engaged in 
political activities mainly in cultural areas. At its best, feminism made connec-
tions between gender issues, private life, subjectivity, sexuality, and every other 
area of social life, a deepening and broadening of conceptions of the political, 
visions of social change, and forms of political struggle. But when those con-
nections were not made, some kinds of feminism, particularly those focused 
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only on improving individual women’s personal lives, represented a retreat from 
politics, not an expansion of them. West German feminists’ general suspicion 
of Marxism and other “male” theories hindered the development of an analy-
sis that could have located their private sufferings in the context of its specific 
determinants within a larger social framework. Some 1970s feminists retained 
a commitment to left analysis and left practice, and the one major exception 
to feminist hostility to Marxism was the wages-for-housework debate of the 
late 1970s. But many other feminists (often those who came to politics after the 
decline of the left) now elaborated new forms of feminist theory, arguing that 
since the world-historical defeat of matriarchy, an undifferentiated patriarchy 
had been responsible for the oppression of women everywhere. Socialist femi-
nism played an even smaller role in the West German women’s movement than 
in the United States and in other West European countries, and the political 
stance of the early West German feminist movement as a whole resembled that 
of American radical feminism (Kulawik 77). Those politics dominated West 
German feminism into the 1980s, as Myra Marx Ferree explains: “The con-
cept “feminist” generally means a radical feminist analysis, which takes oppres-
sion by patriarchy as its starting point, manifested in male control of the female 
body—in marriage, motherhood, sexuality, and the workplace. . . . Gender is 
viewed as the primary, fundamental difference; class and ethnicity are in con-
trast secondary qualities and competing forms of political identity. Even though 
class occasionally is used as an analogy and metaphor for gender, gender counts 
as the more fundamental criterion” (“Gleichheit” 289–90).
From the mid-1980s onward, however, West German feminist consensus 
about a radical feminist analysis and an autonomous political strategy was drawn 
partially into question both by the changes attendant upon the Christian Demo-
crat accession to power in 1982 and by the activities of large numbers of women 
in the Greens and other political parties. The emergence of Afro-German 
women and other women of color as a constituency within West German femi-
nism raised significant questions about the purported unity of interests of all 
women—questions only compounded after unification by the discovery of the 
extraordinary differences, manifesting themselves very swiftly as anger and 
hostility, between West German and East German women in life experience, 
self-definition, political priorities, and forms of organization. Nor were femi-
nists immune to the larger shift in political atmosphere occasioned by the col-
lapse of communism and the Federal Republic’s absorption of the GDR. As 
Konrad Jarausch observed: “The defeat of communism has fundamentally 
transformed the conditions for the old ideological confrontation between Left 
{ 48 }   bachmann and history
and Right by discrediting the former and bolstering the latter. Newly confident 
due to their triumph over the East, various economic, moral, and national con-
servatives are trying to reclaim the ground they had largely lost to the new social 
movements after the cultural revolution of 1968” (10). In part because they 
lacked any supra-regional forms of organization that could defend women’s 
interests on the national level, German feminists found themselves incapable of 
responding politically to conservative assaults on women’s rights, assaults includ-
ing the elimination of “socialist achievements” that had benefited GDR women 
and the decision of the Constitutional Court to overturn the Bundestag compro-
mise on abortion legislation and declare that abortion in Germany was hence-
forth “illegal”—if also “free from punishment.” A decade after unification the 
perception still prevailed that “women were the losers of German unification.” 
Despite hopes to the contrary, the Social Democratic (SPD)/Green coalition 
government’s accession to power in fall 1998 did not in fact represent an enor-
mous lurch to the left. (An example of the coalition’s break with what might 
earlier have been regarded as traditional Social Democratic politics can be seen 
in the comment of Peter Struck, then leader of the SPD parliamentary faction: 
“The old motto of a workers’ party, taking from the rich to give to the poor, 
doesn’t suit a modern society” [Germnews 10 August 1999]). Why the new 
coalition government did not bring about a sudden upturn in feminist fortunes 
is perhaps also suggested by remarks made by Doris Schroeder, the chancellor’s 
wife, in a Stern interview of Summer 1999: “I like to be in the background,” and 
“If you’re good and reach people’s hearts, it doesn’t matter what your sex is” 
(“Frau Doris”).
The analysis developed by feminist intellectuals (including writers and liter-
ary critics) in the late 1970s to justify and advance the politics of the autono-
mous women’s movement in West Germany elaborated upon its basic principles. 
Gender was the most fundamental form of oppression; as Verena Stefan put it 
in Häutungen (Shedding) in 1975; “Sexism goes deeper than racism than class 
struggle” (34). Women everywhere and always were victims of men’s violence, 
as Alice Schwarzer declared in Der “kleine Unterschied” und seine großen Folgen
(The “little difference” and its big consequences, 1975): “Nothing, neither race 
nor class, determines a human life as much as gender. And in that regard women 
and men are victims of their roles—but women are victims of the victims” (178). 
(That portrayal of women as victims, Angelika Bammer has argued, was par-
ticularly attractive to German feminists, since it relieved them of the necessity 
of pondering women’s complicity in National Socialism.) Women and men 
were fundamentally different from each other, and those differences should be 
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preserved, not eradicated. Men’s domination over women took the form of the 
oppression, suppression, and/or repression of femininity, a monolithic and all-
encompassing patriarchy expressing itself most perniciously through its “coloni-
zation” of female consciousness and culture. Feminists believed they discerned 
preexisting alternatives to patriarchy in the past either of the human species (in 
prehistoric matriarchal societies or other preserves of women’s culture) or of the 
individual (in preoedipal psychic organization or the prediscursive drives of the 
female body). Culture and consciousness thus became the main arenas of femi-
nist social transformation. The task of feminism was to disrupt, deconstruct, 
and destroy patriarchal culture and to retrieve and elaborate alternative female 
forms for the future so as to create a new feminist culture that could promote the 
emergence of a new female subjectivity. After an initial flirtation with theories 
of matriarchy, many West German feminist literary scholars turned enthusiasti-
cally to a direction of feminist literary analysis that had begun to seep into Ger-
many from France: French poststructuralist feminism. Drawing on that French 
theory, literary scholars looked for works by women that could disrupt the all-
embracing phallogocentric symbolic order, recover a hitherto repressed feminin-
ity (sometimes defined as a dispersed, destabilized identity or that which eludes 
definition [Fraser, Introduction 7]), and create new forms for female subjectivity 
that would finally permit female otherness to speak.
By the end of the 1980s, a number of feminist academics (perhaps more fre-
quently in the United States than in Germany) had raised some troubling ques-
tions about a radical feminist analysis. Economic and political changes over the 
course of the decade led feminists to question whether domination was really 
exercised mainly in the symbolic realm of culture, consciousness, or discourse. 
More complex ideas of how power functioned suggested that it was wrong to 
argue for the existence of only one single system of domination or to elide patri-
archy with other structural forms of oppression (such as fascism, capitalism, 
colonialism, enlightenment). Some feminists questioned the utility of the term 
“patriarchy” (or “phallogocentrism”) altogether, since it suggested that a single 
form of male domination was responsible for the oppression of all women. Simi-
larly, they questioned the invocation of a female identity, female subjectivity, or 
femininity repressed by a dominant order, since it seemed premised on a belief 
in a transhistorical female essence, as if only one sort of woman had existed 
throughout all time and culture. Feminists increasingly rejected the argument 
that women were always victims of the dominant order and never agents of 
oppression themselves. Among other U.S. feminist theorists, Judith Butler, 
whose works enjoyed a surprising success in Germany in the early 1990s, ques-
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tioned the stability and even the political utility of categories such as “woman,” 
suggesting that “performance,” “masquerade,” or even at times “parody” bet-
ter described manifestations of femininity. Such fundamental challenges to a 
paradigm that had predominated in feminist analysis for over a decade now left 
feminist literary scholars in some confusion about how to proceed—not the least 
in the area of Bachmann scholarship. 
The analysis that would make Bachmann’s prose accessible to German women 
had not yet emerged, of course, in the years before Bachmann’s death when her 
last prose works were published. In the polarized political context of the early 
1970s, Malina and Three Paths to the Lake could not help but disappoint (or even 
enrage) engaged readers, and, as Elke Atzler showed in a review of Malina’s recep-
tion, even mainstream reviewers lamented its “turning a blind eye to social con-
straints” (157). A review by Michael Springer in konkret was typical of the New 
Left response to Malina. Springer is quite willing to acknowledge the accuracy of 
Bachmann’s portrait of her protagonist: “Doubtless the kind of private hell in 
which the main figure of Malina lives is reality for most good bourgeois house-
wives.” But he protests the absence of two elements that really are missing from 
Malina: explicit social criticism and resistance. By failing explicitly to show how (or 
even that) her figure’s suffering was embedded in and derived from the bourgeois 
society to which she belongs, Springer argues, Bachmann permits readings of her 
novel that do not draw that society into question: “Anyone who doesn’t question 
the bourgeois lifestyle and the manners and manias with which it cages in women 
makes himself complicit in it.” And Bachmann’s portrayal of a woman utterly 
unable to defend herself against her tormentors suggests that her fate is inevitable: 
“Who is helped when it’s shown that it’s impossible that way [daß es so nicht geht], 
and when it’s shown in such a way that dying in dubious beauty is the unavoidable 
consequence of these complications—as a tragedy?” (60). 
Springer’s was not the only left response possible in that period; Hans Mayer, 
indebted to a different kind of Marxist criticism (and a far better critic), wrote 
a sympathetic review of Malina that defended it against leftist misreadings: “In 
reviews people accused this ‘heroine’ and her author of being someone who, in 
the midst of bourgeois prosperity, is only striving for individual happiness. . . . 
Those who read that way have misunderstood the novel. The self-realization of 
the ‘I’ is prevented by the social conditions that always stand in the way of such 
fulfilled moments” (164). But there is no reason to believe that women of the 
New Left responded differently from Springer, and Sigrid Weigel has com-
mented on “politically engaged women’s lack of attention to Bachmann’s novel 
Malina when it appeared in 1971” (Stimme 27).
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But if politicized women of the early 1970s were uninterested in Malina, 
that was not at all the case for a more general female readership. Springer’s 
review had suggested that the interests served by books like Malina were those 
of the Kulturbetrieb (culture industry): “By means of clever packaging this 
anti–Love Story was turned into a bestseller; the ‘better circles’ enjoyed the bit-
ter taste, which by contrast sweetened their shallow lives” (60). Perhaps for that 
reason, Malina enjoyed an immediate, if surprising, popularity among readers 
who evidently did not measure it by New Left standards. As Die Zeit reported, 
its publisher, Suhrkamp Verlag, launched an exceptionally cynical public rela-
tions campaign that targeted women readers: “A mail-in campaign was begun 
last week to gain readers, not just buyers, for this book, which Suhrkamp’s 
director Siegfried Unseld hopes will outsell Hildegard Knef’s Gift Horse. The 
question posed on the dust cover, ‘Murder or Suicide,’ is to be answered on a 
mail-in coupon, with a one-sentence justification—and only women are 
allowed to participate. First, second, and third prizes consist of a skiing week-
end with Unseld at St. Moritz” (P n.p.). Released in April, Malina reached 
third place on the Spiegel’s best-seller list by mid-May and, Vienna’s Wochen-
presse reported, on May 24 moved up to second place, just behind the American 
tearjerker Love Story (“Gut” n.p.). 
It may be possible to regard the enthusiastic reaction to Malina as an indica-
tion of prescient readers’ awareness of the impending sea change in German 
literary production that was soon to produce the “New Subjectivity” of the 
1970s. Wolfgang Kraus, for instance, attributes some portion of the novel’s suc-
cess to the “rise of the ‘soft wave,’ a kind of new romanticism, which also pushes 
a different literary genre to the fore. If Malina had appeared two years ago, 
perhaps even a year ago, it’s doubtful that it would have enjoyed the same reso-
nance with readers as now” (n.p.). Perhaps, too, one could recognize in women 
readers’ enthusiasm for Malina a response not so different from the feminist 
excitement several years later about Verena Stefan’s Shedding and other semiau-
tobiographical women’s narratives of the 1970s: they believed they recognized 
their own lives in the story of Malina’s “I.” (Weigel suggested something of that 
sort a decade later when she deplored “the proliferation of a way of female 
reading that consists of identifying with the female figures of texts, under-
standing them as empirical subjects, and reducing these novels to the stories of 
women victims’ love and suffering” [“ Ingeborg Bachmann: Was folgt” 3].) If 
that is the case, Malina represents one of the bridges that links prefeminist to 
feminist consciousness in Germany. Yet that popular reading of Malina was not 
an altogether unproblematic one for feminism. On the one hand, Malina helped 
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women readers to acknowledge the existence of male power over women and 
the central role it plays in women’s lives—a gain over the response of Malina’s 
mostly male reviewers and an important step in the direction of feminism. But 
in other ways the popular reading of Malina did not challenge the prevailing 
understanding of gender relations. The woman as victim is, after all, a central 
figure of many genres of bourgeois literature, and it was quite possible for 
women to read Malina as confirming traditional gender expectations: in that 
novel men and women are polar opposites; women’s concern is the private realm 
and emotional life; women are consumed by their love for men, men mistreat 
and abandon women, and women suffer. Perhaps Malina allowed early women 
readers the pleasure of having it both ways: they could experience a feminist 
indignation at the power men hold over women and satisfaction that the full 
extent of women’s degradation had been revealed without having to consider 
how their own lives might have to change to transform those unequal arrange-
ments. In some ways, I am inclined to believe, Bachmann’s early readers found 
and enjoyed in the novel exactly what Bachmann’s critics accused her of writing, 
the story of an unhappy love affair, so that to them there really did not seem to 
be such a long distance from Malina to Love Story. This reading of Bachmann’s 
novel as a narrative of male power and female victimization would continue to 
influence feminists’ reception of Malina (and, later, of other “Ways of Death”
novels) far into the 1980s.
In the earliest responses to Bachmann by feminist critics, however, the 
woman-as-victim model of feminism had not yet made its appearance. The 
first clearly feminist essay appears to have been written by Ursula Püschel, a 
GDR critic, and was first published in the West German journal Kürbiskern in 
1978. Püschel is critical of both the mainstream and New Left reception 
of Bachmann and particularly indignant about critics’ insistence on using 
Bachmann’s biography as a criterion of their literary evaluation: “Who would 
dare to mention a male writer’s friends or lovers in assessments of his literary 
potency?” (121) Probably under the influence of Christa Wolf, whose 1966
essay, “Truth That Can Be Faced—Ingeborg Bachmann’s Prose,” was reprinted 
as the afterword to a 1976 GDR edition of Bachmann’s stories, Püschel attempts 
to counter criticism of Bachmann’s work as politically unverbindlich (noncom-
mittal) by arguing that Bachmann’s writing was instead a response to the 
human deformations produced by her postwar society. In “The Good God of 
Manhattan,” “Undine Goes,” and Malina, those deformations are represented 
via “the constitutive human relationship, the relationship of man and a woman, 
one of the great themes of Ingeborg Bachmann,” relationships that bear “the 
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stigma of patriarchy” (113). And though Püschel concedes that Malina might 
give rise to the impression that men are responsible for all social ills—“as if 
their causes in this male society were the men themselves and not social cir-
cumstances” (117)—reading the novel the way Bachmann intended it, as the 
entrée to the entire “Ways of Death” cycle, shows that the author is concerned 
with “investigating social conditions, of which the daily murder of humanity, 
the ‘ways of death,’ forms part.” Bachmann’s treatment of gender, Püschel 
maintains, precisely illustrates the charge she gives to literature in her Frank-
furt lectures, to represent what exists and to present that for which the time had 
not yet come: “The limits of the possible and the reactions to transgressions of 
those limits become visible in the sphere of male-female relations” (116). Püschel 
is able to acknowledge the centrality of Bachmann’s concern with gender and 
patriarchy while simultaneously embedding it in a specific social setting that is 
responsible for the particular forms these male-female relations assume. Püschel’s 
essay represents a direction in which feminist scholarship on Bachmann could 
have developed but did not choose to go, and the essay has been virtually 
ignored in subsequent treatments of Bachmann.
Writing at about the same time as Püschel, the first West German critic to 
connect Bachmann to feminism in print was a man. In accounts of the aston-
ishing transformation that Bachmann’s reputation underwent in the decade 
after her death, an exchange between Peter Horst Neumann, writing in Merkur
in 1978, and Gisela Lindemann, who answered Neumann in the Neue Rund-
schau a year later, occupies a central position. Neumann reads “Undine Goes” 
as an anticipation of “the essential motifs of the later women’s movement, . . . 
one of the most far-reaching of the intellectual and political movements of this 
period.” But though he can accept Bachmann’s “hatred of men” in that story, he 
rejects Malina, whose “whole message” had already been presented in “Undine 
goes.” Yet he is confused, Neumann continues, by the fact that only men share 
his objections to Malina, its “garrulousness, lack of precision, triviality”—while 
women defend Bachmann’s novel vehemently. Neumann concludes that 
Weiblichkeit (femininity) is the key variable: “I know that I may make a fool 
of myself using this word. But in my aesthetic judgments of this novel I am 
incapable of ignoring its constant appeal to a gender-specific sensibility. . . . I 
can’t get over the feeling that, as a male reader, I have failed this book” (1134–
1135).
In her response to Neumann, Lindemann assumes a position that places her 
between the social engagement of the early 1970s and later feminists’ blanket 
condemnations of patriarchy (a position Neumann already equates with femi-
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nism tout court). She is not prepared to claim Bachmann uncritically for femi-
nism. Instead, comparing her with Doris Lessing’s Anna Wulf in The Golden 
Notebook, Lindemann proposes that the flaws in Bachmann’s writing may have 
socially occasioned, gender-specific causes: “Perhaps Bachmann’s prose was 
indeed not capable of all her millennial theme demanded, so that the review-
ers who were dissatisfied with her prose were right, but for the wrong reasons” 
(271). Yet she aligns herself with later feminists’ universalizing tendencies when 
she extrapolates from Bachmann’s and Lessing’s novels and her own experience 
to conclude that women’s sense of individual grievance is their most power-
ful emotional response to their oppression: “For reasons that are obvious and 
in the meantime have gradually become well known, for reasons that derive 
from the centuries-long subordination of women in patriarchal society, it’s obvi-
ous—more’s the pity—that the deepest feeling of which women are capable is 
not at all love or devotion or whatever else that nice stuff is called, but rather the 
feeling of being injured [Kränkung]” (273). What both disturbs and fascinates 
Lindemann is Bachmann’s inability to move beyond “pure lamentation,” her 
“tone of being betrayed” (274)—the aspect of Bachmann’s writing that would 
engage ever more feminists in the subsequent decade. 
In the early 1980s, a third West German feminist, also with some allegiance 
to the left, expressed dissatisfaction with the adequacy of Bachmann’s formula-
tions for feminism. Marlis Gerhardt discerns in many women writers of the 
1970s an inability to disengage themselves from the gender polarities that had 
shaped literature and life in the nineteenth century: “Precisely in new literature 
by women, thus in that very literature that has something to do with the label 
‘feminism,’ it’s stereotypically a matter of the suffering of women and the actions 
of men, of female introspection and male room to maneuver” (128). The “I” of 
Bachmann’s Malina cannot even hope that Ivan will love her as she desires, yet 
she continues helplessly to subjugate herself to him, while regarding the aspects 
of herself she projects onto Malina—rationality, autonomy, competence—as 
irreconcilable with her femininity. Gerhardt proposes that Bachmann’s works 
demonstrate a “refusal . . . to step out of the poetic image that, in its own interest, 
a male culture has declared to be the ‘nature’ of woman” (140). To Bachmann’s 
writing Gerhardt contrasts texts of other writers of the 1970s—Christa Wolf, 
Irmtraud Morgner, Sarah Kirsch, Barbara Frischmuth—who could imagine 
possibilities for women apart from those to which men had consigned them. 
Their works confront the same conflicts as Bachmann’s but think beyond them 
to envision other alternatives—self-experiments—for women which will not 
include their self-destruction.
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Bachmann’s earliest U.S. feminist critics also sought female figures who were 
defiant, not victimized, and advanced a variety of interpretations to make Bach-
mann’s texts correspond to their own needs: some were not prepared to read 
Bachmann’s works as narratives of female subjugation at all; others criticized 
her for her failure to imagine more positive feminist solutions. Ellen Summer-
field, who had written the first monograph devoted entirely to Malina before 
feminism reached German Studies in the United States, also presented at the 
1977 Amherst Colloquium what was probably the first feminist address of Bach-
mann scholarship. There she argued that Three Paths to the Lake portrayed five 
modern women who had successfully achieved their independence from men—
a conclusion with which subsequent feminist scholarship would soon take issue 
(“Verzicht”). Dinah Dodds and Ritta Jo Horsley presented papers on “A Step 
towards Gomorrah” at a session titled “Lesbian Themes in German Literature” 
at the Women in German conference, October 1979. Both praised Bachmann’s 
daring choice of topic but criticized her for failing to create characters who 
could abandon hierarchical male models and envision an equal partnership of 
women. Margret Eifler, writing in German but for an American journal, Mod-
ern Austrian Literature, concludes that Malina is about women’s unwillingness to 
remain subjugated to men: “The fundamental statement of this novel aims at 
saying no once and for all to the possibility of a relationship between man and 
woman” (379). The absorption of the “I” into Malina is for Eifler a willed act, 
“self-extinction of femininity for the sake of a doubtful self-preservation,” with 
Malina’s masculinity as “the least of all possible evils” (388). Eifler regards the 
disappearance of the “I” into the wall as the renunciation of “slavish love” (380)
and as “militant self-assertion” (382) (a gesture also figured in Undine’s return 
to the water). If the novel itself ends in solipsism, silence, and resignation, Eifler 
nonetheless hopes that the “expression of this epochal violence and mayhem can 
influence the course of human history” (390). 
Most 1970s feminists in Germany and the United States treated Bachmann’s 
prose texts as more or less realistic representations of female experience, mea-
sured Bachmann’s figures according to feminist criteria, and assumed that a 
relationship existed between feminist scholarship and the task of feminist social 
transformation. But by the 1980s feminists were less inclined to insist upon an 
immediate connection between feminist literary analysis and feminist political 
practice (possibly because the new conservative governments in both West Ger-
many and the United States made swift changes in feminists’ interest much less 
likely). In that context, new feminist approaches could arise that asked quite dif-
ferent kinds of questions about Bachmann’s work. Those approaches drew upon 
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the assumptions of the new directions in feminism that had gained prominence 
in the late 1970s. Feminist Bachmann scholars now tried to read her work as 
an expression of repressed femininity, regarded previous negative responses to 
her writing as an unwillingness to engage with female otherness, and banished 
ideology criticism altogether from the repertoire of critical tools they applied to 
her writing. The Book of Franza, first published in 1978 in the four-volume edi-
tion of the Works, replaced Malina at the center of the feminist Bachmann canon 
and was often regarded as the Rosetta stone that provided the key to the femi-
nist translation of Bachmann’s other works. Following her cue in the preface 
to Franza that “the real settings” were “laboriously covered over by the exterior 
ones” (W 3: 342), many Bachmann scholars also shifted their attention from the 
content to the form of her work, now particularly interested in how she drew 
what they regarded as patriarchal structures and language into question. In its 
acceptance of essential differences between men and women, the new feminist 
response to Bachmann in some ways harked back to popular readings of Malina
that likewise did not challenge gender dichotomies. But in its emphasis on the 
relationship of symbolic or discursive structures to questions of femininity and 
masculinity, the new approach also prepared the way for feminist poststructur-
alist analyses of Bachmann.
A widely read essay that Elisabeth Lenk published in 1981 in the feminist 
journal Courage, “Pariabewußtsein schreibender Frauen” (The pariah con-
sciousness of writing women), featured Bachmann prominently in showing 
how the new approach could be applied to women writers. Lenk does not yet 
call upon French feminists as her authorities, yet many other elements of the 
new approach are already present in her essay. Women, Lenk maintains, are the 
outcasts, pariahs of all societies, like Jews, Indians, and gypsies—like Franza, 
who considers herself “of inferior race,” “a Papua.” Qualitatively different from 
and not subsumable into a dominant homogeneous order, women belong to 
another order altogether, “to the heterogeneous” (27): “The bloody or bloodless 
annihilation of woman, her exclusion from society, her reduction to a beast of 
burden, on which, as on its foundations, the society rests, was the precondition 
for the classical ideal, the equilibrium of the homogeneous” (34). Women face 
two choices: to participate in the dominant order at all, they must deny their 
heterogeneity and hate themselves; alternatively, they are compelled to embrace 
their heterogeneity—that is, develop a “pariah consciousness.” Only those who 
stand outside society—like women writers—can give adequate expression to it. 
That, Lenk declares in conclusion, is Bachmann’s accomplishment:
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What else could the novel cycle “Ways of Death” have been but a description of 
the imperceptible, bloodless annihilation of the other within the human being, of 
the female “I,” which isn’t even allowed to say “I” any more: of an It over which 
men negotiate.
In the opinion of the champions of culture, this It should learn to disappear 
without remainder into a new homogeneous “I.” Then the eternal source of dis-
order would be out of the way. At the end of Ingeborg Bachmann’s novel Malina 
the female “I” has disappeared: a normal process, the process of female social-
ization. But what from the perspective of society looks like successful normal-
ization becomes in Bachmann’s hands, in the sense of pariah consciousness, an 
accusation against the whole society. “I don’t have any sex, not any longer, they 
ripped it out of me.” Female socialization is depicted as a crime against women, 
as a process of annihilation. “It was murder,” reads the last sentence of the novel 
Malina. (34)
In Lenk’s essay most of the components of the new feminism are present. She 
extracts the oppression of women from its historical determinants and projects 
it back into the beginnings of history, when all women became social outcasts 
for the same (biological) reason, all subject to the same kind of male power 
in the same way. Women are by definition outside of and victimized by the 
male order, hence without relationship to or responsibility for its actions. The 
dominant order has become so all-encompassing that it is impossible (hence 
not necessary) to imagine any concrete political steps that can be taken against 
it. Simply to change one’s consciousness and articulate otherness in writing is 
already a mighty feminist act. 
In the Federal Republic the first feminist analysis informed by the new 
approach which was devoted entirely to Bachmann was published by Ria Endres 
in 1981 in two somewhat different forms in Die Zeit and the Neue Rundschau.
Endres draws on a different philosophical model to make arguments similar to 
Lenk’s. Launching a frontal attack on efforts to connect literature and politics 
in the late 1960s and the 1970s, “a time of fetishized concentration on social 
phenomena,” Endres also relies upon an understanding of patriarchy that 
encompasses (while extracting away from) all of human history, folding fascism 
into the grander structure of patriarchy by equating the Heideggerian Angst that 
derived from the “knowledge about the beginning of a new way of Being (patri-
archy)” (“Erklär” 51) with the Todesangst (deathly fear) that Bachmann experi-
enced when Hitler’s troops invaded Klagenfurt. She too assumes the existence 
of diametrically opposed principles of masculinity and femininity, masculinity 
exercising its control via the “way of Being” of patriarchy, which had conquered 
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an earlier matriarchy: “‘Primary’ Being ends at the latest at the time of the old 
Greeks; it is like the paradise of a lost world, in which there exists the possibility 
of matriarchy and thereby another way of Being” (“Erklär”51). Under patriar-
chy, language as well has been brought under male control, obscuring expres-
sions of femininity: “Seen from the perspective of its origins, language is magical 
and bisexual. But in the history of patriarchy a secondary force field emerged. It 
is allocated to the father and saw to it that the female-matriarchal diminished or 
was so fully concealed that it could scarcely be discerned any more” (“Wahrheit” 
82). Both “Undine Goes” and Malina show that “this contest over life and death 
was waged in the world of language.” Malina’s absorption of the “I” at the end 
of Bachmann’s novel is a dramatization of the “loss of female identity,” and the 
Ungargasse is “the site of the defeat of femininity.” Bachmann’s accomplishment 
lies in her ability to convey “the essence of male cruelty and female martyrdom” 
(“Erklär” 51). 
An essay of my own was (as I later regretted) the first to make an explicit 
connection between Bachmann, psychoanalysis, and French theory, and at least 
one of the first to treat Bachmann’s writing as an anticipation of French theory. 
(It is reprinted as chapter 3 of this volume). In that essay, I read Malina through 
the theoretical lens of feminist poststructuralism, maintaining in the first sen-
tence that the novel is concerned with the discursive status of female subjectivity: 
“Ingeborg Bachmann’s Malina is about the absence of a female voice; in some 
respects it reads like an illustration of the feminist theory which has evolved 
since its publication to explain why, within Western discourse, women are per-
mitted no voice and subjectivity of their own” (“In the Cemetary” 75). I situate 
Bachmann’s concern in Malina with gender and language in the context of her 
statements about language, the dominant order, and challenges to the order in 
her essays and earlier works. Through a close reading of the text I try to show 
how the textual practices of the novel undermine its realism and thematize the 
relationship of femininity to representation. Despite my analysis of the text’s 
symbolic structures, my essay still displays my very strong inclination to iden-
tify with Bachmann’s protagonist (one of the reasons, I recall, that I had some 
trouble writing the article: in what voice does a female scholar write about the 
absence of a female voice?). My analysis of Malina places me squarely in the 
woman-as-victim camp. But I also understand Bachmann’s project and my own 
to be both a deconstructive and constructive one in the service of feminism. 
Bachmann “found a language to write the story of women without language,” 
I maintain, and I argue that feminists too “can read her novel as part of our 
struggle to challenge those categories within which we have no right to speak 
bachmann’s feminist reception   { 59 }
as women and to construct some other, more authentic female voice” (“In the 
Cemetery” 102, 76).
Christa Gürtler was the first German-language feminists to apply French 
theory to Bachmann. In her 1982 dissertation, Schreiben Frauen anders? (Do 
women write differently?), she investigated various feminist theoretical models 
of the early 1980s, including Cixous and Irigaray, at some length but had diffi-
culty applying the theory because her analyses examined the themes rather than 
the structures of Bachmann’s and the Austrian author Barbara Frischmuth’s 
works: marriage, sexuality, female identity, patriarchy, female liberation. One of 
the dissertation’s best chapters applies French theory to The Book of Franza (the 
first example of what would in the course of the decade become a small indus-
try devoted to connecting French theory to Franza). Gürtler’s interpretation of 
Franza brought French feminist theory into the mainstream of Bachmann criti-
cism when it was published in revised form as the lead essay in Hans Höller’s 
pathbreaking anthology Der dunkle Schatten, dem ich schon seit Anfang folge
(The dark shadow that I’ve followed from the beginning—a collection that also 
included another feminist contribution by Karen Achberger, an examination of 
subtexts in Bachmann’s writing that challenged patriarchal discourse, and an 
essay more skeptical of feminist approaches by Sigrid Schmid-Bortenschlager). 
Gürtler was the first to read Franza as a novel about the encounter of two sys-
tems of thought: on the one side, Franza’s husband’s (male) “fascist thinking”; 
on the other, Franza’s (female) ver-rückter Diskurs (dis-placed/crazy discourse, 
a fashionable pun of the period)—“the different image of a different woman, 
who speaks differently than we all learned to do and which we are used to” (82
citing Hassauer 56). Jordan, also portrayed as a colonizer who wishes to destroy 
all otherness, drives Franza into madness that expresses itself via the body, in 
hysterical symptoms of the sort French feminists had described as a substitute 
for the female voice. As Gürtler views it, “Franza’s magical way of being (for 
Ingeborg Bachmann the female way) removes itself from rational (male) analy-
sis and is threatening for the man. Ingeborg Bachmann insists on the differ-
ence of the sexes; for her woman is the other/second sex, for whom it isn’t pos-
sible within patriarchy to be a human being, because here to be a human being 
means to be a man. But she also insists that the female way of life is the more 
human” (72). Gürtler also argues that Bachmann overcomes female speechless-
ness in her writing through the articulation of an alternative female voice and 
claims Bachmann for feminism by maintaining that in the “Ways of Death” she 
attempts “to describe the female experience of the world . . . in a very partisan 
way” (82). Gürtler’s analysis is not a very systematic one, but her essay nonethe-
{ 60 }   bachmann and history
less shows the ease with which The Book of Franza accommodated and could be 
made to illustrate the prevailing feminist paradigms of the decade—doubtless 
one reason that in the next years Franza would move to the center of the feminist 
Bachmann canon. Her essay also illustrates the elision of a variety of systems of 
domination into one undifferentiated and all-encompassing system, of which 
the protagonists of the “Ways of Death” are victims. That elision would charac-
terize feminist Bachmann interpretations for most of the rest of the decade.
Christa Wolf’s enthusiasm about Bachmann’s works in the early 1980s
helped bring that new feminist reading of Bachmann to the attention of a wider 
German reading public. In 1966, Wolf had written a response to the Frankfurt 
lectures and The Thirtieth Year which in my view (see chapter 5) still counts as 
one of the finest essays on Bachmann’s early prose. There Wolf maintains that 
Bachmann’s prose texts address the state of human subjectivity under particu-
lar historical conditions (Ursula Püschel’s position a decade later). She argues 
that Bachmann’s concern with language in the early texts served a goal that 
was deeply and directly political, an effort to provide her readers with new cat-
egories of perception that would help them understand and change the world. 
Bachmann’s influence on Wolf’s writing has been apparent since the 1960s, and 
in the 1970s she began explicitly to acknowledge Bachmann as her mentor. Most 
significant for the purposes of this discussion is the evidence in Wolf’s writing, 
beginning in the mid-1970s, of her growing allegiance to a model of feminist 
analysis that dominated Western feminist thought of the same period. The story 
“Self-Experiment” (1974) had already shown Wolf to be a quite early proponent 
of women’s difference from and superiority to men. In her essays on the women 
Romantics she appeals to those women’s experience to provide a still-compelling 
alternative to an instrumental rationality that had increasingly assumed con-
trol of bourgeois society. In her Büchner Prize speech, Wolf portrays woman 
as being outside the “citadel of reason” throughout human history, becoming 
subject to its laws only in the twentieth century, when she entered men’s world 
and engaged in men’s activities. Wolf begins the fourth of her Frankfurt lectures 
(held in spring 1982 at the University of Frankfurt and published a year later 
as Voraussetzung einer Erzählung-Kassandra [Conditions of a narrative: Cassan-
dra]) with an explicit listing of some of the most popular Western feminist texts 
of the decade—including studies of matriarchy and patriarchy, goddesses and 
Amazons, femininity and writing, and Irigaray—texts, Wolf declares, whose 
influence over her she could compare only with her discovery of Marx. Wolf’s 
reading of Bachmann in the fourth lecture is advanced under the influence of—
perhaps even in the name of—that kind of feminism.
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In that lecture, Wolf, like many contemporary Western feminists, also prem-
ises her analysis on the presumption of a matriarchal society organized along 
principles preferable to those of the present—that was overthrown in Greek 
antiquity by a system of male dominance that still continues without fundamen-
tal changes. Women do not fit into that society; they can sometimes articulate 
alternatives to it but mostly are its victims. That is the context within which 
Wolf locates Bachmann:
I claim that every woman in this century and in our culture sphere who has ven-
tured into male-dominated institutions—“literature” and “aesthetics” are such 
institutions—must have experienced the desire for self-destruction. In her novel 
Malina, Ingeborg Bachmann has the woman disappear inside the wall at the end, 
and the man, Malina, who is a part of her, serenely states the case: “There is no 
woman here.”
The last sentence reads: “It was murder.”
It was also suicide. (Cassandra 299)
Bachmann’s “Ways of Death” cannot be pressed into conventional male aes-
thetic forms because (unlike, say, Flaubert’s Madame Bovary) it derives its differ-
ent morphology from Bachmann’s female experience: “But Ingeborg Bachmann 
is that nameless woman in Malina, she is the woman Franza in the novel frag-
ment The Franza Case who simply cannot get a grip on her life, cannot give it 
a form; who simply cannot manage to make her experience into a presentable 
story, cannot produce it out of herself as an aesthetic product” (Cassandra 301). 
Wolf’s lecture culminates in a discussion of Franza, which she regards as evi-
dence for her argument. Franza stands for those “who live magically (a descrip-
tion true, says Wolf, of every woman—“seeress, poetess, priestess, idol, subject 
of artworks” [Cassandra 304]—about whom her lecture speaks), and who are 
so great a threat to that representative of evil masculine, white, Western science 
that he must eradicate them. Wolf concludes with the novel’s description of the 
power of white men to conquer with their spirit what they can not otherwise 
possess: “They will come in spirit if they can no longer come in any other way. 
And they will be resurrected in a brown and a black brain; it will always be 
the whites, even then. They will continue to own the world in this roundabout 
way” (Cassandra 305). That, she tells her readers, would be Cassandra’s prophecy 
today. The consequence of Wolf’s arguments on behalf of women, against the 
power that men have exercised over them and others, was, in some contrast to 
her project in Patterns of Childhood, to extract women from their own culture 
and exempt them from responsibility for it. Those are also the arguments that 
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underlie Wolf’s own novel Cassandra and are, in my view, responsible for some 
of its weaknesses.
Sigrid Weigel is the West German feminist literary scholar whose work most 
strongly influenced Bachmann criticism of the 1980s—and whose scholarly 
method Bachmann seems strongly to have influenced. Beginning with her widely 
read “Der schielende Blick: Thesen zur Geschichte weiblicher Schreibpraxis” 
(Double Focus: Theses on the history of women’s writing), published in 1983,
Weigel laid the theoretical foundations for a German feminist-poststructuralist 
criticism, a method that she often elaborated with reference to Bachmann’s writ-
ing. In 1984, Weigel edited a special issue of text + kritik that featured her own 
essay “‘Ein Ende mit der Schrift. Ein andrer Anfang’: Zur Entwicklung von 
Ingeborg Bachmanns Schreibweise” (‘An end to writing. Another beginning’: 
On the development of Ingeborg Bachmann’s writing style) as its longest contri-
bution. Bachmann’s writing and responses to it then helped to constitute the 
structure around which she built her book-length study of contemporary West 
German women’s writing, Die Stimme der Medusa (The voice of the Medusa). 
Finally, the last chapter of her 1990 book, Topographien der Geschlechter: 
Kulturgeschichtliche Studien zur Literatur (Topographies of gender: Cultural-
historical studies of literature) used The Book of Franza to define “the work of 
deciphering” (Topographien 252) as the task of feminist cultural critics.
“Double Focus,” Weigel’s earliest essay dealing with Bachmann, is much 
more historically and politically grounded than other essays on Bachmann of 
the early 1980s and uses Bachmann’s work to support Weigel’s own theses on 
the possibilities of women’s writing. She praises Malina for its profound critique 
of women’s condition at a particular historical point and understands its portrait 
of a diametrically opposed masculinity and femininity as illustrative of women’s 
present difficulty in finding a place for themselves: “The incompatibility of the 
male and female principle is not thematized as an eternal inner conflict that 
obtains for men and women in the same way; rather, it is the expression of the 
experience of a woman living ‘today’” (“Schielende” 123). The disappearance 
of the “I” at the novel’s end is a mark not just of that irreconcilability but also 
of that figure’s female resistance: “The disappearance of the ‘I’ should not just 
be understood as a homicide, but also as a separation from Malina, as a refusal 
to live a Malina-life” (“Schielende” 125). Weigel similarly reads “Undine Goes” 
as a “refusal of a fairy-tale role” (“Schielende” 129), a rejection of the projec-
tion of male needs onto female figures, a move that helps to anticipate women’s 
freedom from male projections altogether. In “Eyes to Wonder” shortsighted 
Miranda represents for Weigel a different kind of resistance: willing to see only 
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a world that meets her needs, Miranda cannot survive because she lacks the 
“double focus” (Weigel’s guiding metaphor here) that would allow her to find 
her way in the real world.
In her text + kritik article, “An End to Writing,” Weigel moves substantially 
closer to French theory, though the French thinkers on whom she draws for 
feminist writing strategies are Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques 
Derrida rather than Irigaray or Cixous. Weigel now formulates Bachmann’s 
concerns in less historically specific terms, maintaining, for instance, that “the 
gender motif” is “from the beginning integrated into the structure of occiden-
tal thought; it is a moment of history that can be described as an assault on 
nature and on humankind” (“Ende” 72). Following Barthes, on whose Writing 
Degree Zero Bachmann seems to have drawn to write her Frankfurt lectures, 
Weigel defines as a central project of Bachmann’s prose texts the creation of a 
new Schreibweise (writing style, écriture) simultaneously destructive and pro-
ductive. She traces through The Thirtieth Year the steps that in her view brought 
Bachmann to a conception of the relationship of language and the symbolic 
order to gender and argues that only in Franza was Bachmann able to devise a 
writing style that was “a deconstruction of the cultural order” (“Ende” 76), 
Malina functioning as a less radical, more realistic introduction to the problems 
that inform the “Ways of Death.” The deconstruction or “decomposition” of 
Franza demands “the destruction of the symbolic father or of the conception of 
God which as an inscription within Franza corresponds to the real crimes out-
side” (“Ende” 83–84). The “composition” Bachmann accomplished in Franza
derives from her ability to formulate “a third thing” that operates outside of 
binary oppositions and constitutes a female utopia within literature that would 
be, says Weigel in Bachmann’s words, “an empire with unknown borders open 
towards the future” (“Ende” 91). 
In Die Stimme der Medusa, Weigel’s admiration for Bachmann’s accomplish-
ment leads her to lend a certain teleology to her account of the previous three 
decades of women’s writing and reading. Although Bachmann anticipated 
concerns of feminism in works that Weigel calls “concealed women’s writing” 
(Stimme 32), early feminists, she maintains, had not yet learned to read Bach-
mann in ways that enabled them to appreciate her. Conversely, Bachmann’s 
writing functioned as a kind of critique of earlier writers and readers, who 
sought socially critical, realistic texts or authentic articulations of female identity 
or subjectivity. Here, too, Weigel views Bachmann’s “Ways of Death” through 
a poststructuralist lens, seeing Malina’s “I” not as a woman but as “that form 
of existence that is sacrificed to the entry of woman into the symbolic order” 
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(Stimme 37–38). But, perhaps because of the subject of her book, Weigel’s treat-
ment of Bachmann here slides away from the formal concerns of the text + 
kritik essay back to Bachmann’s status within a body of women’s writing and 
her relevance to German feminists. She uses Bachmann’s writing approvingly 
to exemplify a variety of possibilities for women’s writing. Again Weigel praises 
Bachmann’s ability to draw conventional narrative into question, both to convey 
in Malina the history of the “I” and to show why it is impossible to represent 
it. Weigel also praises Bachmann’s treatment of the “paradox of love,” a topic 
that reengaged feminist attention from the mid-1980s onward, “a fundamental 
motif of Bachmann’s literature . . . that she explored in ever new variations” 
(Stimme 217). In Malina, Bachmann portrays love as destructive of but necessary 
for women situated within a dialectic of Leben und Überleben (life and survival) 
(Stimme 226). Like the feminists of the 1970s, “Three Paths to the Lake” sug-
gests that women should keep their distance from men but also preserves the 
idea of love as utopian possibility. Portraying this aporia, “the affirmation of 
love as the negation of its social possibilities or, to put it the other way around, 
the impossibility in the real as the salvation of possibility” (Stimme 230), Weigel 
shows Bachmann able both thematically and formally to present both sides of 
an opposition that seems irreconcilable. 
By the time of her 1990 book, Weigel’s treatment of Bachmann, though still 
shaped by poststructuralism, has moved significantly in the direction of cul-
tural studies. Here Franza is treated as a figure able to undertake the project 
of “deciphering,” the task of a female cultural critic. Weigel’s analytical model 
has become discernibly more complex, and she understands and uses Franza’s 
journey to the desert as an illustration of the central metaphor of Weigel’s own 
study, “as a topography of signifying, textual, and intellectual orders” (Topog-
raphien 254). Franza’s story is now not just about femininity, Bachmann’s text 
representing “the exterior traces of the destruction of (not just) female history” 
(Topographien 252). Weigel now acknowledges “the ambivalent location of the 
white woman, who often finds herself in a simultaneity of victim and perpetra-
tor positions” (Topographien 263): Franza is not just a victim of “the whites,” but 
white herself. And Weigel explicitly draws attention to “the psychic and linguis-
tic involvement of women in the dominant order and thus their own interest in 
existing relationships” (Topographien 255). 
In this book, two “burning problems” (Topographien 260) emerge for Weigel 
that are of great relevance for the Bachmann criticism of the 1980s. First, she 
points out the limitations of attempts to find alternative discourses and forms of 
representation for women outside the dominant order: “In general, the question 
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of the otherness of woman has revealed itself to be a trap, since up to now it has 
just led to an extension of the gender polarity in which woman is fixed as the 
other/second sex” (Topographien 261). In this context, her criticism of efforts to 
place women writers outside of or embracing binary oppositions might be read 
as an effort to distance herself from her own portrait of Bachmann’s writing 
style six years before. Second, Weigel radically draws into question a prior model 
of feminist analysis that had starkly divided the world into the opposition of 
men and women, masculinity and femininity. Now Weigel calls for an intensi-
fied concern with the relationship of sexual and cultural difference, “since every 
subject moves within a meshwork of social, cultural, ethnic, and gender-specific 
differences” (Topographien 264). Such an investigation would demand revision 
of much of the feminist Bachmann criticism that dominated the 1980s. 
By the mid-1980s, variants of radical feminist and feminist poststructuralist 
approaches had conquered the field of Bachmann scholarship, as most clearly 
evidenced in two special journal issues devoted to Bachmann—Weigel’s text + 
kritik volume of 1984 and a special Bachmann number of Modern Austrian 
Literature in 1985—as well as several MLA special sessions ably organized by 
Karen Achberger and Beth Bjorklund. Weigel’s introduction to the text + kritik
collection outlines the principles of that paradigm as they were applied to 
Bachmann and explains that now Bachmann’s works are often regarded as “antici-
patory concretization of poststructuralist theses,” her “Ways of Death” revealing 
“a structural relationship between fascism, patriarchy, ethno- and logocentrism 
and the central role of language/writing for this context, within which the ‘fem-
inine’ as the embodiment of the repressed other is subjected to a wide variety of 
ways of death” (“Andere” 5). But as many feminists now read them, Bachmann’s 
texts also represent her effort to combat (often: to destroy or deconstruct) the 
dominant order; her works, Weigel argues, depict the structures “to which indi-
viduals are subjected and against which they—led by the author—mobilize their 
desperate longing for their own subjectivity, their own history, and a not yet occu-
pied location of their own” (“Andere” 6). What Weigel maintains is not alto-
gether true of her own collection: only her own, Christa Bürger’s, Birgit Vander-
beke’s, and one of Marianne Schuller’s essays are significantly influenced by 
poststructuralism; several others do not thematize gender at all; and Helga Meise, 
Irmela von der Lühe, and I (in the essay published here as chapter 5) try to 
advance various other kinds of feminist approaches to Bachmann.
But the hegemony of a certain kind of French feminist theory is very striking 
in the Modern Austrian Literature volume, where more than half of the essays 
make at least an obligatory nod in its direction. To Angelika Rauch, for instance, 
“femininity” in Bachmann is a “counter model to the reified mode of experience 
and perception that was a consequence of a culture and society defined by ratio-
nality and patriarchy” (21); especially the dream chapter of Malina pushes in the 
direction of a “textual practice” that might produce “new models for female 
images” such as “deconstruction, écriture féminine, hysterical discourse, dis-
placed/crazy discourse” (“Sprache” 48). Peter Brinkemper views The Book of 
Franza as a “paradigm of female aesthetics” that both thematically and formally 
addresses “the female experience of oppression as well as the destruction of per-
sonal, sexual, and social identity via the power of a symbolic order” (170). Renate 
Delphendahl sees “Undine Goes” as a “critique of patriarchal language” (199), 
and Karen Achberger speaks of a female subjectivity “incompatible with patri-
archal culture” (“Beyond” 219). Ritta Jo Horsley argues that “Undine Goes” 
“anticipates French feminism and poststructuralism in its presentation and par-
tial deconstruction of the fundamental cultural forms that shape our conscious-
ness” (“Re-reading” 224). In this volume, even some dissenters from the domi-
nant trend find it necessary to recognize the power of the paradigm, Leo Lensing 
pointing out that the “recent provocative feminist scholarship” neglected the 
Austrian literary tradition (53), while Sigrid Schmid-Bortenschlager tries to dis-
tinguish Bachmann’s writing from the German Frauenliteratur of the 1970s and 
1980s but nonetheless acknowledges the “surprising new orientation . . . par-
ticularly marked in the studies of the prose and of the ‘feminist’ Bachmann” 
(“Spiegelszenen” 39). 
What probably demonstrates most clearly how feminism had moved to the 
mainstream of Bachmann criticism by the 1980s is the sympathetic treatment 
it has received from male Bachmann scholars from that point onward. As early 
as 1980, Bernd Witte, in two essays that still remain extremely useful, identi-
fies gender as the central concern of Bachmann’s work. Surveying “Ingeborg 
Bachmann Today” in 1983, Kurt Bartsch is prepared to give credit for what he 
terms “something like a Bachmann boom”—evidenced in the four Bachmann 
symposia held that year—to “the change in the expectations of literary criticism 
and scholarship in the second half of the 1970s, which among other things is due 
to the influence of the recent women’s movement” (“Ingeborg” 281). Bartsch’s 
Sammlung Metzler monograph, published in 1988, makes proper and gener-
ous use of feminist approaches to Bachmann’s late prose while also attempting 
to illuminate other aspects of her work. The final “Ways of Death” chapter of 
Hans Höller’s 1987 study of Bachmann is also indebted to a French feminist 
approach, while Peter Beicken’s more chatty and less rigorous 1988 Beck series 
monograph takes the legitimacy of a feminist approach for granted. By the time 
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that Kein objektives Urteil—Nur ein lebendiges (No objective judgment—just a 
living one), a retrospective collection of thirty-five years of Bachmann criticism, 
was published in 1989 by Christine Koschel and Inge von Weidenbaum, the 
editors of Bachmann’s Werke, feminist approaches had become so important to 
the evolving body of Bachmann scholarship that essays by many of the feminist 
critics I have discussed here occupied a central and uncontroversial place. Even 
in the 1990s, at a time when some erstwhile feminists abandoned a gender per-
spective (as I show below), male scholars (with a few exceptions) continued to 
acknowledge, even insist upon, the importance of gender issues in Bachmann’s 
writing. 
From the high point of feminist Bachmann criticism at mid-decade, interest in 
Bachmann ebbed in the late 1980s, studies for a time mostly limited to disserta-
tions written by younger women and frequently published by Peter Lang, a press 
very hospitable to doctoral theses. But in the 1990s three developments directed 
attention to Bachmann again. First, in 1990 Werner Schroeter released a contro-
versial film version of Malina, based on a script by Elfriede Jelinek. Though 
Jelinek’s adaptation followed Bachmann’s novel quite closely, Schroeter had other 
ideas. As the Vienna Standard reported, Schroeter was more interested in the prob-
lems of Malina’s “I” than in her difficulties with individual or generic men: 
“Schroeter would have preferred to cut the sequence with the father; for him it 
was a matter of self-destruction” (Cerha Hozwath 10). But that reading of Bach-
mann’s novel produced an outraged response from some feminist Bachmann fans 
(detailed below). The second development was the number of conferences orga-
nized around various aspects of Bachmann’s works to which many established 
Bachmann scholars (the “usual suspects,” in effect) were invited. These meetings 
drew those scholars back into Bachmann research, allowing (and compelling) 
them to address aspects of Bachmann’s work different from those they had previ-
ously considered. Many of major conferences also produced volumes of their pro-
ceedings, including Saranac Lake, New York, 1991 (Ingeborg Bachmann: Neue 
Richtungen in der Forschung?); Münster, 1991 (Ingeborg Bachmann—Neue Beiträge 
zu ihrem Werk); Vienna, 1993 (Die Schwarzkunst der Worte); London, 1993 (Kri-
tische Wege der Landnahme); Bern, 1993 (Schriftwechsel); Debrecen, 1993 (Nicht 
[aus, in, über, von] Österreich); Vienna, 1994 (Ingeborg Bachmann and Paul Celan); 
Brussels, 1996 (Text-Tollhaus für Bachmann-Süchtige); Saarland, 1996 (Klangfar-
ben); and Binghamton, 1996 (If We Had the Word). Third, 1995 saw the publica-
tion of the mammoth four-volume critical edition of the “Todesarten”-Projekt,
meticulously edited by Monika Albrecht and Dirk Göttsche, which made avail-
able for scholarly use and quotation large portions of the previously unpublished 
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material that had resided in the manuscript collection of the Vienna Nationalbib-
liothek. Because the critical edition confirmed some scholarly speculations and 
challenged others, it was immediately at the center of a storm of controversy which 
again brought Bachmann’s name back into print in the German-language press.
Within this context, it is possible to discern three more or less separate devel-
opments in Bachmann scholarship that have continued from the late 1980s to the 
present. Despite the fact that it had fallen out of favor in many sectors of academic 
feminism, a number of studies written as dissertations by younger women (among 
them, Bärbel Thau, Eva Christina Zeller, Ingeborg Dusar, and Mireille Tabah) 
or as books and articles by more senior scholars such as Karen Achberger and 
Manfred Jürgensen continued to pursue some variant of the radical or poststruc-
turalist feminist approach to Bachmann that had claimed the field in the mid-
1980s. Feminist studies by Ortrud Gutjahr, Inge Röhnelt, Saskia Schottelius, and 
Bettina Stuber pursued another connection influential in French-influenced 
scholarship: the utility of psychoanalysis for understanding the construction of 
female identity, language, and culture. Gudrun Kohn-Waechter’s ambitious 1992
study Das Verschwinden in der Wand (Disappearing into the wall) continued and 
deepened the direction of analysis begun in the early 1980s and also initiated a 
controversy in Bachmann scholarship that rages to the present day. In Malina,
Kohn-Waechter maintains, Bachmann had elaborated a “new language” that 
might have pointed the way beyond a Western rationality that suppresses femi-
ninity, yet the position from which that writing style could be undertaken is 
eradicated when the “I” is murdered at the end of the novel. Since the novel fully 
discredits Malina’s narrative position, Kohn-Waechter alleges that it would have 
been impossible for Bachmann to continue to write after the end of her only pub-
lished novel, so that, even had she lived, there could have been no further “Ways 
of Death” narratives. Such arguments for Malina as the single novel Bachmann 
could have written (further elaborated by German feminist scholars such as 
Franziska Frei Gerlach and Edith Bauer but contradicted by statements Bach-
mann herself made after Malina was published) seem to me to rest on the femi-
nist postulation of an essential femininity, eternally antagonistic to masculinist 
domination, whose problems might be solved if a writing style adequate to its 
expression could be devised. Assertions like those of Kohn-Waechter, Gerlach, 
and Bauer also underwrite many of the attacks on the critical edition of the 
“Todesarten”-Projekt. Yet if the edition’s editors are correct to argue that at the 
time of her death Bachmann was engaged in an ongoing literary project, Kohn-
Waechter, Gerlach, Bauer, and others must concede that their own analyses of 
Bachmann’s writing strategy are quite wrong. 
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Werner Schroeter’s film of Malina provided one final opportunity for radical 
feminists to vent their anger against men who treated women and their cultural 
productions badly. Schroeter’s adaptation produced, for example, an outraged 
response from Alice Schwarzer in the journal Emma, demonstrating that at 
least in her circles radical feminism was alive and well. Bachmann’s great theme, 
Schwarzer maintained, had been men’s brutality to women, and a close reading 
of Malina now revealed that the suffering of Bachmann’s protagonist was a con-
sequence of incestuous sexual abuse, the great radical feminist issue of the late 
1980s. Schwarzer outflanked German feminist scholars by accusing them of 
diminishing the brutal crimes of men via arguments that made women com-
plicit in their own subjugation: “Feminist, postfeminist, antifeminist, or what-
ever-else criticism dissects the novel with aesthetic and psychoanalytic methods. 
. . . Fashionably, it blames the victim, even insinuates that the victim enjoys suf-
fering, even worse, some of the critics relegate what happens to the realm of a 
masochist’s fantasies” (“Schwarzer” 19). She protested the violence done to 
Bachmann both by Schroeter’s film and by her “feminist” critics, who failed to 
recognize that a majority of women will endure sexual assault during their 
lifetime and that incest survivors suffer lifelong symptoms like Bachmann’s 
own. To support her position, Schwarzer reprinted an updated version of 
Jelinek’s 1984 essay, “Der Krieg mit anderen Mitteln” (War By Other Means), 
which proclaimed men’s treatment of women a continuation of the Nazi exter-
mination of the Jews, viewing women as exiles from a culture in which they 
had no part and no voice and which was determined to destroy them. 
A number of other feminist critics and scholars followed Schwarzer’s 
lead—Iris Radisch, Dorothee Römhild, Kathleen Komar, Regula Venske—in 
denouncing the film (and at least one male scholar, Gerhard Austin, denounced 
the feminists’ denunciations). But later in the decade, possibly as a radical femi-
nist analysis loosed its hold, opinions moderated to the point that Ingeborg Glei-
chauf could maintain: “The film opens new interpretive possibilities for reading 
the novel” (222), and Margret Eifler, writing from a more historically conscious 
U.S. feminist perspective in 1997, even declares that the changes Schroeter made 
to Bachmann’s text were necessary: “The progress of time dictated alternate 
forms of the same problem: feminism had moved into another generational per-
ception, and the change to another medium demanded an alternate encoding” 
(“Bachmann” 223).
But even though feminist approaches with roots in the early 1980s continued 
to shape some analyses of Bachmann work up to the present, some discomfort 
with those sorts of feminist arguments also seemed apparent by the end of the
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1980s. Thus a countertendency to feminist approaches emerged increasingly in 
the second half of the decade: often investigations of Bachmann by younger 
women scholars did not address the question of gender at all. In the Women 
in German Yearbook in 1992 (“Feminist”), I opined that gender was missing in 
those studies because Bachmann scholars wanted to pursue a range of aspects of 
her work other than those addressed by 1980s feminists and did not know how to 
do so in a way that also took gender into account. Now, I would not be so certain 
that there is a single answer to the absence of attention to gender in Bachmann 
scholarship. It may really be the case that some feminist scholars have not been 
able to elaborate a gender-based approach adequate to the questions they want to 
pose. (As my commentary to chapter 6 shows, for instance, it still is not clear to 
me how to explore whether the question of gender influenced Bachmann’s read-
ing of Wittgenstein.) On the other hand, the Bachmann criticism of the 1990s
sometimes manifests the abandonment of gender as an analytic category even 
when its utility seems obvious and even in writing by scholars for whom gender 
formerly seemed to be a central concern. Thus the question arises whether the 
retreat from gender (particularly in Germany) might be read within the context 
of a larger move away from oppositional politics after German unification. The 
poststructuralist feminist model of the 1980s made it possible to examine femi-
ninity and writing in the rather ethereal context of high theory alone. But since 
many of the newer approaches to gender demanded that scholars simultane-
ously consider class, race, sexuality, and other social categories, 1990s feminists 
found it much harder to avoid more controversial social issues. The retreat from 
gender might thus be viewed both as a welcome repudiation of an earlier femi-
nist model that seemed inadequate to address the new concerns of Bachmann 
scholarship and as a means to avoid topics that seemed quite out of fashion in the 
new and more conservative unified Germany.
A 1994 special issue of the Zurich monthly Du devoted to Bachmann dis-
plays both these tendencies. The issue’s editor, Dieter Bachmann (no relation to 
the author), understands his project to be saving Bachmann from feminist and 
other extremists: “The one extreme: many (men) . . . constructed a myth out of 
the elements Undine and death drive. The other extreme: many (women) . . . 
transfigured her into their feminist ancestress and installed her as their principle 
of hope” (13). Similarly, Corinna Caduff, Sigrid Weigel’s research assistant at 
the University of Zurich, protests that Bachmann has been “co-opted by the 
women’s movement and elevated to their cult figure” (86), while Maria Gaz-
zetti, reporting on Bachmann’s Italian reception, warns that “the scholarly and 
artistic undertakings of a new women’s movement could stand in the way of a 
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deeper comprehension” of Bachmann, though, she happily notes, such misun-
derstandings scarcely ever occur in Italy (92-93). On the other hand, the issue of 
Du also evidences some of the problems that arise when discussions of gender are 
omitted in accounts of Bachmann’s life and work. The magazine contains much 
new information including unpublished photographs, material from the Vienna 
archive, and reminiscences by friends. Yet except for a somewhat sexist recollec-
tion by Hermann Burger of an evening with Bachmann (“A woman of boundless 
openness for everything terrible, hard as a man in her tragic consistency, and yet 
helpless as a woman towards an overwhelming life” ([69]) and a commentary by 
Sigrid Weigel on Bachmann’s “effort to combine work on the (im)possible loca-
tion of a female position within the dialectic of enlightenment with the problem 
of representation in the aftermath of National Socialism” ([“Urszene” 23]), gen-
der is not discussed at all—though precisely an examination of the condition of 
being a woman intellectual in the aftermath of National Socialism in the 1940s, 
1950s, and 1960s might help to explain some of the problems that Bachmann 
confronted and on which her friends and acquaintances comment. 
Similar problems are evident in a later text + kritik issue devoted to Bachmann, 
published in November 1995 and obviously meant to replace the famous 1984
number that had first proclaimed “the other Ingeborg Bachmann.” To be sure, 
in her article Ursula Krechel notes that earlier feminist paradigms have been 
abandoned for good reason: “The dichotomy exploiter-exploited, like that of 
perpetrator and victim, derived from the general political discourse of the 1960s
and used by the new women’s movements for gender difference, was replaced in 
the 1980s by differentiated analyses of the accountability and complicity of 
women in the patriarchal system, complicity which looks not at individual 
responsibility or guilt but rather at the social networks of gender dependencies” 
(15). With the exception, however, of an article by Susanne Baackmann, a young 
Berkeley-trained Germanist, none of the other essays— even those by such schol-
ars as Sigrid Weigel (“Sie sagten”) and Irmela von der Lühe (“Abschied”), who 
were represented in the 1984 issue—can be termed feminist in any sense or con-
sistently employ a gender analysis, even when their topics cry out for an investiga-
tion of gender’s relevance: responses to Bachmann’s writing by younger women 
poets; Bachmann’s literary and actual relationships to Max Frisch, Paul Celan, 
and Jean Améry; the degree to which Maria Callas and Bachmann are phenom-
ena of the 1950s. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that some Bachmann schol-
ars find gender issues to be no longer opportune. 
Indeed, in the popular media the rollback to a prefeminist era seems even 
more emphatic than a mere obliviousness to gender issues. In the 13 November 
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1995 issue of Der Spiegel, Sigrid Löffler—then a member of the ZDF’s Liter-
arisches Quartett, the former editor of the Feuilleton of Die Zeit, and herself an 
Austrian woman—purported to review the new four-volume critical edition 
of the “Ways of Death” but in fact reduced Bachmann’s writing to a mostly 
biographical account of her successes and failures with men. “At thirty she was 
a myth,” writes Löffler. “A myth for men. Fellow writers, readers, and critics all 
succumbed to her morbid charm which combined girlish timidity and lyrical 
power, shyness and poetic boldness. Half accursed princess, half wild, prophetic 
conjuress, Bachmann [die Bachmann] moved as if transported from prize cer-
emony to prize ceremony, from poetic honor to poetic honor” (244). The less 
positive reception of her prose Löffler attributes to the criticism of masculin-
ity in The Thirtieth Year: “‘Undine goes’—and curses men. Her community of 
male adorers never forgave her that” (244). The main impetus behind the “Ways 
of Death,” Löffler intimates, was Bachmann’s personal ressentiment resulting 
from her “experience of a catastrophic and crisis-ridden love affair with Max 
Frisch” (245), though her portrait of society “as the execution site of patriarchal 
violence” won her a new readership: “As a myth for men she’d long been cast 
aside; as a myth for women she made her posthumous career” (247). Pursuing 
her trope with a vengeance, Löffler also metamorphoses Bachmann into a range 
of mythological figures, portraying her as a spurned woman obsessed with 
revenge against the men who have wronged her: “The poetic seeress and song-
stress turned into the herald of prosaic violence, the beautiful Melusine turned 
into the male-hating virago. A transformation from ondine to banshee. The 
lyrical water nymph, driven from her magic element, exploits the devastated 
land of annihilated femininity. Undine goes. Undine has gone. She comes back 
as a Fury” (247). Löffler’s review signals a 1990s backlash against feminism as 
she attempts both to trivialize feminist concern with women’s treatment by men 
in the private sphere and also, turning radical feminism on its head, to reduce 
Bachmann’s writing to that single issue.
Surprisingly, even Sigrid Weigel, the scholar probably most responsible for 
directing feminist attention to Bachmann, seems to have moved significantly 
away from feminist approaches in the comprehensive 600-page study of 
Bachmann she published in 1999. In many ways, the book represents a break-
through for Bachmann scholarship. Assuming that letters from Bachmann 
would be found not among her own private papers—closed to the public until 
2025—but in the papers of her correspondents, Weigel consulted archives in 
Germany, Austria, Israel, and the United States to discover letters to and from 
Gerschom Scholem, Theodor W. Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Paul Celan, Peter 
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Szondi, Uwe Johnson, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Alfred Andersch, Hans Werner 
Richter, and Hermann Kesten, among others. Weigel can particularly docu-
ment Bachmann’s very grave concern with the aftermath of National Socialism 
in Germany and Austria and her connections to major Jewish figures of the 
period, and that indeed will change the way Bachmann scholars address her 
work. The conception structuring her book, Weigel explains in her prologue, is 
that of Bachmann as intellectual and participant in the debates and discussions 
of her day. “Resistance to a female intellectual” is what explains the negative 
response to her prose: “Literary critics never forgave her for breaking from a 
terrain that was defined with the help of the equivalence lyric = intuitive = 
female” (Ingeborg 16). Yet Weigel’s book almost entirely fails to pursue that 
topic. In her prologue she is very critical of feminist scholarship, apparently not 
entertaining the possibility that feminist investigations can be carried out in 
varieties of ways: “To be sure, often only in the light of feminist and deconstruc-
tive literary theory were the more radical philosophical dimensions of [Bach-
mann’s] thought and writing discovered; but at the same time in an abundance 
of seminar papers and theses her work has been misunderstood as the legacy of 
‘women’s literature’ and in presenting her so that she represents ‘female identity,’ 
they have once more obscured the profile of the author as an engaged literary 
politician, as a philosophically and historically informed thinker” (Ingeborg 16). 
But when the book addresses questions of femininity at all, Weigel falls back 
into the model of the 1980s (an approach that to me does not seem compatible 
with her historical emphasis): “Franza is figured as a woman who has no stable 
place of her own in the symbolic order”; the dreams of Malina “refer to the 
drama of the ‘feminine’ in the symbolic order under a ‘law in the name of the 
father’” (Ingeborg 516, 538). Weigel rightly observes critically that “Germanists’ 
interpretations quite frequently ignore the historical situations in which [Bach-
mann’s] literature was located” (Ingeborg 17). We can hope that in subsequent 
studies Weigel will explore the possibility of elaborating a method that is both 
historical and feminist and add gender to the analytical categories she uses to 
understand the historical situations she so usefully explores.
Happily, not all Bachmann scholars either remain wedded to a radical or 
poststructuralist feminist method or decide not to address gender at all. Many 
studies of Bachmann’s work include gender among the various issues they 
investigate, an approach that would be called feminist in the United States if 
not in Germany, and a number of younger feminist scholars—particularly 
though not only in English-speaking countries—have also begun to inves-
tigate the application of new kinds of feminist methods to Bachmann’s texts. 
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Several essays in Andrea Stoll’s very useful 1992 Suhrkamp volume of materi-
als pertaining to Malina (Ingeborg) consider gender-related aspects, and Stoll’s 
own overview of Malina’s reception (“Bruch”) treats feminist approaches very 
evenhandedly. From earlier feminist studies, Maria Behre’s essay very sensibly 
extracts three historically specific points for analysis—a description of con-
temporary expectations of femininity, a historical investigation of their genesis 
and variability, and an examination of the utopian functions of descriptions 
of the other—proposing that the feminist question “Do women write differ-
ently?” (Schreiben Frauen anders? is the title of Christa Gürtler’s 1983 study) 
be transmuted into “Why did Bachmann write differently than her male con-
temporaries?” (212). Almut Dippel’s fine 1995 monograph situates the vol-
ume Three Paths to the Lake very precisely at the time of its production, notes 
that Bachmann criticizes not only capitalist consumer society but also the 
“partial blindness of left circles in the 1960s and 1970s, who like Philippe [in 
“Three Paths to the Lake”] fight exploitation in the Third World, but don’t 
see or don’t want to see that they’re exploiters themselves in their private lives.
. . . Remarkably,” Dippel notes with some irony, “it was exactly this contradiction 
in the behavior of many comrades of 1968 that was the catalyzing moment for 
the constitution of a solid women’s movement. The women in the Three Paths to 
the Lake cycle don’t of course rebel or do so only inaudibly. Thus it remains for 
male and female readers to recognize the contradictions and draw conclusions 
from them” (127). In another excellent book on Three Paths to the Lake, Bettina 
Bannasch argues that even though Bachmann tried to distance herself from 
feminism (maintaining, for instance, “This is not a book for women, and also 
not one for men, it’s a book for human beings” [TP 4: 11]), she was not success-
ful, since, in contrast to the male perpetrators of crimes against women, none of 
her women figures becomes a persecutor of men (53). These books show that it 
is possible to consider gender relations as a central concern of Bachmann’s writ-
ing without making gender the central and overriding emphasis to which all 
other issues in the texts are subordinated. 
The editors of the critical edition of the “Todesarten”-Projekt, Monika Albrecht 
and Dirk Göttsche, also take for granted in their textual commentaries that 
gender is a significant, though far from the only, issue addressed in the novel cycle 
(in my view one of the virtues of the edition). In their own scholarship, Göttsche 
and Albrecht emphasize gender themes and add a dimension frequently missing 
in Bachmann scholarship by assuming a critical stance toward her writing. 
Albrecht observes, for instance: 
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Just as Horkheimer and Adorno equate the beginning of enlightenment with 
that of world history, Bachmann seems to locate the origins of today’s gender 
problematic in prehistoric times when myth developed. It seems, therefore, 
doubtful that Bachmann, as it has been claimed, does bring up for discussion the 
“incompatibility of the male and female principle . . . as an ‘eternal’ conflict that 
equally concerns man and woman.” After all, in Malina she even goes one step 
further; in the last dialogue with Malina, just before the disappearance of the “I” 
in the wall, it is noted, in reference to Malina and the “I”: “Something must have 
gone astray with the primates and later with the hominoids. A man, a woman . . 
.strange words, strange mania.” (“A man” 133–34)
That critical perspective continues to inform their selection of scholarly essays 
in the three volumes titled Über die Zeit schreiben that Albrecht and Göttsche 
published as a kind of Bachmann yearbook in 1998, 2000, and 2004 and in their 
Bachmann-Handbuch of 2002. (In the interest of full disclosure, I should reveal 
that chapters from this book appear in German translation in all three volumes, 
and I also contributed several sections to the handbook.) In their call for papers 
for the second volume, Albrecht and Göttsche stress that Bachmann scholarship 
is changing and urge contributors to pay special attention to situating her works 
within history: “Contributors are welcome to choose their topics but should take 
into consideration that in the last few years a changing view of the historical 
period in which Bachmann wrote has been evolving. In the light of the emerg-
ing reassessment of the 1940’s to early 1970’s Bachmann scholars will have to 
pay even more attention than so far to the historical context of her writing, to 
her involvement with contemporary history and the critical (scientific, philo-
sophical, social, literary) discourse of her time, and to the cultural implications 
of her works” (E-mail 18 May 1998). Interestingly, the three volumes feature a 
preponderance of U.S.-based scholars, and, as perhaps is appropriate for stud-
ies that have come into being “with the consciousness that Bachmann research 
is going through a time of upheaval” (Albrecht/Göttsche Über 8), many of the 
essays treating gender do so in ways critical both of Bachmann and/or of previ-
ous varieties of feminist scholarship. The scholarly revisions necessitated by the 
appearance of the critical edition also include, it appears, a reconsideration of 
Bachmann’s own treatment of gender relations. 
Finally, some of the most original and exciting feminist work on Bachmann 
to appear since the late 1980s has begun to apply to texts a range of new meth-
ods that foreground gender concerns and maintain gender as a central category 
of their analysis. In a subtle 1989 essay in New German Critique, Sabine Gölz 
adapts and revises Harold Bloom’s theory of literary influence in order to under-
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stand Bachmann’s own female theory of writing as rereading, advanced from 
her perspective as a woman poet positioned in opposition to the poetic Father 
Precursor. Though gender appears not to be an explicit concern of the poems 
Gölz discusses, she shows that gender is nonetheless inscribed in the poem in 
the way Bachmann distances herself from a male tradition that assured the coher-
ence of the poem and “a reading that presumes it can ‘know’ its object” (“Reading” 
31). Gölz’s interpretive model opens up Bachmann’s poetry, which had seemed 
to baffle feminists, to feminist analysis, allowing discussion about gender there 
without resorting to essentialist notions of what counts as female or feminist. Her 
book, The Split Scene of Reading (1998), expands on these insights by contrasting 
the relationship of Bachmann’s stance—a “readerly” one that refuses closure and 
allows readers the freedom to make their own meanings—to the posture of other 
writers (Derrida, Apollinaire, Nietzsche, Kafka) who appear to undermine the 
reliability of signifying structures but finally retreat from their own daring cri-
tique to insist that they themselves can proclaim what meaning is. 
From quite another standpoint, Constance Hotz’s lively and very innovative 
“Die Bachmann” (1990), an examination of Bachmann’s reception by journalists 
during her lifetime, uses reception theory, structuralism, and semiotics to exam-
ine the production of a journalistic discourse about Bachmann in which gender 
(among other issues) played a central role. Thus, for instance, she argues that the 
Spiegel cover that brought Bachmann her early fame derived some portion of 
its effect through its contrast with the usual portraits of women: “Erotic styliza-
tion is de rigeur for the Spiegel covers of the fifties that feature women; the attri-
butes of makeup, jewelry, a neat hairdo, mouth opened to a smile, often décol-
leté, consistently present a femininity that directs attention to itself. Ingeborg 
Bachmann’s face, however, is characterized by a significant lack of these attri-
butes or by their negative presentation: short hair, an evasive glance, a covered 
neckline, a firmly closed mouth. The eroticism of this face is infused with a ges-
ture of refusal”(46). Even the identification of female authors through the use of 
the definite article prescribed by Duden, the authoritative dictionary of the Ger-
man language, Hotz argues, affected the way Bachmann would be read: “With 
the addition of the definite article in the case of female authors (cf. in contrast 
without articles: Goethe, Grass etc.) the neutral use of the name as a metonymic 
representation of the work is abandoned, and the personal aspect is emphasized 
before the work; and according to gender-specific usage demanded by grammar 
the personal aspect is always characterized by and as femininity. The category of 
gender (but only the female, not the male) is thus always connected to the refer-
ence to the work.”(130). Via these and many other examples, Hotz contributes 
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to an understanding of how and why the image of Bachmann as “the poetess” 
[die Dichterin] and “First Lady of the Gruppe 47” was generated and simulta-
neously establishes a new paradigm for feminist Bachmann scholarship.
Susanne Ruta’s 1991 review of Malina in the Village Voice, written from out-
side the German feminist hothouse, brought a breath of fresh air to the entire 
feminist debate on Bachmann. “Bachmann’s feminism,” Ruta declares, “is 
always full of unresolved paradoxes,” particularly as “she buys into the ancient 
misogynist division of humankind that equates the male with reason, logic, 
order, light, and the female with passion, chaos, confusion, and darkness.” What 
interests Ruta as much as gender issues in Bachmann’s novel are its politics: she 
views Malina as “a political novel about postwar capitalist society on the remake, 
and about cold war tensions and their hidden psychic toll. It’s a cold war novel 
the way le temps retrouvé—as Bachmann demonstrates in her lovely essay on 
Proust—is a novel about World War I. In both cases polite society, with its fur-
tive nastiness, concealed vices, and paraded vanities, is presented as a microcosm 
of the larger political scene” (66). Ruta’s iconoclastic reading of Malina points in 
the direction of the approach to Bachmann’s “Ways of Death” that is grounded 
in politics and social history that scholars writing since her review now increas-
ingly pursue.
Most recently, feminist scholars often based outside Germany have pursued a 
variety of innovative approaches to Bachmann. Friederike Eigler, for instance, 
uses a Bakhtinian model to examine the “heteroglossia,” the various voices 
within the figures of Simultan, in order to investigate the split relationship of 
women to dominant discursive forms. Helgard Mahrdt views Bachmann’s writ-
ing through the lens of the Frankfurt School, emphasizing the deformations of 
subjectivity and sensuality that result from the penetration of instrumental 
rationality into the private sphere. Karen Remmler explores the affinities 
between Walter Benjamin’s concept of remembrance (Eingedenken) and Bach-
mann’s own treatment of history and memory. Gisela Brinker-Gabler proposes 
that Franza’s identification (“I am a Papua”) with the victims of colonization 
represents a renewed colonization of the colonized, since her assumption of their 
perspective does not leave room for a perspective of their own. And Monika 
Albrecht (“Sire”; “Postkolonialismus”) and I (“White” and this book’s chapter 
10) pursue further the question of Bachmann’s relationship to postcolonialism 
and critical exoticism. Ingeborg Majer-O’Sickey criticizes “post-structuralist 
theoretical paradigms” that “tend to ignore Bachmann’s understanding of wom-
en’s situation as a social phenomenon in historical contexts” (55), and she also 
raises the possibility that the split subject and multiple voices of Malina force 
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readers to avoid totalizing readings and offer “an altogether new possibility for 
feminism” that simultaneously rejects ‘representivity’ at once as it retains a fem-
inism of articulation” (68). Gudrun Brokoph-Mauch considers Bachmann’s 
treatment of Austria a reason to allocate her writing to the Austrian tradition of 
“critical Heimat-literature.” Rhonda Duffaut reads Malina through the perspec-
tive of nationality, arguing that in her ecstatic love for Ivan the “I” of Malina
conceives of an alternative form of community beyond national boundaries but, 
when that love ends, “becomes reinscribed by gender roles that confine her to 
the kitchen, to the home, that function together with nationalism” (39). Reading 
“Undine Goes” through a Lacanian lens, Veronica Scrol maintains that “her 
oscillation between the imaginary and the symbolic” subverts dichotomies (24), 
while Margaret McCarthy, criticizing poststructuralist and psychoanalytic 
theory for its denial of female agency, maintains that the “I” typifies the alien-
ated Lacanian subject but expresses her resistance via her performance of 
“excess.” Also critical of French poststructuralist theory for its too easy accep-
tance of gender dichotomies, Stephanie Bird instead shows how different 
modes of responding to historical experience are central to definitions of the 
female subject. Karin Bauer applies categories of queer theory, as elaborated by 
Teresa de Lauretis and Judith Butler, to argue that the love relationship of two 
women in “A Step towards Gomorrah” fails because even Charlotte’s fantasies 
are “censored images always already relegated to the realm of the reproduction 
and reiteration of the norm” (232). Finally, two essays by Elizabeth Boa from 
1990 and 1997 display the transformation of feminist approaches to Bachmann 
in the 1990s. In the first, Boa still draws upon French theory, arguing that 
Malina’s “I” gives expression to the Kristevan semiotic, an expression of female 
desire that can be conceived of as simultaneously regressive and, in its challenge 
to the symbolic ruled by the law of the father, subversive. By 1997, in contrast, 
she discusses Malina “as expressing less the dilemmas of all women under uni-
versal patriarchy than of an intellectual woman in twentieth-century Austria” 
(“Reading” 271); she also addresses ethnocentrism in Franza, though she con-
cludes that the novel can be defended against that charge “precisely because the 
Other is left largely blank” (“Reading” 286). 
All these essays reveal both the proliferation of feminist approaches during 
the fifteen years 1990–2005 and the more general feminist move towards a more 
historically and culturally specific conception of gender inflected by a range of 
other social categories. And recent Bachmann conferences since the thirtieth 
anniversary of her death (Rome 2003, the papers published in a special issue of 
Cultura tedesca; Dublin 2004; Nottingham 2005; Vienna 2006; Ljubljana 2006)
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with the ensuing essay collections are producing yet more new and innovative 
feminist readings of Bachmann’s texts. 
A 1995 dispute in German Quarterly reveals what is at stake in this transfor-
mation of feminist methods over two decades and why, for academic feminists, 
such methods are of more than academic interest. In the fall number of German 
Quarterly, Albrecht Holschuh published an indignant response to an article by 
Susanne Baackmann on “Undine Goes” takes extreme issue with what he con-
siders her misreading of Bachmann’s text. To Holschuh, Baackmann is guilty 
of pressing the text into a predetermined interpretive schema, associating tex-
tual passages with random extratextual phenomena, appealing to the obligatory 
authorities to substantiate her shaky points, and looking for political relevance 
instead of literary understanding. Moreover, Holschuh claims, Baackmann’s 
essay exemplifies a more widespread practice deriving from a new conception 
of the discipline that has become German Quarterly’s virtual program. “But the 
prevailing practice has disadvantages,” Holschuh warns ominously, “and it’s 
high time to get its effects under control” (430).
So what has Baackmann done to incite such wrath? In her GQ article, as 
in her essay in the 1995 Bachmann issue of text + kritik and in her book Erklär 
mir Liebe (1995), Baackmann employs an approach that is quite representative 
of Bachmann scholarship in transition (and also probably manifests the influ-
ence of her two most important teachers, Sigrid Weigel and Anton Kaes). On 
the one hand, she continues to draw on the French thinkers most influential 
for 1980s feminist theory—Irigaray, Cixous, Kristeva—and also still speaks of 
the place of femininity tout court in discourse or the symbolic order, as if this 
system and its definitions of femininity were not historically variable. But to 
the feminist poststructuralist method she adds a new historicist examination of 
other cultural materials illustrating “the representation of femininity and the 
presence of women in the 1950s and 1960s” in order to show, as she puts it, 
“that Bachmann thematically and via her writing style intervenes into the con-
temporary discussion of femininity and love and in what terms [unter welchem 
Bedeutungshorizont] this discourse circulated in the public sphere during the 
years in which Bachmann was working on The Thirtieth Year” (“Reply” 433). 
Baackmann’s approach is premised on many of the assumptions that inform 
feminist investigations of the late 1990s: that literary texts are not beyond or 
exterior to the social order of a particular period, but are rather both products 
and producers of that society’s discourses, toward which the text may take any 
variety of stances; that texts—and various readings of those texts—are thus in 
no sense politically neutral but can support, subvert, oppose, and so on, various 
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aspects of that social order; that feminist readings (like all others) are partisan 
in specific ways and thus will necessarily stress those aspects that correspond to 
their particular feminist needs.
Holschuh regards all those methodological principles as illegitimate, but, 
as Baackmann’s dignified “reply” underlines, his objections to her reading of 
“Undine Goes” are also founded upon unacknowledged ideological premises. 
By alleging that a literary text can be understood immanently, without reference 
to the society from which it emerges, and by maintaining that concepts such as 
“the absolute,” “spirit,” and “humanity” can have a meaning independent of the 
society that gave them rise, scholars blindly perpetuate the dominant values of 
the reigning order; by insisting that there is a single meaning of the text (perhaps 
guaranteed by the author’s intentions) to which he alone has access, Holschuh 
seems to situate himself as the authoritative purveyor of a single truth and denies 
the polysemy and multivalence of the text and the multiplicity of subject posi-
tions assumed by the readers who appropriate it. Finally (and here I am assum-
ing a more polemical position than Baackmann’s own), Holschuh’s military 
imagery—“I’m sorry that so to speak as a front soldier [Baackmann] has entered 
the line of fire” (430)—and his rhetoric in accusing Baackmann of “political 
correctness [das politisch Korrekte]” (432) suggest that his intervention should be 
understood as another volley in what, since the late 1980s, has been termed the 
“culture wars” or the “P.C. debates”: the efforts of conservatives to roll back the 
methodological and curricular changes that were the academic consequences of 
the struggles for social justice on the part of the social movements of the 1960s. 
And certainly Holschuh does nothing to dispel that suspicion when he sarcasti-
cally claims of Baackmann’s approach: “So with a good conscience and not too 
much effort the social sins of all times can be exposed and the scholar’s existence 
at least virtually obtains that political-moral relevance that has glimmered on as 
a fantasy since 1968” (430). This apparently innocuous scholarly exchange thus 
reveals itself to be a small skirmish in a much larger struggle over what kind of 
social order will prevail.
Evidently, I understand my own work, and this book, to form part of that 
struggle. Since, as this chapter must have shown, feminism itself is far from 
monolithic, smaller disputes over strategy and tactics take place among femi-
nists themselves, in places (among others) such as the displaced form of dis-
agreements over readings of texts. Although over the past several decades I have 
myself advanced a number of different interpretations of Bachmann which were 
clearly not always consistent with one another, I have continued to plead for a 
historically grounded understanding of her work. I would argue now that the 
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German feminist appropriation of Bachmann in the 1980s did damage both to 
the understanding of her that is of most utility to feminism and to feminism 
itself. Bachmann’s writing as feminists received it then encouraged them to ask 
certain questions about women’s lives and ignore others, supported what was in 
effect a withdrawal from political contestation in the public arena by portray-
ing issues of the private sphere as most crucial to women, and allowed feminists 
to advance a monocausal analysis of women’s situation: all women always only 
victims of all men. Her work thus supported political tendencies which had by 
the late 1970s moved to the fore in many Western feminisms: a concentration 
on the private realm, culture, psychic structures, and interiority to the relative 
neglect of social structures and the public arena. In my view, those developments 
produced a depoliticization of feminism from which we may still have not com-
pletely recovered.
But as this chapter has shown, the 1980s feminist appropriation of Bachmann 
is not the only feminist reading of Bachmann possible. It appears to me that fem-
inist readings of Bachmann from the 1990s onward (like my own) begin by mak-
ing several assumptions about how to think about Bachmann in her historical 
context. First, feminist Bachmann scholars return to questions asked in the 1960s, 
exploring how the deformations of private life portrayed in Bachmann’s writings 
are related to larger social structures—and this time not to an abstract, general-
ized, monolithic, and all-embracing patriarchy or phallogocentrism but to 
particular historical and social determinants of which gender is only one—and 
how those issues find representation in Bachmann’s texts. That is, we attempt to 
return Bachmann to history and history to Bachmann. Second, we may view 
Bachmann’s relationship to poststructuralism, for which indeed a good deal of 
evidence exists, as itself a historical phenomenon; we might even concede that 
Bachmann’s affinities to French poststructuralist thought (or any other intellec-
tual or literary tradition) may well tell us nothing at all about the “truth” of 
women but is evidence only of the fact that some (women) intellectuals wrote 
at approximately the same time, turned to the same intellectual precursors, and 
used them to arrive at similar conclusions. And finally, we have begun to aban-
don what Leslie Morris in conversation called our “wishful thinking” about 
Bachmann’s politics, our attempt to make her conform to our ideas about what 
the proper form of feminist (or other) theory and practice should be. For as 
Hans Werner Henze told Morris in an interview conducted on 2 August 1988,
though Bachmann was a committed antifascist, she was in fact—especially vis-
à-vis the possibilities for political action the 1960s offered—not otherwise very 
politically engaged. Instead, we can now regard Bachmann’s writing with a 
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more dispassionate eye, consider her limitations as well as her virtues, and inves-
tigate her and her texts as products of a particular historical moment which is 
no longer our own. With this grounding in history as their starting point, femi-
nist scholars can begin to appropriate and elaborate new methods of feminist 
analysis, ask new questions about aspects and areas of Bachmann’s work other 
than those that 1980s feminists considered, and perhaps advance readings of 
Bachmann’s works that could be of increased utility to feminist thought and 
practice in the first and subsequent decades of the new millennium. 
The questions I myself ask about Bachmann’s work and the assumptions I 
make about it derive, of course, from my own social and historical location and 
are generated by my own intellectual interests—among other things, my desire 
to elaborate a method for feminist scholarship that is adequate to the investi-
gation of the relationship of historical situatedness, gender, and textuality; my 
commitment to a feminism that acknowledges and respects women’s difference; 
and my continued allegiance to an anticapitalist politics. My present reading of 
Bachmann, like all others (including the quite different interpretations of her 
work that I myself have advanced over the past several decades), is one that 
grows out of my particular needs and accords with my own political agenda. 
That positionality produces, I hope, new kinds of insights into Bachmann’s texts 
but is also, I am sure, responsible for other sorts of blindnesses. After twenty 
years of poststructuralism, I would not want to argue for a single truth of the 
text, nor would I wish to maintain that any reading (except perhaps one that 
willfully flies in the face of the evidence of the text), is false, wrong, or a misread-
ing (though I might want to oppose it for other, political reasons). As Bachmann 
herself maintained in the passage that I have chosen as the first epigraph for this 
chapter, literary texts deserve and can accommodate many different readings, 
and we should be prepared to grant their legitimacy while recognizing that dif-
ferent interpretive postures will serve different and contending interests, includ-
ing those that are non- or even antifeminist. Our feminist reading remains 
merely one among others; we as feminists have no special advantage that allows 
us to transcend our own historical situation or gives us special insight into the 
meanings of Bachmann’s works. To vary my second epigraph, women readers, 
too, when they read, are readers of themselves. What we, like Bachmann’s other 
readers, find in her texts will also inevitably be at least in part a mirror of our 
own concerns. 
PART II
A History of Reading 
Bachmann
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“Around 1981,” Jane Gallop observes in her book of the same title, “a good num-
ber of feminist literary academics in this country were focused on the ‘difference 
between French and American feminism,’ on the question of psychoanalysis or 
deconstruction and their usefulness or danger. ‘We’ were not only American 
feminists like me who thought French psychoanalytic, deconstructive theory a 
great thing but also those who expended a good deal of energy attacking it. 
Around 1981, this conflict, this debate seemed central, and to many more aca-
demics than me, to feminist literary studies” (3). Now, gazing back from the 
perspective of the early twenty-first century on the battles that then rent U.S. 
academic feminism, the distinctions between these two methods of feminist cul-
tural analysis seem much smaller, and the course that American (academic) fem-
inism has taken since its emergence in the late 1960s might even be understood 
as leading toward the convergence of the two approaches. In its earliest phases 
of both activism and analysis, the U.S. women’s movement primarily agitated 
against men’s sexist treatment of and discrimination against women. Socialist 
feminists (indebted to a Marxist, class-based paradigm) and radical feminists 
(who saw men’s oppression of women as primary) sought a revolutionary social 
transformation, whereas liberal feminists wanted equality in a society otherwise 
unchanged, but all agreed that women possessed the same capabilities as men 
and deserved the same opportunities. 
The earliest feminist literary scholarship focused, like Kate Millett in her 
groundbreaking Sexual Politics (1970), on male (and sometimes even female) 
authors’ stereotypical images of women. Susan Koppelman Cornillon, for 
instance, declared in the preface to her anthology Images of Women in Fiction
(1972) that her book addressed all of women’s social roles, “beginning with the 
most desiccated and lifeless traditional stereotypes of woman as heroine and 
as invisible person, progressing through an awakening to reality, wherein the 
woman is treated as person, and ending with the newest insistence by women 
that we are equal in all respects to men”(x). But by the mid-1970s (perhaps under 
the influence of the new groups of women without experience in the social 
movements of the 1960s who now declared their allegiance to feminism), many 
academic and nonacademic feminists had arrived at a much-altered understand-
ing of women’s situation and the tasks that would be necessary to ameliorate 
it. As the influence of socialist feminism waned with the decline of the New 
Left, a new kind of radical feminist assumed leadership of the movement. Radi-
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cal feminists now took the position that women were not only different from 
men but perhaps even superior to them, so that existing gender differences 
(which, some argued, included qualities that might be considered fundamen-
tally female) should be preserved and elaborated, not elided or obscured. Some 
feminists attempted to determine qualities that could be identified as particu-
larly, perhaps essentially female—attachment to life, peacefulness, capacity to 
form connections and embrace interdependency, cooperation, tolerance of ambi-
guity. Feminists of the later 1970s sought to discover in the past and elaborate 
in the present an already existent female counterculture. Culture thus became 
the appropriate realm for political activity, and the proper political practice for 
feminists increasingly came to be seen not as challenging male dominance in the 
public arena—a domain somewhat contemptuously relegated to liberal femi-
nists—but as constructing autonomous or even separatist feminist institutions. 
No politically correct woman, radical feminists argued, would wish to enter 
into any sort of relationship with men, let alone assume an “equal” position in 
institutions dominated by them.
“Cultural feminism,” as this feminist tendency came to be called in the late 
1970s, loosed an enormous energy and creativity: the past accomplishments of 
women were rediscovered and celebrated and a wide array of new feminist insti-
tutions brought into being: battered women’s shelters, rape crisis lines, women’s 
centers, bookstores, restaurants, journals, publishing houses, record companies, 
rock groups, and even “the other MLA,” as feminists in the seventies referred to 
a whole range of feminist counterevents within the official convention. Though 
early U.S. feminists had regarded psychoanalysis as a field dominated by sex-
ist male analysts endeavoring to reconcile women to their traditional femi-
nine duties, by the late 1970s, under the influence of scholarly studies such as 
Juliet Mitchell’s Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974), Dorothy Dinnerstein’s The 
Mermaid and the Minotaur (1977), and Nancy Chodorow’s The Reproduction 
of Mothering (1978), cultural (and other) feminists used psychoanalysis to pro-
vide an explanation for why and how girls relinquished their first love objects, 
their mothers, and learned to assume their proper position within a patriarchal 
order. In her influential Signs article “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian 
Existence” (1980), Adrienne Rich maintains that women choose male sexual 
partners and otherwise “collaborate” with men only as a consequence of male 
violence and situates all woman-identified experience on what she terms a “les-
bian continuum.” The paradigmatic work of cultural feminism in the late 1970s
was Mary Daly’s Gyn/Ecology (1978). Daly details the crimes of male culture 
(ruled by a single necrophilic principle which sometimes seems to derive from 
male anatomy), catalogues the multitude of ways in which all women can be per-
ceived to be victims of all men, and, in a brilliant series of wordplays, attempts 
to recover original feminist meanings in a language debased by men. For Daly, 
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the task of feminists is to repudiate, by an act of will, their identification with 
male culture, separate themselves from patriarchy, and join in a voyage toward a 
community of free lesbian women—Spinsters, Hags, and Crones.
Under the influence of cultural feminism, the question that dominated the 
work of literary scholars up to the early 1980s had been posed by Silvia 
Bovenschen: “Is There a Feminine Aesthetic?” As Elaine Showalter observed, 
the appropriate activity of feminist literary scholars was “gynocritics,” defined as 
“the study of women as writers, and its subjects are the history, styles, themes, 
genres, and structures of writing by women; the psychodynamics of female 
creativity; the trajectory of the individual or collective female career; and the evo-
lution and laws of a female literary tradition” (“Feminist” 248). From the late
1970s to the present the vast majority of feminist literary analyses have focused 
on writing by women. Within the various national literatures feminists 
attempted to retrieve lost and neglected women writers, to establish the canon-
ical literary figures of feminism, to uncover a female countertradition, to iden-
tify the literary qualities that distinguish women’s writing from men’s. At issue 
was not merely feminist content but also form, for if the shape, the morphology 
of every aspect of female experience was different from men’s, then that differ-
ence would inevitably also express itself in the aesthetic forms necessary to con-
tain it. Or, as Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar emphasize in The Madwoman in 
the Attic (1979), if women writers are constrained to use men’s methods and fol-
low their rules, at the very least they succeed in embedding their own subversive 
message like a palimpsest in their texts, and those cryptic communications can 
be retrieved by a later generation of feminist scholars who have learned to read 
against the grain texts endeavoring to accommodate themselves to patriarchal 
norms.
Such feminist accomplishments in many areas of cultural analysis pre-
pared the ground on which “French feminist” theory would flourish (battles 
between proponents of “French” and “American” feminism notwithstanding), 
and at least in the version in which U.S. feminist academics received French 
feminism, the two tendencies seemed to display many similarities. The French 
thinkers (of whom Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva were the 
most frequently cited) seemed to propose that some qualities were shared by all 
women, that those qualities had been suppressed by men (or a male-dominated 
system of signification), and that access to them could be achieved by attend-
ing to the specificity of the female body, the female unconscious, and female 
language. Whether in Kristeva’s appeal to a presymbolic, “semiotic” realm of 
poetic languages deriving from the child’s connection to the mother’s body, 
Cixous’s demand that we write in mother’s milk, or Irigary’s two lips speaking 
their jouissance or orgasmic pleasure, the maternal body and female eroticism 
were central to the release of that which a phallogocentric symbolic order had 
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prevented from expressing itself. Culture was hence the most important realm 
within which to challenge patriarchy, since it had been systems of signification 
(often delimited by the adjective “Western,” though adherents of this paradigm 
never investigated whether “non-Western” structures of representation might 
function differently) that were responsible for the systematic repression of femi-
ninity and hence must be challenged by finding some alternative voice in which 
women might nonetheless speak. By thus breaking the silence and claiming 
their right to a female subjectivity the possibility of whose existence Western 
discourse denies, women draw into question the premises on which Western 
symbolic systems rest and, as a revolutionary act, explode the entire phallogo-
centric order. As in the analyses of the groups around the French journal Tel 
quel, the French feminist approach placed special emphasis upon the revolution-
ary potential of avantgarde literary texts, termed by the French feminists écriture 
féminine or sometimes parler femme. Via their appropriation of French theory, 
feminist literary scholars in the United States were able to arrive by a different 
route at the same conclusions (very flattering to their own discipline) to which 
United States feminist theory had led them: that literary texts by women and 
the feminist analysis of them constituted one of the most (if not the most) crucial 
sites of feminist intervention.
From the perspective of the early twenty-first century (and within the frame-
work of this book), it may seem startling that I have been able to produce such 
a historical narrative of academic feminism without any reference to histori-
cal events that may have helped to shape it. It is also hard to understand how 
feminists of that era could have advanced analyses so breathtakingly unaware 
of women’s historical situation and the various historically specific forces that 
interacted to produce it. Such obliviousness to history and culture, however, was 
itself characteristic of many feminists’ self-understanding in this period, who 
were fond of quoting the assertion by Virginia Woolf in Three Guineas: “As a 
woman, I have no country.” In retrospect, feminists’ freedom to disregard the 
larger historical context seems itself historically occasioned, enabled by the mod-
erate liberalism of the 1970s which allowed feminists still to imagine that they 
could preserve or establish women’s spaces exterior to male power. And though 
cultural feminism was founded on assumptions that now seem demonstrably 
incorrect, for a time those premises were enormously productive for a particu-
lar group of white, middle-class women (arguably still the hegemonic group 
within academic feminism). The women’s movement has probably never again 
recovered the vitality it manifested in the 1970s. Those premises were to be chal-
lenged “around 1981,” though feminist literary scholars had perhaps not yet seen 
the writing on the wall.
In February 1981, Tom Hayden, writing in the Nation, declared: “What the 
conservatives called ‘bleeding heart liberalism’ finally hemorrhaged and died in 
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1980” (193). In “The Wraps Are Off,” the first editorial of the Nation’s first issue 
in 1981, its editors drew the consequence:
Let there be no illusions about the nature of the new Government of the United 
States, composed of Reagan et al. (and especially Al Haig), and the 97th Congress. 
Forget the Honeymoon. Dismiss the notion that the Presidency enobles. Prepare 
for the very worst. . . .
On the evidence of the Cabinet choices and the radical policy formulations of 
the “transition,” there seems little doubt about where Reaganism is heading. We 
had better start preparing to resist. The interlude of spurious hope is over. (3–4)
The hopes of the women’s movement had been curtailed as well. In the context 
of a Nation series in November–December 1981 on the future of the women’s 
movement, Frances Lear asserted tersely: “Feminism has had a generous share 
of heroes, but the 1980 elections proved that it does not have clout” (635). In the 
same series, Ellen Willis began her article by taking account of the changed cir-
cumstances: “The momentum of the movement has drastically slowed, and if it is 
to survive, let alone progress, it must regroup and begin a new offensive” (494). 
Willis took particular aim at cultural feminism because of its damaging 
impact on the women’s movement more generally:
While cultural feminism has always been one tendency in the women’s move-
ment, in recent years it has become increasingly prominent and more aggressive 
in attempting to establish itself as the feminist orthodoxy. It has been a drag on 
the movement in two ways. First, it provides no intellectual basis for a concrete 
antisexist politics. If anything, it does the opposite, channeling female energy into 
counter-cultural projects, fantasies of restoring an alleged golden age of matriar-
chy, or moral crusades against male vice. It also reinforces oppressive cultural ste-
reotypes, especially the assumption that men have a monopoly on aggression and 
active genital sexuality (cultural feminists often equate the two), while women are 
nonviolent, nurturing and more interested in affection than in sex. (495)
She and the other contributors to the Nation series called upon feminists to 
break out of their isolation and to reaffirm their allegiance to oppositional poli-
tics. Indeed, over the course of the 1980s, a new attention to women’s historical 
situatedness would come to shape feminist activism, theory, and analysis. As I 
hope Part 2 of this book will show, over the decade the new feminist orienta-
tion would “trickle down” (a favored image of those years) to feminist literary 
scholarship as well.
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CHAPTER 3
In the Cemetery of the 
Murdered Daughters
MALINA
Look, she said, but the pharaoh 
forgot that though he had eradicated 
her, she was still there. It can still be 
read, because nothing is there where 
in fact something should be. 
 —Ingeborg Bachmann, The Book of Franza
Ingeborg Bachmann’s Malina is about the absence of a female 
voice; in some respects it reads like an illustration of the feminist theory which 
has evolved since its publication to explain why, within Western discourse, 
women are permitted no voice and subjectivity of their own. It may be that 
feminism is the collective struggle of women to constitute that voice, but that 
battle has barely begun. In what voice, then, does a female scholar write about 
the absence of a female voice? I have realized that my struggle with Malina,
Bachmann’s struggle to write it, and the struggle she describes in it are all part 
of the larger war in which we women (against our will and often without our 
conscious knowledge) are combatants—and which may have killed Bachmann. 
“Our bodies, falling, will dam that great river of sexism,” Tillie Olsen said in 
1979 at the MLA, “and over us others will pass.” Feminist literary scholars still 
speak mostly with that sovereign (male) voice which explains the literary text 
to less astute readers. (What other choice do we have, particularly given our 
precarious position at the edge of academics? We have to play by their rules.) 
But Malina shows what women lose when they try to accommodate themselves 
to the categories of male subjectivity. Though Bachmann is without solutions 
herself, we feminists can read her novel as part of our struggle to challenge those 
categories within which we have no right to speak as women and to construct 
some other, more authentic, female voice.
Bachmann explained in a 1972 interview that her novel Malina, published the 
previous year, had provided solutions to problems of composition with which she 
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had struggled for years. With Malina as opening or overture, she could proceed 
with her work in progress, a mammoth novel cycle titled “Ways of Death”: “I 
wrote almost a thousand pages before this book, and these last 400 pages from 
the very last years became the beginning that I had always lacked. I didn’t find 
the entrance to that book—and for me this has now become the book which 
makes my access to the Ways of Death possible” (GuI 96). How, the interviewer 
asks, did she happen upon the double figure of Malina and the “I” of the novel?
For me it’s one of the oldest, if almost inaccessible memories: that I always knew I 
had to write this book—very early already, while I was still writing poems. That 
I constantly searched for the main character. That I knew: it would be male. That 
I could only narrate from the standpoint of a male character. But I often asked 
myself: Why? I didn’t understand, in the stories either, why I so often had to use 
a male “I.” It was like finding my character to be able not to deny this female “I” 
and nonetheless to emphasize the male “I.” (GuI 99–100)
Of all the authors mentioned in Malina, not a single one is a woman: for Bach-
mann, there is no female narrative voice. At the end of the novel, the female “I” 
disappears into a crack in the wall, and only Malina is left. “It was murder,” 
reads the novel’s last line (Malina 239). “Malina will be able to tell us,” Bach-
mann explains, “what the other part of his character, the ‘I,’ left behind for him” 
(GuI 96). These are the “ways of death,” told in Malina’s male voice, experienced 
by the female “I” and the cause of her destruction.
The novel Malina itself has been badly received and ill-understood since its 
publication in 1971. Most recently [1980], Marcel Reich-Ranicki called it Bach-
mann’s “late, incidentally weak and confused novel” (“Tageslicht” 387); in the 
latest installment of the Kritisches Lexikon zur Gegenwartsliteratur (Critical lexi-
con of contemporary literature) Bernd Witte gives probably the most accurate 
assessment of it yet, but in his limited space he must ignore most of the work’s 
difficulty. But Malina is a difficult work, and its relative inaccessibility is tied very 
closely to its subject matter. Before her death, Bachmann published another vol-
ume of prose, the short story collection Three Paths to the Lake, which seems to be 
part of the “Ways of Death” cycle, since its characters appear also in both Malina
and the cycle’s unfinished novels. In 1978, four volumes of Bachmann’s collected 
works appeared, including the mostly completed novel The Book of Franza, the 
novel fragment Requiem for Fanny Goldmann, and some longer fragments whose 
position in the larger cycle is not clear. The Werke also contain Bachmann’s essays 
from the 1950s and 1960s. From these various writings it is possible to conclude a 
great deal about her purposes for the “Ways of Death” in general and Malina in 
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particular, why these were subjects that concerned Bachmann from the time she 
began writing, and why, most specifically, the struggle to find a narrative voice to 
tell the “Ways of Death” realized itself in a text that took the shape of Malina.
Trained as a philosopher at the University of Vienna by Viktor Kraft, one of 
the last of the grand old men of logical positivism (GuI 82), Bachmann explored 
her concern with the possibilities of language from her student days onward. 
From the beginning, however, her examination of language was an idiosyn-
cratic one, more akin to the concerns of present-day poststructuralism than to 
mainstream logical positivism, as her two 1950s essay on Ludwig Wittgenstein 
show. For what interests Bachmann most about Wittgenstein is not his analysis 
of what language can say, but what it can’t: “The limits of my language mean 
the limits of my world.” For Wittgenstein, a mystical appropriation of the world 
is also possible which does not participate in the limitations of language: “There 
is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical” (Tractatus 149, 
187). What Bachmann finds in Wittgenstein is the possibility of a response to 
the world which transcends the categories of occidental reason, as she quite 
explicitly indicates in a radio essay:
first speaker: Does Wittgenstein not in fact come to the same conclusion as Pas-
cal? Let’s hear what the author of the Pensées said three hundred years before him: 
“The last step of reason is the recognition that there is an infinitude of things that 
surpass it.”
second speaker: Wittgenstein took this last step of reason. He who says like Witt-
genstein: “God does not reveal himself in the world” says also implicitly “Vere 
tu es deus absconditus.” For about what should one keep silent if not about that 
beyond limits—about the hidden god, about the ethical and aesthetic as mystical 
experiences of the heart which take place in the unsayable. (W 3: 120)
Moreover, Bachmann pursues this line of thought in Wittgenstein’s work 
into his later Philosophical Investigations, where she identifies his project as an 
attempt to abolish the language of philosophy, understood as a system of abstract 
categories, and substitute for it some other way of speaking which is closer to 
the texture of daily life: “It is Wittgenstein’s conviction that philosophy has to be 
brought to rest by us so that it is no longer tormented by questions which place 
it itself in question, and he believed that we can silence the problems if our lan-
guage functions well and sensibly, if it lives and breathes in use. Only where 
language, which is a form of life, is taken out of use, where it runs dry—and that 
happens, in his opinion, when it is used philosophically, in the usual sense—do 
problems come about. These problems are not to be solved but rather to be got-
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ten rid of” (W 4: 124). Using metaphors which will emerge again in the “Ways 
of Death,” Bachmann argues that Wittgenstein’s philosophy will undertake a 
healing of the sickness that philosophical problems now represent: “And since 
language is a labyrinth of ways—as he terms it at another point—philosophy 
must take up the struggle against the bewitching of our understanding through 
language. Philosophy must destroy castles in the air and reveal the basis of lan-
guage, it must be like a therapy, for philosophical problems are sicknesses which 
have to be healed. It’s not a solution but a cure that he calls for” (W 4: 124). 
The implications of what Bachmann hints at here are far-reaching: she points 
towards fundamental and inherent defects of our present language (which is to 
say, of the entire mode of thought that we know), which her choice of metaphor 
allies with the human body or psyche (“therapy,” “sickness”) and which can be 
overcome only through some transformation in the present condition of lan-
guage/philosophy—that is, of present human categories of thought.
But Bachmann’s essays also identify ways of speaking already outside the 
categories of Western reason. Particularly interesting is her essay on Georg 
Groddeck, to whom her short story “Eyes to Wonder” in Three Paths to the Lake
is dedicated. Groddeck, a psychoanalyst slightly older than Freud and loosely 
allied with him, originated the term “It” (“Es” in German, “Id” in English 
translations of Freud), which represented for him the speech of the body. For 
Groddeck, Bachmann explains, a physical symptom “is a production, like an 
artistic one, and sickness means something. It wants to say something, it says it 
by its particular way of appearing, running its course, and disappearing or end-
ing fatally. It says what the sick person doesn’t understand, although it’s his most 
particular expression.” Passionately, Bachmann speaks of Groddeck’s recogni-
tion of the power of the It over the relatively powerless ego: “The It is a word he 
uses for lack of better, it’s not a thing in itself but is supposed to mean some-
thing’s there, it’s there and stronger and much stronger than the ego, for the ego 
can’t even intentionally intervene in breathing, in digestion, in blood circulation, 
the ego is a mask, a pretension with which all of us go about—and we are ruled 
by the It, the It does that, and it speaks through sickness in symbols” (W 4: 352). 
Important here are Bachmann’s insistence that human desire cannot be con-
tained, though its needs refuse the categories which the ego has accepted, and 
her allying of the speech (the attempt to signify) of Groddeck’s It to artistic pro-
ductions, where that which the ego had not wanted to say or known it was say-
ing can break through into signifying material and speak itself behind the back, 
against the will, of the signifying subject.
Finally, a variety of Bachmann’s essays from this earlier period as well as 
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several short stories and her radio play “The Good God of Manhattan” address 
head on the role of Eros as source both of resistance to this social order and of 
the possible articulation of some alternative to it. The subversive power of Eros 
is also associated with the mysticism on which she had touched in the Wittgen-
stein essay, a mode of articulation beyond the borders of language. The influ-
ence of Critical Theory is apparent here, not simply Herbert Marcuse but also 
Ernst Bloch: love is a concrete utopia that points toward some future social order 
less hostile to human happiness. To understand the relevance of these utopian 
love affairs for the “Ways of Death,” however, it is also necessary to recognize 
that they are antisocial, contravening fundamental social taboos, and that this 
dimension of the revolt of desire is exactly what constitutes their utopianism. 
Bachmann’s radio essay on Marcel Proust, whom she terms a “positivist and 
mystic” (W 4: 180), concentrates mainly on the theme of homosexuality in his 
work: “The latent revolt of the individual against society, nature against moral-
ity, led him to the conception of the ‘homme traqué,’ the hounded, surrounded 
human being of whom the invert is only an especially clear example” (W 4: 160). 
As Bachmann explains it, the love of Musil’s Ulrich for his sister Agathe more 
clearly still elaborates a utopian alternative with explicit social relevance. This 
love is an alternative, ecstatic, quasi-mystical condition of mind which, though 
not itself applicable to a changed social order, fulfills its function in negating and 
disrupting the present dominant order: “It’s true that the ‘other condition’ leads 
from society into absolute freedom, but now Ulrich knows that the utopia of this 
other life makes no prescriptions for the practice of life and, for a life in society, 
has to be replaced by the utopia of the given social condition—Musil calls it 
that of the ‘inductive attitude.’ But both utopias bring about the replacement 
of closed ideologies with open ones” (W 4: 27). Moreover—and this is of major 
importance for the “Ways of Death”—for Bachmann the order of thought that 
Ulrich’s ecstasy opposes, those closed ideologies, has a direct and causal con-
nection to war, a term which here includes not just the national conflicts of the 
twentieth century, but the general state of contemporary society: “Not only the 
case of Kakania has shown that thinking in closed ideologies leads directly to 
war, and the permanent war of faith is still the order of the day” (W 4: 27). A 
variety of Bachmann’s earlier creative writings also locate a basic resistance to the 
dominant order of thought in love, so that to pursue this love would be almost 
to foment revolution, to change the world utterly: “A Step towards Gomorrah,” 
“A Wildermuth,” “Undine Goes” from The Thirtieth Year. But though with the 
exception of “A Step towards Gomorrah” these loves are taboo only in that they 
are illicit, what is important to notice with respect to the particular relevance of 
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these stories to the “Ways of Death” is that the promise of satisfaction for which 
desire longs is embodied in women. In “The Good God of Manhattan,” love 
is “another state of being” and “crossing a boundary” (“GG” 182), which Jan, 
the man, cannot sustain. He retreats to a corner bar, “lapsed. Routine stretched 
its hand out to him for a moment” (“GG” 96). Jennifer, the woman, keeps the 
faith and is blown sky-high by the Good God to reestablish his divine, patriar-
chal normality.
It is not clear (nor does it matter much) whether a coherent theory underlies 
these various concerns of Bachmann’s earlier writing—though it is hard to 
believe that this erudite woman, with her particular interests in philosophy, 
psychology, and language, did not follow the latest developments in European 
thought in the 1960s and 1970s. In any case, that theory exists now (a theory 
that addresses the problem of coherence and incoherence) and can be used to 
explain the conjuncture of interests that meet in the “Ways of Death.” For even 
the most superficial reading of Bachmann’s late prose should make clear who is 
being killed in these various ways (and also that “death” can be the death of the 
spirit as well as of the body): women. Recent feminist theory, drawing particu-
larly on the work of Derrida and Lacan, argues that the oppression of women 
is structured into the fundamental categories of our thought, which must be 
transformed if women are to achieve an autonomous subjectivity of their own. 
This order, as Derrida argues, is logocentric, predicated on the assertion of a 
logos, a central term or presence-to-itself (whose name has varied historically: 
God, essence, substance, consciousness, man, etc.) against which all other terms 
are measured. The laws of logocentricity which structure all our thought are 
learned through the child’s appropriation of language and constitute its funda-
mental categories. But as Lacanian psychoanalysis maintains, through this 
entry into language infants are also constituted as gendered human beings: to 
take on language means to accede to the channeling of infant desire into socially 
appropriate expressions and to assume one’s proper place in the gendered order. 
For women, this means to accept both the preeminence of the phallus, Lacan’s 
“transcendental signifier,” and the “fact” of their own castration. So long as 
they fail to revolt against this order, women logically and in fact will be associ-
ated with the negative term of a logocentric and phallocentric order: object, 
nature, other, absence, silence, lack. Derrida’s endeavor is of course to decon-
struct self-identity, presence-to-itself, by showing that it was never that which it 
asserted itself to be. Bachmann’s intent in the “Ways of Death” and particularly 
Malina, I would like to argue here, is a similar one. This work, with which she 
struggled for so long, shows that the destruction of women—though it be a 
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destruction they themselves accept—is a necessary consequence of the order in 
which they live. But even as they are destroyed, they speak, cry out, rebel: their 
desire will not be completely contained. The current women’s movement barely 
existed when Bachmann died in 1973, and she can conceive women only as 
victims. Perhaps we are further than that today—but it is important that we 
know what she has to tell us. 
The dilemma that Bachmann confronts and represents in Malina involves 
women’s place in the symbolic order. How can it be possible for her, a woman, 
to write about women when exactly what she wishes to assert makes her own 
position as woman wielding the pen impossible? This awareness of oneself as a 
contradiction in terms traces its way through Malina in recurrent phrases which 
express both extraordinary pain and perseverance: “Those who have to live 
a Why can endure almost any How,” and, most poignantly, in view of Bach-
mann’s own death by fire, “Avec ma main brulée, j’écris sur la nature du feu” 
(with my burned hand, I write of the nature of fire). Damaged herself, she will 
insist on overcoming her injuries to write of their causes. But what voice does she 
assume? Monique Wittig, in her introduction to The Lesbian Body, addressed 
this problem of the lack of a female “I” in our language, pointing out that sub-
jectivity is generically human, which is to say male, in Western thought: 
“I” [Je] as a generic feminine subject can only enter by force into a language which 
is foreign to it, for all that is human [masculine] is foreign to it, the human not 
being feminine grammatically speaking but he [il] or they [ils]. “I” [Je] conceals 
the sexual differences of the verbal persons while specifying them in verbal inter-
change. “I” [Je] obliterates the fact that elle or elles are submerged in il or ils, i.e. 
that the feminine persons are complementary to the masculine persons. The femi-
nine “I” [Je] who is speaking can fortunately forget this difference and assume 
indifferently the masculine language. But the “I” [Je] who writes is driven back 
to her specific experience as subject. The “I” [Je] who writes is alien to her own 
writing at every word because this “I” [Je] uses a language alien to her; this “I” [Je]
experiences what is alien to her since this “I” [Je] cannot be “un ecrivain.” If, in 
writing je, I adopt this language, this je cannot do so. J/e is the symbol of the lived, 
rending experience which is m/y writing, of this cutting in two which throughout 
literature is the exercise of a language which does not constitute m/e as subject. J/e 
poses the ideological and historic question of feminine subjects. (x) 
Wittig drew attention to her problem by orthographic splitting; Bachmann’s 
solution is analogous, as we will see. 
Moreover, if another writing is necessary even to begin to examine the 
possibility of the female articulation of subjectivity, it is clear that, for us, 
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another, different, reading will be entailed as well—as feminist critics, most 
brilliantly Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, have begun to argue. For, Gilbert 
and Gubar point out, what traditional scholarship regards as the strangeness of 
women’s writing may result both from their own difficulty in writing with a 
male “I” and from the necessity to transform male narrative to fit the forms of 
female lives: 
They [women writers] may have attempted to transcend their anxiety of author-
ship by revising male genres, using them to record their own dreams and their own 
stories in disguise. Such writers, therefore, both participated in and . . . “swerved” 
from the central sequences of male literary history, enacting a uniquely female 
process of revision that necessarily caused them to seem “odd.” . . . [W]omen . . . 
produced literary works that are in some sense palimpsestic, works whose surface 
designs conceal or obscure deeper, less accessible, (and less socially acceptable) lev-
els of meaning. (Madwoman 73)
No doubt, many scholarly difficulties with Bachmann’s writing result from 
the attempt to understand it in terms of exactly those categories that she is trying 
to subvert. Cited in the center of Bachmann’s novel is the Ibsen play which also 
gives its title to Adrienne Rich’s famous essay on female creativity. Rich’s essay 
begins: “Ibsen’s When We Dead Awaken is a play about the use that the male art-
ist and thinker—in the process of creating culture as we know it—has made of 
women, in his life and in his work, and about a woman’s slow struggling awak-
ening to the use to which her life has been put.” Women in the “Ways of Death” 
rarely awaken to an understanding of the male order (though they often cry out 
in their sleep), but a feminist reading of Bachmann’s late works could be part of 
our awakening. Rich continues: 
Re-vision—the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old 
text from a new critical direction—is for women more than a chapter in cultural 
history: it is an act of survival. Until we can understand the assumptions in which 
we are drenched we cannot know ourselves. And this drive to self-knowledge, for 
women, is more than a search for identity: it is part of our refusal of the self-
destructiveness of male-dominated society. A radical critique of literature, femi-
nist in its impulse, would take the work first of all as a clue to how we live, how we 
have been living, how we have been led to imagine ourselves, how our language 
has trapped as well as liberated us, how the very act of naming has been till now 
male prerogative, and how we can begin to see and name—and therefore live—
afresh. (“When” 34–35).
This, evidently, is part of Bachmann’s purpose in Malina.
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To begin this strange book is already to be put off balance. The “Malina” of 
the title appears to be the first name of a woman but is identified in the initial cast 
of characters as the last name of a man. (There are in fact plenty of last-name 
Malinas in the Vienna phone book, yet it is clear that this confusion is inten-
tional.) The “I,” whose female identity emerges only slowly, has no name at all, 
though she shares some qualities with Bachmann herself: “born in Klagenfurt.” 
But Malina too has some characteristics which, ironically transformed, are remi-
niscent of Bachmann: “Author of an apocrypha no longer available in bookstores, 
but which sold a few copies in the late fifties.” Apocrypha: writings of doubtful 
authenticity or authorship. Malina’s occupation puts him in his place once and for 
all: “employed in the Austrian Army Museum,” to preside over the relics and 
mementos of past wars, of an empire and way of life which has already suc-
cumbed to history (Malina 1). (Elsewhere in the novel the “I” remarks of Vienna: 
“I am very glad to live here, because from this point on the planet where nothing 
more is happening, a confrontation with the world is all the more frightening, 
here one is neither self-righteous nor self-satisfied, as this is not some protected 
island, but a haven of decay, wherever you go there is decay, decay everywhere, 
right before our eyes, and not just the decay of yesterday’s empire, but today’s as 
well” [Malina 59].) 
Though Malina is presented as an independent character and continues to 
be elaborated as one throughout the novel, it is clear early on that there is some-
thing odd about his relationship to the “I”: “For years my relationship with 
Malina consisted of awkward meetings, absolute follies and the biggest possible 
misunderstandings—I mean of course much greater misunderstandings than 
with other people. Certainly I was subordinate to him from the beginning, and 
I must have known early on that he was destined to be my doom, that Malina’s 
place was already occupied by Malina even before he entered my life” (Malina
5). Bachmann has made clear enough in a number of interviews that Malina is 
the double of the “I” (though, she says, the reader need not necessarily grasp the 
relationship to appreciate the novel) and that he represents male subjectivity, a 
position that a woman must occupy, a guise that she must assume, according to 
the rules of this social order, if she is to possess any subjectivity at all. It does not 
make sense within a Freudian paradigm to assert, as Walter Helmut Fritz 
does, that Malina is sometimes a superego for the “I” (24); among other things, 
he is far too nice to her. To be quite clear: Malina is the persona that women 
must assume when they enter the project world; they must become the gender-
less (that is to say, male), liberal, bourgeois subject, suppressing their female 
qualities. Malina is the voice in which Bachmann mostly narrates, the only 
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voice available to professional and academic women, and the voice in which I 
am writing this essay, a borrowed voice, not our own.
Now it is apparent that the invention of Malina solves a good many prob-
lems for both Bachmann and the “I.” In the voice of Malina, Bachmann can 
narrate the rest of the “Ways of Death” in a form apparently coherent, realis-
tic, and accessible—as various reviewers (e.g., Wirsing) remarked with relief 
of Three Paths to the Lake. If Malina does not break with the categories of the 
order he depicts, he nonetheless gives account of the tragedies it occasions with 
kindness and compassion. Bachmann’s fondness for her figure is evident in the 
Toni Kienlechner interview: “There is an important place in the book for me 
where the ‘I’ says that Malina is not out for the demasking that we know from 
literature, that x-ray glance at people which humiliates them, that Malina does 
not look through people but looks at them, that he’s fair to everyone—for other-
wise irony can easily lead to diminishing people” (Kienlechner 101). But though 
Malina moves in the direction of a nineteenth-century narrator, the moral bur-
den of what he has to tell us is none the weaker for that; it is only that we must 
read the moral out of his narratives. In drafts for the figure of Malina, Bach-
mann makes his moral purpose clear. Observing, for instance, the wreckage of 
a civilization at the Frankfurt Book Fair, Malina thunders his wrath like an Old 
Testament prophet: 
You hear, I obey an old language and old concepts, I turn back like all people who 
gaze at what has happened and are turned to stone, and perhaps an angel will 
tell you in time, don’t look back, and then you won’t see Frankfurt consumed in 
smoke and brimstone, as I see it consumed today and twice every year, for ven-
geance has come. Not my vengeance, for I have come to tell and not to judge, but 
judgment haunts all the stories, and lamentation in the smoke when it rises to 
heaven and is told. (TP 1: 364)
Malina tells; we judge.
For the female “I” in Bachmann’s novel, Malina is also a convenient figure, a 
kind of reality principle. He is the one who pays the bills, remembers appoint-
ments, keeps her affairs in order. He is also the calm and soothing voice of male 
reason, who comforts her when she awakens in terror from her nightmares. 
What would we do without him, especially in the middle of the night? It is fool-
ishness, nonsense, forget it and go back to sleep. (Or, at least as often, the voice 
of a sovereign male reason which, in a sober and distanced way, tries to analyze 
the psychological motives for the terror which emerges in the dreams: “I’ll get to 
the point. Why is your ring missing? Did you ever wear a ring? Or course you 
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didn’t” (Malina 144). Lina, the cleaning lady, who is a further splitting off from 
Malina, is also a useful figure; she is clean and orderly and can move furniture 
all by herself, that autonomous, if subservient, superwoman: “Men! gnädige 
Frau, we don’t need any men for that!” (Malina 75). 
But there are also disadvantages when a woman assumes a male persona, 
something like the “double consciousness” of black people which W. E. B. 
Du Bois described: we know who we are seen to be; we know what we assert 
ourselves to be; we have some idea of who we are—and those are not the same 
thing. The tension involved in holding together these disparate parts of the per-
sonality is difficult to sustain. What a fortune-teller reads out of the palm of the 
“I” is no surprise to her:
She said that at first glance it shows an incredible tension, it’s really not a picture 
of one person but of two people standing in extreme opposition to one another, 
it must mean that I am constantly apt to be torn in two; with configurations like 
these, if all the dates I had given were accurate. I asked hopefully: The torn man, 
the torn woman, right? If they were separated it would be livable, maintained 
Frau Novak, but scarcely the way it is, furthermore male and female, reason and 
feeling, productivity and self-destruction also appear in an unusual manner. I 
must have made a mistake with my dates, since she liked me right away, I’m such 
a natural woman, she likes natural people. (Malina 163)
Of course she is a natural woman, hanging on despite the fact that this ten-
sion has become second nature to us. But an even more critical disadvantage to 
asserting (and believing) ourselves to be generically human and not specifically 
female is that we have no access to the female side of ourselves. Subsumed in the 
male, we do not attend to it and cannot tell about it. It is in good part because 
Malina exists, as a dimension of the “I” to which she clings, that she has no nar-
rative voice, as she sometimes recognizes: “Malina interrupts me, he is protect-
ing me, but I think his wanting to protect me is preventing me from telling. It’s 
Malina who isn’t letting me talk [erzählen]” (Malina 175). As in Christa Wolf’s 
story “Self-Experiment,” for women to become men seems the most obvious 
solution to centuries of women’s oppression. But it may also mean that women 
lose what is most important to them. 
Yet to demonize men as somehow ontologically incompatible with the female 
is also too easy a solution. As it has been the burden of deconstruction to show, 
male subjectivity is not altogether unproblematic or identical with itself, either. 
How much more this must then be the case of a male subjectivity assumed by a 
woman! Examined more closely, Malina himself is a suspicious figure; perhaps 
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it’s for this reason that he can narrate the “Ways of Death” at all. As Rainer 
Nägele has pointed out, “Shuffled anew, the letters of the name produce an 
animal which, if you cut off its tail, spiritualizes itself into an anima” (38). An 
“animal” is hidden in Malina, a metaphor which Bachmann also pursued in her 
short story “The Barking,” where the old woman finally rebelling in her senility 
against her tyrannical son is overwhelmed by the imaginary barking of the dog 
her son had hated (it is also interesting that in her loving topography of Vienna’s 
Third District, the one large landmark the “I” suppresses is the Tierärztliche 
Hochschule [Veterinary School], right around the corner from the Ungargasse). 
Malina also has a female double in the novel, Maria Malina, a Viennese actress 
much more famous than he, her name combining the two most popular stereo-
types about women, sainthood plus carnality: Maria Animal. In the drafts for 
the Malina figure, Maria Malina, “who on stage was a dream, an animal,” is 
revealed—by a male narrator—to be “unassuming” in real life: “a vehemence, 
a silence, a sob, a smile, those stooped shoulders and big feet and her nose was 
rather thick, she didn’t have make-up on, she had a bad complexion and too 
thick a nose, and she wasn’t thin and wasn’t fat, a medium-sized body, not unro-
bust, and her hair was greasy, stringy, dishwater blond, that was the Malina 
woman” (TP 1: 346–47). A woman must be a consummate artist to meet men’s 
expectations of her, and her reality is bound to disappoint them. Maria Malina 
is eaten by a shark at age thirty-four—or at least this was the report given by 
the man with whom she had traveled to Greece, the only witness to her death. 
Malina has experienced “ways of death,” too.
The first encounter of the “I” with Malina is also an interesting allusion 
to his lack of self-identity and to the possibility of suppressed psychic quali-
ties emerging into male bourgeois consciousness which could destroy all its 
achievements. If Bachmann’s name itself reveals the split personality to which 
Malina gives expression, the “Bach,” fluidity of the female, channeled by the 
masculine “Mann,” it is a “Mann”—Thomas—whose themes Malina varies 
in displaying its own problems with a threatened and dying society to which 
no alternative seems to offer itself. The “I” first glimpses Malina in a scene 
which draws upon the experiences of Gustav von Aschenbach (who shares a 
portion of Bachmann’s name and combines the fire and water motifs that trace 
their way through Malina): she waits for a streetcar on the edge of a park (the 
Stadtpark, which, as I show later, represents the allure and threat of psychic 
nondifferentiation), boards, and looks about for Malina, who has vanished. But 
of course the figures are reversed here: it is Malina who represents the firm 
male ego boundaries which will be confirmed at the end of this work, though 
dissolved at the end of Mann’s. Malina is first observed with a newspaper in his 
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hand: he has the access to the language of social communication (here some-
what debased) which Aschenbach also possesses and which is lacking in this 
female “I.” Moreover, this “I” will never even make it to Venice. Though it 
represents as for Aschenbach the promise of sensual fulfillment, the “I” must 
experience it as distinct and separate from herself, in the “cinema behind the 
Kärntnerring . . . where I first saw Venice, for two hours in extravagant colors 
and a lot of darkness, the oars beating the water, a melody accompanied by 
lights passing through the water as well, and its da-dim da-dam carried me 
along, all the way inside the figures, the coupled figures and their dancing. In 
this way I arrived in a Venice I would never see, on a clanking, windy winter 
day in Vienna” (Malina 11). 
Of yet more central importance to Malina is the opposition, which is cen-
tral to Thomas Mann’s Doktor Faustus, of Beethoven and Arnold Schönberg:
if Adrian Leverkühn’s masterwork, “Fausti Weheklage” is written to rescind 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, to remand that joyful affirmation of a social 
order, Bachmann’s “Ways of Death” cycle aims at the same intention. Across 
from the house where this silenced female “I” lives, Ungargasse 6, is Ungargasse 
5, the Beethovenhaus, where the deaf Beethoven wrote his Ninth Symphony. 
Yet the central musical composition whose thematics shape Bachmann’s work is 
by the figure whom Mann construed as Beethoven’s negation, Schönberg. But 
as I explain in more detail below, the Schönberg work Pierrot Lunaire, on which 
Malina draws, not only negates current cultural categories like Leverkühn’s 
composition but also hints simultaneously at some other, utopian possibilities 
for human happiness. 
By far the most intriguing indication that Malina is more than he appears to 
be is found in a reference to the work by Bachmann’s admirer Christa Wolf, 
whose writing circles about many of the same themes as Bachmann’s own. In 
Wolf’s The Quest for Christa T., the one extended narrative which Christa T., that 
thwarted and utopian figure, is able to write is titled “Malina, die Himbeere” 
and involves a journey of a thirteen-year-old girl to Kalisch, then (in 1940) a 
district of Russian Poland occupied by the Nazis. The young narrator insists she 
is traveling to a foreign country, though her mother maintains it is German. The 
story breaks off with their arrival in Kalisch. “Now one ought to know why she 
stopped at this point,” the narrator of Christa T. continues. “What was to be the 
outcome of the Polish strawberry [sic: Himbeere = raspberry]—Malina—for 
which she had raised the whole magic structure, with Brockhaus 1889, the jour-
ney to a foreign country which wasn’t any such journey, her mother and herself, 
talking and replying . . . you asked what testimony I’ve got. Well: the tone of 
these pages of hers, for example. She speaks so you can see her” (Wolf, Quest 90). 
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To speak about and across borders which are not physical ones is a task of female 
writing, especially in a land occupied by a foreign invader, one whom Bachmann 
might even be inclined to define more precisely as fascist, as in Wolf’s work. 
Christa T. couldn’t write either; even the story “Malina” is unfinished, and she 
laments “the difficulty of saying I.” Nevertheless, in Wittgensteinian terms, 
Christa T. does venture to cross some borders, and both the “I” of Malina and 
Malina himself come from the border, where the rigid boundaries each language 
sets become softened a little. This pressure on the limits of language is one of the 
themes and strengths of Bachmann’s novel.
Yet perhaps this discussion of Malina has been somewhat misleading, for 
Malina is not, strictly speaking, whom the novel is about. The other and more 
overtly tyrannical figure in relationship to whom the “I” constitutes herself is 
Ivan, her lover, and it is this relationship that structures the novel: after a short 
introductory section, the first longer portion of the novel is called “Happy with 
Ivan” and gives an account of their love affair. The middle section, “The Third 
Man,” consists mainly of her dreams of persecution, in which her father plays 
the major role. In the third section with its apocalyptic title “Last Things,” the 
relationship with Ivan trails off and the disappearance of the “I” is prepared. As 
Bachmann pointed out in an interview, Ivan is also probably a kind of double 
for the “I” (GuI 88), which is to say, he also resides in the female psyche: he 
represents the tyranny of romantic love, of compulsory heterosexuality, whose 
laws women accept and interiorize. Like other lovers in Bachmann’s works—
Jan in “The Good God of Manhattan” and “You monsters named Hans!” (TY
177) in “Undine Goes”—Ivan is a “john,” a more or less interchangeable male 
lover. That is why, unlike Malina and the “I,” he is a signifier identical with his 
signified or, perhaps more accurately, a signifier without a signified, as the “I” 
remarks: “Despite all our differences, when it comes to our names Malina and 
I share the same timidity, only Ivan is completely enthused with his own name 
[geht ganz und gar in seinen Namen ein]” (Malina 52). 
For the same reason Bachmann could assert in an interview (though what 
she says is not quite true), “We never learn: what did Ivan do before, what will 
he do later, what’s going to happen at all, who is this man?” (GuI 88). In the final 
section of the novel, Bachmann makes extremely clear that for women, loving 
a john is a far from idyllic or utopian experience, nor does it allow women the 
exploration and elaboration of their own sensuality and eroticism. Men make 
love as suits their tastes, and their female partners must arrange themselves as 
best they can: 
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Sometimes one is lucky, but I’m sure most women are never lucky [haben aber 
bestimmt nie Glück]. What I’m talking about has nothing to do with the supposi-
tion that there are some men who are good lovers, there really aren’t. That is a 
legend which has to be destroyed someday, at most there are men with whom it 
is completely hopeless and a few with whom it’s not quite so hopeless. Although 
no one has looked for it, that is where the reason is to be found why only women 
always have their heads full of feelings and stories about their man or men. Such 
thoughts really do consume the greatest part of every woman’s time. But she 
has to think about it, she needs to evoke feeling, to provoke feeling—and she 
can do this without harming herself—otherwise she could literally never bear 
being with a man, since every man really is sick and hardly takes any notice of 
her. (Malina 178)
“A legend” literally—love is an elaborate symbolic system, a game or dance, the 
responsibility for which falls on women, who nevertheless do not expect their 
sick male lovers to make them happy. 
This illness leads to the heart of Bachmann’s argument: all men are sick, and 
all women must come to terms with these diseased gender arrangements: “You 
could say the whole approach of men toward women is diseased [krankhaft], 
moreover each disease is so wholly unique that men will never be completely 
cured. At most it might be said of women that they are more or less marked 
by contaminations they have contracted by sympathizing with male suffering” 
(Malina 177). It is this sickness that Bachmann’s “Ways of Death” is directed 
at revealing, as she has made quite clear in interviews. Thus, asked of Malina,
“Then one should understand it as a document of contemporary existence, of 
human beings who are themselves destroyed by this destruction—as one of their 
‘ways of death’?” she replied, “Yes, there is a correspondence between their sick-
ness and the sickness of the world and the society” (Kienlechner 104). A closer 
examination of the love between Ivan and the “I” will reveal the far-reaching 
implications of this sickness.  
It is important to notice the absences in this love affair. Love itself is rarely 
mentioned; never do they say “I love you.” Sex is never discussed and barely 
alluded to; this is not a relationship where a female subject discovers her jouis-
sance. Even at the level of realism, it is obviously a miserable relationship, with 
the “I” steadfastly refusing to concede her own unhappiness; yet I would suspect 
that for most women this sexual dependency is quite convincing: of course she 
will not break with him, for she loves him. Or one might formulate this some-
what differently: Ivan is the presence that makes it possible to constitute reality, 
a “fix” which must be renewed for it to have its effect on her: 
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I’m thinking about Ivan.
I’m thinking about love.
About injections of reality.
About their lasting merely a few hours.
About the next, more potent injection. (Malina 24)
For her, Ivan is “My Mecca and my Jerusalem” (Malina 23); “Everything bears 
Ivan’s brand, from the House of Ivan” (Malina 13–14). In this relationship the 
“I” is thoroughly female: “My fräulein, we are, after all, very female,” says Ivan 
(Malina 89). But this is a femininity socially defined, offering her no more access 
to an authentic female voice than the assumption of Malina’s male subjectiv-
ity. Ivan is a father with two children, but he is “The Onlie Begetter” (Malina
59); the mother does not exist in this story. The children’s names suggest some 
relationship to the original differentiation which makes language possible: Belá, 
Andras, b-a. But Ivan has accomplished this on his own; the woman is absent 
and unnamed. The “I” regards Ivan’s function for her as the assurance of her 
entry into language: “For he has come to make consonants constant once again 
and comprehensible, to unlock vowels to their full resounding, to let words come 
over my lips once more, to solve problems and recreate connections long since 
disrupted, and I will not stray from him one iota” (Malina 15) Yet the language 
Ivan gives her to speak is one in which women are permitted to exist only in 
relationship to men and have no independent voice of their own at all.  
Ivan places a variety of limits on the right and ability of the “I” to speak. 
The most frequent conversations reported between them are telephone calls (a 
Verbindung, connection, facilitated by the cord, always impossibly tangled, which 
connects her to him). At their best, the calls are banal and boring miscommu-
nication—the “I” running gasping and desperate to answer the telephone, then 
maintaining, in a futile endeavor to protect herself from him, that she really 
has no time to talk. Usually the telephone conversations reported are not even 
complete sentences but completely inadequate vehicles for conveying her emo-
tions, precodified sets of propositions: “example sentences,” “fatigue sentences,” 
“swearing sentences.” By the time we arrive at that last, ominous set of sen-
tences, the self-deception as the “I” asserts that she is “happy with Ivan” is quite 
clear, for he directs the terms at her which men have often used to express their 
terror and loathing of women: “witch,” “beast [Luder],” bastard [Aas].” But Ivan 
insists that she nonetheless proclaim her happiness with him; in the language 
that it is given her to speak, all is well between men and women. (All the books 
in her huge library don’t help the “I” deal with Ivan—those books are written 
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by men. The one book she needs is missing: a cookbook.) Ivan explicitly forbids 
her to continue writing the drafts of the “Ways of Death” he has found in her 
apartment: 
In general he avoids questions, but today Ivan asks, what do these notes mean, 
since I’ve left a few pages lying on the armchair. Merrily [belustigt] he takes one 
and reads: death styles [TODESARTEN = ways of death]. And from another piece 
of paper: Darkness in Egypt. Isn’t that your writing, didn’t you write that? Since 
I don’t answer, Ivan says: I don’t like it, I suspected something like this was going 
on, and nobody wants all these books lying around in your crypt, why isn’t there 
anything else, there must be other books, like exsultate jubilate, which make 
you mad with joy, you’re always mad with joy yourself, so why don’t you write like 
that. (Malina 30)
And the “I” vows obediently henceforth to rejoice in and write about the bliss 
which this affair has brought her: “[Ivan] told me: I’m sure you’ve already 
understood. I don’t love anyone. Except my children, of course, but no one else. I 
nod, though I hadn’t known, and it’s obvious to Ivan that it should be so obvious 
to me. jubilate. Poised over an abyss, it nonetheless occurs to me how it should 
begin: exsultate” (Malina 33). This “way of death” can’t be written either. 
Since the “I” accepts the rules for entry into the symbolic order of compulsory 
heterosexuality, she constitutes herself according to the social rules of femininity 
even away from Ivan. There is great and painful irony in the scene in which the 
“I,” on her own, “fables removed from the men [sagenweit entfernt von den Män-
nern],” nonetheless recreates herself as the woman the fashion industry has told 
her to become: “The result is a composition, a woman is to be created for a dress. 
In complete secrecy designs for a female are redrawn, it is like a genesis, with 
an aura for no one in particular. The hair must be brushed twenty times, feet 
anointed [gesalbt] and toenails painted, hair removed from the legs and armpits, 
the shower turned on and off, a cloud of powder floats in the bathroom, the 
mirror is studied, it’s always Sunday, the mirror, mirror on the wall is consulted, 
it might be Sunday already” (Malina 86). The natural, independent woman: 
painted, powdered, dehaired, self-created as an image for the mirror on the 
wall, of which a woman asks—naturally?—“Who is the fairest of them all?” 
As John Berger argues, since women are born into a world which men control, 
they are constrained to become the observers of themselves, for how they appear 
determines how men will treat them. Women interiorize this doubleness and 
constitute themselves as comprising both “surveyor and surveyed”: “The sur-
veyor of woman in herself is male: the surveyed, female. Thus she turns herself 
into an object—and most particularly an object of vision: a sight” (47). 
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Or one might theorize this scene as Susan Gubar does: such female narcis-
sism exists for lack of other expressive possibilities. Without language, female 
creativity is expressed through the female body itself—though still within a ref-
erential system that predefines what those possibilities for creativity may be. The 
“I” thus suffers from the dis-ease of misrepresentation—though it’s the only 
representation she’s got. We are warned not to believe anything she maintains 
about herself. It’s clearly not the case that Ivan (or Ivan plus Malina) provides 
the solution to her problems, nor is, contrary to her assertions, the Ungargasse 
the home for which she has longed. For a reader sensitized to issues of sexual 
politics, the irony in the following passage is very strong:
The tremulous anxiety, the high tension hovering over this city and presumably 
everywhere has almost completely abated here [between Ungargasse 6 and 9], and 
schizothymia, the world’s schizoid soul, its crazy, gaping split, is healing itself 
imperceptibly.
The only remaining excitement is a hasty search for hairpins and stockings, a 
slight quiver while applying mascara and manipulating eyeshadow, using narrow 
brushes on the lids, or while dipping flimsy cotton puffs in light and dark powder. 
(Malina 14)
Of course it is precisely this crack in the world into which she disappears at the 
end; the Ungargasse is not a refuge for her after all. Before meeting Malina and 
Ivan, the “I” had lived in the Beatrixgasse, where she, if—à la Dante—partici-
pating in the male order, nonetheless preserved a certain virginal inaccessibil-
ity. Now she has moved around the corner to the Ungargasse, which derives 
its name from the penetration of (Hungarian) foreigners into Vienna. Malina 
lives at 6, Ivan at 9; two men, simply inversions of one another, not different in 
quality. The “I” is “un-gar,” unfinished, undone. Neither of these male voices 
permits her to express herself at all.
Yet this isn’t the complete story of the “I” (if it were, we’d have a different 
text: a female Bildungsroman, perhaps, or a Gothic love story). It is to her credit 
that despite Ivan’s urgings, she is not happy: she is not totally subsumed in the 
ideology of romantic love through which her identity had been constituted, and 
she does not write that book exsultate jubilate. Her story speaks through 
her unhappiness, a sickness which moves toward madness. One is reminded of 
the statement by S. Weir Mitchell, cited as an epigraph to the second chapter 
of Gilbert and Gubar’s The Madwoman in the Attic: “The man who does not 
know sick women does not know women” (45). It was, after all, Weir Mitchell’s 
patient, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, whose protagonist in The Yellow Wallpaper 
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also tries to disappear into the wall because her doctor, based on Weir Mitchell, 
has forbidden her to write. But what it is important to emphasize here is that 
the other story of the “I” can’t be told: there is no language that this story can 
be told in. Like the female schizophrenics whom Luce Irigaray studied, there 
is no metalanguage for this dis-ease: “A woman in a state of madness does not 
have, for some reason, the means for elaborating a delirium. Instead of language 
being the medium of expression of the delirium, the latter remains within the 
body itself. The dominant element in feminine schizophrenia is corporal pain, 
the feeling of deformation or transformation of organs, etc” (74). Repressed, it 
must struggle to speak in spite of the proscriptions upon expression, here not 
so much through symptoms of the body (though this is the case elsewhere in 
Bachmann, for instance in “Eyes to Wonder”) as in the dreams and parapraxes 
which Freud indicated to be the signifying material of the repressed. But there 
is no coherent narrative of the “I”: to argue that there is would be to recuperate 
her own distress and misunderstand Bachmann’s novel. Instead, we need to look 
for places where the “I” mis-writes herself—sich verschreibt, as Bachmann puts 
it (GuI 98). At best, we can indicate some areas in which that which she cannot 
say tries nonetheless to speak. 
The narrative structure of the book itself is one of those places. The central 
thematic concern structuring the traditional novel, the relationship of the indi-
vidual to the social world, is the one that’s missing here, except for one short, 
funny examination of the vacation habits of the Viennese upper crust. (So 
inclined, Bachmann can write social satire with the best of realist novelists. But 
there’s an ominous undertone even here; it’s hinted that the brilliant, articulate 
women who oversee these social games have their dark side, too: “Antoinette is 
completely puzzled by every man”; “But what do you say to Christine’s hysteria” 
[Malina 103–104].) If the lack of coherent plot development or even of an identi-
fiable narrative stance has been responsible for some of reviewers’ and scholars’ 
problems with the book, it’s also an assertion of the lack of coherence available 
to the “I.” It is interesting, too, that this is the area of the novel which Bachmann 
identified as closest to experimental writing proper: “What I regard as experi-
ments with prose the reader isn’t bothered with, for my experiments land in the 
wastebasket—although I certainly need them. But I don’t believe they’re there 
to be published. In this novel, which isn’t a seamless narrative—it isn’t that at 
all—there are quite different elements, from the dreams to the dialogue to the 
musical score–like ending—I call those a no longer visible experiment with nar-
rative possibilities” (Kienlechner 102). But one might also regard these failures of 
the text to constitute a seamless narrative, and even those opaque and mysteri-
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ous allusions which remain resistant to interpretation, as a utopian hint—though 
only a hint—in the direction of another, less oppressive discourse which feminists 
could make use of. In this reading of the text we might explore Bachmann’s sug-
gestion with respect to the complexity of her novel, “how interconnected it is, 
so that there’s almost no sentence which doesn’t refer to another one” (GuI 96). 
This might be a logic of association and “both/and” rather than of causality and 
“either/or.” This might be a subjectivity which does not do violence to itself by 
asserting its self-identity but concedes its disunity and nonsynchrony. For without 
(one hastens to add) giving up on reason altogether, a feminist voice, however it 
finally constitutes itself, will need to admit that which the binary oppositions of 
logocentricity haven’t wished to permit within present patriarchal discourse. 
“But at night, alone, is when the erratic monologues arise, the ones that last, 
for man [sic] is a somber being, only in the darkness is he master of himself 
and during the day he goes back to being a slave” (Malina 63). Most clearly we 
discover that which the “I” can’t say in the middle or dream section of the novel. 
Bachmann told Kienlechner: “We learn nothing about the life of this ‘I’ or about 
what’s happened to her—that’s all in the dreams, partially concealed and par-
tially expressed. Every conceivable kind of torture, destruction, harassment (GuI
97). As these are dreams, even though literary ones, we cannot expect to be able 
to interpret them completely; indeed, as Freud cautioned, “We must not concern 
ourselves with what the dream appears to tell us, whether it is intelligible or 
absurd, clear or confused, since it cannot possibly be the unconscious material 
we are in search of” (15: 114). 
Nonetheless, as Bachmann suggests, not everything is concealed here, and 
some themes emerge which help us to understand the constraints of conscious-
ness. The most obvious common element of these varied dreams is the father 
figure, who emerges again and again as the persecutor and tormentor of the “I.” 
Bachmann has stated explicitly that this omnipotent father is the figure who is 
responsible for the destruction of the “I,” her “murderer”: “All the stories which are 
not included here because the ‘I’ is not permitted to tell anything about herself—
for her doppelgänger forbids her to—they appear in the dreams, for instance 
the explanation for her destruction, for her almost having been annihilated by 
a prehistory brought about by this overpowerful father figure, about whom we 
discover that this figure is the murderer, and more precisely, the murderer whom 
we all have” (GuI 89). This is a patriarchal, an oedipal tragedy which strikes all 
of us. Under threat of the most terrible of punishments, the deprivation of our 
sexuality, we submit ourselves to the Law of the Father, which spells death to an 
independent desire expressing itself outside of socially prescribed channels.
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From the first dream, from which I have borrowed the title of this essay, the 
crime for which the father is responsible emerges: its setting is “the cemetery of 
the murdered daughters” (Malina 114), and he is the perpetrator of the “ways 
of death.” Murder (along with lesser offenses) is accomplished in the greatest 
variety of ways. In the second dream she is gassed in a gas chamber; later she 
is transported to Siberia with other Jews (more substantiation for Bachmann’s 
association of patriarchy and fascism). She is frozen in ice and plunged into fire, 
subjected to electroshock, buried under an avalanche, electrocuted, and eaten by 
a crocodile. With yet clearer symbolism her dreams frequently refer to her incest 
with her father, a connection she regards with abhorrence, though Melanie, a 
recurrent figure who, analogous to Malina, is another of her doubles, is pleased 
enough at the advantages of the relationship. “Mela-Nie,” thinks the “I.” Her 
mother, who sometimes allies with the father, is a dog, “who completely submits 
to his thrashing” (Malina 124). Her father directs an opera: “My father has gone 
to the theater. God is a show [Vorstellung]” (Malina 118), in which she is pre-
pared to sing a duet with a young man, yet she recognizes that “his voice is the 
only one audible in this duet anyway, because my father wrote the whole part for 
him and nothing for me of course, since I don’t have any training and am only 
supposed to be shown” (Malina 123). In various ways he denies her speech: he 
will not permit delivery of letters to her friends and tries to gain control of the 
sentences dried on her tongue as she dies of thirst. But what is constant in these 
dreams is her resistance to her father and her refusal to be murdered: “Now and 
then I lose my voice. Nevertheless I have permitted myself to live. Sometimes my 
voice returns and can be heard by all: I am living, I will live, I claim my right to 
live” (Malina 151–152). By the end of these dreams, the “I” (with Malina’s help) 
has understood that despite the apparently harmless ball scene from War and 
Peace which recurs in the dreams, what she has experienced here is only war, 
and the section concludes with this recognition: 
malina: So you will never again say: War and Peace.
me [“I”]: Never again. 
         It’s always war.
         Here there is always violence.
         Here there is always struggle.
         It is the eternal war. (Malina 155)
If “The Third Man”—the title of this section—prevents her self-articulation 
like the other two, the “I” is at least left with the possibility of refusing their defi-
nition of her: “In another language I say Ne! Ne! And in many languages: No! 
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No! Non! Non! Nyet! Nyet! No! Ném! Nein! No! For in our language, too, I 
can only say no, I can’t find any other word in any language” (Malina 115).
The waking life of the “I” is also informed by a desire to write, to articulate 
herself, which cannot be fulfilled. Interspersed through the first and third sec-
tions of the book are letters by the “I” which represent her attempt to take up 
the pen. They are mostly written “in tremendous haste and anxiety,” a recur-
rent phrase which also characterizes, as the “I” reported in the introduction, the 
unity of time—“Today”—in which she is compelled to live. If the letters are 
completed at all, they are signed “an unknown woman.” At the beginning of 
the novel’s third section, the “I” explains that these mysterious and cryptic let-
ters are connected to her experience of a postal crisis concerned with the nature 
of the “privacy of mail [Briefgeheimnis].” Her own meditations on the “privacy 
of mail” and the unmailed letters mostly written deep in the night are released 
by the case of the letter carrier Otto Kranewitzer in Klagenfurt who, suddenly 
struck by the enormity of his postal duties, was no longer able to deliver the 
mail. For this crisis, the “I” asserts, is one with immense existential and onto-
logical implications: 
After the Kranewitzer case I burned my letters of many years, then began writing 
completely different letters, mostly late at night, till eight in the morning. I didn’t 
send all these letters, but they’re the ones that concern me. Over these four, five 
years I must have written ten thousand letters, to myself alone, letters which con-
tained everything. I also leave many letters unopened, in my attempt to practice 
privacy of mail, in my attempt to approach the height of Kranewitzer’s thought, to 
comprehend what could be unlawful in reading a letter. (Malina 160).
No doubt the “privacy of mail” is illuminated by a multilingual pun, the over-
lapping of the two meanings of letter/lettre in English and French. For the “I” 
had betrayed the secret earlier in the book to her baffled and frustrated inter-
viewer Herr Mühlbauer, saying, “I will tell you a terrible secret: language is 
punishment” (Malina 60).
Nonetheless, there are moments when, despite herself, that which the “I” 
is forbidden to say breaks through into her waking language as well. The “I” 
recognizes (and tips us off to) the parapraxes that allow the repressed to emerge 
in this book: “That’s when I also started distorting everything I read. Instead of 
‘Summer Fashion Exhibition’ [Sommermode] I would read ‘Summer Fashion 
Execution’ [Sommermorde]. That’s only one example. I could name hundreds of 
others” (Malina 137). Thus, it seems, we are also to look at the language of this 
book for that which is not supposed to be there. Reading closely, one can find, 
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below the apparent narrative, some subterranean themes that tell a different 
story from the one the “I” intends. The Pierrot Lunaire motif to which I have 
already referred is one of these. The first line from the last poem of that cycle, 
which recurs through Malina—“O ancient scent from far-off days”—points in 
the direction of archaic reminiscences which the “I” has repressed and to which 
she now barely has access, having constituted herself in a different time, a pres-
ent, “Today,” “a word that only suicides [of which, it appears, she is one] ought to 
be allowed to use” (Malina 2). (The dreams in contrast deny synchronism alto-
gether: “The Time is not today. In fact, the Time no longer exists at all, because 
it could have been yesterday, it could have been long ago, it could be again, it 
could continually be, some things will never have been” [Malina 113]). Yet it 
seems that the “I” is able to resist these men at all only because of her archaic 
reminiscences of an original satisfaction now denied. The “I” first hears her 
Schönberg song sung by a “chalkwhite Pierrot . . . in a cracking voice” (Malina
4) in the Stadtpark, to which neither Ivan nor Malina wish to accompany her 
and of which she herself is afraid, for it is a place of “shadows and dark fig-
ures,” that is, a site of night and dreams: “Only in the darkness is man master 
of himself” (Malina 87). The Stadtpark also seems to be the site of an original 
polymorphous perversity where in the immediate postwar period illicit sex of all 
varieties took place: “You could hardly meet anyone who hadn’t seen everyone 
with someone else” (Malina 181).
For the “I,” the Stadtpark is associated as well with water and with the fear 
of drowning, from which her men in the Ungargasse save her: “I wasn’t sure of 
myself but am again insured [in Sicherheit], no longer walking past the Stadt-
park at night, jittery as I walk along the walls of houses, no longer on a detour 
through the dark, but already a little at home, already docked safely at the 
Ungargasse, already safe and sound in Ungargassenland, with my head even a 
little out of water. Already gurgling the first sounds and sentences, already set-
ting forth, beginning” (Malina 88). The “I” flees water, which may suggest to 
her the “oceanic feeling” before psychic differentiation and the more fluid ego 
boundaries of the female. Instead, she’s chosen to associate herself with Malina, 
whom she imagines to be a phallic hero creating order out of watery chaos, 
allowing, so the legend has it, Klagenfurt (a ford of lamentations?) to arise from 
suspiciously female swamps—Klagenfurt, the city where she was born: “but I 
liked him best as Saint George who slew the dragon so that my first city could 
be born, so that Klagenfurt could arise from the barren swamp” (Malina 7). Yet 
the Pierrot Lunaire motif recurs throughout the novel: in the Beatrixgasse, at a 
moment of despair in Vienna society; as a reprise at the end of the novel before 
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the “I” vanishes into the wall. That ancient scent wafts a promise of happiness 
which can’t be completely forgotten.
Perhaps this can help us understand the one extended narrative, running 
in italics through Malina, of the Princess of Kagran, which the “I” seems to 
have written and which anticipates her love affair with Ivan. The princess comes 
from a region near the Danube where St. George had triumphed over the floods. 
When the princess has to decide between the floods and the fearsome willows, 
she allows herself to be rescued by the stranger in the dark coat who prefigures 
Ivan. What other possibilities did she have, what other narrative could she have 
written? She has to tell this story: there is no other way for her to imagine the 
satisfaction of her desire. But this does not mean that her utopian vision is alto-
gether wrong, only that it must be channeled into the language which is given 
her to speak. The transformation she longs for is a vision of luxe, calme et volupté,
which nonetheless draws upon her own specifically female desire. Bernd Witte 
has argued this most persuasively: 
Attached to the fairy tale, also characterized externally as connected by the same 
italics, are further fragments of a vision of a perfect society in later portions of the 
first chapter. “A day will come when all women have redgolden eyes, redgolden 
hair, and the poetry of their sex, their lineage will be recreated . . .” The return 
of the golden age here emanates quite obviously from women. Only several pages 
later, when this sentence is repeated, is the word “women” replaced by “mankind,” 
while the arrival of paradise is linked to the condition that “their hands will be 
gifted for love.” (Kritisches)
Counterposed to and subversive of Malina’s patriarchal subsumption of women 
is a feminist utopia of sensual pleasure and erotic joy. It is from this narrative that 
Bachmann herself read when asked for her own vision of utopia: “A day will 
come when people will have goldblack eyes, they will see beauty, they will be 
freed from dirt and from every burden, they will rise into the sky, they will dive 
into the sea, they will forget their calluses and their wants. A day will come, they 
will be free, all people will be free, even from the freedom they had intended. 
There shall be a greater freedom, beyond measure, a freedom to last a whole life 
long” (GuI 92).
Now what are feminists to make of this? The vision is beautiful but scarcely 
realizable; the patriarchal reality, terrifyingly familiar and concrete. The story 
the “I” tells about of Marcel, a clochard of Paris (and, it seems, a compatriot of 
Proust), comes to mind; like the “I,” he is one of the “wounded,” and he simply 
dies when a well-meaning social worker tries to redeem him “for a new life 
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which does not exist” (Malina 187). As the feminist scholar Myra Love once 
remarked to me, Bachmann lacked the context. But we might derive some com-
fort and assistance from the single vow of the “I.” Having passed the Rigorosum
(oral examination) of the University of Vienna, she swears upon its staff and, 
armed with this knowledge, triumphs over both the waters and her father’s 
might: “And with a handful of sand that is my knowledge, I cross the water, and 
my father cannot follow me” (Malina 122). Perhaps we need not, like Leda, put 
on patriarchal knowledge with his power. Perhaps there is another and more 
liberating use to make of knowledge; perhaps, from within the cemetery of the 
murdered daughters, men’s knowledge can be turned against them. Bachmann 
is neither the “I” nor Malina; she found a language to write the story of women 
without language. We know this now. “One who expresses herself completely 
does not cancel herself out,” wrote Christa Wolf of Bachmann in 1980 in her 
Büchner Prize speech. “The wish for obliteration remains as a witness. Her part 
will not vanish” (“Shall” 10).
READING BACHMANN IN 1981
Published in early 1981 (with a publication date of 1980) in a special issue 
of Studies in Twentieth-Century Literature, this essay is a paradigmatic example 
of many qualities of feminist literary scholarship around that time. As I noted in 
chapter 2, I believe it is also the first to apply this sort of cultural feminist analy-
sis to Bachmann’s work, an approach that would become virtually de rigueur 
by 1984–85, responsible for producing what Sigrid Weigel termed “the other 
[feminist] Ingeborg Bachmann” (“Andere” 5). As the essay’s title already under-
lines, its approach is premised on a notion of woman as victim—all women, 
including the “I” of Malina, Bachmann herself, and (with quite a dose of self-
pity) me. (The “we” of this essay—e.g., “‘We’ have to play by their rules”—is a 
common rhetorical gesture of the period, invoking all women’s commonality. 
My evident identification with Bachmann and her figure, enabled by cultural 
feminist assumptions, is also a very common feature of Bachmann scholarship 
during this period.) In this essay, men’s (all men’s, or, alternatively, “Western” 
men’s) domination over women is a phenomenon of the cultural realm where 
women are denied a voice and a subjectivity; thus if women (“we”) nonetheless 
speak, it is only because we have uneasily assumed the subject position (a term 
that would not have been used at that time) of men. This I then took to be 
the “message” of Malina, which—as I along with many, many other Bachmann 
scholars of the period insisted—can be read as an anticipation of the theory now 
used to explain it. 
For feminists, then, the immense value of Bachmann’s novel derives from 
its ability to delineate women’s situation before the advent of the second wave 
of feminism and to point us (“us”) in the direction of our preeminent feminist 
task, the elaboration of an authentic voice for women. In the essay I understand 
Bachmann’s lifelong concern with questions of language as her effort to grope in 
such a direction via her rejection (like that of the French theorists) of totalizing 
theories, her allegation of a connection between reason and totalitarianism, and 
her advocacy of possibilities of signification other than those that existing philo-
sophical systems allow. Such possibilities are enabled by Eros, non-normative 
sexuality, the body, or the unconscious. The essay draws upon French poststruc-
turalist theory to shore up its cultural feminist approach (discerning no incom-
patibilities at all between the two methods): women, I maintain, accommodate 
themselves to the patriarchal system both because they must yield to the stric-
tures of compulsory heterosexuality and because they must subject themselves to 
the law of the phallus to enter the symbolic order. The struggle between men’s 
attempts to contain female subjectivity (and the language in which it would be 
expressed) and women’s efforts at deconstruction/destruction of the male philo-
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sophical/cultural/linguistic order is, I allege, the war of which Malina speaks. 
The experimental quality of Malina derives from Bachmann’s endeavor to probe 
the limits of language as she represents this bellicose contest. Her texts are thus 
shown to manifest precisely the kind of feminist politics that were most en 
vogue in the U.S. women’s movement of the time, and Bachmann proves herself 
a woman writer worthy of adulation by feminists and supremely fit to enter the 
feminist pantheon of German literature.
The cultural/French feminist approach proved very satisfying to feminist lit-
erary scholars and Bachmann fans, since it revealed the limitations of the male 
critics who had earlier responded negatively to Bachmann’s texts because, it now 
appeared, they were simply not theoretically au courant. Conversely, this read-
ing of Bachmann’s texts provided powerful support for the cultural feminist 
tendencies that had mostly dominated the West German women’s movement 
from its outset, allowing that direction of feminist analysis now to be substanti-
ated by vanguard theory. Within West (and possibly even East) German femi-
nism, Bachmann early took on the role of iconic figure akin to that played by 
Virginia Woolf (or possibly a combination of Woolf and Sylvia Plath) within 
Anglo-American feminism. I am inclined to believe that the immense prestige 
of Bachmann’s work within German feminism and the apparently perfect con-
gruence between her works and the cultural feminist theory of the early 1980s
provided a powerful substantiation for the cultural feminist approach within 
Germany, helping it to maintain its legitimacy there long after it had been 
drawn into question in Britain and the United States.
To be sure, even in its heyday, cultural feminism was never without its femi-
nist critics in the United States. I discern in this essay no effort at all to distance 
myself from the theoretical paradigm elaborated by cultural feminists or French 
feminists in 1981. But (to come to my own defense for a moment) in the same 
year I also formulated (in “The Female Aesthetic and German Women’s Writ-
ing,” one of the first feminist articles published by German Quarterly, thanks to 
Ruth Klüger Angress, then GQ’s editor) a critique of some of the major limita-
tions of that approach:
As the [French feminist] analysis has been received outside of France, it has 
intersected with and reinforced certain “essentialist” tendencies in German (and 
American) feminism which argue that the historical facts of women’s differ-
ence are ontological qualities instead. Likewise, female subjectivity is taken to be 
capable of articulating itself fully in its radical otherness outside of male discourse 
when feminist women only open their mouths. . . . Thus, what spoke in the many 
autobiographical accounts of recent German feminism was at best a woman no 
more than the inversion of male categories, subjective in the sense of private, emo-
tional, irrational, and receptive. No doubt there is already something liberating 
in women’s daring to objectivate in writing female experiences which have never 
been so expressed before. But to assume that a pristine woman exists underneath 
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female socialization, only silenced but not fundamentally shaped by her social 
experience, has a retarding effect for feminism, for it ignores the enormous politi-
cal and personal changes which feminists must still undertake. (“Trends” 64)
I am pleased to discover that over two decades ago I was already convinced of 
the importance of historical analysis and of praxis (a holdover, no doubt, from 
my earlier training in historical materialism). But like many other feminists of 
the period, even in this relatively critical account of flaws in the feminism of 
the early 1980s, I was not then able to raise the kinds of objections to cultural 
feminism that would emerge over the course of the coming decade: that in fact 
no basis exists on which to postulate the commonality of the very different kinds 
of women in the world; that to comprehend women’s situation gender was cer-
tainly a necessary yet always also a far from sufficient category; that women 
cannot be perceived as universal victims but are always implicated in the social 
circumstances of which they are part and may quite willingly contribute to the 
perpetuation of the oppression of others (including other women), though they 
may be subordinated themselves. Only later in the decade would such insights 
begin to inform the analyses of feminist literary scholars—including my own.
1983
By 1983, as a consequence of developments outside of and within the U.S. 
women’s movement, the limitations of the cultural feminist analysis had 
emerged more clearly, and challenges to its founding premises were raised on a 
variety of fronts in feminist theory and practice. In June 1982 the Equal Rights 
Amendment went down to defeat because it had failed to achieve ratification by 
the requisite number of state legislatures. The “New Right,” arrayed under the 
banner of the “Reagan revolution” and proclaiming a pro-family, “right-to-life” 
(i.e., antiabortion) politics, concentrated much of its energies on rolling back 
gains made by women in the 1970s. Women continued to earn only fifty-nine 
cents for every dollar earned by men, and they were so hard hit by the Reagan 
administration’s cuts in social benefits that social commentators began to speak 
of the “feminization of poverty.” In 1976 the Hyde Amendment denied poor 
women Medicaid funding for abortion, and many state legislatures followed 
suit. In the second half of the 1970s, the dispirited liberalism of Jimmy Carter 
had still allowed cultural feminists a certain free space in which to operate and 
other women to make moderate inroads into various male domains. But in the 
context of the vastly changed politics of the Reagan era, it began to seem ludi-
crous for white, middle-class women to assert that retreat into a separate female 
sphere was an adequate solution to all women’s problems or to maintain that 
women would burst the bonds of a phallogocentric culture if they could only 
elaborate a specifically female voice. Feminists who had defined power as male 
and any struggle in the political arena as reformist now saw naked political and 
economic power exercised against themselves and, without an adequate theory 
or analysis to explain current developments, watched with horror as women’s 
rights were eroded and ever more women sank into poverty.
In addition, the right-wing upsurge under Reagan brought with it a new 
heightening of Cold War tensions, as Reagan set about to demonize the “Evil 
Empire” of the Soviet Union and demanded new expenditures for weapons sys-
tems to protect an America that was once again “standing tall.” The huge mili-
tary build-up that the Reagan regime initiated included plans for tactical nuclear 
war and the deployment of cruise and Pershing II midrange missile systems, to 
be stationed in Western Europe and directed toward the Soviet Union. These 
initiatives spurred the resurgence of a post-Vietnam peace movement in the 
United States and Europe; half a million people demonstrated, for instance, in 
New York City on 12 June 1982. The dangers of nuclear war also encouraged 
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feminists to address issues of global and national politics and launched a feminist 
peace movement that turned the cultural forms elaborated in the 1970s to the 
cause of peace. In November 1980 and 1981 the Women’s Pentagon Action devel-
oped an elaborate set of two-day rituals focusing on “Mourning, Rage, Empow-
erment, and Defiance” (they included encircling the Pentagon and weaving its 
doors shut with yarn) to express “their fear for the life of this planet, our Earth, 
and the life of the children who are our human future,” as their Unity Statement 
put it. Modeling their action on the 1982 Women’s Peace Camp at Greenham 
Common in England, in 1983 at Seneca Falls, New York, feminists established a 
Women’s Peace Encampment to protest the nuclear weapons stored at the Seneca 
Army Depot. Though it is unlikely that any of these actions had any practical 
political effect, they signaled the beginnings of a new feminist understanding of 
the necessity of public engagement with “male” political power.
Beginning in the late 1970s, protests by women of color speaking from within 
the women’s movement itself also began to unsettle the dominant paradigms of 
U.S. feminism by challenging white feminists’ assumption of female common-
ality across race, class, and culture and their blithe willingness to say “women” 
but describe only their own white selves. Many conferences of this period ended 
with shouting, bitterness, and tears, and by 1982 the National Women’s Studies 
Association had decided to focus its entire national conference on the topic 
“Women Respond to Racism.” In a widely read open letter to Mary Daly that 
illustrates the vehemence of these exchanges, black lesbian poet Audre Lorde 
attacked Gyn/Ecology’s appropriation of the experiences of women of color 
merely to advance the argument of Daly’s book: “Mary, I ask that you be aware 
of how this serves the destructive forces of racism and separation between 
women—the assumption that the herstory and myth of white women is the 
legitimate and whole herstory and myth of all women to call upon for power 
and background, and that non-white women and our herstories are noteworthy 
only as decorations, or examples of female victimization. I ask that you be aware 
of the effect that this dismissal has upon the community of Black women, and 
how it devalues your own words. . . . Should the next step between us be war, 
or separation? Assimilation within a solely western-european herstory is not 
acceptable” (96). The early 1980s saw the publication of a series of important 
books by feminist women of color that addressed the specificity of their experi-
ence and its difference from that of white women: Angela Davis, Women, Race 
and Class (1981); bell hooks, Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism (1981); 
Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, editors, This Bridge Called My Back: 
Writings by Radical Women of Color (1981); Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, 
and Barbara Smith, editors, All the Women are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But 
Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women’s Studies (1982); Barbara Smith, editor, Home 
Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology (1983). White feminists were thus compelled 
to recognize the implicit racism of an analysis that assumed that categories 
derived from the lives of white women could describe all women; that alleged 
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that gender oppression was the most primary and fundamental problem of all 
women; that called upon women of color to repudiate their connections to their 
brothers, forged in the struggle against racism, to bond with potentially racist 
white women; and that assumed that the same strategies of resistance were 
appropriate for all women in all cultures and contexts. For academic feminists, 
the challenges raised by U.S. and international women of color have been the 
factors most crucial to the elaboration of present-day academic feminist para-
digms, “conflict over race” becoming, as Jane Gallop put it in Around 1981, “a 
decade later [i. e., 1991] the point of densest energy in academic feminism” (6).
The battle between radical/cultural feminists and others (including socialist 
feminists, somewhat revitalized in the 1980s) was also joined via debates over 
the relationship of feminism to sexuality. Cultural feminism had argued that 
pornography, butch/femme lesbian relationships, consensual sadomasochistic 
relations, perhaps even heterosexuality itself were expressions of patriarchal 
society’s violence against women and—should women also engage in, even 
enjoy, such forms of sexual behavior—evidence of their brainwashing by patri-
archy. By the early 1980s that position (sometimes termed “anti-sex” by its oppo-
nents) had expressed itself in a quite powerful antipornography movement that 
sometimes made common cause with the New Right. At a contentious confer-
ence at New York’s Barnard College in 1982, that analysis was challenged by a 
group of mostly academic feminists who denounced cultural feminist positions 
as simplistic and dreary, insisted that fantasy and play should not be conflated 
with reality, and demanded their right to sexual agency and sexual pleasure. 
Debates surrounding the conference had consequences that extended far beyond 
its topic. Probably the conference was a signal of a more far-reaching discontent 
with cultural feminist analyses and led, like the race debates, to an emphasis on 
women’s difference from one another and on the possibilities of female agency 
as well as female victimhood. Even more important, conference organizers 
began, as Carol Vance formulated it in the conference’s “Concept Paper,” “from 
the premise that sex is a social construction which articulates at many points 
with the economic, social, and political structures of the material world” (39). 
This conception of sexuality demanded the elaboration of categories sufficient to 
understand it and pointed feminists in the direction of the creative combination 
of poststructuralist and post-Althusserian Marxist categories that would charac-
terize feminist and other forms of cultural analysis in the 1990s. Like the race 
debates, then, the controversy over sex in the women’s movement marked at 
least the beginning of the end of cultural feminism’s hegemony over academic 
(and probably nonacademic) feminism.
The changed climate of early 1980s feminism did not translate immediately 
into new paradigms of literary analysis, however. Instead it produced confusion 
and incoherence, for some feminist literary scholars perceived at least dimly that 
the neat frameworks of American and French feminist analysis did not exactly 
correspond to altered circumstances, yet they were at a loss for an alternative 
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model. In 1982 in Writing and Sexual Difference (a volume of feminist essays, 
edited by Elizabeth Abel, that had appeared in Critical Inquiry), prestigious 
feminist scholars continued to speak of “the woman writer”—though women of 
color are represented by Mahasveta Devi’s “Draupadi,” translated and analyzed 
by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, whose method is explicitly that of deconstruc-
tion. Whether indicating the “difference between the sexes” or “the difference 
within sex” (Gallop, “Critical” 285), the “sexual difference” of the book’s title 
refers to solely men and women, or masculinity and femininity, and many of the 
contributors to this volume are concerned with the relationship of femininity or 
the female body to writing—of sexuality to textuality—often with the help of 
French theory. Some essays explore the relationship of women’s to men’s writ-
ing, thus locating women’s cultural production in the context of cultural prac-
tices in general rather than in a separate female sphere, but only Carolyn Allen’s 
“Critical Response” objects to the lack of attention to “the contemporary plural-
ity of cultures based on differences of race, class, sexual preference, age, religion, 
and geography, to name only some of the variables” (300).
Feminist journals of the period directed a self-critical gaze at academic fem-
inism’s earlier omissions, a Signs editorial of autumn 1982 inquiring, for instance: 
“True, feminism challenges the disciplines with questions relating to women, 
but to what extent are those questions still bound by the values and viewpoints 
of the dominant cultural group? Are the questions those of a privileged, white, 
heterosexual middle class, and does their language, while reflecting some wom-
en’s experience and knowledge, leave others totally invisible?” (Gelpi 2). But the 
literary analyses in those journals often limp somewhat behind their historical 
and social-scientific studies. (It is worth noting, however, that in spring 1983
Signs published an article on women under National Socialism by Gisela Bock 
which is now regarded both as somewhat scandalous and as a prime example of 
the woman-as-victim paradigm within historical scholarship. There Bock 
maintained that German women, both “Aryan” and Jewish, were victims of 
Nazism because they were targets of Nazi eugenicism.) Janice Radway, now one 
of the influential figures of feminist cultural studies, published an early article 
on women reading romance novels in Feminist Studies in spring 1983, and Paul 
Lauter explored “Race and Gender in the Shaping of the American Literary 
Canon” in the next issue. Nevertheless, in essays on mythmaking in American 
women’s poetry (Ostriker, “Thieves”), on representation in recent women’s fic-
tion (Homans, “Her”), and on H.D. and Adrienne Rich (Friedman, “I go”), 
Signs remained firmly committed to various versions of the amalgam of the 
older American and French feminist model. The disaggregation of women had 
for the most part not yet taken place in literary criticism, and several more years 
would be required before feminist literary analysis could develop a methodology 
adequate to the challenges posed to feminism in the early 1980s.
CHAPTER 4
Christa Wolf and Ingeborg Bachmann
DIFFICULTIES OF WRITING THE TRUTH
Man can face the truth.
—Ingeborg Bachmann, Werke
In the West German edition of Christa Wolf ‘s essays, Lesen und 
Schreiben (1980; translated into English as The Reader and the Writer), the two 
oldest essays, dating from 1966, deal with the works of Bertolt Brecht and Inge-
borg Bachmann. Along with the East German author Anna Seghers, Brecht 
and Bachmann count among authors whose writing Wolf respects most, and 
the presence of those essays in The Reader and the Writer provides a useful meta-
phor for understanding Wolf’s own work: one might maintain that it exists in a 
tension between those two poles, Brecht and Bachmann. For all the differences 
between Wolf and Brecht, they evidently share certain convictions and concerns: 
Wolf too is a socialist, deeply committed to social change and to creating a lit-
erature that promotes it. Brecht’s example encouraged Wolf to develop other 
literary forms appropriate to the problems of her own age, as she explained in 
1966: “The possibility of applying Brecht’s art and his theory of art lay not in 
simple imitation, . . . but in encouraging people to make their own discoveries” 
(Reader 58). Yet if in this sense Wolf’s project continues Brecht’s own, one can 
sometimes detect in Wolf’s remarks on Brecht a hint of impatience, as if the 
model provided by this now classic GDR literary figure could also have a retard-
ing effect on the literary discoveries Wolf wishes to undertake—might even, one 
suspects, share some complicity in the problems Wolf’s work has increasingly 
sought to critique. Pursuing in detail Brecht’s influence on Wolf and her grow-
ing distance from him would be a fascinating enterprise; however, it is one that 
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I explore here only indirectly, as I investigate instead Wolf’s attraction toward 
that other pole, the writing of Ingeborg Bachmann. 
The nature of Bachmann’s influence on Wolf is less easy to grasp and, though 
Bachmann’s name recurs again and again particularly in Wolf’s writing of the 
1970s and 1980s, scholars with some rare exceptions (e.g., Klemens Renolder) 
have not addressed the relationship of these two major women writers, no doubt 
in some part because Bachmann’s own work has proved so difficult to compre-
hend. With the elaboration of feminist theory and a methodology for feminist 
literary scholarship, Bachmann’s work has become more transparent for us, 
though it may be that we still do not possess a conceptual apparatus capable of 
understanding completely what connects Wolf to Bachmann. That is an inves-
tigation I would like to begin here. I want first to outline the qualities of Bach-
mann’s work which Wolf identifies and admires in the 1966 essay, relating them 
to themes in Wolf’s work from the mid-1960s onward. Then I want to trace 
some parallels between Wolf’s work and Bachmann’s which might be regarded 
as conscious allusions or even as homages to Bachmann on Wolf’s part. Finally, 
I want to look closely at Wolf’s most recent writing, examining her work on the 
women Romantics, her Büchner Prize acceptance speech, the Frankfurt lec-
tures, and Cassandra to show that in the late 1970s, encouraged by Bachmann as 
well as by events of recent history, Wolf arrived at a standpoint very similar to 
Bachmann’s in her last writing, the novels of the “Ways of Death” cycle. I main-
tain that the 1970s saw a movement in Wolf’s writing away from Brecht and 
toward Bachmann, as Wolf increasingly challenged the received truths of Marx-
ism and, from the perspective of a woman within European society, both insider 
and outsider, grappled with the difficulties of expressing another truth that 
would question some of the most basic assumptions on which European culture 
rests and on which Marxism itself also relies. 
Certainly this critique was not fully elaborated in 1966, when Wolf wrote her 
Brecht and Bachmann essays; yet already the title of the Bachmann essay, “Truth 
That Can Be Faced [Die zumutbare Wahrheit]”—Ingeborg Bachmann’s Prose” 
deriving from an essay of 1959 by Bachmann, “Man Can Face the Truth [Die 
Wahrheit ist dem Menschen zumutbar],” shows that Wolf had grasped something 
of Bachmann’s philosophical project, her struggle to formulate a different epis-
temology, to articulate a different model for truth. More impressionistic than 
analytic, Wolf’s early essay does not provide, probably could not have provided, 
handy categories for understanding Bachmann’s prose. But two themes are 
striking. First, Wolf emphasizes that Bachmann aimed to provide her readers 
access to a truth they had not seen before: “To become seeing, to make people 
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see: a fundamental motif in the work of Ingeborg Bachmann” (Reader 85). 
Bachmann seemed to suggest that humans might not even successfully grasp 
the nature of their own suffering, might lack the categories enabling them to 
recognize it at all. “For it is time,” Bachmann had written, “to understand the 
voice of man, the voice of a chained creature not quite able to say what it suffers 
from” (quoted in Reader 85). On the other hand, failing to challenge conven-
tional truths might mean not only individual pain but complicity in the world’s 
evils altogether: “the haunting temptation to join hands—through conformity, 
blindness, acceptance, habit, illusion or treachery—with the deadly dangers to 
which the world is exposed” (Reader 84). As Wolf viewed it, Bachmann’s endeavor 
was to hold fast to the legitimacy of her own experience and to find a language 
that could accurately express it: “It is her cause to have the courage to create her 
experience anew in herself and to assert it in the face of the truly overwhelming 
mass and discouraging dominance of empty, meaningless, ineffectual phrases” 
(Reader 85). And this explained Bachmann’s concern with a new language, 
which critics had too often understood as only aestheticism. Quoting Bachmann 
herself, Wolf emphasized what Bachmann sought in her quest: “To seek ‘a new 
language,’ ‘a thinking that desires knowledge and wants to achieve with and 
through language. Let us call it, for the time being, reality’” (Reader 94).  
As its second structuring theme, Wolf’s essay insists—remarkably enough 
for a Bachmann study written at this time—that Bachmann intended her writ-
ing to be deeply and directly political. In the 1950s and 1960s, Bachmann’s lyric 
poetry was generally thought to be the beautiful, if somewhat obscure, expres-
sion of the personal experiences of the poetess, timeless and generally applicable 
to the human condition, whereas her prose was regarded as unsuccessful, weak, 
and confused by some, although enthusiastically and positively received by oth-
ers. But Wolf had read carefully Bachmann’s essays, particularly her Frankfurt 
lectures of 1959–1960, observing there the centrality of Bachmann’s insistence 
that literature should promote social change, and Wolf was able to use those 
essays to illuminate qualities of Bachmann’s imaginative writing that other 
readers had not grasped. Epigraphs from Bachmann’s essays begin each sec-
tion of Wolf’s own essay and document her emphasis on the connectedness of 
Bachmann’s concern with language and consciousness to a society she wishes to 
transform. Thus, for instance, the third section of Wolf’s essay begins with a 
quotation from the Frankfurt lectures: “But what in fact is possible is change. 
And the changing effect of new works educates us to new perception, new feel-
ing, new awareness” (Reader 89). Wolf emphasizes, too, that Bachmann under-
stood literature to derive from a particular historical period and to address his-
{ 126 }   a history of reading bachmann
torically specific problems, as she had again maintained in her lectures: “‘Writing 
does not take place outside the historical situation’” (quoted in Reader 89). If this 
is the case (as Wolf obviously believes it to be), Bachmann’s works need to be 
read both as written from the perspective of her own historically specific experi-
ences and as addressed to quite specific, if far-reaching, problems of her society. 
The categories of perception she wants to encourage in her readers would be 
those enabling them both to understand and to change the world. Simultane-
ously, the insufficiencies and weaknesses of her works—as well as the difficul-
ties of her own life—can be understood as having historical causes, too. For 
Christa Wolf, then as now, “the historical situation is such that the question of 
the possibility of man’s moral existence must be at the center of all writing. This 
approach is one of the main drives in [Bachmann’s] prose—often in curious 
disguises, not immediately recognizable, as a subjective reflex, as fear, doubt, a 
feeling of menace: ‘Hanging on to the high-voltage current of the present’”
(Reader 89).
But if social change is the central emphasis of Bachmann’s prose, the literary 
strategies she chooses could scarcely be more different from those of Brecht, who 
exemplified the engaged, experimental writer: neither the arena she identifies as 
crucial for change nor the techniques she employs resemble Brecht’s at all. 
Instead, Wolf emphasizes, Bachmann’s stress is on the human subject, its “self-
assertion,” even its “spreading” of itself [Selbstausdehnung] (Reader 85–86). For 
Bachmann, as later for Christa T., it is important to be able to say “I,” “without 
arrogance but with head high” (Reader 87). But this is a subject that also finds 
itself deeply imperiled, and its salvation might come through reasserting human 
power to comprehend the object world: “To regain a sovereignty lost through 
submission. To master it by designation” (Reader 86). “It may stimulate her,” 
writes Wolf, “to conquer banality in the course of writing” (Reader 89). “Banal-
ity,” a noun that could not be used carelessly after Hannah Arendt’s 1963 book 
on Adolf Eichmann, suggests even in this early essay some connection be-
tween the crisis of the subject and National Socialism, a theme that Wolf’s and 
Bachmann’s later works would pursue in great detail. For Wolf, most important 
in Bachmann’s work is her defense of that subject itself against the many forces 
that threaten it: “She defends no outlying regions but ‘regions of the heart.’ 
Man’s right [Anspruch des Menschen] to self-realization. His right to individuality 
and to unfold his own personality. His longing for freedom” (Reader 91). Defend-
ing those human capacities, Bachmann’s work begins to make it possible for 
new subjects to be created: “brave, deeply moving picture[s] of a new man” 
(Reader 95).
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Bachmann’s concentration on the subject rather than on events in the exter-
nal world is, for Wolf, not a quality to be understood only, or even primarily, 
negatively. From the perspective of Wolf’s later work, clearly her description of 
Bachmann’s prose is not really intended as criticism: “One will often seek in 
vain for concrete situations or for a realistic presentation of social processes. 
What we have here are stories of feelings” (Reader 89). Bachmann’s prose reveals 
the movements of subjectivity: “taking up her own position, showing her own 
weaknesses, being hit, rising again, attacking the enemy at its center, constantly 
in danger at the very heart of life, . . . self-assertion as a process” (Reader 86). 
When Bachmann portrays the external world, it is a world made luminous and 
transparent by the subject’s comprehension of it, a vision of its hopes and its 
dangers. Another frame of reference produces another reality: “This, subordi-
nated to a surprising system of references, is the irrepressible and insatiable long-
ing to penetrate into the natural and social environment with the help of human 
standards” (Reader 86). What “system of references”? “Unnamed,” says Wolf, 
“probably not thought out. Literature as utopia” (Reader 95). The pursuit of that 
“system of references”—or “viewing lens,” as Wolf termed it most recently in 
her own Frankfurt lectures—is what draws Wolf back repeatedly to Bachmann’s 
work.  
To be sure, Wolf’s response to Bachmann in this essay is not solely positive. 
She perceives obscurities and inadequacies in Bachmann’s writing, but those 
often derive from Bachmann’s real situation: she felt she lacked an audience 
who could understand her and was deeply pained by that. And since she could 
not foresee any mediation between her fantastic visions and their realization in 
the world, the resolutions her stories achieve sometimes also seem abrupt and 
unmotivated: 
If it accords with no social movement the radical claim to freedom becomes a 
ravaging longing for absolute, unlimited and unreal freedom, complete despair 
about what steps to take next turns into illusionary demands “to set up a new 
world” by “abolishing all that exists.” And the departure from this radicality, a 
return to normal activities and attitudes to life is either regarded as capitulation or 
remains unmotivated and without foundation, as in “The Thirtieth Year”: “I say 
to you: Stand up and walk! No bones are broken!” (Reader 92)
In 1966, Wolf seemed still able clearly to distinguish her position as a socialist 
writer in the GDR from Bachmann’s. Bachmann stood for the furthest extreme 
of integrity and resolution one could reach in a capitalist society. Wolf wanted to 
hope that socialist writers, learning new lessons from Bachmann, could also 
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provide the setting to bring them to concretion. “Only then,” says Wolf, “on a 
new social foundation, can the ‘defence of poesy’ begin” (Reader 95).
Yet one of Wolf’s observations in the Bachmann essay points beyond her con-
fidence in GDR socialism toward a position she herself would come close to 
assuming in the coming decades. The fourth section of her essay begins with a 
quotation from Bachmann’s story “The Thirtieth Year”: “But a few drank the 
cup of hemlock unconditionally” (Reader 94). Without access to a social move-
ment radical enough to realize the social changes her works had envisioned, 
Bachmann is inclined to withdraw her characters from society altogether instead 
of making them pay the price necessary to survive in it. In this gesture, she joins 
others in the history of German literature: “Some refused to be bought, to be 
won over by temptation or forced by blackmail; they preferred death to self sur-
render, in order to remain alive in their own time and to have an effect on the 
future. Ingeborg Bachmann appears to be trying to hold on to these, to their 
moral example” (Reader 94–95). In Bachmann’s prose of this period, the most 
striking example of nonconformity is Undine in the last story of The Thirtieth 
Year, “Undine Goes.” (Appropriately, Wolf’s essay from The Reader and the 
Writer was reprinted as the afterword to Undine geht, the East German edition 
of Bachmann’s stories published in 1973.) Wolf understands fully how radically 
Bachmann had rejected the achievements of an entire culture: “Weariness of 
civilization and doubts about progress are most strongly marked in ‘Undine 
Goes’: total alienation of man from himself and his like and romantic protest 
against it” (Reader 92). She grasps as well that this is a protest advanced against 
a male world from the standpoint of a female figure who stands outside it, 
“accusing a man’s world in the barely disguised voice of the author” (Reader 93). 
Given Wolf ‘s recognition of the extremity of the positions Bachmann assumes 
in this story, it is all the more startling to observe how closely Wolf ‘s description 
of Undine corresponds to figures in her own work, particularly Christa T. and 
Karoline von Günderrode: she is “also romantic in attitude, the comparison of 
commonplace utility thinking with ‘a spirit that is destined to no use.’ . . . Since 
[Undine] sees no possible way to take up the struggle, she retreats before the 
unacceptable demands of society in the hope that she can thus preserve herself. 
But this retreat always ends in surrender of self, since separation from the prac-
tices of society also wears away the individual’s inner powers of resistance” 
(Reader 92–93). “The acceptable [zumutbare] truth” that the (woman) writer 
can provide, should she withstand “the unacceptable [unzumutbare] demands of 
society”—this dilemma threads its way through Wolf ‘s work to the present.  
Although Wolf did not explicitly acknowledge Bachmann as a mentor until 
christa wolf and ingeborg bachmann   { 129 }
the late 1970s, a careful reader of her work can clearly perceive her indebtedness 
to and acknowledgment of Bachmann much earlier. Wolf’s literary-theoretical 
essay of 1968, “The Reader and the Writer,” reveals great debts to Bachmann’s 
writing in general and more specifically to the concerns in Bachmann’s work on 
which Wolf had commented earlier. Remarkable in the 1968 essay is its attempt 
to pose its concerns in Brechtian terms while moving at least in some respects 
ever further from Brechtian literary models. Though Wolf, like Brecht, places 
her considerations “in the scientific age,” the science she stresses is that of Ein-
stein and Heisenberg, where scientific regularity and reliability have given way 
to relativity and imprecision. In the wake of these scientific changes and given 
the continuation of Brecht’s project, she calls for a new “epic prose.” But in con-
trast to epic theater, Wolf’s epic prose is produced and consumed by single indi-
viduals; indeed, here she expressly criticizes Walter Benjamin’s assertion that the 
individual author as producer was as inevitably fated to disappear as the indi-
vidual entrepreneur, “crushed between the institutions producing on a mass 
scale” (Reader 207). Moreover, epic prose does not undertake to show its readers 
a world “changing and changeable” into which they—cool, critical, and dispas-
sionate—can intervene; instead, it offers to address and transform those readers’ 
very subjectivity itself: “Epic prose should be a genre which undertakes to pen-
etrate along paths not yet traveled into the inner regions of this individual, the 
reader of prose. Into the very inmost part, where the nucleus of the personality 
develops and consolidates” (Reader 201). As Wolf had argued in her “Interview 
with Myself” published in the same year as “The Reader and the Writer,” the 
achievement of the real basis for socialism in the GDR meant that socialist lit-
erature could, indeed should, now concern itself with human subjectivity, com-
prising emotions as well as reason (Reader). As a socialist writer, Wolf thus turns 
to the elaboration of precisely those dimensions of human experience virtually 
excluded in Brecht’s work.
Wolf’s shift reveals the influence not just of Bachmann but also of Ernst 
Bloch—the thinker whom Bachmann in the Frankfurt lectures had proposed, 
along with Wittgenstein, as a central impulse for contemporary writing. The 
last of Bachmann’s Frankfurt lectures was titled “Literature as Utopia”; from 
“The Reader and the Writer” and The Quest for Christa T. onward, Wolf also 
places her own work (as Andreas Huyssen has shown) in the service of the 
Blochian principle of hope. Her writing, like Bachmann’s, projects an unrealized 
vision and reveals the desires and disappointments beneath the surface of the 
present, employing epic prose to project, as she maintained in “The Reader and 
the Writer,” “the future into the present” (Reader 201). Wolf argued eloquently 
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in that essay that formulating utopias should be the most important function of 
socialist prose, indispensable in a socialist society: 
[Prose] can keep awake in us the memory of the future that we must not abandon 
on pain of destruction. 
It helps mankind to become conscious subjects. 
It is revolutionary and realistic; it entices and encourages people to achieve the 
impossible. (Reader 212)
In 1968, what still distinguished Wolf’s utopias from Bachmann’s was of course 
Wolf ‘s ability to imagine a society in which they might be realized—a hope she 
long, against mounting evidence to the contrary, tried doggedly to maintain. 
One might suggest that Wolf’s use of Bachmann is what Benjamin would have 
termed redemptive: rescuing the most radical elements in her work from mis-
understanding and oblivion, making it accessible to the present, in order to bring 
about her visions in reality. 
In Wolf’s writing until the late 1970s, one can detect a series of parallels with 
and allusions to Bachmann’s writing too obvious, particularly in the case of the 
names Wolf chooses, to be anything but deliberate. To readers familiar with 
Wolf’s Bachmann essay, the words with which her narrator introduces the short 
story “June Afternoon,” for instance, recall the description of Bachmann’s prose. 
The last two clauses (“A vision perhaps, if you understand what I mean” [Her-
minghouse 113]) reveal the narrator’s expectation that, as was the case with 
Bachmann’s work, the vision that this difficult story comprises is not immedi-
ately evident. What the story reveals, beneath an exterior that could not be more 
banal—a family afternoon in a weekend garden plot outside Berlin—is the fan-
tastic texture of subjectivity underlying it. On the one hand, the garden itself, 
not unlike other literary gardens, stands as a container for “the immoderate 
desires, always held in check” of the Bachmann essay. This very real garden, 
says the narrator, also contains within it the dream of its own perfectibility: “In 
all the time we have known it, . . . it has never had the opportunity to show what 
it is capable of. Now it turns out that it was the dream of being a green, rampant, 
wild, and lush garden, no more, no less. The archetype of a garden. Garden 
incarnate” (Herminghouse 113). Simultaneously, the banal everyday is filled 
with vague and ominous threats—“Husband’s Corpse Found in Bed Cabinet” 
(Herminghouse 117) reported in the newspaper, the lost ropes needed to tie up 
the roses, the dismembered dead in a train wreck, the fear of death itself: “After 
all, who is to say that the hand which will pull one away from everything is 
already set to pounce?” (Herminghouse 129). 
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Although the story, drawing conventional conceptions of reality into ques-
tion, never moves altogether into the realm of the fantastic or the surreal, it suc-
ceeds in undertaking nonetheless the epistemological experiment Wolf began to 
describe in “The Reader and the Writer,” questioning the immutability of a 
physical and a social world exterior to human subjects. Readers, recalling Wolf’s 
comments there on Newtonian “celestial mechanics” (as well as the imagery of 
her novel Divided Heaven), will apply them to the narrator’s remark in “June 
Afternoon”: “We were suddenly overcome by a sense of insecurity about the 
reliability of celestial landscapes” (Herminghouse 116). Instead, in this vision, 
reality is often constituted through the creative use of language; the family 
engages in spontaneous play with words that brings into being that which has 
never existed before: “wormghost and crookrain and nightjail and duckworm 
and jailluck and nightrain and duckcrook” (Herminghouse 121). But to their 
creativity is contrasted the attitude of their neighbor, the engineer, of whom the 
narrator remarks, “He goes by printed matter in general” (Herminghouse 119). 
The danger the engineer represents is his attractiveness for the thirteen-year-
old daughter, who regards him as “modern,” “chic.” On this ordinary after-
noon, two models for the future compete for the allegiance of the next GDR 
generation.  
Such themes evidently continue into Wolf’s next creative work, The Quest for 
Christa T. Critics have remarked on some similarities between Christa T. and 
Bachmann, or at least Bachmann as Wolf describes her (Stephan 122). Christa 
T. too formulates fantastic visions, longs to be useful, and laments “that I can 
only cope with things by writing!” (Quest 34). For Christa T. also, “seeing” is a 
key term: “Sehnsucht comes from sehen, to see, and Sucht, craving. This craving 
to see, and this was her discovery, accorded with actual things in a simple but 
irrefutable way” (Quest 88). But the most striking concrete parallel between this 
work and Bachmann’s can be found in the single extended narrative written by 
Christa T. within Wolf’s novel, a narrative that bears the same title as Bach-
mann’s longest prose work—”Malina.” Assuming that even the deep affinities 
between these two writers could not have caused them to arrive independently 
at this same and unusual title for a prose work, I risk the assertion that Wolf 
meant the title as an acknowledgment of Bachmann’s work and her influence 
on The Quest for Christa T. (Alternatively, as I suggested in chapter 3, Bachmann 
may have intended the name “Malina” as an hommage to Wolf—or the two 
authors may of course indeed have arrived at the same title independently.) 
Christa T.’s “Malina” presents puzzles similar to those of Bachmann’s writings: 
an apparently realistic narrative whose purpose is unclear but which touches on 
{ 132 }   a history of reading bachmann
the themes of National Socialism; a mother who encourages her young daugh-
ter to accede to the assertions of a dominant order; a journey over a border to a 
destination simultaneously foreign and not foreign (recalling Bachmann’s meta-
phoric use of the both real and Wittgensteinian language border from which 
she derived), and a text a female narrator fails for unknown reasons to conclude. 
“Now one ought to know why she stopped at this point,” writes Wolf’s narrator 
(Quest 90). But we can assume that Christa T.’s inability to continue, despite the 
vital importance to her of writing, is deeply connected to the larger dilemma of 
women (and particularly women writers) in this time, the dilemma that both 
this work and Bachmann’s writing are devoted to exploring.
The complex eighth chapter of Patterns of Childhood then pursues explicitly 
the connection of the most important themes of Wolf’s writing to Bachmann’s 
work. In this novel again the somewhat unusual name, Jordan, had already 
revealed affinities between Patterns of Childhood and Bachmann’s work: the 
family whom Wolf chooses to illustrate the functioning of “everyday fascism” 
shares its name with central figures of “The Barking” from Three Paths to the 
Lake and of the novel The Book of Franza, published first in 1978 but from which 
Bachmann had given readings in the late 1960s. Wolf’s chapter eight, which, her 
narrator tells us, had long been intended to deal with the topic of war, becomes 
explicitly structured around references to Bachmann’s work when the narrator 
learns through a radio broadcast on 19 October 1973 that Bachmann had died 
from burns. “With my burned hand I write about the nature of fire” (Patterns
163) is the epigraph from Bachmann that heads the chapter, and, like the “I” of 
Malina, the narrator broods over all-pervasive war; however, war here is not just 
metaphorical, as it sometimes seems in Bachmann, but real—in Poland, Viet-
nam, the Middle East, and in Chile, where in 1973 Allende had just been mur-
dered. The connections to Bachmann’s female “Ways of Death” are underlined 
also in the links the narrator establishes between Goebbels’s declaration, “At last 
the Teutonic Empire of the German Nation has come into being,” and young 
Nelly Jordan’s mournful assertion to her mirror image: “Nobody loves me.” 
“How can anyone be made to understand,” the narrator asks of her character, 
“that these two completely unrelated sentences are, in your opinion, somehow 
connected?” (Patterns 164–165). In this dark chapter the despair that led Bach-
mann to her death is comprehensible, though staggering to the narrator: 
The military junta in Chile has forbidden the use of the word compañero. There 
is, then, no reason to doubt the effectiveness of words. Even when someone on 
whose serious relationship to words you have counted for a long time can no lon-
ger make any use of them, who lets go of herself and records these days with the 
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sentence: With my burned hand I write about the nature of fire. Undine goes. 
Make with the hand—with the burned hand—the sign for finality. Go, Death, 
and stand still, Time. A solitude into which no one follows me. It is necessary, with 
the echo still in the mouth, to go on and to keep silent. Be prepared? For what, 
then? And not overcome by sadness? Explain nothing to me. I saw the salaman-
der go through every fire. No fear threatens him, and he is pained by nothing. 
(Wolf, Kindheitsmuster 233–234; passage omitted from English translation)
But the temperamental or historical differences between Wolf’s narrator and 
Bachmann reassert themselves: “To regain oneself after a brief stumble, caused 
by the increased burden on one’s shoulders. It is necessary to talk” (Kindheits-
muster 234; passage omitted from English translation). Bachmann’s 1953 script 
for a radio broadcast on Wittgenstein, “Sagbares und Unsagbares” (The speak-
able and the unspeakable; W 4: 103–127) very early had maintained that it was 
altogether impossible to speak about that which was most important. For Wolf, 
however, this position is not at all sufficient, and her narrator responds to Bach-
mann’s death by maintaining, “One must eventually break the silence about 
difficult things” (Patterns 178). And this narrator also recognizes the small con-
crete utopias of everyday life, as Bachmann sometimes recognized, too; con-
sider, for example, the Bachmann quotation with which this dark chapter ends: 
“The most beautiful thing under the sun is being under the sun” (Wolf, Pat-
terns 197).
Wolf’s writing since Patterns of Childhood can be regarded as centrally con-
cerned with the dilemma posed by Bachmann’s death: whether the (woman) 
writer can have faith enough in the hope of remedying the evils she details, of 
realizing the visions she projects, to preserve her from despair. The eighth chap-
ter of Patterns of Childhood had already described Nelly’s mother as the figure 
with whom Wolf’s more recent work is concerned, the prophet whose words are 
not heeded: “Always expecting the worst. Cassandra, behind the counter in her 
store; Cassandra aligning loaves of bread; Cassandra weighing potatoes” (Pat-
terns 165). For instance, in an interview published in 1982, Wolf explained that 
this problem informed No Place on Earth—written after the East German song-
writer Wolf Biermann’s expulsion from the GDR: “I wrote No Place on Earth in 
1977. That was a time when I found myself obliged to examine the precondi-
tions for failure, the connection between social desperation and failure in litera-
ture. At the time, I was living with the intense feeling of standing with my back 
to the wall, unable to take a proper step. I had to get beyond a certain time when 
there seemed to be absolutely no possibility left for effective action” (“Culture” 
89). In “The Shadow of a Dream,” the foreword to her edition of Karoline von 
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Günderrode’s writing, Wolf uses Bachmann’s term to describe the generation of 
young Romantics to whom history offered no hope: “German life stories. Ger-
man death styles” [Todesarten = ways of death] (Author’s Dimension 135). The 
metaphor of the injured hand also threads its way through the story of Günder-
rode’s ill-fated love for a married man not her equal. 
Wolf’s clearest response to the dilemmas posed by Bachmann’s life and death, 
however, is found in her Büchner Prize acceptance speech, which circles the issues 
posed in Bachmann’s last published poem, “No Delicacies” (Storm 187–188). In 
that poem, first published in the 1968 issue of Kursbuch that proclaimed the death 
of literature, Bachmann declares her unwillingness henceforth to seek beautiful 
words to adorn her writing at this time of grave social crisis. In yet more dire 
times, Wolf, too, expresses great doubts about the efficacy of writing, in which 
she continues to believe nonetheless. Bachmann’s writing, even in its despair, 
gives precise expression to the extremity of a state of consciousness that we would 
not have known so well without her description of it, showing us more clearly 
what conditions unworthy of human beings we need to combat. In this time, 
Wolf explains, “all, nearly all products of our age must bear within them, or at 
least within their invented opposites, the seed of self-destruction. Art can-not 
transcend itself as art, literature not as literature” (“Shall” 10). Bachmann had 
concluded “No Delicacies” by renouncing her vocation: “As for my part, let it 
vanish” (quoted in “Shall” 9). In the Büchner Prize acceptance speech, Wolf does 
not accept that resignation: “One who expresses herself completely does not 
cancel herself out: the wish for obliteration remains as a witness. Her part will 
not vanish” (“Shall” 10). In a 1982 interview as well, Wolf, herself unresigned, 
seemed to promise that she would not choose Bachmann’s way out: “But many 
readers also see that by probing deeper and deeper into the wounds of our times, 
which are also my wounds, I don’t intend to give up” (“Culture” 96).  
It remains still to be asked what these wounds of our times are that occasion 
responses so dark from these writers and in what senses they, women writers in 
central Europe in the last third of the twentieth century, arrived at a corre-
sponding understanding of themselves and their culture. Now, looking back on 
Bachmann’s writing, we can see that she sought from the beginning, in her 
prose writing at least, to understand the causes of the troubles of her time. 
Although her explanations seem now too vague, too imprecise, or too restricted 
to the realm of ideas, those defects may derive from Bachmann’s lack then of an 
appropriate theoretical vocabulary or framework—a lack that theory writing of 
the last twenty years, including that of feminism, has helped to address. Else-
where I have argued that it is possible to observe in Bachmann’s essays insights 
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into the structures of Western thought akin to those of contemporary French 
poststructuralism (see chapter 3): she discerns both the limitations of Western 
discourse and the connections between Western thought and Western history. 
In one essay on Wittgenstein, for instance, Bachmann emphasizes that Western 
thought is unable to speak, to formulate meaningful propositions, about pre-
cisely what is most important to human beings, which nonetheless is available to 
us as “the mystical,” about which nothing can be said. This “negative” dimen-
sion of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, as she terms it, interests Bachmann most and 
makes Wittgenstein represent for her the insoluble dilemmas at which Western 
thought, indeed Western culture altogether, has arrived. “These efforts may 
permit us to call Wittgenstein the great representative thinker of our time, since 
in him are expressed the two extreme tendencies of the intellectual trends of the 
West. He occupies the pinnacle of scientific thought of the age—that thought 
which accompanies and precedes the development of technology and the natu-
ral sciences; and yet it is precisely he who reminds us of the quotation by the 
nineteenth-century Austrian playwright Johann Nestroy: ‘The altogether unique 
aspect of progress is that it appears to be much greater than it really is’’’ (W 4:
116–117). 
An Austrian writer in the late twentieth century, Bachmann obviously 
understood the danger of challenges posed to reason, particularly within a Ger-
man context. But simultaneously, she insisted on the necessity of questioning a 
destructive form of reason that could not transcend the limitations of scientifism 
and positivism. Moreover, even Bachmann’s early essays indicate her clear aware-
ness that the problems she was addressing were not merely those of the realm of 
thought but were, on the contrary, expressions in thought of the real cul-de-sac 
at which our culture seemed to have arrived. Her radio essay on Simone Weil 
(W 4:128–155) pursues the deep connection in Weil’s work between structures 
of Western thought and the misery of the proletariat—a misery against which a 
Marxism that fails to repudiate its roots in the Western philosophies from which 
it derives is also powerless. In Bachmann’s essays on Robert Musil she also 
stresses that his The Man without Qualities addresses the same cultural problem-
atic, showing, as Bachmann herself wants to maintain, that its logical outcome 
is war: “It is not the Kakanian [the term Musil used to refer to the Austro-Hun-
garian empire on the eve of World War I] situation alone that has shown that the 
thought-processes of rigid ideologies lead directly to war” (W 4: 27).  
Read from this perspective, Bachmann’s creative writing and particularly 
her prose reveal themselves as concerned from the beginning, if sometimes 
somewhat obliquely, with the destructiveness at the heart of our culture, the 
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flaw at its core. Her story “The Thirtieth Year” attempts a far-reaching critique 
of all hitherto existing cultural structures: “The renunciation of every tradi-
tional view and every traditional condition, of states, churches, organizations, 
means of power, arms, education. The great strike, the instantaneous stoppage 
of the old world. The cessation of work and thinking for this old world. The 
dismissal of history, not for the sake of anarchy, but for the sake of a fresh start” 
(TY 56). “A Wildermuth,” recalling Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Hofmanns-
thal’s “Lord Chandos Letter,” deals with the impossibility of talking about a 
truth that is more than facts (TY 139–176). As Wolf had recognized, the last 
story of the collection makes Bachmann’s point with the greatest clarity and 
finality: Undine goes, repudiating the monstrous male world that is incapable, 
for all its achievements, of grasping human happiness. As Bernd Witte has 
perceptively observed, Bachmann’s writing from the mid-1960s onward pur-
sues the insights first expressed in “Undine Goes”: “Ingeborg Bachmann hints 
already in this anti-fairy-tale at the central motif of her later prose works by 
attempting to combine in thought the catastrophic course of world history and 
her own self-alienation as a woman. She locates their common cause—she 
blames the thoughts and actions of men” (Witte, “Ingeborg” 27).
In those late works Bachmann shows us her “ways of death” directly: women 
mentally or physically destroyed, often themselves unaware of how their condi-
tion is connected to a social order that makes a happy and autonomous female 
subjectivity impossible. In Malina, the female “I” disappears into a crack in the 
wall, leaving her male alter ego to tell her story; “It was murder,” says the narra-
tor (225). In “Gier” (Greed), the central female figure is literally murdered by 
her husband; in Requiem for Fanny Goldmann (Franza), Fanny dies mysteriously 
after a man betrays her; and the women in the stories of Three Paths to the Lake
suffer all manner of psychic and physical distress. Bachmann’s argument is 
made most decisively and completely in the unfinished novel The Book of Franza:
here the causes for Franza’s madness are linked explicitly to both National 
Socialism and European imperialism; they aim to extend their totalitarian grasp 
over the entire world, colonizing minds they cannot control through physical 
violence. Like the other “Ways of Death” women, Franza is destroyed, but in 
this case she recognizes that she is a victim of the white culture to which she 
belongs, and she dies resisting, cursing the whites: “[The whites] should be 
damned” (Franza 142). Given these far-reaching and devastating recognitions, 
then, it must be no surprise that there is no way out for Bachmann’s characters. 
If white history culminates in fascism and imperialism, in murder and destruc-
tion, then how can a white woman, excluded from that history but part of no 
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other, find another place to stand? By the time of her death, Bachmann was 
thus left with an increasingly more radical and more clearly formulated analysis 
of the major failures of our culture—a critique so far-reaching that only that 
culture’s abolition could have seemed adequate response to the abuses she 
detailed. But virtually nowhere in her work do we find expressed even the hope 
for her culture’s transformation, scarcely even the hope that that to which she 
gives expression will be understood.
Wolf ’s Frankfurt lectures on poetics (W 4: 182–271) make it possible to 
maintain that the position toward which her writing of the 1970s moved increas-
ingly resembles Bachmann’s, both in the radicality of her cultural analysis and 
to some degree in its pessimism as well. As early as the stories in Unter den Lin-
den, published in 1974, the critique of scientific positivism and instrumental 
rationality—to which GDR functionaries were only too clearly not immune—
became a central theme of Wolf’s work. Although she reveals the deep-reaching 
consequences of technocratic thought, however, a reading of her stories generous 
to the GDR might still understand them as attacking social abuses there, not the 
fundamental orientation of her country or even of Marxism altogether. But in 
Wolf’s essays on the Romantics, written after the expulsion of Biermann as a 
thinly veiled examination of conditions in her own country, the varieties of ways 
in which she takes issue even with Marxism are scarcely concealed; Marxism 
continues rather than breaks with the structures of thought and action that had 
led civilization to its present pass. 
In the letters of Bettine Brentano and Karoline von Günderrode, Wolf finds, 
for instance, an alternative to the instrumental reason about to conquer all of 
Europe—triumphant, Wolf clearly believes, to this day: “An alternative, yes. An 
alternative which was conceived and proposed at the very moment when the 
society switched irreversibly onto the track of the exploitation of nature, the 
twisting of ends into means, and the oppression of every ‘feminine’ element in 
the new civilization” (Author’s Dimension 212). Contrasting Bettine’s sympathy 
with and tenderness toward nature with Faust’s attempt to subdue the Earth 
Spirit, Wolf shows herself willing to reverse an entire orthodox Marxist tradi-
tion of the appropriation of the cultural heritage within which Faust, unbounded 
in his energy and ambition, is a paradigmatic figure, a culture hero: “What a 
different scene from Faust’s confrontation with the Earth Spirit! Not a declara-
tion of war to the death, not the unconditional subjugation of nature; not the 
hubris of the Faustian man who, casting aside Faust’s doubts, gains knowledge by 
putting nature on the rack, forcing confessions out of it with screws and irons. 
Hers is a different kind of progress. A different kind of magic from the diabolic 
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sort for which Faust sells his soul, and which destroys him, a man become a 
stranger to himself (Author’s Dimension 213). Wolf obstinately rejects a model she 
also identifies as male, and Bettine joins Undine in the female opposition: “How 
different an adversary was created by God the Father when he made Mephisto to 
incite man to ambivalent creation than was bred by Mother Nature when she 
made her army of witches, nymphs, and sprites—those beings who now, in the 
Faustian age, were repressed, accursed, and labeled taboo, and whose ranks Bet-
tine, their latter-day descendant, joined trembling with emotion” (Author’s 
Dimension 213). Wolf’s Büchner Prize acceptance speech only makes completely 
explicit and pursues to its final, most contemporary consequence what had been 
clear already in these essays: committed in East and West to its destructive course, 
a culture based on principles that alienate human beings from nature, each other, 
and themselves, now stands poised to destroy itself altogether.  
What is not so clear in the essays on the Romantics, however, is the exact 
object of Wolf’s attack; there it might still be possible to regard that attack as 
limited to residues of bourgeois thought—the Romantics, after all, produced 
their counterproposals at the moment when bourgeois industriousness and util-
itarianism triumphed. Yet even in these essays there are indications that Wolf’s 
analysis of the flaws of Western civilization might reach as far as Bachmann’s 
imprecations against “the whites.” In “The Shadow of a Dream,” for instance, 
Wolf praises Bettine and Karoline for their discovery of models other than those 
of classical Greece, other than those of Europe: “Powers which derived from the 
mother’s womb instead of from the father’s brain, that is, the head of Zeus, like 
Pallas Athena: an alternative to the sources of classicism, a turn toward archaic, 
partially matriarchal models. They reread mythology—not just the Greek, 
which had dominated the study of myth in the past, but prehistoric myth and 
the teachings of India, Asia, the East. Eurocentrism had been breached, and, 
with it, the exclusive rule of the conscious mind” (Author’s Dimension 155–156). 
With the Büchner Prize acceptance speech Wolf aligns herself more clearly 
with the analysis of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, tracing the destructive tendencies of the present back to the 
Greek beginnings of Western culture; and her recently published [1983] narra-
tive, Cassandra, reveals in its fullness, often with virtually explicit allusions to 
Bachmann, the extent of her critique. Here Wolf returns to the roots of our 
culture to tell of its origins from the perspective of a woman who, like the fig-
ures of “Ways of Death,” is simultaneously inside and outside that culture, destroyed 
because of her complicity in it. Surely, as in The Book of Franza, one must under-
stand the real events of this story as internal to the female psyche, an illustration, 
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perhaps, of Freud’s remark that Greek culture—that is, the oedipus complex—
stood in the way of the analytic discovery of an earlier layer of civilization, the 
Minoan-Mycenean preoedipal phase so crucial for femininity (21: 26). For Cassan-
dra, a “seer,” as for Bachmann, seeing is primary, and her own insights deepen as 
the narrative progresses, but, like Bachmann, she is fated not to be understood. 
Indeed, Cassandra laments, “They did not even understand the questions to which 
I was seeking an answer” (Cassandra 48), and she will perish as a consequence of 
what she recognizes—“to give birth to what slays me” (quoted in Author’s Dimen-
sion 157), as Karoline von Günderrode had written. Cassandra, also, writing with 
her burned hand: “I was noted for my endurance of pain. For my ability to hold 
my hand over the flame longer than anyone else” (Cassandra 31).
What does Cassandra see, and how does that correspond to Bachmann’s 
visions? Wolf explained the new position at which she had arrived and explic-
itly acknowledged her indebtedness to Bachmann in her Frankfurt lectures, 
held in May and June 1982 at the University of Frankfurt and titled Vorausset-
zungen einer Erzählung: Kassandra (Conditions of a narrative: translation pub-
lished as Cassandra: A Novel and Four Essays). Her lectures begin by explaining, 
with some irony, why she herself has no poetics of her own, a new poetics 
according to her Classical Antiquity Lexicon coming into being via an oedipal 
struggle with one’s fatherly precursors: “‘Poetics’ (the definition reads): theory 
of the art of poetry, which at an advanced stage—Aristotle, Horace—takes on 
a systematic form, and whose norms have been accorded ‘wide validity’ in 
numerous countries since the age of humanism. New aesthetic positions are 
reached (the book says) via confrontation with these norms (in parentheses, 
Brecht)” (Cassandra 141). From that warlike patriarchal lineage that ends with 
Brecht, from that entire literary-theoretical tradition, Wolf here distances her-
self altogether: “I have never felt the raging desire for confrontation with the 
poetics, or the model, of a great writer (in parentheses, Brecht). This has only 
struck me in the last couple of years, and so it may be that, incidentally, these 
essays will also treat a question that I have not been asked: the question of why 
I do not have a poetics” (Cassandra 141). Advancing another model, “a fabric 
[that] . . . is an aesthetic structure, and . . . would lie at the center of my poetics 
if I had one” (Cassandra 142), Wolf attempts in the lectures to explicate the 
complicated and subjective process whereby she arrived at the Cassandra nar-
rative. Her first and second lectures deal with her trip to Greece; her third, a 
“Work Diary,” records “the vise grip between life and subject matter”; the 
fourth explores, with explicit and detailed reference to Bachmann, the “his-
torical reality of the Cassandra figure” and the “conditions for the woman 
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writer past and present” (Cassandra 142). The fifth lecture is the narrative 
Cassandra itself.
In the fourth lecture Wolf declares that the discoveries she has made in writ-
ing Cassandra—the epistemological changes forced upon her, still difficult even 
to describe—are comparable only to the transformation of her vision to which 
her discovery of Marx had compelled her thirty years before: 
With the widening of my visual angle and the readjustment to my depth of focus, 
my viewing lens (through which I perceive our time, all of us, you, myself) has 
undergone a decisive change. It is comparable to that decisive change that occurred 
more than thirty years ago, when I first became acquainted with Marxist theory and 
attitudes; a liberating and illuminating experience which altered my thinking, my 
view, what I felt about and demanded of myself. When I try to realize what is hap-
pening, what has happened, I find that (to bring it down to the lowest common 
denominator) there has been an expansion of what for me is “real.” Moreover, the 
nature, the inner structure, the movement of this reality has also changed and con-
tinues to change almost daily. It is indescribable; my professional interest is wide-
awake and aims precisely at description, but it must hold back, withdraw, and it has 
had to learn to want and to bring about its own defeat. (Cassandra 278)
The title of this lecture draws our attention to those epistemological concerns 
that had already served as the basis of Wolf’s original essay on Bachmann: “A 
Letter, about Unequivocal and Ambiguous Meaning, Definiteness and Indefi-
niteness; about Ancient Conditions and New View-Scopes; about Objectivity” 
(Cassandra 272). And the essay’s epigraph comes from Bachmann’s The Book of 
Franza: “For the facts that make up the world need the non-factual as a vantage 
point from which to be perceived” (Cassandra 272)—the same sort of vision, 
that is, that Wolf had detected in Bachmann’s early prose. 
And indeed, insights learned from Bachmann, the epistemological changes 
forced upon her by her reading of Bachmann, form the structuring principle of 
this lecture. As Wolf began to think about Cassandra, she explains, as she 
began to pose to herself the question: “Who was Cassandra before anyone 
wrote about her?” (Cassandra 273), she began also to meditate upon the mean-
ing of the Bachmann poem she had cited in the eighth chapter of Patterns of 
Childhood, “Tell Me, Love.” Wolf devotes several pages to explicating the poem, 
stressing the concern of the poem’s speaker with her status as thinker, which 
might preclude her from love. Says Wolf, “‘Must someone think’ may perhaps 
mean: must a man—or a woman— think like that? So—exclusively? In a way 
that excludes love, and what is lovely” (Cassandra 274). But the poem simultane-
ously offers another model of thought and feeling: “Reflecting on this, regret-
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ting it, even lamenting it, the poem itself gives an example of the most precise 
indefiniteness, the clearest ambiguity. Things are this way and no other way, it 
says; and at the same time (this cannot be thought logically) things are that 
way, a different way. You are I, I am he, it cannot be explained. The grammar 
of manifold simultaneous relations” (Cassandra 276).  
Wolf had begun this lecture/letter by telling her friend A., the addressee of 
the letter, about the “mountain of books” she had taken to the country with her, 
listing almost half a page of works of mostly feminist scholarship from Western 
Europe and the United States. From feminism, from Euro-American women’s 
conscious refusal to accede to the structures of men’s reality, she begins to derive 
her explanation of that new model, as she had often hinted in earlier works and 
stated clearly in her third essay: “To what extent is there really such a thing as 
women’s writing? To the extent that women, for historical and biological rea-
sons, experience a different reality than men. Experience reality differently 
than men and express it. . . . To the extent that they stop wearing themselves 
out in trying to integrate themselves into the prevailing delusional systems” 
(Cassandra 259). In the fourth essay, Wolf pursues women’s status in classical 
works, especially in Aristotle and Goethe, tracing women’s loss of the authority 
they had possessed in European prehistory and linking it to the triumph of a 
mode of thought that was to culminate in the technological nightmare of the 
present. “To put it in simplified terms,” Wolf tells us, “this one-track-minded 
route is the one that has been followed by Western thought: the route of segre-
gation, of the renunciation of the manifoldness of phenomena, in favor of dual-
ism and monism, in favor of closed systems and pictures of the world; of the 
renunciation of subjectivity in favor of a sealed ‘objectivity’”(Cassandra 287). 
But thinking men still need women to preserve them from the limitations 
of their own rarified thought: “They need cunning little devices to avoid dying 
of the cold. One of these devices is to develop women as a power resource. In 
other words, to fit them into their patterns of life and thought. To put it more 
simply, to exploit them” (Cassandra 294). Leaping unabashedly 2,500 years to 
show in what that thinking culminates, Wolf quotes a few sentences of dia-
logue from Marieluise Fleisser’s “Tiefseefisch” (Deep sea fish). The setting is 
Berlin in the 1920s; the speakers are Wollank, a former bicycle racer, and Tütü, 
head of a literary clique, obviously modeled on B.B.—Brecht. Wollank main-
tains, “These women are dreadful, the way they swarm around you and each 
one dies to perform a different service.” But Tütü asserts in reply, “I don’t see 
why I shouldn’t take what I can get. I have turned it into a system. Everything 
that is able to stimulate me is brought to me without my having to lift a finger. 
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. . . My energies,” he continues, “are freed for what is essential” (Cassandra 295). 
How, asks Wolf, can this be an aesthetic that women writers could use to free 
us from the West’s destructive thinking?  
And the woman who starts to speak in her own voice, to say “I,” faces enor-
mous obstacles. “I claim,” Wolf asserts, “that every woman in this century and 
in our cultural sphere who has ventured into male dominated institutions—
‘literature’ and ‘aesthetics’ are such institutions—must have experienced the 
desire for self-destruction” (Cassandra 299). Her example is the unnamed 
female “I” of Bachmann’s Malina. Bachmann, Wolf maintains, had succeeded 
in naming what had happened to women in the course of the development of 
Western civilization, their “ways of death,” and had also consciously chosen an 
aesthetic different from that of “Goethe, Stendhal, Tolstoy, Fontane, Proust, 
and Joyce” to do so (Cassandra 300). But Bachmann found also that her experi-
ence as a woman scarcely allowed itself to be pressed into form at all: “Which-
ever direction you look, whichever page you open the book to, you see the cave-
in of the alternatives which until now have held together and torn apart our 
world, as well as the theory of the beautiful and of art. A new kind of tension 
seems to be struggling for expression, in horror and fear and tottering conster-
nation. There is not even the consolation that this is still capable of being given 
form; not in the traditional sense” (Cassandra 301).
What is the “this” of this sentence? Wolf asks, and she looks for an answer in 
The Book of Franza, where Franza’s brother asks a similar question: “What 
could have destroyed her in this way?” (Cassandra 302). Concluding her lecture, 
Wolf offers a reading of that unfinished novel, quoting passage upon passage to 
underline her own argument that real women, like Franza, have been colonized 
by a culture culminating in National Socialism which destroys them and itself. 
Franza dies cursing the whites; Wolf ‘s final words in this lecture come from 
The Book of Franza, and they are, she says, what Cassandra would say today, 
mocked, of course, not heard, declared abnormal, ejected, turned over to Death. 
She says: 
The whites are coming. The whites are landing. And if they are repulsed 
again, they will return again once more. No revolution and no resolution and 
no foreign currency statute will help; they will come in spirit if they can no 
longer come in any other way. And they will be resurrected in a brown and a 
black brain, it will still always be the whites, even then. They will continue to 
own the world in this roundabout way. (Cassandra 305)
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The Cassandra metaphor is almost as bleak as those of Bachmann’s novels, 
and one stands sobered and aghast before so devastating an assessment of our 
contemporary condition. In the third lecture Wolf had asked herself, “How can 
you teach younger people the technique of living without alternatives, and yet 
living?” (Cassandra 251). In the Cassandra image Wolf gives with one hand the 
possibility of Euro-American women’s providing that alternative, only to take 
that hope back with the other hand—like Bachmann in that respect, whose late 
works offer almost only “ways of death.” It might be, of course, as a male East 
German writer, Heiner Müller, suggested in a recent interview, that there is no 
answer for Euro-Americans because the proletariat on whom Marx and Brecht 
counted can no longer be relied upon to redeem the system that created it. If one 
has really grasped what Bachmann and Wolf have said in its materiality and 
historicity, it is hard not to come as close to despair as they. Quotations from 
Wolf, however, spring to mind. In No Place On Earth she had written, “If we 
cease to hope, then that which we fear will surely come” (117). Or her words on 
Bachmann in the Büchner Prize acceptance speech: in describing clearly the 
historical dilemma at which we have arrived, in advancing, at least as vision, an 
alternative, these women writers may, we can hope, help to forestall the worst. 
Or perhaps they may not. Wolf’s third lecture began with that fear: “The litera-
ture of the West (I read) is the white man’s reflection on himself. So should it be 
supplemented by the white woman’s reflection on herself? And nothing more?” 
(Cassandra 225).  
To these depressing notes let me add, however, a coda, drawing on a recent 
essay [1982]on Brecht and Bachmann by Gerhard Wolf, Christa Wolf’s hus-
band. Käthe Reichel, one of Brecht’s female collaborators, had preserved a copy 
of Die gestundete Zeit, Bachmann’s first poetry volume, that she had brought 
from West Germany to give to Brecht. (One recalls the comment Wolf quoted 
from Fleisser’s dialogue: “Everything that can excite me is brought to me.”) 
Reading the volume an einem kleinen Nachmittag (On a little afternoon)—the 
title of Gerhard Wolf’s essay—Brecht had undertaken to make corrections in 
Bachmann’s poems, so that they became linear, pointed, didactic, political, like 
his. “We”—Gerhard Wolf fails to specify to whom, apart from himself, that 
pronoun refers—travel to visit Reichel and record her impressions of that arro-
gant Brechtian undertaking, so illustrative of his aesthetic, political, and human 
failings. But Reichel’s judgment of Brecht is more differentiated. His commit-
ment to those ordering principles was, she maintains, also a way of managing 
his own pain at the world he saw around him, a poetry written with tightly 
pressed lips. Bachmann’s advantage as a woman, though it brought her greater 
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pain, was to pursue that suffering to its depths, with open mouth. In this she 
joins another lineage, another tradition: “It will be written on a new page that 
here speaks a woman whom one regards today in a line of tradition: Else Lasker-
Schüler—Nelly Sachs—Bachmann—Sarah Kirsch—the open mouth!” (Ger-
hard Wolf 180). Into which sisterhood of German women poets, Christa Wolf, 
though not herself a poet, may also be admitted, to write upon that new, unwrit-
ten page. 
READING BACHMANN IN 1983
This essay was written in spring 1983 for the volume titled Responses to Christa 
Wolf: Critical Essays, edited by the late Marilyn Sibley Fries (though not pub-
lished until 1989). It displays some of the methodological heterogeneity of the 
early 1980s, as feminist literary scholarship hesitated between a cultural femi-
nist paradigm and something to come that had not yet been elaborated. Per-
haps somewhat paradoxically, I wrote it at almost exactly the moment that 
Christa Wolf herself emphatically declared her allegiance to the very feminist 
paradigm that U.S. feminists were beginning to draw into question. In May 
1982, in connection with the lecture series on poetics hosted by the University 
of Frankfurt which Bachmann’s own Frankfurt lectures had inaugurated in 
1959–60, Wolf delivered four lectures titled “Conditions of a Narrative,” 
intended to explain the political and literary considerations that led her to write 
her novel Cassandra. The fourth lecture had just been published in Sinn und 
Form when I began work on this essay, and Cassandra appeared as I was writ-
ing it. 
It is in lecture four that Wolf lists the feminist works that brought about a 
“decisive change,” as she terms it, in her “viewing lens,” comparable only to her 
discovery of Marxist theory thirty years previously. Most of the texts she cites are 
by feminist writers who in the main can be consigned to the radical or cultural 
feminist camp: “The First Sex. Mothers and Amazons. Goddesses. Patriarchy. Ama-
zons, Warrior Women, and He-Women. Women—the Mad Sex? Women in Art. 
God-Symbols, Love-Magic, Satanic Cult. Male Fantasies. Female Utopias—Male 
Casualties. Women and Power. The Sex Which Is Not One. The Secret of the Oracle. 
Utopian Past. Outsiders. Cultural-Historical Traces of Repressed Womanhood. 
Mother Right. Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Woman’s Wild 
Harvest. The White Goddess. Woman as Image. A Room of One’s Own. Woman-
hood in Letters” (Cassandra 273). In her increasing concern since the mid-1970s
with “the self-destructiveness of male dominated society” (Kuhn 178 quoting 
Rich, “When” 35), then manifesting itself in the superpowers’ stationing of 
nuclear missiles in Central Europe, Wolf also seemed to align herself with cul-
tural feminists’ new concern in the early 1980s with issues of peace and ecology. 
In the Cassandra lectures Wolf read Bachmann through that lens, contrast-
ing Bachmann’s writing to the masculinist politics and poetics of Bertolt 
Brecht—and providing me with the framework for my own essay, Brecht ver-
sus Bachmann.
Despite these avowed allegiances, Wolf was mainly not read as a cultural 
feminist by her U.S. feminist audience, probably consisting mainly of German-
ists at least until the publication of Cassandra. Many Germanists of my genera-
tion, products of the student movement and trained by Marxist-influenced pro-
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fessors (at das rote Wisconsin [red Wisconsin], among other places), had turned 
to GDR literature because focusing on the GDR made it possible for us to con-
join our professional careers and our commitment to socialism. To those of us 
who became feminists in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the extraordinary texts 
of GDR women’s writing that blossomed in that period (exactly as U.S. social-
ist feminism became enmired in ever more tortured [and boring] attempts to 
force women’s experience into the categories of Marxist economics) allowed us 
to keep alive the hope of combining the most creative and visionary possibilities 
of Marxism and feminism in a society that would both provide for basic human 
needs and promote subjective self-realization (“This coming-to-oneself—what 
is it?” as Wolf put it in the motto to The Quest for Christa T. [Quest 1] which she 
had borrowed from Johannes R. Becher). Many socialist feminists of the 1970s
had elaborated a position (somewhat indebted to Herbert Marcuse) that allowed 
us, while not relinquishing our commitment to a far-reaching transformation 
of the entire society, to repudiate an equal-rights feminism that sought only to 
give women men’s prerogatives and to embrace cultural feminism’s celebration 
of superior female qualities. Excluded from the instrumental world of work, 
women, we maintained, had preserved alternative, more humane modes of 
human interaction that could be embraced “after the revolution” by all of human-
kind—much the same argument Wolf makes in her short story “Self-Experi-
ment.” In Christa Wolf’s writing I and others thus believed that we had found 
an example of the socialist feminist model we were seeking. In the years 
between Erich Honnecker’s accession to power and Wolf Biermann’s expulsion 
(1971–1976), it also appeared to us that the GDR offered the real possibility of 
bringing into existence a society based on such a model (in some contrast to the 
very abstract demands of the U.S. left or feminists for a revolution that seemed, 
as the 1970s progressed, increasingly improbable). Though our hopes were cer-
tainly much dimmed by the crackdown that followed Biermann’s expulsion, 
Christa Wolf’s work nonetheless encouraged socialist feminists within the dis-
cipline of German Studies to continue to assert a Marxist-influenced analysis 
through the 1970s and early 1980s that would then assume renewed relevance 
in the Reagan era.
Wolf’s still very Marxist 1966 essay on Bachmann, published both as an 
afterword to a GDR edition of Bachmann’s writing and in Wolf’s own essay 
collection, The Reader and the Writer, suggested strongly that Wolf had derived 
from Bachmann the fundamentals of what we U.S. feminists read as her social-
ist feminism. Simultaneously, the 1966 essay asserted that Bachmann could nei-
ther realize her vision nor even articulate it very clearly because she lived and 
worked in a capitalist society where such far-reaching changes were almost liter-
arily inconceivable; that is, Wolf took the position that the situation of women 
(and, consequently, of women writers) was shaped by the specific social condi-
tions of the society from which they derived, not just from a patriarchy that 
had oppressed women since the beginnings of human history (as many of the 
texts in Wolf’s feminist library seemed to maintain and as one might also rea-
sonably conclude from Cassandra). From the beginning to the present, Wolf’s 
1966 essay has strongly influenced my appropriation of Bachmann. My reliance 
on it in this 1983 essay may be regarded as a somewhat tentative effort, born of 
my residual socialist feminism together with a growing discontent with cultural 
feminism, to wrest Bachmann not only from earlier male critics who had con-
sidered her writing a manifestation of timeless beauty but also from the kind of 
feminism that Wolf now espoused. As well, as the critique of white racism 
became increasingly central to U.S. feminism, I had been very moved to dis-
cover The Book of Franza’s focus on the crimes “the whites” had committed 
against the other peoples of the world and was quite thrilled to discover that 
Wolf had also stressed this aspect of Bachmann’s work in her fourth Cassandra
lecture. As was the case with my earlier interest in the GDR, it now seemed to 
me that in focusing on these two writers, I could address a topic of importance 
within the field of Germanistik and simultaneously pursue what had increas-
ingly become my central political priority: elaborating an antiracist feminism. 
(Indeed, while I was writing this essay I also presented a paper, “Towards an 
Anti-Racist Feminist Theory,” at a conference on the intersection of Black Stud-
ies and Women’s Studies.) The question of white women’s support for racism 
almost inevitably directed the attention of U.S. feminist Germanists to the issue 
of German women’s support for National Socialism, despite German feminists’ 
vehement insistence that German women had only been Nazism’s victims. 
(Claudia Koonz’s Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics
[1987], which argued for the centrality of women’s participation, within their 
own female sphere, in the success of National Socialism, settled this question to 
the satisfaction of U.S. feminists, but for some time its conclusions continued to 
be vigorously opposed by German feminists.) On this count, Wolf’s courageous 
examination in Patterns of Childhood (1977) of her own quite enthusiastic involve-
ment in National Socialist youth activities seemed to me to place her on the side 
of those feminists prepared to concede that women had not been just victims for 
all of human history.
Nonetheless, despite my enthusiasm for this topic because it seemed to point 
beyond some of the impasses at which the feminism of the early 1980s had 
arrived, I think my essay itself mainly rests on principles that do not deviate 
significantly from those of cultural feminism (in part, of course, because it was 
much shaped by the mostly cultural feminist perspective through which Wolf 
read Bachmann). I structured it around the notion of a fundamental difference 
between men and women: Brecht versus Bachmann. It is “gynocritical,” focus-
ing on two preeminent women writers and attempting to establish a countertra-
dition of female literary production that would link them. Like cultural femi-
nists, I consider the violence of the contemporary social order to be a consequence 
of its control by men (tout court), and I treat women (tout court) as the implaca-
ble foes of that order and as almost entirely excluded from it. If there is hope for 
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such a death-driven civilization at all, Wolf and I imply, it is to be found in the 
interventions of women, and literature is to be one of women’s primary weap-
ons, since it is in literature that women writers (tout court) can give expression to 
their alternative vision of human relations which derives from their (common) 
female experience, epistemology, and aesthetics. If contemporary society is to 
survive, this essay seems to suggests, it will be solely as a consequence of the 
contributions of women alone (an expression of cultural feminism’s new inter-
ventionist stance of the early 1980s). Thus, though this is an essay of which I am 
quite fond and that does, I think, correctly represent the relationship of Wolf to 
Bachmann, it also very clearly displays, despite some superficial evidence to the 
contrary, its fundamental indebtedness to a feminist paradigm about which I 
and other scholars of the period had grown increasingly dubious, yet to which 
we had not yet found an alternative.
Much of this 1983 work, then, is founded on principles that do not signifi-
cantly differ from those of the cultural feminism of the day, possibly inflected to 
some degree by ecofeminism. Beginning my essay with Brecht signaled not only 
my own (as well as Wolf’s) allegiance to socialism but also my feminist distance 
from certain varieties of it, a question I had already pursued in a 1978 article on 
Brecht and women. There and in this 1983 essay I took the cultural/ecofeminist 
line (a position similar to Wolf’s own and one I may have in part derived from 
her as well as from the Frankfurt School) that an increasingly hegemonic instru-
mental, project-oriented, productivist rationality was inimical both to feminist 
ends and to the welfare of the world altogether. Like Horkheimer and Adorno 
in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, I assumed that such a form of rationality 
could be traced back to what I then considered the origins of European history 
or the European tradition in Greece (a construction that now seems in need of 
interrogation), from which point it had progressively grown in intensity and in 
the increasing array of human activity under its sway. Marxism I considered to 
be of a piece with this tradition, not a rupture with it. (During this period a 
member of my women’s group who had visited Cuba sent me back a postcard 
with a picture of a huge poster hung from a Havana high-rise bearing the words 
“Productividad! Productividad! Productividad!”) I clung tenaciously to the 
claim (clearly authorized by Bachmann’s and Wolf’s texts) that it was men who 
were the agents of such forms of rationality and women its implacable foes. 
Characteristic of much literary and other scholarship of the early 1980s, I think, 
is my unwavering conviction that the culture of our era could be conceived of as 
a single, coherent, malevolent piece, a position I now believe to be a holdover 
from Cold War theories of totalitarianism, and the unremitting idealism (in its 
philosophical sense) of my (and Wolf’s and Bachmann’s) arguments: rather than 
assuming a reciprocal (not to say dialectical) relationship between thought and 
action, we postulated that it is structures of thought or ideologies that are respon-
sible for how individuals and societies behave.
I suggested in chapter 2 that in the early 1980s Wolf’s attention to Bachmann 
in her Büchner Prize speech and the Cassandra lectures helped to popularize the 
new feminist reading of Bachmann. My own essay, which for a range reasons 
first appeared in English only in 1989 and was then reprinted in German in 
1992 (in a collection originally intended to introduce U.S. feminist literary schol-
arship to the GDR, though history overtook its editor, Ute Brandes), acceded 
and lent authorization to that feminist reading long after I myself had ceased to 
advance it. It is thus a particularly good example both of the historical specificity 
of feminist readings and, a little paradoxically, of their nonsynchronicity. As in 
this case, the vagaries of publishing may be responsible for the simultaneous 
circulation of feminist analyses that derive from quite different historical 
moments and may potentially support positions long since abandoned in practi-
cal feminist politics.
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Even feminists themselves sometimes recall the mid-1980s as a period of decline 
for the U.S. women’s movement. One of the longtime feminist activists that 
Nancy Whittier interviewed for her Feminist Generations, for instance, charac-
terized those years as “a time of this horrible backlash, a fear-producing, eco-
nomically self-motivating time, when lots of stuff was driven out of the visible 
realm into the personal again” (85). Certainly it is true that during this period 
funding for feminist projects was cut, numbers of shorter- or longer-term femi-
nist organizations and initiatives folded, grassroots feminist activism waned, 
and the influx of younger women into the movement slowed. And such develop-
ments delighted many media commentators, who could allege that the “post-
feminist” younger generation disdained the women’s movement because they 
had now successfully “made it” in all the arenas to which feminists had sought 
access. 
But this waning support for feminism’s goals and activities is only part of the 
story. It is also possible to regard the Reagan era as a time when feminist strate-
gies and tactics were reconfigured in response to the new political landscape. As 
early as 1982 the journal Feminist Studies had called upon feminists to “dig in” 
and confront these changed political circumstances by building institutions and 
forming alliances. The exuberant countercultural practices of feminism in the 
1970s no longer sufficed as a response to the new conditions. “After a decade of 
experience,” the editors observed soberly, “we realize that a magic sisterhood 
cannot sustain a woman’s movement, especially through hostile and shifting 
circumstances.” Particularly, they argued, “we feel it essential that our ties to the 
‘movement’ acquire the solidity and specificity of alliances” (Ryan iv). Often 
quoted in this period were the words (cited at greater length in my introduction) 
that Bernice Johnson Reagon (civil rights activist, Smithsonian Institute anthro-
pologist, and founder and lead singer of the a cappella group “Sweet Honey in 
the Rock”) had directed at participants in a (mostly white) lesbian feminist 
music festival in 1981: “In a coalition you have to give, and it is different from 
your home. You can’t stay there all the time. You go to the coalition for a few 
hours and then you go back and take your bottle wherever it is, and then you go 
back and coalesce some more” (359).
As a consequence both of the changed political context, which seemed to 
demand coalitions and alliances, and of debates around differences of race, class, 
and sexual practice among women, many feminists of the mid-1980s moved into 
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more generally left-of-center political activities, bringing their feminist political 
priorities with them. One of Whittier’s activists mused: “I haven’t forgotten the 
women’s movement. But to me it’s a piece of this larger issue, in which we need 
to think about how all people can be empowered, as who they are. It’s the femi-
nist criticism, I think, that has expanded our consciousness to the point where 
we can even see that there’s a problem. But I guess I don’t see feminism as my 
guiding call anymore. It’s sort of part of the whole picture” (99). 
Although large political demonstrations for peace subsided after the station-
ing of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe in November 1983, feminists 
continued to be active in organizations for peace and against militarism and 
nuclear weapons, particularly under the aegis of the National Nuclear Weap-
ons Freeze Campaign. CIA subversion of the leftist Sandinista regime that had 
come to power in Nicaragua in 1979 and U.S. support for the right-wing 
regime in the civil war in El Salvador called into birth a range of support orga-
nizations for Central America. (Margaret Thatcher’s war over control of the 
Falklands/Malvinas in 1982 and Reagan’s invasion of Grenada in October 1983
showed that these new right-wing leaders were quite prepared to use military 
force to ensure constellations of power favorable to their interests in the rest of 
the world.) Campaigns urging institutions to withdraw their investments from 
firms that did business with South Africa’s apartheid regime achieved signifi-
cant successes in the mid-1980s. Of long-range importance were coalitions of 
feminists and black electoral candidates that coalesced under the umbrella of 
the Rainbow Coalition, first formed to support black progressive Mel King’s 
campaign for mayor of Boston in fall 1983. Many feminist groups participated 
in the August 1983 March on Washington, commemorating the twentieth 
anniversary of Martin Luther King’s 1963 march. In 1984 these coalition efforts 
converged in Jesse Jackson’s candidacy for the Democratic Party’s presidential 
nomination. Like those of Rainbow Coalition mayoral candidates, Jackson’s 
platform included strong feminist planks written for him by his feminist sup-
porters. The Jackson campaign inspired widespread feminist enthusiasm and 
left in its wake broad coalitions prepared to work for progressive political 
change at the local level.
Except for cuts in research funding, feminist scholarship was probably less 
affected by the Reagan era than feminist activism, but it is possible to discern 
research trends that to some degree parallel political transformations outside the 
academy. On the one hand, the broadening of feminist emphases to include a 
wider range of political concerns was, possibly under the influence of ecofemi-
nists and women in the peace movement, accompanied by quite grand efforts to 
theorize the connections of women’s oppression to everything else—not so dif-
ferent from the arguments made by Christa Wolf. The autumn 1983 issue of 
Signs, for instance, focused on women and religion and alleged in its prefatory 
editorial that religion was, as Virginia Woolf had commented of science, “not 
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sexless; she is a man, a father, and infected too” (Woolf 139). The editors of the 
issue continued: “The infection of both science and religion does not lie in mas-
culinity itself but in the infusion of masculinity with dominance. As [Hilary] 
Rose points out [in an article in this same Signs issue], an ideology of dominance 
twists scientific investigation into the study of the means of control over nature, 
with an accompanying loss of feeling for the sacredness of all life.” Indeed, the 
editorial goes on to allege, exactly such qualities may in fact constitute “the cen-
tral malaise of Western culture: one in which conflict for dominance, beginning 
with dominance over women, becomes obsessive. Such conflict, when it finds its 
expression in international politics, makes nuclear armament the ‘business’ of 
science, as Rose points out” (“Editorial” 1983 1-2). Such grand and all-encom-
passing theoretical models revealed their indebtedness to cultural feminism par-
ticularly in their effort to portray the oppression of women as primary and as 
prior to all other forms of domination.
In some contrast to attempts to elaborate large theoretical paradigms, how-
ever, other feminist scholars called for much more careful attention to historical 
and cultural specificity in order to acknowledge diversity among women. In that 
same issue of Signs, black feminist Gloria Joseph, reviewing Angela Davis’s
Women, Race, and Class, remarks: “Mainstream white feminists must realize 
that feminist theory, feminist organizing, women’s conferences, and women’s 
studies courses generally lack an ideological philosophy capable of systematically 
encompassing the histories, experiences and material need of Black and work-
ing-class women” (136). Such observations necessitated a fundamental rethink-
ing of certain basic feminist premises. Some U.S. scholars followed the lead of 
British feminist Michèle Barrett in maintaining that even the use of the term 
“patriarchy” obscured significant differences in the way male dominance was 
exercised transhistorically and -culturally (Van Allen 85). Others maintained 
that the use of the analytic category “women” confused more than it clarified, 
Marilyn Power arguing in Feminist Studies with respect to Reaganomics, for 
instance, that “women cannot be analyzed as a sexual class. To understand the 
impact of Reagan policies on women, and the implications for political activity 
by women, we must remain aware of class and race differences among women” 
(31). And Roger Gottlieb, writing in Socialist Review, convincingly demon-
strated the inability of psychoanalytic feminist theories such as Chodorow’s and 
Dinnerstein’s to account for historically specific psychic structures. Many articles 
in feminist journals, particularly those written by historians and anthropolo-
gists, now concentrated on the wide varieties of female experience in the world. 
Increasingly, feminist conferences focused on differences among women world-
wide and in the United States: for example, the University of Illinois conference 
“Common Differences: Third World Women and Feminist Perspectives” and 
the pathbreaking Five College conference on the intersection of Black Studies 
and Women’s Studies, both held in April 1983. On the other hand, despite pious 
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disclaimers like that of the Signs editorial in the spring 1983 issue focused on 
“women and violence”—“Yet we should remain mindful that women are par-
ticipants in violence as well as victims of it and note that feminist scholars up to 
this point have given little attention to this fact” (Freedman/Gelpi 399), femi-
nist scholars nonetheless seemed to remain loath to concede that some women 
might really be fundamentally antagonistic to the goals claimed by feminists 
and other progressives. Examinations of even the most unlikely groups (women 
of the Moral Majority [Pohli], women missionaries seeking “to convert heathen 
savages” [Grimshaw], Mormon women in polygamous marriages [Dunfey]) 
continued to discover that they too displayed at heart a germ of true feminist 
consciousness.
In some articles written in 1983-1984 it was nevertheless possible to discover 
faint traces of a paradigm shift that would not be fully evident until the late 
1980s. Though Gayle Rubin (sex radical as well as anthropologist) had first 
proposed the examination of women’s lives in the context of a “sex/gender sys-
tem” in a 1975 article, it was only in the mid-1980s and particularly in connec-
tion with the sex debates that feminists more generally began to discuss the 
necessity of understanding femininity as a reciprocal term always defined in 
relationship to masculinity, the assumption on which the term “gender” rests. 
As well, feminist scholars began in this period to investigate the “social con-
struction” of gender and sexuality, again in the context of the debates around 
sexuality. As Kate Ellis put it, “The question is: does sexuality begin as an 
unmediated ‘it’ that is later constructed by societal input, or is sexuality like 
language, only brought into being through the process of ‘learning’ it?” (119). 
Ellis also suggested that the social construction of sexuality and femininity is 
the notion that fundamentally divides cultural and socialist feminists, and it 
seems to me that it was indeed social constructionism that pounded the final 
nail in the cultural feminist coffin.
It is not surprising that Michel Foucault entered feminist discussion at about 
this moment, particularly via the sex debates. From him, feminists began to 
acquire a new conception of power not just as repressive and negative but as 
productive and positive—a notion that would be central to the elaboration of 
social constructionism. In feminists’ attention to Foucault it is possible also to 
discern some stirrings of suspicion about the utility of grand theory and total-
izing models altogether: Biddy Martin, for instance, one of the earliest U.S. 
feminists to emphasize the importance of Foucault for feminist scholarship, 
argues that conceptions of capitalism and patriarchy as “total theories of mono-
lithic control or power held by a clearly identifiable and coherently sovereign 
group” have made it impossible “to get at the operations of power and the pos-
sibilities for resistance in modern Western societies, to comprehend the constitu-
tion and the transformation of power relations at the level of the local and every-
day” (5). Yet in the mid-1980s, as the tensions of the Cold War were reinvigorated 
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by a president who saw America “standing tall” again, a conception of power 
disseminated from the top downward seemed after all not so far-fetched, and it 
may be that the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War would be 
necessary before Foucault would find final favor with feminists.
Finally, though feminist literary scholarship made no great leaps forward in 
the period up to 1984, some hints of things to come could be detected in that 
arena. In 1982 Stephen Greenblatt had first coined the term “new historicism,” 
a method which was at that point was, and for several years to come would 
remain, astonishingly oblivious to gender issues yet which nonetheless served as 
a harbinger of the new, more historically based approach inflected by cultural 
studies, cultural materialism, and Foucault which feminists would embrace in 
the 1990s. In a 1984 report in Signs, “Towards a Feminist Literary History,” 
Marilyn L. Williamson pointed feminist literary scholars in a similar direction. 
Williamson proposes that, rather than attempting to add great women writers 
to the canon, feminists should abandon the notion of the canon altogether. 
Instead, they should seek to examine women’s non-traditional writing, and for 
that they would need to draw upon the conclusions of other disciplines and 
develop an interdisciplinary approach: for “providing a cultural setting for non-
traditional works through the study of history and ideology may be a more 
effective method than one governed by purely literary concerns” (137). More-
over, she proposed to abandon a concept of the autonomous text set against the 
backdrop of its context in favor of understanding how each helped to configure 
the other: “The ideological approach, moreover, will not privilege aesthetic dis-
course: it will not see social and economic conditions as a background reflected 
in literary products. Instead such an approach will view literature as part of a 
general discourse produced by a given culture, all aspects of which at once create 
and reflect its value system” (143). (Louis Montrose would later famously cap-
ture Williamson’s insight in the chiasmus “the historicity of texts” and “the tex-
tuality of history” [“Professing” 20].) In the light of things to come in feminist 
literary scholarship, Williamson’s conclusion is remarkably prescient: “And so it 
appears that as contemporary theories gradually transform our curricula and 
habits of mind, the historical, ideological study of women’s nontraditional writ-
ing will take its place among many accepted ways to organize and study a great 
variety of texts” (147).
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CHAPTER 5
Gender, Race, and History in 
The Book of Franza
Philosophical problems are illnesses that
must be healed.
—Ingeborg Bachmann, Werke
Though The Book of Franza was uncompleted at the time of Bach-
mann’s death, it was begun as the first of the “Ways of Death” novels. As the 
editors of the Werke explain, Bachmann had conceived her plan for the novel 
cycle even before she completed The Thirtieth Year and originally intended 
“Ways of Death” as the title for the novel which was to become Franza. In 1967,
after having written the portions that have now been printed, she laid Franza
aside, to begin work on Malina. She explained in a 1971 interview that only 
Malina had made access to the world of the “Ways of Death” possible for her: 
“I wrote almost 1,000 pages before this book, and these last 400 pages from the 
very last years finally became the beginning that I had always been lacking” 
(GuI 96). One can understand the importance of the novel Malina for a novel 
cycle which was to be narrated by a male figure; that first published novel 
explains why there could be no female narrative voice for the “Ways of Death.” 
But, perhaps because of its subject matter, that difficult first novel of the 
“Ways of Death” cycle was badly received, and only now are we beginning to 
grasp all that is responsible for the destruction of the “I” of Malina, that, as Bach-
mann put it, “the sickness of the world and the sickness of this person is the 
sickness of our time for me” (GuI 72). Should Bachmann have completed and 
published The Book of Franza before Malina, the misunderstandings to which 
Malina was subjected might have been fewer, for The Book of Franza more 
explicitly and concretely locates the female “ways of death” of which her cycle 
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speaks in a social and historical context. The reading of The Book of Franza I 
offer here is thus intended both as an interpretation of this daring, complex, and 
fragmentary novel and also as an attempt to illuminate, via an understanding of 
Franza, Bachmann’s intentions for the entire “Ways of Death” cycle. 
I consider this endeavor of particular importance because in my view Bach-
mann’s work, after her rediscovery and reinterpretation by feminist literary 
scholars of the late 1970s, now faces the danger of a second dehistoricization and 
Verharmlosung (domestication). Several recent scholars have shown how Bach-
mann’s fame as a poet in the 1950s was purchased at the cost of the extraction 
of a social context from her work. Bernd Witte argues, for instance, “For secret 
conservatives of all hues her moderate modernism thus became the appropri-
ate contemporary continuation of pure poetry” (Kritisches). Such preconceptions 
continued to shape the reception of her later fiction—with which critics seemed 
powerless to come to terms. Now the feminist rereadings of Bachmann, par-
ticularly facilitated by the works of the French feminist theorists Luce Irigaray 
and Hélène Cixous, have given us a lens through which to view that late fiction, 
showing us how Bachmann’s “Ways of Death” investigate the psychic states of 
women in a world dominated by men. These new feminist interpretations have 
permitted extraordinary insights into Bachmann’s work, and we now under-
stand dimensions of it which without feminism we perhaps might never have 
seen at all. Nonetheless, it has seemed to me recently that there is an inclination 
in feminist literary scholarship in general and in Bachmann scholarship in par-
ticular to use gender as the single category through which to understand works 
by women writers. Encouraged by French and American psychoanalytic femi-
nist theory and by the influential American literary scholars Sandra Gilbert and 
Susan Gubar, such scholarship often treats the category “woman” as if it were 
one that did not vary historically and culturally, as if gender were the only source 
of oppression from which women have ever suffered, and as if all women were 
only innocent victims of male power, not also members of classes and cultures in 
which they possess (some) privilege and power, including the power to oppress 
other women and men. At a point at which Bachmann’s deep concern with the 
status of human (and particularly female) subjectivity in the contemporary world
is only beginning to be grasped in its fullness, such ahistorical feminist interpre-
tations seem to me, despite their contributions, once again to do violence to her 
works, by truncating the breadth of their politics and depth of their suffering 
and depriving them of their full radicality. 
In this essay I want thus to stress what I believe to be The Book of Franza’s 
most central theme, the location of the “ways of death” suffered by contempo-
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rary European women within the trajectory of European and world history. 
Fundamental to my analysis is an understanding of the course of European his-
tory which draws heavily upon Critical Theory: I assume here (and document 
in The Book of Franza) that Bachmann also believes European history to be 
characterized by increasing tendencies toward domination and control, accom-
plished particularly through the eradication of the qualitatively different, the 
other. These efforts manifest themselves not just through the use of overt vio-
lence and force but also through the management of consciousness. In the realm 
of human thought the eradication of otherness takes the form of the domina-
tion of the abstract and interchangeable over the specific or unique, what Hork-
heimer and Adorno, following Weber, call the disenchantment of the world, 
the elimination of magical thinking. To create the human beings who are the 
agents and the objects of this domination, violence also had to be done to the 
human psyche, as Horkheimer and Adorno remark: “Men had to do fearful 
things to themselves before the self, the identical, purposive, and virile nature of 
man, was formed, and something of that recurs in every childhood” (33). Only a 
repressed residue remains that can express itself in dreams, parapraxes, neurotic 
symptoms, and madness. Language as well is complicit in domination, subsum-
ing the particular under the rule of the concept; with the increasing separation 
of science from poetry, nonliterary language is employed to control the object 
world, not to be like it or to know it in its otherness. Women (or at least those 
women lacking a “manly character”) cannot be the agents of domination: they 
are included among the others, an “image of nature, the subjugation of which 
constituted that civilization’s title to fame.” On the other hand, alone of all the 
dominated object world, women are allowed to participate in the human world, 
to enjoy the spoils of domination if they agree to accede to their oppression and 
to celebrate their masters’ accomplishments: “Woman herself, on behalf of all 
exploited nature, gained admission to a male-dominated world, but only in a 
broken form. In her spontaneous submission she reflects for her vanquisher the 
glory of his victory, substituting devotion for defeat, nobility of soul for despair, 
and a loving breast for a ravished heart” (Horkheimer/Adorno 248–249). This is 
mostly the situation of the women Bachmann depicts in the “Ways of Death.” 
What is missing from Dialectic of Enlightenment and from most of Critical 
Theory is what Bachmann, building on this understanding of history, brings 
to The Book of Franza. Horkheimer and Adorno wrote from the perspective of 
what they believed to be the world-historical triumph of domination: National 
Socialism in Germany on the one hand, the culture industry of the United States 
on the other (developments that obviously concern Bachmann as well). But they 
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virtually ignored the most obvious of enlightenment’s efforts at domination:
Western imperialism and neoimperialism, which surpass National Socialism in 
their brutality if not in their efficiency. In a parallel omission, Horkheimer and 
Adorno also fail altogether to acknowledge that there are cultures in the world 
which operate according to quite different rules, still at least in part outside the 
grip of enlightenment. Western history is not the whole of human history, and 
one suspects that in omitting any mention of that which is not subsumed by 
the West, Horkheimer and Adorno show themselves to be entrapped in the 
very dialectic of enlightenment that their book details. In The Book of Franza,
however, Bachmann pushes the logic of their analysis further, particularly as 
regards Western women and also as regards their possibilities for liberation. The 
questions this novel poses are ones that it is central for feminism to address. 
If Western women are implicated in enlightenment, simultaneously its victims 
and its beneficiaries, what standpoint can they assume to struggle for their own 
liberation, and what will be the relationship of their struggles, within the West, 
to the struggles of other victims of the West who stand outside of it? Can history 
take a course which is not just that of increasing domination? Do white women 
have a place in such a history, or is their fate inextricably tied to that of the West? 
Where does their own story (told in the “Ways of Death”) fit in? To these dif-
ficult and painful questions Bachmann has only the beginnings of answers, but 
her novel attempts to explore these dilemmas in their full complexity, revealing 
the truth to her readers—a charge she had set herself as a writer, for “Man can 
face the truth [Die Wahrheit ist dem Menschen zumutbar]” (W 4: 275-277). 
The historical event central to The Book of Franza provides a concretization 
of the quandaries white women face. In flight from the white man in Vienna 
who had tried to drive her mad, Franza, in the company of her brother Martin, 
finds herself in Luxor, Egypt, on 14 May 1964. They had, we are told, “trav-
eled into a historical event” (Franza 105, translation modified). On that day 
Nikita Khrushchev, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and three other Arab presidents—
Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, Abdel Salam Arif of Iraq, and Abdullah al-Salal 
of Yemen—“standing on a granite bluff high over the site of the Aswan Dam 
Project, pressed a button . . . setting off a dynamite charge that opened a channel 
to divert the waters of the Nile,” reported the New York Times of 15 May 1964
on its front page. “The explosion marked the completion of the first stage of the 
billion-dollar power and irrigation project which is designed to remake the face 
of this ancient and undeveloped land” (Walz 1). 
The ramifications of this event for the themes of the novel are great. The 
story of the building of the Aswan Dam is centrally entwined with the activi-
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ties of the whites in Africa. Perhaps the dam itself can be regarded as an image 
something like the grand technological plans for progress at the end of Faust II,
for, as the Times reported in another article of the same day, “a gigantic high 
dam that would harness the Nile became the dream of Egyptian reformers” 
(Mohr 3)—European technology used to channel the powers of nature, turn-
ing them to human purposes. In the 1950s, the United States, Britain, and 
the World Bank initially agreed to finance the building of the dam. President 
Nasser, objecting to their condition that the Egyptian economy be supervised 
during the dam’s construction, began negotiations with the Soviet Union. When 
the Americans withdrew their offer, Nasser seized the internationally owned 
Suez Canal Company, and the Israelis, French, and British invaded Egypt in 
retaliation, an act many regarded as blatant imperialism, bringing the world to 
the brink of war. 
In the novel, Martin and Franza pass through Suez and allude to that crisis, 
though Suez shows no trace of such momentous events: “Suez was a surprise, 
for no immediate drama presented itself to the eyes, nor any trace of a past 
war” (Franza 90). Instead, the Soviets financed the building of the dam: Egypt 
chose a course of development not that of Western Europe but one that might 
nonetheless be regarded as the culmination of enlightenment thinking. As 
Khrushchev pointed out during his visit (a visit which, the novel tells us, Mar-
tin followed avidly in the newspapers), the dam can be regarded as a “symbol 
of peaceful cooperation” and “proves that through socialism there is progress” 
(Walz 1). Indeed, the dam will achieve for Egypt the inundation and fertility 
which Franza, as I show below, is unable to find: the Times notes that the dam is 
“designed to raise the Nile nearly 200 feet. It will store water in a lake 300 miles 
long. The lake will enable Egypt to increase tillable acreage from six million to 
eight million acres” (Walz 3). On the other hand, the day on which the states-
men loose the Nile waters is the same day on which Franza is buried alive in the 
hardening Nile mud. She says: “What have I seen? A limousine, a ship, and rose 
petals. Then they will open the sluices, the water will come out. History will 
dub it the Day of the Water. And I was buried alive” (Franza 106-107). Probably 
this history is preferable to that of outright colonial exploitation, though it is not 
clear that such progress leads in the direction of human liberation. It is also not 
at all clear what this larger course of history has to do with Franza’s own story, 
for the history made by the statesmen of the Second and Third World is not one 
that she shares. Or, as she asks: “My story and the story of all those who make 
up the larger history, how do these find a place within the whole of history?” 
(Franza 107).
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In this novel Franza’s story has three parts, which stand simultaneously for 
different cultural locations, different points in history, and, most important, for 
different regions of the psyche or stages of psychological development, as Bach-
mann explained in her draft of a preface to the novel: “The settings then are 
Vienna, the village of Galicien and Carinthia, and the Arabian, Libyan, and 
Sudanese deserts. The real settings, the interior ones laboriously concealed by 
the external, are elsewhere” (Franza 4). The different locations of the novel allow 
Bachmann both to explore the development of Franza’s illness and also to inter-
rogate its causes, to pursue the reasons for Franza’s death: “The book, however, is 
not simply a journey through an illness. Ways of death also include crimes. This 
is a book about a crime” (Franza 3). For, as Bachmann goes on to explain in the 
preface, “the virus of crime . . . cannot have simply disappeared from our world 
twenty years ago [i.e., in 1945]” (Franza 3). Instead, in our society, the attitudes 
of mind which produced National Socialism now exercise their brutality in the 
realm of consciousness: “Crimes that require a sharp mind [Geist], that tap our 
minds and less so our senses, those that most deeply affect us—there no blood 
flows, but rather the slaughter is granted a place within the morals and customs 
of a society whose fragile nerves quake in the face of any such beastliness. Yet 
the crimes did not diminish, but rather they require greater refinement, another 
level of intelligence, and are themselves dreadful” (Franza 4).
The novel’s second chapter, “Jordanian Time,” explores, as I detail below, 
how these destructive practices are most commonly carried out within Euro-
pean culture (only apparently not at war) in the domination of women by men. 
To demonstrate, however, that male dominance (or domination altogether) is 
neither an ontological nor a historical constant, Bachmann shows in the novel’s 
first chapter, “Return to Galicien,” that there existed a time, a culture, and a 
point in psychological development—now all irretrievably lost—when peace 
was possible. In the novel’s final chapter, “The Egyptian Darkness,” Franza 
flees Europe in search of a cure for the madness into which her husband, agent 
of the crimes of her culture, has driven her. In North Africa, however, she dis-
covers the extent of the crimes of Europe. Her imprecations are thenceforth 
delivered against “the whites” as well as against her husband, her dying words: 
“The whites should. They should be damned. He should” (Franza 142). Franza 
finds in the North African desert no cure for the situation of women in contem-
porary Europe, no standpoint from which she can assert an alternative to the 
cultural dominance of the white fathers—though she may have learned there 
at least how to break out of the psychic structures imposed upon her by Euro-
pean men, and perhaps even how to rebel against them. But the novel seems to 
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conclude with the suggestion that if there is a solution for humankind, it may 
not be one that would include white women like Franza. To explain fully the 
relationship of Franza’s story to “the whole of history,” the remainder of this 
essay investigates these points at greater length.
Franza’s “case” begins in contemporary Vienna, the site of Three Paths to the 
Lake and the other “Ways of Death” novels, whose characters appear again in 
this work. Here, as elsewhere in Bachmann’s work, geography and landscape 
have a paradigmatic, sometimes even symbolic function. The elite social stra-
tum Bachmann describes in Vienna embodies some central qualities of the 
grande bourgeoisie in contemporary Europe, and her Vienna recalls Balzac’s 
Paris in its emphasis on social success, in its cold-blooded opportunism, in its 
constantly shifting liaisons, in the dirty or vicious secrets that lie beneath its 
polished surface. But simultaneously, Vienna (or more generally, Austria), 
because it is now no longer central to the course of European history, provides 
Bachmann a privileged perspective from which to view events elsewhere, as she 
remarked in a 1971 interview: “It [Austria] differs from all other small countries 
today in that it was an empire and it’s possible to learn some things from its his-
tory. And because the inactivity to which one is compelled there enormously 
sharpens one’s perspective on the big situation and on today’s empires. Those who 
have declined themselves know what that means” (GuI 106). As “interior set-
ting,” Vienna stands for the psychic structures demanded and imposed in con-
temporary Europe, in Franza’s case a feminine psyche as her culture constructs it. 
To succeed in Vienna, Franza must be gleichgeschaltet (forced into conformity), 
obliterating her provincial eccentricities and other nonsynchronic residues of her 
past; she must learn and accept her place in the social and linguistic order, where 
she is the object, not the subject. Talented at languages, Franza learns the lan-
guage of her domination well, becoming a “young lady [who] had changed her 
hairstyle and dropped the Galicien accent, exchanging it for a different accent in 
Vienna, walking through Herrengasse and through the Kohlmarkt as if she 
had never walked over the Matchstick Bridge at home” (Franza 22). The sites at 
which Bachmann locates Franza in Vienna are significant: sipping coffee in the 
Café Herrenhof, strolling through the Herrengasse, Franza has agreed to 
acknowledge men as her masters. To be able to enjoy the privileges available to 
the wife of her husband, to become “Frau Jordan, who was used to being admit-
ted” (Franza 126), Franza has been obliged to become feminine, following an 
almost classically Freudian model: “She was twenty-three, about to give up her 
studies, allegedly having fainted [ohnmächtig geworden] in a hall of anatomy, or in 
an equally romantic tale she fell into the Fossil’s [Jordan’s] arms” (Franza 9). 
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Anatomy teaches her her powerlessness (Ohnmacht): she cannot become the 
doctor but must marry someone who is—Leopold Jordan. 
Though Martin terms Jordan a fossil, Franza knows that is wrong: “Why 
did you call him the Fossil? Oh, no, you’re wrong, for he’s more contemporary 
than I am, he is the type that rules today, that succeeds today, that attacks and 
lives to do so, for I’ve never seen a person with so much aggression” (Franza 79). 
An esteemed psychoanalyst, Jordan can be regarded as an administrator of con-
sciousness, responsible for discriminating between sanity and madness and for 
restoring those who deviate to normality. Like the agents of domination whom 
Horkheimer and Adorno describe, Jordan uses his science to reduce his patients 
to that alone which his categories can contain: “He dissected everyone until 
nothing more was left, nothing remaining except a finding that belonged to 
him. . . . [H]e couldn’t allow any person to deviate from the norm he established 
for them” (Franza 73). Martin uses the term fascism to describe a form of ratio-
nality which has turned into its opposite, and here Franza concurs: “He must 
be crazy. And there’s no one who seems more rational” (Franza 76). Jordan’s 
great work, a study of the medical experiments done on concentration camp 
victims (a preliminary study for the work mentioned in “The Barking,” titled 
“The Significance of Endogenous and Exogenous Factors in Connection with 
the Occurrence of Paranoid and Depressive Psychoses in Former Concentration 
Camp Inmates and Refugees” [Paths 106]), is thus a model for and description 
of his own practice. Jordan prefers particularly those who willingly and com-
pletely give themselves into his hands, his wives: “He didn’t like women, and 
yet he always had to have a woman in order to provide him with the object of 
his hatred” (Franza 72). “Why was I hated so much?” asks Franza, and corrects 
herself, “No, not me, the other within me” (Franza 62), the otherness of women 
that escapes the parameters of male control. 
The accomplishment of this novel in the area of gender relations, then, is its 
dramatization of how a woman accedes to and is destroyed by a man’s power. In 
two respects this novel is different from the other “Ways of Death” works: first, 
because rationalized male power is embodied in a figure deliberately and calcu-
latedly brutal, and second, because Franza, probably alone of all the “Ways of 
Death” figures, is allowed to come to consciousness of her own condition. Franza 
discovers that Jordan has intentionally set about to manipulate and destroy her: 
“He was working on me, he was working on me as his case study. He hounded 
me” (Franza 82). She succumbs, falling prey to hysterical attacks of coughing 
and breathlessness, phobias, and paralyzing anxieties. Object of his scientific 
calculation, Franza is an experiment, like those of the concentration camps, as 
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she explains bitterly: “A magnificent experiment was made on me. To put it 
vulgarly: How much can a person stand without kicking the bucket?” (TP 2:
62, passage omitted in translation). Jordan’s omission of her name from even the 
foreword to his great work represents an attempt to remove her from discourse 
altogether: “He wanted to erase me. My name should simply disappear in order 
that I could disappear for real later on” (Franza 63). And in contrast even to the 
concentration camp victims, there are no words to describe what is being done 
to her, no one to whom to appeal, no allies against this sort of fascism: 
I was suddenly no more a co-worker, no longer married. I was separated from 
society with my husband, living in a jungle in the middle of civilization, and I saw 
that he was well armed and that I had no weapons at all.
But what am I saying? I’m missing the central point. No, no, I wasn’t in any 
jungle, I was in the middle of civilization, along with its definition in the diction-
ary, and its verbal ability to handle any situation. (Franza 81-82)
The turns of phrase obliterate her actual situation, will not allow her to tell 
the story of her victimization by the male subject of this civilization.
In Vienna, what reveals Franza’s real situation to her are her dreams. Those 
dreams speak in the language of the unconscious, which refuses to acknowledge 
the rules of gender and discourse as culture imposes them but articulates in its 
own language its desire and distress. “When you learn this in the same manner 
within yourself, on the trip through the tunnel in the night, then you know it’s 
true” (Franza 79, translation modified). (This is, it appears, the same metaphori-
cal tunnel through which Martin passes at the book’s beginning, a creative pro-
cess drawing on the unconscious which produces the words on paper, the truth 
of this novel: “The words line up together, and brought along out of the darkness 
of the tunnel passage . . . the originals and the copies roll on, the illusions and the 
true conceptions rolling into the light, rolling down through the head, emerging 
from the mouth that speaks of them and asserts them and is reliable because of 
the tunnel in the head” [Franza 9, translation modified].) Franza’s dreams tell 
her the story of patriarchy and power: “the dream . . . presenting you with your 
own great drama, your father and a henchman named Jordan together in one 
person as equally important as any great figure. . . . Your free-floating fear, for 
which you have no basis, presents a story that assaults your sight and hearing, 
and you know for the first time why you feel such angst. I saw a graveyard at 
sunset, and the dream told me: that is the Graveyard of the Daughters” (Franza
78). Both this dream and the dream of being gassed in a gas chamber (“and 
Jordan held the knob and was letting the gas in” [Franza 70]) appear also in 
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Malina. Here is the explanation for the “ways of death” endured by Bachmann’s 
women, stories that can be told only outside a cultural framework that regards 
such treatment of women as natural and legitimate.
Her dreams let Franza generalize from her own oppression to that of other 
victims of this culture’s power: “What I have realized is that I am from a lower 
race. Or perhaps it’s a class” (Franza 79). She stresses particularly the affinities 
between the power exercised against her and that which white imperialism 
has directed against nonwhite peoples: “He stole all of my goods. My laughter, 
my tenderness, my capacity for joy, my compassion, my ability to help, my ani-
mal nature, my shining rays, for he stomped out everything that rose up until 
it could no longer rise again. Why someone does that I don’t understand, but 
it’s incomprehensible why the whites took all the goods from the blacks. Not 
just the diamonds and the nuts, the oil and dates, but also the peace in which 
such goodness grows, and the health without which one cannot live” (Franza 80;
translation modified). Like the Papuas, she is dying of “deadly despair”: “I am 
a Papuan,” she proclaims (Franza 80). Only in the third chapter do we learn 
that Franza finally left Jordan because he had also taken her only child from 
her, forcing her into an abortion conducted by “a sterilized surgeon dressed in 
a snow-white uniform,” a white scientist, an “authority” like Jordan. Franza 
foresees that the aborted fetus will be thrust, like the Nazi victims, into the 
cremation ovens. Falling on her knees in the operating room, revealing the real 
authority relationship in effect, she begs that the child be preserved (analogously 
to the Egyptian mummies) in a canning jar, or that she be allowed to reincorpo-
rate it into herself, to eat its heart (like Isis and Osiris in Musil’s poem discussed 
below). It is Franza’s behavior, of course, that is judged to be mad, while the 
men who control her are regarded as normal. Despite her psychic state, Jordan 
decrees that her expropriation continue: “Jordan, the psychotherapist in charge, 
knew best whether there was any cause for concern, and Jordan the authority 
assured him authoritatively: There’s no need to worry” (Franza 94). For in the 
language of this white science, one need not worry about the fate of the victims, 
and the victims are unable to speak in their own behalf. 
To be able to tell her own story, as Franza succeeds nonetheless at least par-
tially in doing, two conditions seem to be necessary. First, she must have some 
way of moving outside the limits European thought sets her. She does so in 
her dreams but also geographically: the second chapter, “Jordanian Time,” 
takes place on shipboard, under way from Genoa to North Africa, within the 
boundaries of no land at all (a situation somewhat analogous to the dream also 
in its relationship to water). Second, she seems to need a sympathetic listener; 
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she needs to be able to turn the analytic relationship against the aims of psy-
choanalysis that Jordan represents, using it to gain access to events and mean-
ings that Jordan refuses to acknowledge, to create a history for herself different 
from Jordan’s history. Even before their trip, Martin had noticed that inducing 
Franza to speak of her experiences helped her to combat the hysterical attacks 
which overcame her—precisely the same discovery Freud had made with his 
own hysterical patients. Thus what needs to be asked here as well is the status 
in the novel of this sympathetic listener and interlocutor, Martin. Is he the lost 
brother/lover whom women seek? What does the relationship of Franza and 
Martin tell us about the possibility of understanding and love between men and 
women in this culture?
As even the linguistic similarities of their names indicate, Martin plays in 
this novel a role somewhat similar to that of Malina in the novel of that name 
(Martin/Malina; cf. Jordan/Ivan). Martin and Franza as children, before each 
accepted the gendered rules for adulthood, spoke the same language (or some-
times no language at all), and hence could understand each other. But in the 
present time of this novel, Martin has also succeeded in the Viennese high soci-
ety of the “Ways of Death,” which means he has become a successful man. The 
novel’s first sentence suggests that his relationship to Franza is almost as propri-
etary as Jordan’s: “The Professor, the Fossil, had destroyed his sister for him” 
(Franza 7; translation modified). Martin also possesses other characteristics of 
men in this society, sometimes even a caricature of their qualities. He regrets, 
for instance, his sister’s illness particularly because it interferes with his carefully 
calculated love affair with Elfi Nemec, the model who will become Jordan’s 
next wife after Franza’s death. In a rather comic scene Martin tries, in analogy 
to Jordan, to understand Franza’s illness using geological categories, the only 
science he knows (and here portrayed as a particularly positivistic one): “His 
sister was cut through by pain and by something he was unable to explore, given 
his specialty, for he had no desire to describe or identify the grind [Schliff] of his 
sister, which was from the Modern Era and not from the Mesozoic” (Franza 29;
translation modified). Even outside Europe, in the desert, “the immense sana-
torium” (Franza 89), Martin mostly fails Franza; he cannot understand what 
she is trying to say, even when she is dying, and at the end of the novel returns 
to Vienna apparently untroubled, “a white man among white people” (Franza
145; translation modified). He came “home,” Bachmann tells us, “where he felt 
at home again, there in the third district, and went to sleep and never thought 
this way again” (Franza 146). 
Why does Martin fail Franza? His fascination for Breasted, an Egyptologist 
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(to whom Franza is indifferent!), provides a clue. James Henry Breasted was 
the author of The Dawn of Consciousness (1933), a work that Freud used to sup-
port his argument in Moses and Monotheism (1937–39) that Moses was actually 
an Egyptian, not a Jew. According to Freud, Moses derived the monotheism 
he introduced to the Jews from the Egypt of Amenhotep IV (better known as 
Akhnaton) of the Eighteenth Dynasty. Amenhotep IV forced monotheism on 
his Egyptian subjects, says Freud, a religion that was “contrary to their thou-
sands-of-years old traditions and to all the familiar habits of their lives.” It was 
a strict monotheism, Freud continues, “the first attempts of the kind, so far as 
we know, in the history of the world, and along with the belief in a single god 
religious intolerance was inevitably born, which had previously been alien to the 
ancient world and remained so long afterwards” (23: 20). The roots of monothe-
ism go back to the reign of Thothmes III (also known as Thutmose), who was 
responsible for making Egypt a world power. “This imperialism,” Freud says, 
“was reflected in religion as universalism and monotheism” (23: 21). Thothmes 
III was the successor (and also half-brother and husband) to Hatchepsut, the 
first female queen in Egyptian history, and tried to eradicate every trace of her, 
a fact upon which Franza remarks when she visits Hatshepsut’s temple in the 
novel’s third chapter. Freud of course connects monotheism, the worship of a 
universal, all-powerful Godfather, to the internalization of patriarchal values 
resulting from the successful traversal of the oedipus complex. Martin’s admira-
tion for Breasted can thus be read as a kind of shorthand on Bachmann’s part, an 
indication of how Martin—as a successful young white man—is also inheritor 
to a system of values that rest upon universalism, abstraction, imperialism, and 
male power (as well as a conception of linear progress from the past to the pres-
ent)—while Franza is the victim of these values, at their mercy. Thus Martin, 
like Malina with the “I” and despite his evident love and sympathy for Franza, 
is also part of the order which is destroying her; hence, he cannot really under-
stand her or come to her aid. At the beginning of the novel Martin believes that 
he has understood Franza’s “message [Mitteilung]” (the telegram she sends him 
appealing for help), that he could be a Champollion for Franza, like the transla-
tor of the Rosetta stone, “the first to shed light on a forgotten form of writing 
[Schrift]” (Franza 7), finding an equivalent in his language. But Franza cannot 
be translated into Martin’s language, as the “I” cannot be into Malina’s. 
Bachmann suggests, however, that Martin and Franza were not always so 
estranged, and the novel’s first chapter, “Return to Galicien,” returns to a time in 
human psychological development and in European history before the reign of 
terror (to which “Jordanian Time” testifies) held such complete sway. In this sec-
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tion, as elsewhere in Bachmann’s writing, the Austrian province Carinthia plays 
an important role as a nonsynchronic alternative to contemporary Vienna, scene 
of the crimes of the “Ways of Death.” Because it is in the “language triangle” 
[Sprachdreieck] or on the border, Bachmann also seems to regard it as an area 
where the limits of language are not drawn so firmly, whence transgressors of 
boundaries (Grenzgänger) derive. This aspect of Bachmann’s work, its produc-
tive use of an Austrian tradition, has only begun to be investigated, but I can 
advance here at least some initial observations. The Galicien to which Martin 
and Franza return home is an imaginary village near the real town of Villach on 
the Gail River in Carinthia. But “home” seems also to be the site of an original, 
nonalienated relationship of man and woman to each other, to culture, and to 
nature. In this respect, of course, Bachmann’s attempt at a “return home” recalls 
Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope, a work that she identified in the Frankfurt 
lectures as a major influence on contemporary writing. In psychological terms, 
the young Franza and Martin demonstrate the possibility of love between the 
sexes before they have assumed their role in the patriarchal order as adult man 
and woman. Alone, without parents, they have avoided the oedipal “family 
romance” and can love each other as equals; because their love precedes the 
institution of the incest taboo, it is also erotic, and it is possible that Martin and 
Franza become lovers in Egypt. This erotic and maternal older sister–younger 
brother relationship traces its way through Bachmann’s published work from the 
poems (especially “The Game is Over”) to “Three Paths to the Lake,” an alterna-
tive to the present-day “tangle and confusion, the discrepancy inherent in all rela-
tionships” (Paths 175) between men and women.
It is because Martin is also psychologically not of a single piece, because he 
also preserves archaic recollections of other possible relationships between men 
and women “beneath” the psyche he has acquired as an adult male, that he can 
respond to Franza at all. In their childhood, Martin recalls, he called her “girl” in 
a different language, “For that’s what he had called her, ‘Gitsche,’ the Windish 
word for girl, ‘Gitsche,’ who was the essence of all the Gitsches” (Franza 21–22). 
Because of their prepatriarchal connections, Martin and Franza can sometimes 
communicate across space and time, without words. Thus expressly “against all 
reason [Vernunft]” (Franza 18), Martin knows that Franza, in flight from Jordan, 
would have gone home to Galicien.
In a manner somewhat analogous to Freud himself, who used the meta-
phor of an earlier civilization, the Minoan-Mycenean, chronologically anterior 
to Greece, to explain the existence of a preoedipal psychic phase especially 
important for women, Bachmann appeals to Egypt to explain the nature of this 
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preoedipal sibling love. The “special saying [Kult-Satz]” of the siblings, which 
Martin recalls only imperfectly, derived from a poem of Robert Musil’s, “Isis 
und Osiris”: “Among a hundred brothers there is one. And he ate her heart. 
. . . And she ate his [Unter hundert Brüdern dieser eine. Und er aß ihr Herz. 
. . . Und sie das Seine]” (Franza 58). Bachmann alludes here of course to the love 
of Ulrich and Agathe in The Man Without Qualities. She quoted the Musil 
poem for the first time in a radio essay written sometime after December 1952,
explaining there how Ulrich and Agathe’s love was a failed attempt to achieve 
a “different condition [anderen Zustand]” through love, a utopia intended as an 
attack on “the dominant orders, in which every thing is solely a singular exam-
ple of its possibilities” and also an alternative to the impending war, “which 
initiated the collapse of culture and thinking about culture” (W 4: 100, 102). 
Musil’s importance for Bachmann needs still to be investigated, for here as in 
other respects there seem to exist deep affinities between their writings, and 
Bachmann has acknowledged his work as one of her most important literary 
influences (GuI 56). 
In The Book of Franza, however, even more important is Bachmann’s allusion 
to the Isis and Osiris myth itself. As Freud recounted in Moses and Monotheism,
the religion of Aten (associated by Freud with imperialism, abstraction, and the 
power of the father) kept “complete silence about the god of the dead, Osiris, and 
the kingdom of the dead” (23: 24). According to Breasted, traditional Egyptian 
thinking “was always in graphic form. The Egyptian did not possess the termi-
nology for the expression of a system of abstract thought; neither did he develop 
the capacity to create necessary terminology, as did the Greek. He thought 
in concrete pictures” (7-8). Hieroglyphic writing (or the “royal cartouches” to 
which Bachmann refers) exemplifies Egyptian concreteness, and it is also of 
course according to Freud the technique the unconscious uses to construct a 
dream: “The dream-work makes a translation of the dream-thoughts into a 
primitive mode of expression similar to picture-writing” (15: 229). In the earliest 
Egyptian thinking, Osiris is identified with the Nile, with water in general, and 
sometimes also with the land; he is in general a god of fertility. After Osiris was 
killed by his evil brother Set, his faithful wife Isis retrieved the dismembered 
parts of her husband, and he was revived to rule over the kingdom of the dead; 
according to Sir James Frazer, both Isis and Osiris can be regarded as corn dei-
ties. Though Martin, apart from his love for Franza, bears little resemblance to 
Osiris, Bachmann hints that Franza has qualities in common with Isis. Martin 
recalls Franza in her girlhood, “who went around with lighted pumpkins, who 
in the afternoon had climbed the ladder to the hayloft with Martin to tunnel 
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through stacks of hay, who had taught him how to carve pumpkins and roast 
corn and to live stretched out in the hay as if that was all he would ever need to 
live” (Franza 21, translation modified). Recalling how she had rescued him from 
drowning in the Gail, Martin calls her “a mythic figure” (Franza 20). From 
these hints and suggestions (Franza’s age, thirty-three, also alludes to deities 
who die and are born again), one can begin to surmise what Bachmann intends 
with the Isis and Osiris myth. It performs a function something like the myth of 
matriarchy in feminism, indicating a time in personal and human history before 
the patriarchal estrangement of the present, when thought was still magical and 
concrete and those of different sexes could still love each other as equals. Franza’s 
third chapter, “The Egyptian Darkness,” will undertake, then, to explore the 
possibilities of retrieving this psychic and historical Egypt in the present.
To understand, however, why Egypt cannot answer Franza’s needs, one must 
look at another dimension of the “Return to Galicien” chapter which is inter-
twined with Bachmann’s investigation of prepatriarchal psychology. Galicien 
also stands for a time in the history of Europe before domination had achieved 
its present guises, for alternative forms of social relations that, though lost, are 
preferable, despite their problems, to the present. The relationship of their grand-
parents Nona und Neni, whose wedding portrait hangs over the beds in Gal-
icien, if not a happy one, was far more desirable than any contemporary relation-
ship of men and women in Bachmann’s works: “Nona was undefeated, gazing 
across at the picture of Neni, . . . though he too was undefeated and under attack 
only by the picture opposite, whose face was not ready to sign any armistice in a 
silent marriage war that they would end together, and out of which each would 
emerge the victor. They were both the unvanquished, the two of them up there, 
and Franza said without a smile, that was her opinion too” (Franza 52; transla-
tion modified). Nona and Neni died at the end of World War II. It was not this 
sort of marital battle, between equal antagonists, in which she was engaged, 
Franza insists. 
The incident with which Martin’s and Franza’s time in Galicien concludes 
suggests that out of Galicien a possibility might have come for saving Franza. On 
the last evening before the departure for Egypt, Franza tries to drown herself in 
the Gail, an attempt that can be read as an endeavor to stay in Galicien or, perhaps 
more accurately, as an effort to withdraw, like Undine, from the deadly world of 
men altogether to return to her original watery realm. Franza is retrieved from 
the water by a mysterious “man from Müllnern,” an “experienced, knowledge-
able, schnapps-besotted rescuer who lightly swayed, but who, like a rider in the 
Wild West, clamped the motorcycle between his thighs and, as ever, headed his 
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horse in the right direction” (Franza 56). This incident recalls the utopian tale 
from Malina, “The Secrets of the Princess of Kagran,” in which the Princess 
(and her horse) are likewise saved from the water by a mysterious knight whose 
appearance prefigures the possibility of the erotic love and happiness between 
men and women for which the “I” longs. 
Within Franza, the incident also alludes to the images Bachmann uses to indi-
cate a real historical course that Galicien could have chosen after 1945, a peace 
that might have prevented the “ways of death” that her works lament. For 
Franza recalls (though Martin cannot remember) the “most beautiful spring” 
of May 1945, when peace came to Galicien in the person of another knight, 
an English captain, Sir Perceval Glyde, an innocent man. For Franza, aged 
fifteen, left virtually alone in Galicien when the peasants flee the village, the 
peace, the extraordinary spring, and her own awakening sexuality intertwine, 
and she waits in Galicien for a “miracle, . . . that’s what she called her sense 
of restlessness,” heralded by the air force squadrons overhead, the “heavenly 
hosts” (Franza 38; translation modified). If, as Franza contends in the third 
chapter, Jordan later eradicates her sexuality, here she experiences the coming 
of peace with an erotic intensity expressed nowhere else in this novel: “Franza 
had fallen into such a state that there was hardly any more room in her body 
for such excitement” (Franza 39). In the charming and archaic English she has 
learned in school she hands Galicien over to the man who stands for peace: 
“Sire, this village is yours. We have no arms. . . . We have no Germans and no 
SS. The people has left (was that right, or was it lived?) the village, because of 
fear” (Franza 41). Unlike even her brother, this man understands, despite their 
different languages: “And Sire and the peace, this king and this first man in 
her life, realized what she meant and continued to understand even when she 
stopped shaking. . . . And the miracle continued” (Franza 41-42; translation 
modified). From this man, her first love, Franza receives her first kisses, which 
she terms “the English kisses.” Later, she protests vigorously when Jordan tries 
to convince her that this description is a parapraxis, that she had meant not 
“English” but “angelic,” yet she insists on the real-worldly content of her first 
encounter with love and peace. But Sir Perceval leaves Galicien, and when 
Franza, grown up, encounters him later at a conference in London, he is part 
of Jordan’s world, a promise of peace that has been betrayed, to whom Franza 
could no longer offer her love and her body: “For it was a long way from the 
onset of peace to the middle of an extended peace, and amid the latter there was 
nothing one could do, . . . the peace having become a mirage” (Franza 48). 
If, however, peace has been betrayed, if the fascism virus continues in the 
gender, race, and history in THE BOOK OF FRANZA   { 173 }
postwar period, if, as the “I” of Malina observes, “It is the eternal war” (Malina
155), Franza does not forget the promise of a peace that would save her. On her 
way to the desert she remembers peace and asserts, “Sire, I arrive” (Franza 90,
translation modified). She remembers peace again when during a hashish expe-
rience she achieves an “other condition” and proclaims, “I want to fly again, I 
want to arrive, Sire, I want to arrive” (Franza 117, translation modified). But the 
“ways of death” result from Europe’s failure to eradicate domination with the 
military defeat of fascism. Until fascism in this broader sense is overcome, Euro-
pean women like Franza will not find the peace that could make them happy.
If, for a moment, peace, the liberation from fascism in all its guises, seemed 
possible in Europe, why is it not realized? In part, this is the subject that the 
third chapter addresses. One suspects that Bachmann, in turning to the Third 
World, is attempting to assert that domination of the rest of the world is essen-
tial to the West, to enlightenment as a system, hence impossible to abandon on 
a worldwide scale, despite the eradication of domination in its most extreme 
political forms in Europe. Like “Return to Galicien,” the novel’s third chapter, 
“The Egyptian Darkness,” can be understood as functioning on several separate 
if intertwined levels. On the one hand, the settings are again interior ones, and 
the journey to Egypt may be understood as an attempt to arrive at a layer of 
the psyche uncolonized by twentieth-century European structures of thought. 
Franza and Martin’s father dies in the battle of El Alamein, one of the turning 
points of the Second World War. Egypt thus stands for the defeat of fascism and 
the death of the father. But on the other hand, Egypt in this novel is not just a 
metaphor for Franza’s (or white women’s) prepatriarchal psychic strata. (Indeed, 
to make it such would represent a kind of imperialist arrogance of the sort Bach-
mann is here critiquing—nothing allowed to exist which is not of relevance 
to the European subject.) It also literally represents the Third World with its 
victims of white domination in the form of European imperialism. Vis-à-vis 
the Third World Franza is part of the oppressor culture, not its ally. Both in its 
past and its present, Egypt is a land that is foreign to Franza, within which she 
is a white person (though also a victim of white men). Thus the Egypt of this 
novel reveals itself to be neither a possible site of refuge nor a source of healing 
for Franza, though it enables her to envision, for a utopian moment, a world 
that would permit her to live rather than die. It is this second aspect of the third 
chapter I would like to consider first, and then the consequences for Franza’s 
psyche of the estrangement of this white woman from the nonwhite world.
As Franza travels farther into Africa, she first recognizes with relief her 
growing distance from the whites: “The whites. Finally they were nowhere 
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to be seen. Here she no longer had to turn around and hear them behind her 
and be afraid of being strangled, pressed against a wall in fear, pushed from a 
car into the snow” (Franza 95). She stops wearing her underwear, “the sweaty 
nylon and lace, . . . since they had left Europe behind them, there being no rea-
son for her to remain a white woman with habits, taboos, and residues of the 
past” (Franza 97), and with an almost mystical fervor embraces the—somewhat 
romanticized—customs of the nonwhite world. “Who here feared the bacteria 
catalogued by the whites? Who washed out a cup? Who boiled water? Who 
disinfected the lettuce leaves? Who closely examined the fish? Hunger, thirst, 
discovered once again. The danger, discovered once again. The ears, the eyes, 
were sharpened, directed toward the outer world, a sense of purpose having 
been regained” (Franza 98). Believing that other laws obtain here, Franza pro-
claims confidently, “I am discovering my rights” (Franza 102). But of course she 
remains a white woman, and curious Arab children touch her “reddish-brown 
arm again and again, since it still looked white compared to theirs” (Franza
110). And she discovers that the whites are not so easily evaded, that they, or 
their way of thinking, are almost everywhere: “The whites are coming. The 
whites are landing. And if they are driven back, then they will come again. No 
revolution or resolution can prevent it, nor any controls over the currency. They 
will come again in spirit if there’s no other way for them to come. And they will 
resurrect themselves in a brown or black brain, which will become white once 
again. They will take over the world through such indirect means” (Franza 112). 
Further, it is not at all clear to her that the customs she encounters are any more 
humane than those she had left behind, and she is haunted by images of a camel 
slaughtered at a wedding, a belly dancer, a madwoman in Cairo bound by her 
hair. As a white woman she is, like the woman in Cairo, bound to Jordan, her 
fascist husband: “I am bound and tied. I never escape” (Franza 132). 
At the level of her psychic development, Franza also expects that the desert 
will cure her. As Sigrid Weigel has argued, one can view Franza’s recourse 
to the desert as an effort of decomposition or deconstruction, an attempt to 
destroy psychic structures of domination as a first step toward the establish-
ment of new structures beyond the “ways of death” (“Ende”). The desert is 
termed “the immense sanatorium” and “the great padded room of the sky, 
light and sand all about me,” or, alternatively, “the immense inescapable purga-
tory” which will burn away the dross of this existence (Franza 89–90). Franza 
hopes here like Undine to be able to return to the water, to the original Nile 
of Isis and Osiris. But she is in Egypt in May, at the worst time for that fruit-
ful inundation, and access to the water is blocked by monsters, jellyfish and 
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snakes. Instead of flowing into the Nile, she finds herself covered with harden-
ing Nile mud, unable to move or speak or scream (“I wanted to scream, I kept 
wanting to scream. But I simply wasn’t able to scream” (Franza 107); she was 
“buried alive” as in Vienna (Franza 106). And she also finds she cannot escape 
the European God (her father, her husband), who appears to her in a vision. 
Though she has vowed never again to bend her knee to anyone, again as in the 
operating room she falls to her knees before this image that wants to eradicate 
both her and her otherness:
She remained lying there, suffering convulsions as she had in the hallway in 
Vienna, on a parquet floor, a linoleum floor, a hospital bed, and again on the sand, 
on the sand bloodied by a camel, as she laughed and laughed and laughed—her 
laughter providing the opening for the decomposition that began: Who am I? 
Where did I come from? What’s wrong with me? What am I looking for in this 
desert? Something happened and yet did not happen, since nothing can happen, 
only something stepped on her and alongside her walked something else, part 
death, part consciousness, part animal, part human, part of the five senses, one 
a sister, the other a woman, the flesh directed by the sun toward ruin, en route 
toward something that is unrecognizable. (Franza 119)
If deconstruction is Franza’s necessary first step, she cannot escape entirely the 
European patriarch who has colonized her head, and the desert cannot save her 
from dying.
Franza’s death, and its cause, follow then with a deadly logic from her expe-
riences in the desert: it is appropriate to the course of events in the novel, per-
haps even inevitable. Martin wishes to climb the Great Pyramid before they 
leave Egypt; as he climbs, Franza walks around the pyramid, wading through 
the sand. She encounters there a white man who, while masturbating, hits her 
with his stick and then, returning, rapes her. Franza recalls that Jordan had also 
raped her in their library in Vienna: “When she wanted to escape he had shoved 
her against the hard edges of the shelves and done it” (Franza 139). After the 
rape, in a gesture that is in part self-destructive, in part rebellious, she brings 
about an injury that causes her death: “Then she hit the wall, smashing her 
head, slamming it with full force, her head smashing against the wall in Vienna 
and the stone wall in Giza” (Franza 140). Franza had agreed to visit the pyra-
mid to please Martin, telling him, with great unconscious irony, “You’ve already 
missed so much” (Franza 137). Martin’s ambition to climb this enormous edifice, 
his desire to conquer it through his human effort, is surely intended to refer to 
such general habits among white men. The Blue Guide to Egypt [1983] reports 
that “because of the frequency of accidents climbing the pyramids is forbidden 
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except with special permission” (Seton-Williams and Stocks 399); it is signifi-
cant that Martin, unlike Franza, can break the rules with impunity. At another 
level the Great Pyramid, as Hegel argued, can represent the body of the sign, 
the beginning of an alphabet which is nonhieroglyphic: hence the discourse 
and language within which there is no place for Franza (Derrida, “Pit”). That 
sexual violence should occasion Franza’s death is fitting, since violence deriving 
from definitions of gender (including the violent attempt to eradicate Franza’s 
sexuality: “I have no sex, no longer, it was ripped out of me” [TP 1: 278; passage 
omitted in translation]) is in a more general sense responsible for the “way of 
death” that Bachmann describes in this novel. Finally, it is not surprising that 
Franza’s last injury should be self-occasioned, since the order responsible for her 
destruction is, as Bachmann underlines, one of which she is the victim but one 
to which she has also acceded.
If this were the full story of Franza’s death, however, she would be no differ-
ent from the other victims of the “Ways of Death.” It is what Bachmann adds 
to Franza’s story, her rebellion and resistance, that makes this novel so remark-
able. Franza’s initial response to her rapist is an acceptance of such violence 
done to her as necessary and inevitable. Again she does not cry out against what 
is killing her:
Perhaps she should yell for help. She only had to let loose a scream, but why call 
for help? He was already at the corner. What was the point of screaming, why do 
it? The poor devils, they need to do it, to frighten someone.
She smoothed flat the linen dress behind her. It’s nothing, nothing happened, 
and even if it did, what did it matter? (Franza 139)
Then, however, she breaks loose from those structures of thought that legiti-
mate domination, rejecting (as she smashes her head against the stone) the vio-
lence committed against her in Egypt and Vienna: “Her thinking broke off, and 
. . . her other voice returning, she said aloud: No. No” (Franza 140, translation 
modified). Her last words, then, are an assertion of the destruction of the cat-
egories of domination and an imprecation against the whites and against a “he” 
who carries out the white will:
All conceptions shattered.
The whites.
My head.
The whites should.
They should be damned. He should. (Franza 141-142; translation modified)
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The ability of Franza, virtually alone among the “Ways of Death” figures, 
to rebel derives from a highly significant encounter with an oppressor figure 
from which she does emerge the victor. Seeking some alleviation of her suf-
fering, Franza is directed to consult a “doctor who worked miracles,” “one of 
those Germans, you know the type” (Franza 124-125). Franza recognizes this 
doctor, SS-Hauptsturmführer Dr. Kurt Körner, in fact Viennese, from her 
husband’s great work: he had participated in the Nazi euthanasia program for 
the mentally ill, “the eradication of undesirables” (Franza 129). “I know who 
you are,” Franza tells Körner, and demands also to be eradicated (Franza 127). 
That is, acknowledging his power, Franza accedes to her destruction, seeking 
only to speed it along. Körner of course refuses, outraged and indignant. But 
to her astonishment when she next visits Körner, Franza discovers that he has 
vanished, afraid of her; she has vanquished him by confronting him:
Körner had really left because of her, because he was afraid of her. Someone had 
been afraid of her, for the first time afraid of her rather than her being afraid of 
someone.
On the drive to Giza [to the Great Pyramid], she said to Martin in the taxi:
He—she corrected herself—Jordan was never afraid of me. He was so sure 
that I would tell no one, that I would rather die first (as well as until death did us 
part). He never once displayed any kind of uneasiness. But I still have made some-
one afraid. One of them. Yes, that I have done. (Franza 136)
What she has to say, however, is something Martin of course cannot, does not 
want to hear; this is a rebellion which he also must subdue: “Martin saw that 
her fists were balled up. He didn’t understand her remarks, for the discontinu-
ity of such sentences made it hard. In order to pull her out of her trance he took 
her hand and gently opened her fist and talked casually about something else” 
(Franza 136). Nevertheless, Franza’s capacity not just to revolt but to revolt effec-
tively, to put “one of them” to flight, suggests a strategy for women like herself 
which might move them beyond victimhood: to refuse this deadly order, actively 
to challenge their oppressors. (That “three muscular, older Dutch women” “pick 
up [aufheben]” Franza after her rape suggests how such a refusal might be car-
ried out collectively, while their nationality hints that there may exist a Germanic 
people who refuse collusion with fascism or even actively resist it [Franza 140]). 
This strategy might move such white women not backward, into an imagined 
prepatriarchal past, but forward, past the crimes of whites in the present toward 
a future which is their own. 
But this does not, of course, happen in the novel. Even if, as the imagery of 
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this novel sometimes hints, Franza’s “fall” (her “senseless fall [Sturz],” as Martin 
terms it [Franza 142]), has also a religious meaning, there is no grace for her, and 
she dies unredeemed. Thus the final question this novel addresses is whether, 
within the trajectory of human events that the novel describes, within human 
history, there can be a solution for women like Franza. I would like to propose 
here that, though this is a problem broached in the novel, Bachmann did not, 
perhaps could not, resolve it, and this is at least one of the reasons The Book of 
Franza remained unfinished. 
European history, history as progress, is implicated in Franza’s destruction. 
her horror at how the whites have treated Egyptian graves (“The whites. They 
violated the . . . , they didn’t allow the dead to rest in peace” [Franza 109]) strongly 
recalls Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” “Only that his-
torian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past,” says Benjamin, 
“who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he 
wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious” (255). The history written 
by the enemy regards as significant only those events that contribute to the pro-
duction of the present—a present that the enemy controls. This history has no 
place for Franza’s history, indeed, has eradicated it (whereas, says Benjamin, “a 
redeemed mankind receives the fullness of its past,” a “past citable in all its 
moments” [244]). Franza and Martin are astonished at the effort taken by the 
third Thothmes (associated with the introduction of abstraction and monothe-
ism) to destroy any evidence of the reign of Hatshepsut, Egypt’s first queen—
“this urge to destroy, . . . this desire to erase a great figure” (Franza 110)—but 
Franza consoles herself with the recognition that Hatshepsut’s absence also 
speaks: “Look, she said, but the pharaoh forgot that though he had eradicated 
her, she was still there. It can still be read, because nothing is there where in fact 
something should be” (Franza 109). As a queen, Hatshepsut occupied the loca-
tion of a man, even calling herself a king and wearing a false beard—thus becom-
ing memorable within a history that is a history of domination. In the case of 
Franza and of white women like her, there is the danger that history may not 
even remark her absence, that she will be extinguished altogether. On the other 
hand, if Franza exists in the present only as part of white history, the history of 
domination, it is not clear how her story can in the future become part of the his-
tory of the former victims. She belongs neither to the Second nor to the Third 
World, responsible for fruitful inundation at Aswan, and her own history may 
not intersect at all with the “historical event” she observes at Luxor.
If there is hope within history for Franza, it is given expression in the curi-
ous fragments of chapter three included at the end of the Franza volume in the 
Werke (passages omitted from the translation but located within the “Wüsten-
buch” in volume one of the “Todesarten”-Projekt). The editors of the Werke tell 
us that these sections were intended to be inserted between the first and second 
parts of the third chapter: “In the typescript of part I a page follows with the 
handwritten note: Here a piece is missing with the stations Aswan and Wadi 
Halfa, before the return of the siblings to Cairo” (W 3: 561). That Bachmann 
intended an integration of those sections is indicated by the novel’s conclusion, 
which refers back to them in a manner extremely significant for a final interpre-
tation of this work. 
The section with which these fragments begin, set in Luxor, is further sub-
stantiation for an interpretation of this novel through the lens of Critical Theory, 
for the passage suggests that in Egypt, Franza finds a nonreified relationship 
to the world of production: here both the producer and the consumer retain a 
human relationship to things, a relationship irretrievably lost in advanced capi-
talism. Franza remarks: “Luxor: all artisans’ shops are open, I see for the first 
time how a shoe is made, again for the first time since childhood how bread is 
baked. The cobbler doesn’t make a beautiful shoe but a durable one, the two 
men work all day in plain sight of everyone, they smile when you sit down with 
them, they don’t let me pay for the tea that I fetch for them, every customer gets 
to sit down, in the shadows, gets tea or coffee to drink and gets to watch while 
they’re working” (TP 1: 253). Bachmann goes on to specify, in almost classi-
cally Marxist fashion, the consequences of a way of life in which we have lost 
an organic relationship to the products of human labor: “It’s not fondness for 
the simple life but rather merely the thought that we no longer see anything of 
how things come to be, which we need, that our children might again know 
where their food, their clothing comes from, that toys are palmed off on them 
that abuse the imagination so that it’s all wrong from the outset, that their 
knowledge has no foundation” (TP 1: 253). Similar passages may be found in 
Bachmann’s work as far back as The Thirtieth Year, but this one may represent 
Bachmann’s clearest statement anywhere that the developments in the realm of 
thought which her works chronicle and lament have both a material basis and 
historical causes.
Yet more significant for the interpretation of this novel are Franza’s experi-
ences at Wadi Halfa, a town on the Nile in the Sudan, just south of the Egyp-
tian border. The original Wadi Halfa will be submerged under the waters of 
Lake Nasser when the Aswan Dam is completed, a destruction that is a con-
solation and solace to Franza: “I’m traveling to Wadi Halfa. I can hang on to 
that. For it will perish [untergehen]” (TP 1: 278). On the one hand, for Franza, 
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Wadi Halfa has a meaning similar to that of the desert (“Oh, it is also there, 
the desert, what else should be” [TP 1: 279], she says), standing for the eradica-
tion of white thinking. Here the destruction of white thought takes the specific 
form of a refusal to recognize white symbols of exchange and communication 
(metaphors, it appears, for language altogether): at the closed post office, stamps 
are beautiful (“pretty stamps, a whole set”) but useless, and a sign reads “tele-
grammes are for delay.” “Nobody needs telegrams here,” Franza recognizes, 
“nobody ever needed them, as little as the stamps, the seals, the file folders” (TP
1: 279). Outside of Egypt and farther south, Wadi Halfa as interior setting may 
represent a layer of Franza’s psychology antecedent even to the deconstruction 
of conceptions she achieves in the desert. But one may also regard Wadi Halfa 
as a utopian projection “forward” in that it represents the response of a com-
munity that is not white to white thought and a revenge on the whites: “gentle 
revenge, unconscious, on the whites is the legacy that stares back at them” (TP 
1: 279). The question that then remains is that of Franza’s relationship to that 
community.
In Wadi Halfa, for a moment, Franza finds that connection to a community 
in a setting that is almost religious, a kind of last supper. She drinks, like the 
Arabs, from the communal jug, finally finding her way to the water: “I have to 
drink, it tastes just like water, it’s Nile water, the gnats don’t matter” (TP 1: 280). 
Led by an old Arab to a house at the edge of the town, Franza there silently, 
without language, eats from a bowl of beans, her hands dipping into the bowl 
along with those of the Arabs and Nubians. For Franza this is a moment of total 
awareness and total peace: “It’s the most conscious moment, the most natural, 
the first and only meal has taken place, is taking place, it is the first and only 
good meal, would perhaps remain the only meal in a lifetime that was not dis-
turbed by barbarism, indifference, greed, thoughtlessness, calculation, by none 
at all” (TP 1: 282). Franza refers to this meal in specifically religious terms: she 
seems to view it both as confirming the possibility of comprehending the world 
“magically” (that is, non-instrumentally), as she has attempted to do, and simul-
taneously suggesting that it is possible to grasp that magic mode differently than 
she, in her madness, had hitherto been able to do: “I knew that the ingredients, 
the magic ones, of my world were given preference by my superstitions, I knew 
that the ingredients could be changed, but the experience of their variability was 
nothing less than a revelation” (TP 1: 282). The meal in Wadi Halfa thus (like 
John the Baptist, preaching in the desert, baptizing in the River Jordan, prepar-
ing the way for a savior whose time is not yet come) holds out the promise of a 
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redemption for Franza on the far side of the world of the whites: “Thus I came 
to a sermon that nobody spoke and that was not held under a temple roof, to a 
sermon of the desert and unformulated laws, to mouthfuls of water and bites of 
food, ways of walking and sleeping, which waited under a thin crust of another 
kind of comprehension for their hour, for the mystical connection of breathing 
in and breathing out, of moving and resting, for the hallelujah of survival in 
nothingness” (TP 1: 283). With nonwhite people, Franza discovers that secu-
lar mysticism that traces its way as a utopian image through Bachmann’s work 
from the beginning.
For Franza, of course, that image is only utopian. Though she succeeds in her 
efforts of destruction, there is nothing more she can attain, as the novel’s last sen-
tence indicates: “The Egyptian darkness, that one must grant her, is complete” 
(Franza 146; translation modified), and after her death Wadi Halfa is submerged 
as well, as Martin, returned to Vienna, learns from Viennese newspapers. The 
novel’s difficult final paragraph suggests other consequences, though it is not alto-
gether clear what we are to conclude from them. The communion of Wadi Halfa 
is continued, Bachmann tells us, but celebrated now only by nonwhite people, the 
hands of the white woman expressly excluded from that communal bowl. “But 
one can assume that the post office . . . was evacuated on schedule, despite an 
unscheduled delay, and that the brown and black hands would find themselves 
together again, reaching into a dish of beans in a new settlement further south. 
But Franza’s white hand could no longer reach into a bowl in search of another 
morsel, and the silent woman near the wall would never learn that she had pre-
pared the meal that had tasted better to her than all others” (Franza 146). If there 
is a historical realization of this utopia, it is not one in which a white woman like 
Franza participates.
On the other hand, the image with which this paragraph concludes is one of 
hope for history, though only in the most general of senses. A beacon remains at 
Wadi Halfa as a promise: “Even if it were forgotten by the departing refugees, 
there was a light in Wadi Halfa that would be lifted up by the Nile.” With 
emphasis, Bachmann underlines the Hegelian term aufheben—to cancel, to pre-
serve, to raise to a higher stage— to which she here makes recourse: “It wouldn’t 
be swept away, for nothing can be swept away. It couldn’t be dragged under, for 
it drags nothing down. Lift up [aufheben]. The inundator” (Franza 146; transla-
tion modified). What Bachmann’s image does not clarify here is for whom the 
promise of the lantern is aufgehoben, or for whom it will be redeemed. If history, 
the passage of time, or nature itself (for we cannot tell how Bachmann wishes us 
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here to understand the flooding of the Nile) will not solve the problem of domi-
nation, what hope is there for the Franzas of this world, for us? The example of 
Franza’s resistance, the utopian image of human community beyond domina-
tion, and the promise of historical change may be as close as this novel can come 
to an answer to the problems of white women that it so carefully details.
READING BACHMANN IN 1984
 
This essay was first published in German in 1984 in the special text + kritik issue 
on Ingeborg Bachmann guest-edited by Sigrid Weigel; it appears here for the 
first time in English. Written in the spring of 1984, it was strongly influenced by 
contemporary debates both inside and outside of feminism. The two-year-long 
Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education–sponsored Five Col-
lege faculty seminar on the intersection of Black Studies and Women’s Studies, 
culminating in a major conference in April 1983 (Karcher), made a profound 
impact on me which has lasted to the present. Apart from discovering that I 
knew virtually nothing about black women, black history, and black culture 
in general (a gaping hole in my knowledge that I have tried to fill since then), I 
was brought into confrontation with two further aspects of black life that would 
cause me to reconsider my own feminist premises. First, it was impressed upon 
me that, whereas white feminists lamented their powerlessness and, as a solu-
tion, counseled retreat into preserves where men could not bother them, black 
history in contrast revealed (most obviously, of course, in the civil rights move-
ment) a black determination to confront white power in order to gain for black 
people what was rightfully theirs. That recognition occasioned a transformation 
in both my theoretical and practical understanding of how feminists might con-
tend with male power. Among other things, I drew upon the black example to 
encourage myself to become more feisty when I dealt with men, and that is why, 
in the essay, I am so pleased that Franza discovers it is possible to stand up to, 
even say no to, white men. 
Second, a quite spectacular row in the seminar compelled me to acknowl-
edge that the perspectives and modes of interaction elaborated by white femi-
nists might not be the only forms opposed to those of dominant white men; that, 
indeed, the assertion of the superiority of white feminist models (with respect to 
how to conduct a seminar discussion, say) might itself be seen as an expression 
of white racial privilege. From these somewhat heated interactions I derived two 
far-reaching insights that would have a long-term impact on my conception of 
feminism: first, that white women (or “women” in general) are not inevitably 
on the “right” side; and second, that white women, even white feminists, can 
—quite unknown to themselves—think and act in ways that perpetuate their 
racial and class privilege (as in Marx’s “social being determines consciousness”). 
In loose association with the faculty seminar two colleagues and I cotaught a 
rather large and somewhat disastrous undergraduate course called “Feminism, 
Black Nationalism, Marxism” in which, to my great dismay, the inadequacies 
of feminist analyses (and my own rhetorical skills) emerged in stark relief. (The 
French feminist paradigm was a particular casualty of the course.) The upshot 
of these experiences for me was quite a lot of confusion (not to say downright 
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skepticism) about the validity of the assumptions I had hitherto relied upon to 
found my feminism.
But like many other feminists of this era, I had other, very compelling politi-
cal concerns to occupy my time. In spring 1984, Jesse Jackson’s campaign for the 
Democratic presidential nomination, waged under the banner of the Rainbow 
Coalition, called forth an astonishing cross-racial, cross-class coalition in the 
area of western Massachusetts where I live: academics and local townspeople of 
all races, ethnicities, and ages; Democratic Party politicians; trade unionists; 
students. I became cochair of the Five College Faculty and Staff Committee for 
Jackson (my greatest accomplishment a full-page signature ad in the local paper 
the Friday before the primary); the Students for Jackson committee was orga-
nized by students in the interdisciplinary program I direct, the Social Thought 
and Political Economy Program. The campaign produced both an exuberance 
and a sense of hope and wonder (particularly at seeing such an unlikely group-
ing of people assembled in one room working for the same end) that I had not 
experienced since the 1960s. The day of the primary, as I was driving voters to 
the polls, I recall seeing an old white man dressed in polyester pants hobbling 
slowly up the sidewalk to the polling place. “Jackson’s for the poor,” he said 
cheerfully. “I’ve been poor all my life. I’m voting for Jackson!” My deep admira-
tion for the image of community that Bachmann invokes in the novel as Fran-
za’s white hand, brown hands, and black hands dip silently into a common bowl 
at Wadi Halfa derives from my own experience of community in the Jackson 
campaign. As well, the distress felt by Jews associated with the campaign after 
Jackson was reported to have said that he was going up to “Hymietown” forced 
me for the first time to confront the importance of ethnicity in American life, 
my own white Protestant Northern European ethnicity having shielded me 
hitherto from registering that ethnic background was of great importance to 
other Americans, including other feminists and, to my surprise, many of my 
friends, though not at all to me. The struggle and pain that emerged from this 
aspect of the Jackson campaign reinforced my commitment to the now not just 
theoretical but obviously also very practical urgency of addressing the question 
of differences among women.
Somewhat to my own astonishment, I wrote this essay in the spare moments 
I could steal from my work on the Jackson campaign: the intensity of the politi-
cal work seemed to fill me with such buoyant energy that even academic writing 
came easily. In addition, I felt strongly that I was addressing at the level of my 
intellectual work many of the same issues that I confronted in my practical pol-
itics, and that made the essay take on a significance to me somehow akin to the 
importance of helping Jesse win. By this time, I had come to an understanding 
of Bachmann’s work very like that of Christa Wolf’s 1966 essay: all of Bach-
mann’s writing, but the “Ways of Death” with greatest success, could be under-
stood as an effort to illuminate the condition of (female) subjectivity at a particu-
lar place and in a particular period of human history—a reading quite different 
from that of chapter 3, “In the Cemetery of the Murdered Daughters,” and one 
obviously called into being by the new attention to difference among feminists 
and among women in general and by the fascinating historical and anthropo-
logical investigations into the specificity of gender arrangements across time and 
culture appearing in recent feminist journals. Like probably all feminist Bach-
mann scholars, I had been dismayed by male scholars’ condescending dismissal 
of her in the period before the advent of the second wave of feminism, but I had 
also grown concerned about her reception by feminists, since (as I suggest in 
chapter 2), they seemed to view Bachmann through a feminist lens that itself 
treated gender so ahistorically that the political dimensions of her undertaking 
disappeared. My essay here was an effort to draw on what I had learned in the 
1980s from debates inside and outside of feminism in order to advance a new, 
more historically specific model of analysis.
Looking back on the essay now, it appears to me to be informed by two not 
very compatible feminist discourses, both of which were current in U.S. aca-
demic feminism at the time it was written. As I’ve already suggested, the new 
feminist attention to race and my own experiences in addressing questions of 
race were obviously factors motivating my writing of this essay. (At the time, I 
did not know that the use of the term Rasse was problematic in German because 
of its association with the Nazis’ racial policies.) To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first essay in Bachmann scholarship to deal straightforwardly with 
questions of race and the non-Western world (that is, to treat Franza’s impreca-
tions against “the whites” as not merely a metaphor for something other than 
race), and I believe it is among the first in feminist German Studies altogether to 
thematize the question of race ( a topic around which something of a cottage 
industry has developed in the meantime). My own struggles with my position 
vis-à-vis racism also prevented me from regarding Franza only as a victim and 
exempting her from complicity in the culture she is trying to escape (an unusual 
position for those days), and I ask in this essay whether Franza’s history is inevi-
tably linked only to the history of the racist/imperialist West, a question of very 
grave concern to white feminists in general. I was at the time quite smug about 
being the first to whom it occurred to investigate the “historical event” that 
Martin and Franza encounter in Egypt and thus to be able to develop a whole 
historically based strand of argument that links the siblings specifically to First 
and Second World neoimperialism. (Now, I would also want to point out how 
that event emphatically situates Franza within the context of cold war tensions.) 
By turning to Critical Theory, I avoided an argument that uses gender as its 
single analytical category, though I was also sensitive enough to Eurocentrism to 
recognize that Dialectic of Enlightenment’s failure to discuss the non-Western 
world was a serious theoretical limitation. Finally, the alert reader will notice that 
even in 1984, this essay only uses the term “patriarchy” a single time.
reading bachmann in 1984   { 185 }
{ 186 }   a history of reading bachmann
Nevertheless, I think this essay still displays a recourse to totalizing theories 
with (white) women at the center which recalls the “Women and Religion” spe-
cial issue of Signs. My appropriation of the Frankfurt School here is scarcely 
distinguishable from the Christa Wolf of Cassandra and is quite compatible with 
cultural/ecofeminist analyses or at least does not break with their founding 
premises. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno identify a 
single, all-encompassing system of domination presided over by (possibly ruling-
class) white men responsible for the subordination of everyone and everything 
else; the alternative to this model of thought is “magical thinking” of the kind 
that Franza displays. Within such a system, as Horkheimer and Adorno also 
suggest, the (white) woman-as-victim plays a central role. I would now consider 
theories making such grandiose claims to be examples of precisely the tenden-
cies they believe they are challenging, displaying the hubris of a Western reason 
that believes its categories can adequately comprehend everything within its 
sway, that simultaneously elevates Western women to central status (thus merely 
the mirror image of the Western male subject) and lets them off the hook by 
maintaining that they are the innocent objects of a system for which men alone 
are responsible. (At best, they have access to the spoils “only in a broken form,” 
as Horkheimer and Adorno put it [249], once they have submitted to their mas-
ters.) Moreover, in its assertion of the possibility of an uncontaminated, non-
alienated existence temporally or spatially outside the system (an allegation cen-
tral to many varieties of Western theory, not the least to psychoanalysis), this 
theory (like cultural feminism) makes exactly the claim that Foucault refuses (in 
The History of Sexuality), that some fundamental areas of human experience 
escape social construction to which humans could potentially retreat as a ges-
ture of resistance or refusal. (Within the novel, Franza’s hysterical symptoms 
and her flight to a location where she believes she can escape the whites perform 
this role.) 
In general, this essay is far too dependent on psychoanalysis to be genuinely 
historical or attentive to cultural difference, for, as Stuart Hall has observed, 
psychoanalysis “addresses the subject-in-general, not historically determinate 
social subjects, or socially determinate particular languages. Thus it is incapable, 
so far, of moving its in-general propositions to the levels of concrete historical 
analysis” (46). My reliance on the Frankfurt School to found a historically based 
analysis is in general a little paradoxical, since in their attempt to discern broad 
trends within a historical tradition that appears to begin with the Odyssey the 
Critical Theorists are almost as cavalier about historical detail are as subsequent 
poststructuralists. Moreover, though I treat Bachmann as a writer concerned 
with historical problems that extend beyond gender alone, I do not examine 
Bachmann and her texts as historical phenomena themselves. At that point, I 
believe, a feminist methodology did not yet exist to pose such questions, and that 
is of course the main project of this book. Finally, I now detect in this essay a 
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quality that I have discerned in a great deal of “gynocritcal” feminist scholar-
ship: my analysis of Bachmann’s writing is not only not critical of her but con-
cludes by determining that she represents a position precisely in accord with 
what was most au courant in the feminist analysis of the moment!
Despite my criticisms of today, however, I remain quite pleased with this 
essay. I continue to believe that its analysis of Bachmann’s own utilization of 
Frankfurt School theory is correct, and I believe that opened up some important 
areas of research into Bachmann that other scholars have since pursued. Yet 
somewhat to my dismay, my call for a more historically based Bachmann schol-
arship did not immediately find a response or even, I think, much initial under-
standing of what I was trying to do (as reviews of the journal that brushed over 
my essay seemed to show). On the contrary, I think, partially as a consequence 
of the position I had taken in “In the Cemetery of the Murdered Daughters,” I 
was first assumed to be a proponent of the tendencies that dominated feminist 
Bachmann criticism in 1984. As I also note in chapter 2, this essay first appeared 
in the landmark issue of text + kritik which proclaimed the existence of the 
“other Ingeborg Bachmann,” whose texts could be regarded as an anticipation 
of feminist poststructuralism, particularly its assertions about the repression of 
female otherness by a phallogocentric culture/discourse. Though this was pre-
cisely the dehistoricizing tendency with which my own essay was contending, I 
suspect that by publishing it in that context I in fact lent support to precisely the 
political direction this essay had attempted to challenge.
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The caesura that separated 1984 from 1985 was Ronald Reagan’s landslide vic-
tory in the November 1984 election. The lopsided results turned the euphoria 
of progressives who had participated in the Jackson campaign into deep gloom. 
The title page of the January–February 1985 issue of Socialist Review bore the 
caption (borrowed from Ntozake Shange’s play) “For Leftists Who Have Con-
sidered Suicide When the Rainbow Is Enuf,” and the Socialist Scholars’ Con-
ference in April 1985 was titled “The Left in Crisis.” Despite the Democratic 
Party’s nomination of the first-ever female vice presidential candidate of a major 
party, Geraldine Ferraro’s candidacy had not especially inspired women to vote 
the Democratic ticket. Perhaps that was in part because the campaign managers 
for presidential candidate Walter Mondale, targeted as the candidate of “spe-
cial interests” (“women, trade unionists, blacks, Hispanics, gays, and environ-
mentalists—that is, seventy to eighty per cent of the population,” remarked one 
commentator wryly [Altman 10]), did not allow Ferraro to appeal specifically to 
women voters until shortly before election day—far too late. And despite a 4 to 9
percent gender gap that divided men’s and women’s support for the Republicans, 
a majority of U.S. women as well as men backed Reagan (Riddiough 24–25). 
The New York Times quoted a thirty-year-old woman from Ferraro’s New York 
neighborhood as saying: “Reagan is a true capitalist, and so am I. I really don’t 
care about social programs. Reagan cares about strength, power, spending 
for the military just like I do” (Altman 8). The so-called New Deal coalition 
seemed to have collapsed, and only black voters, including those newly regis-
tered by the Jackson campaign, remained a reliably Democratic constituency.
Feminists also were shaken by the Reagan win and by a more general sense 
of feminism’s lack of political effectiveness. Though they conceded that liberal 
feminism had made gains for women, within Reagan’s America those changes 
were minuscule compared with the complete transformation of everything 
that radical and socialist feminists had originally envisioned. A panel of emi-
nent socialist feminists, asked by Socialist Review to comment on the state of 
socialist feminism, proclaimed its demise (somewhat ironically, since only a 
few years later it would be reincarnated, at least in the academy, as “materialist 
feminism”). Deirdre English commented: “I don’t feel very comfortable calling 
myself a feminist anymore, because socialist-feminism is dead, my version of 
radical feminism is dead, and the mainstream feminist movement is just bark-
ing up the wrong tree” (English et al. 104). Not surprisingly, recriminations 
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and soul searching were the consequence both outside and inside the academy. 
Cultural feminists and “difference” feminists of all sorts took a beating in aca-
demic feminist journals, since the emphasis on women’s difference from men 
was now seen as racist, classist, and of potential utility to the right. The editors of 
Feminist Studies noted, “We suspect that the very category of ‘difference,’ to the 
extent that it implies biologically based distinctions between women and men in 
cognition and capacity, may prove finally to impede rather than to further the 
quest for knowledge and for equality” (Vicinus/ Rosenfelt 5). In summer 1985
the editors of Signs, printing the papers of the 1983 Signs-sponsored conference 
“Communities of Women,” apologized for the limitation of their topic: “We 
did not realize, until courteously yet explicitly advised of our failure of insight, 
that this focus might be seen to limit the topic’s appropriateness to the interests 
of middle-class white women in their struggle against the dominance of white 
men. When women and men are oppressed because of class or race or both, 
women’s autonomy may not be a relevant issue” (“Editorial” 1985, 634). 
Among the critiques of feminist methodology advanced by those papers, 
most striking was Joan Ringelheim’s account of how a cultural feminist per-
spective had led her to ask the wrong questions about women’s experience in 
the Holocaust. “Cultural feminism,” she now declared, “developed not sim-
ply as a tactic for battling the antiwoman line in a sexist world, but as a way 
to detour around it without violent revolution; without confronting the state, 
family, marriage, or organized religion, and without eliminating institutions 
intent on keeping women in their place. . . . [C]ultural feminism substitutes 
a political activism that was risky and offensive for another that, accidentally 
or not, conveniently disallows risk” (754). “My use of cultural feminism as a 
frame (albeit unconsciously),” she continued, “changed respect for the stories of 
the Jewish women into some sort of glorification and led to the conclusion that 
these women transformed ‘a world of death and inhumanity into one more act 
of human life.” But the Holocaust, she concluded, “is a story of loss, not gain” 
(756–57). 
Other feminist scholars developed similarly scathing critiques of cultural 
feminism. Anthropologist Micaela di Leonardo, for instance, debunked the 
notion of woman as peacemaker which had underwritten cultural feminist par-
ticipation in the peace movement. The articles in the book she was reviewing, 
she explained,
reflect a certain radical feminist perspective that envisions women as innately more 
peaceful than—and thus morally superior to—men, thus lodging this analysis in 
an imagined matriarchal past. This perspective leads authors to make statements 
that are historically and anthropologically inaccurate. They assert that “women 
are the first victims of the patriarchal state of war,” and declare that “pre-Patriar-
chal cultures believed that, because women alone brought forth life, women there-
fore held the secrets of nature and the keys to wisdom.” This last claim would 
come as a considerable surprise to the foraging African Pygmies and Australian 
aborigines. Such counterfactual assertions, misreading ethnographic and histori-
cal evidence, are the despair of feminist anthropologists. (606)
Carol Gilligan’s theory of women’s different moral sensibilities were not just 
based on insufficient empirical evidence, members of a feminist study collective 
argued, but could also be used to support arguments like those of conservative 
Phyllis Shlafly for the separate interests of women and men—“a conviction,” they 
maintained, “that contributed to the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment” 
(Auerbach et al. 159). Wendy Chapkis even cast aspersions at Susan Brownmill-
er’s insistence on clinging to the feminist “uniform” of the 1970s—unshaven legs, 
no makeup, functional clothing, trousers, flat shoes: “[Brownmiller’s book] Femi-
ninity reads like the statement of a woman weary of the struggle and unable to 
find inspiration for a new female esthetic that allows for play and pleasure” (111). 
(Such a remark documents a striking sea change pointing in the direction of the 
flirtation with gender performance that would characterize the queer politics of 
the 1990s.) Even literary scholars denounced the cultural feminist or French fem-
inist lens that had been directed at women’s literary texts: in the spring 1985 Signs
issue, for instance, Alicia Ostriker protested a conception of poetry advanced in 
an article by Margaret Homans which, drawing on French theory, portrayed 
women’s experience as inexpressible in men’s language.
While thus displaying the influence of the reconsideration of feminist polit-
ical strategies in the political arena, feminist scholarship simultaneously moved 
toward the elaboration of alternative paradigms that might avoid what they 
now perceived as earlier errors. In feminist journals, articles exploring the 
enormous range of female possibilities across culture and history proliferated: 
anarchist women in the Spanish Civil War (Ackelsberg); black women in the 
Sanctified Church (Gilkes); contemporary Iranian women (Higgins); Jewish 
immigrant women in New York and the 1917 food riots (Frank); women work-
ers in the Shanghai cotton mills from 1919 to 1949 (Honig); German feminists 
before World War I (Ann Taylor Allen); women in the Israeli army (Yuval-
Davis); Bedouin women (Abu-Lughod); women workers in the Yale clerical 
union strike (Ladd-Taylor), women in the new Nicaragua (Molyneux). Authors 
of articles on such topics developed increasingly more careful ways of theoreti-
cally and practically differentiating among women, Maxine Molyneux argu-
ing, for instance: “Although it is true that at a certain level of abstraction women 
can be said to have some interests in common, there is no consensus over what 
these interests are or how they are to be formulated. This is in part because 
there is no theoretically adequate and universally applicable causal explanation 
of women’s subordination from which a general account of women’s interests 
can be derived” (231). 
As followed from the critique of cultural feminism’s emphasis on women’s 
separate sphere, feminist scholars also began to problematize their strategy of 
examining women’s undertakings independently from those of men. Kathryn 
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Kish Sklar observed, for instance: “One of the most important questions asked 
by historians of American women today is, To what degree has women’s social 
power been based on separate female institutions, culture, and consciousness, 
and to what degree has it grown out of their access to male spheres of influence, 
such as higher education, labor organization, and politics?” (659). In accord 
with critiques raised against various sorts of feminists in the political realm, 
feminist scholars also criticized the practice as well as the theory of feminists 
who perpetuate an existing system of domination in the course of pursuing 
what they believe to be feminist ends: Susan Schechter and Michelle Fine, for 
instance, drew attention to what they termed a “feminist hegemony” in the bat-
tered women’s movement, “the imposition of a feminist way and a feminist set 
of values on women who live and work in these shelters” (Fine 402). Rather 
than predicting women’s automatic opposition to oppression, scholars examined 
how they actually negotiated conflicting pressures and how ideologies as well as 
actual conditions guided their choices (Lamphere; Ferree, “Between”; Zavella). 
Particularly in texts focused on sexuality, scholars began to underline notions of 
the “social construction” of all aspects of female behavior (Caulfield).
Literary scholars also demonstrated a greater awareness of both political and 
social conditions and strategies of literary representations as barriers to under-
standing a female author as a voice unproblematically giving expression to the 
concerns of a female subject. Margaret Homans began an article on women’s 
love poetry by remarking, “This essay assumes that poets are shaped as much 
by the literary forms and the conventions of language they inherit as they are 
by the social and political universe in which they have their historical being” 
(“Syllables” 569). Scholars commented as well on the difficulties of politics, 
positioning, and representation that intrude between a feminist scholar and her 
subject matter (Minnich). Leslie Rabine’s analysis of Harlequin romance novels 
continued to move feminist literary analysis beyond canonical texts into inter-
disciplinary methodologies by arguing that recent Harlequins treat the theme 
of sexuality in the workplace as a means to envision “an end to the division 
between the domestic world of love and sentiment and the public world of work 
and business” (40), thus helping readers to manage conflicts in their own lives. A 
feminist critic of Shakespeare (a field where much pathbreaking literary scholar-
ship was undertaken in the 1980s) proposed a feminist reading of Shakespeare’s 
texts as a site at which discursive contradictions could be interrogated: “For 
generations Shakespearean critics lamented the marriages that end these plays 
as tacked on and conventional; recently feminist critics have described them as 
strategies that circumscribe female revolt and power. I would suggest instead 
that the plays expose contradictions between the enactment of repressive social 
structures manifested in genre (courtship and marriage) and the representation 
of powerful female protagonists” (Newman 602). In the best literary analyses 
of 1985, feminist scholars gave expression to their efforts to reach beyond the 
(frequently mainly formalist) training they had received in their own fields and 
also investigated developments occurring in other fields of cultural studies as 
they inched toward the major transformation of their field that would begin 
later in the decade.
Most indicative of the new directions in which feminist scholarship was mov-
ing and the rupture with earlier feminist paradigms that they would represent 
(as well as the emergence of a new version of socialist feminism) was Donna 
Haraway’s article “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist 
Feminism in the 1980s,” first published in the March-April 1985 issue of Socialist 
Review. From the perspective of the development of feminist thought, Haraway 
clearly elaborated her cyborg myth in response to the implosion of the category 
“woman.” “Woman,” she explained, is itself a fictional construction imposed on 
us by our enemies: “There is nothing about being female that naturally binds 
women. There is not even such a state as being female, itself a highly complex 
category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other social 
practices. Gender, race, or class consciousness is an achievement forced on us 
by the terrible historical experience of the contradictory social realities of patri-
archy, colonialism, and capitalism” (“Manifesto” 72). Instead, the cyborg is the 
“fiction” Haraway wishes to use to characterize women. In contrast, say, to the 
woman as cultural feminism understood her, cyborgs are hybrid and heteroge-
neous postmodern creatures that refuse those binaries which structure Western 
thought: arising out of a confusion and transgression of boundaries, they are 
both nature and culture, both organic and crafted, products of both imagination 
and material reality, both public and private, a conglomerate of races, beyond 
gender, neither deriving from a single lineage nor originating at a moment of 
prelapsarian wholeness. Haraway explains:
An origin story in the “Western,” humanist sense depends on the myth of original 
unity, fullness, bliss and terror, represented by the phallic mother from whom all 
humans must separate, the task of individual development and of history, the twin 
potent myths inscribed most powerfully for us in psychoanalysis and Marxism. 
Hilary Klein has argued that both Marxism and psychoanalysis, in their concepts 
of labor and of individuation and gender formation, depend on the plot of original 
unity out of which difference must be produced and enlisted in a drama of escalat-
ing domination of woman/nature. The cyborg skips the step of original unity, of 
identification with nature in the Western sense. (“Manifesto” 67)
When such concepts are drawn into question, theories based on ontology 
and teleology such as classical Marxism and classical psychoanalysis—and cul-
tural feminism—become impossible as well. As Haraway observes: “Catherine 
MacKinnon’s version of radical feminism is itself a caricature of the appropriat-
ing, incorporating, totalizing tendencies of Western theories of identity ground-
ing action. . . . It’s not just that ‘god’ is dead, so is the ‘goddess’” (“Manifesto” 77, 
81). But the consequence of the loss of such constructions that also motivated 
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political action for socialist feminists, Haraway underlines, need be not cyni-
cism or despair but rather opposition and a contestation for meanings that can-
not predict in advance what the outcome will be. “We do not need a totality in 
order to work well. The feminist dream of a common language, like all dreams 
for a perfectly true language, of perfectly faithful naming of experience, is a 
totalizing and imperialist one. In that sense, dialectics too is a dream language, 
longing to resolve contradictions.” Writing (in contrast to an originary, self-
identical speech) is preeminently the technology of cyborgs, and “Cyborg writ-
ing,” says Haraway, “is about the power to survive, not on the basis of original 
innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked 
them as other” (“Manifesto” 92, 94). Haraway argues here for a theory and prac-
tice based on a feminism without guarantees, an aleatory strategy that squarely 
confronts the bleak present but, opting (like Brecht) for the “bad new” rather 
than the “good old,” nonetheless continues, as a new sort of socialist feminism, 
to hope and work for a transformation of the future.
CHAPTER 6
Bachmann and Wittgenstein
Not just the case of Kakania showed that 
thinking in closed ideologies leads directly to war,
 and the permanent war of faith is still ongoing.
—Ingeborg Bachmann, Werke
Twelve years after her death, literary scholars are slowly beginning 
to understand the author whom Sigrid Weigel has termed “the other Ingeborg 
Bachmann.” As Weigel explains, “The stimulus of feminist cultural criticism 
and poststructuralism was necessary before Bachmann’s late work could be 
understood and the more radical dimension of her writing grasped” (“Andere” 
2). The new Bachmann scholarship has been remarkable, producing several 
impressive recent volumes and finally enabling us to begin to comprehend Bach-
mann’s profound and difficult texts. Yet despite the accomplishments of the new 
scholarship, it too runs some danger of again distorting Bachmann’s works by 
extracting them and Bachmann herself from their cultural context, the mid-
twentieth-century Austria which her fiction so carefully anatomizes. It is cer-
tainly the case that Bachmann participated in the intellectual debates of the 
European intelligentsia of the postwar period, thus also knew and was influ-
enced by, among other things, the developing poststructuralist theory of the 
1960s. As evidence of her familiarity with issues under discussion by European 
intellectuals, one might, for instance, consider the names of the other members 
of the editorial board of a proposed international literary journal on which 
Bachmann was also chosen to serve, including in 1963 Hans Magnus Enzens-
berger, Günter Grass, Helmut Heißenbüttel, Uwe Johnson, Martin Walser, 
Roland Barthes, Michel Butor, Michel Leiris, Italo Calvino, Alberto Moravia, 
and Pier Paolo Pasolini (W 4: 376). In Bachmann’s own contribution to the first 
number of the journal, however, she cautions against the creation of a common 
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European “supermarket of the spirit” and urges instead that literary production 
be rooted in the particularities of language and culture: “Only now can one 
safely ponder what one can say and contribute oneself, each from his own prov-
ince, from his own place at which the world (that is, the other provinces) washes 
up” (W 4: 70–71). At this point in the development of the new Bachmann criti-
cism it may be most productive to follow Bachmann’s own advice and, while 
preserving the insights gained via the use of poststructuralist theory, to investi-
gate Bachmann’s roots within the specificity of Austrian history and the Aus-
trian cultural tradition.
As a contribution to that effort I would like to explore Bachmann’s indebted-
ness to the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who, despite the efforts of Allan Janik 
and Stephen Toulmin in Wittgenstein’s Vienna, is also almost invariably extracted 
from his Austrian background. Unpublished material from the Bachmann 
papers as well as Bachmann’s published essays on Wittgenstein show that many 
of the concerns that inform Bachmann’s late fiction were present, at least in ger-
minal form, in her work from the beginning and can be traced to her encounter 
with Wittgenstein. Using Janik and Toulmin, I first briefly examine Wittgen-
stein in the context of the Austrian intellectual tradition, stressing particularly his 
relationship to the Vienna Circle, the perspective from which Bachmann, under 
the influence of her dissertation director, Viktor Kraft, first treated him. Then I 
trace Bachmann’s own development as a young philosopher, from her critique of 
Heidegger—undertaken mostly from the perspective of logical positivism—to 
her growing engagement with the work of Wittgenstein, whom she increasingly 
distinguished from the logical positivists. Finally, I examine Bachmann’s two 
published essays of the 1950s on Wittgenstein and argue that her encounter with 
his posthumous Philosophical Investigations, which she read after writing the first 
and before the second of her essays, was of key importance to her subsequent 
intellectual development, the themes she emphasized in the second essay remain-
ing central to her own writing until her death. 
Janik and Toulmin point out that Wittgenstein’s concern with what language 
is able to say—in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) as well as the Philo-
sophical Investigations (1953) and the various other collections of aphorisms, 
remarks, and lecture notes published after his death—is rooted in both the neo-
Kantian atmosphere and the general spirit of cultural crisis of pre-1914 Vienna. 
His work needs to be understood as an attempt to secure the first principles of 
human thought at a time when it was increasingly unclear on what founding 
principles the culture rested. Wittgenstein, Janik and Toulmin explain, was 
born in 1889 as “the youngest son of Vienna’s leading steel magnate and patron 
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of the arts” (13). Within that intellectual milieu, of course, not only philosophers 
deliberated the principles through which language corresponded to the object 
world; for figures such as Karl Kraus, Arthur Schnitzler, Adolf Loos, Oskar 
Kokoschka, Arnold Schönberg, and Sigmund Freud, along with many others, 
questions about communication and representation were critical, finding their 
most drastic expression in Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s “Lord Chandos Letter.” 
Because the Wittgenstein household was, Janik and Toulmin argue, both a cul-
tural center and also a site of generational conflict, “Wittgenstein was personally 
exposed to the crises in art, morality and even family life that were the central 
sources of cultural and ethical debate in prewar Vienna” (174). Wittgenstein 
(like Robert Musil and Albert Einstein) began his own intellectual life with the 
study of engineering, which required at that time also a thorough grasp of theo-
retical physics and mathematics, and his early thought was influenced by debates 
in those fields. Ernst Mach insisted, for instance, that all knowledge can be 
reduced to sensation and that physical theories are merely simplifications of expe-
rience which are more or less efficient and useful. Max Planck, however, main-
tained that Mach’s theory was still enmired in metaphysics and argued instead 
(not unlike Kant) that the physicist “creates the physical world by imposing form 
upon it” (Janik and Toulmin 138). On matters of ethics and aesthetics, Janik and 
Toulmin argue that prewar Viennese thinking was informed by the very unsci-
entific thought of Arthur Schopenhauer, Søren Kierkegaard, and Leo Tolstoy, 
demonstrably figures who also helped to shape the work of Wittgenstein. As a 
philosopher and a Viennese, Wittgenstein faced the problem of reconciling con-
temporary thinking on physics with that on ethics. 
The Tractatus, which Wittgenstein completed while fighting in the Austrian 
army during World War I, thus draws upon his training in physics to argue that 
language uses an a priori system of logic to make “pictures” (Bilder) that describe 
the facts of the world. Such propositions can be empirically verified. Proposi-
tions that are neither tautological nor empirically verifiable are literally mean-
ingless or non-sense. By far the larger part of the Tractatus is devoted to the 
details of its author’s critique of language. The sixth and seventh sections of the 
book, however, concern the nature of ethics, a realm which is “higher” and 
“transcendental” and about which one cannot speak at all, as Wittgenstein 
explained in the work’s final sentence (which Bachmann never tired of citing): 
“What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” (Tractatus 151). As 
Wittgenstein tried to explain to friends (e.g. in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker), 
what he had not said in the book was its point: “The meaning of the book is an 
ethical one. I once wanted to put a sentence into the foreword which now in fact 
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isn’t there but which I will now write to you because it will perhaps be a key for 
you. I wanted to write, my work consists of two parts, of the part that’s here, and 
of all that I didn’t write. And precisely this second part is the important one” 
(Briefe 35).
Believing the Tractatus to be the final solution to the problems of Western 
metaphysics, Wittgenstein gave up philosophy until 1929, when he returned to 
Cambridge, where he had earlier studied with the British philospher Bertrand 
Russell, and worked for the rest of his life on the ideas that would be published 
after his death (and that are discussed in greater detail below). In the English-
speaking world, where Wittgenstein’s work has received most attention, he has 
been viewed mostly through the lens of Cambridge as an analytic philosopher 
on the order of Gottlob Frege, Russell, and C. E. Moore. In Vienna, Wittgen-
stein’s early writing influenced the work of the Vienna Circle, formed in the 
1920s around Moritz Schlick, who held the chair for philosophy of the inductive 
sciences (established for Mach) at the University of Vienna. Relying on Mach’s 
sensationalist theory of knowledge, the members of the Vienna Circle used the 
Tractatus to provide the basic logical structure for their own philosophy. As the 
Vienna Circle was dispersed in the 1930s by death, academic departures, and 
persecution, Wittgenstein’s work came also via this route into international cur-
rency. “Nicely domesticated,” as one Wittgenstein scholar has put it (Edwards 
2), Wittgenstein’s works became a subject of consideration by professional phi-
losophers and social scientists, whereas their relevance to the historical issues of 
his time was scarcely examined. 
Bachmann apparently also came to Wittgenstein via the Vienna Circle, writ-
ing her dissertation under the direction of Viktor Kraft, of whom she said in a 
later interview: “There were very few professors back then; I think the students 
were more or less on their own until I then happened on one of the last old men 
of this ‘Vienna Circle,’ the Vienna neopositivists, from whom I may really have 
learned something” (GuI 82). Kraft, born in 1890, had been a member of the 
Vienna Circle while still a student of Friedrich Jodl and may be the only mem-
ber of the group to have remained in Vienna until after 1945 (Johnston 189). In 
a work published in 1951, Der Wiener Kreis, Kraft detailed the history and phil-
osophical positions of members of the group, remaining, as he explained stead-
fastly if somewhat apologetically, committed to their principles:
To be sure, those who seek from philosophy a confession of personal wisdom 
about the world or life, of subjective interpretation of world or life, or those who 
seek from it the speculative construction of an otherwise veiled and inaccessible 
ground of being or the conceptual poetry of a novel about the world—such people 
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can certainly understand philosophy as the Vienna Circle understands it only as 
an impoverishment. For it excludes everything that can’t be obtained in a scientific 
way. But only then can one move beyond subjective difference and variability, only 
then can one claim universal validity and lasting results. (10)
That Bachmann’s own philosophical position at the time of her dissertation 
corresponded to Kraft’s is evident not just from the dissertation itself (analyzed 
in further detail below) but also from two unpublished essays in her papers, 
apparently written in the period immediately after she completed her studies. In 
what seems to be the first of the two, “Philosophie der Gegenwart” (Philosophy 
of the present), Bachmann briefly summarizes phenomenology, contemporary 
metaphysics, existentialism, idealism, and historical materialism, but ten of the 
essay’s eighteen pages are devoted to the Vienna Circle, an emphasis she justifies 
in the introduction: “The special attention to the ‘Vienna Circle’ can be explained 
by the consideration that neopositivism displays the most radical break with tra-
ditional philosophy and the path toward scientific philosophizing is taken most 
convincingly” (“Philosophie” 1). Her discussion of the Vienna Circle follows the 
structure and content of Kraft’s book and often also borrows his language with-
out acknowledgment. Her treatment of Wittgenstein in this essay stresses his 
relationship to the work of the Circle: she emphasizes that neopositivism’s con-
cern with language derives from the members’ interest in logic as a tautological 
system, and that their investigations of language are inquiries into its possibili-
ties as a “system of representation [Darstellungssystem].” Because one must use 
language to speak about language, she explains, Wittgenstein came to the con-
clusion that one could not speak meaningfully about language at all: “But finally 
all philosophical questions led back to this analysis. Philosophical problems thus 
revealed themselves as pseudo-problems. Wittgenstein draws the conclusion 
from that and concludes his work with the explanation that his own remarks 
make no sense, for: What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” 
(“Philosophie” 11). This is a significantly different explanation of the conclusion 
to the Tractatus than Bachmann would later give to it. 
In contrast, Bachmann continues, Rudolf Carnap argues that philosophy 
could evolve a “metalanguage” to analyze language. He considers the task of 
philosophy to be metalogical or semiotic analysis of the language of science, 
investigating linguistic symbols pragmatically, semantically, syntactically, and 
independently of their content. One of the sticking points of neopositivism, how-
ever, became the verification of propositions. Wittgenstein’s solution in the Trac-
tatus to the problem of verification “pointed the way ahead,” Bachmann explains. 
There he insists that all general statements must be reducible to individual 
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empirical statements (“all men are mortal” being thus identical with the asser-
tions “X is mortal” plus “Y is mortal” plus . . .) to be meaningful at all. Later 
some of the neopositivists came to the conclusion that it was impossible to reach 
ultimate verification and that statements must be regarded as more or less prob-
able hypotheses. The pragmatism to which the neopositivists were now com-
pelled enabled them to address broader areas than before, though, says Bach-
mann, perhaps exactly because their earlier dogmatism allowed them to clarify 
the bases of philosophy’s claim to scientificity. But she concludes her essay by 
maintaining, like her teacher, that still no answers to humankind’s most funda-
mental questions can be expected from philosophy: “The expectations of many 
that they will find instructions on how to lead their lives or access to under-
standing the world can’t and won’t be fulfilled here. Scientific philosophy—and 
it is the task of philosophy to be a science—is, unlike religion or literature, 
unable to console, to assist, or to give insight into thinking that may lie beyond 
the experiential, but rather it must make order, must investigate the knowledge 
that various sciences convey to us, uncover logical relationships and bring them 
into a useful system” (18). 
Bachmann’s second unpublished essay on this topic is “Der Wiener Kreis: 
Logischer Positivism—Philosophie als Wissendchaft” (The Vienna Circle: logi-
cal positivism—philosophy as science). This radio essay, first broadcast on 14 
April 1953 by the radio station Hessischer Rundfunk, was not included in the 
Werke, the editors explain, because “in places Bachmann followed to the letter 
Viktor Kraft’s book Der Wiener Kreis” (W 4: 406). Although its style is less 
labored and the essay is more clearly oriented around the Tractatus, Bachmann 
still interprets Wittgenstein here through the lens of the Vienna Circle, and the 
essay does not differ in perspective from “Philosophie der Geganwart.” Yet a 
subtle shift in Bachmann’s own position is apparent. Although she praises the 
Vienna Circle for the resistance it offered to the irrationalism and subjectivism 
of its time, no longer does she claim that the only philosophy possible is the sort 
the Vienna Circle undertook. Through the voice of a critic Bachmann is able to 
articulate objections to the Circle’s position more clearly, and by explaining that 
its endeavor initially was to create a “unitary system” via an analysis of language, 
she is able to show how it continues to be implicated in the project of Western 
metaphysics. Most important, Bachmann’s radio essay, after discussing the later 
fortunes of former Vienna Circle members, concludes by asking “Where should 
the lever be applied today? Perhaps with Ludwig Wittgenstein, who still must 
be discovered, the greatest and at the same time most unknown philosopher of 
our epoch. There are statements on the last pages of his Tractatus logico-phil-
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sophicus that could bring the turning point, the end of positivism, without hav-
ing to give up its insights.” She continues: 
For he says, before he revoked all his words into silence:
(Professor/reading) “The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its 
solution. 
We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the 
problems of life remain completely untouched. 
Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer. 
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves 
manifest. They are what is mystical. 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who under-
stands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as 
steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder 
after he has climbed up it.) 
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.” 
(“Wiener Kreis” 25)
If at this point in her development Bachmann could not yet think beyond the 
philosophical solutions of the Vienna Circle, this radio essay displays clearly 
both her desire for other sorts of answers and her recognition that Wittgenstein 
too pointed beyond the limitations of the philosophers who had learned so much 
from his work. 
Bachmann’s dissertation, “Die Kritische Aufnahme der Existentialphiloso-
phie Martin Heideggers” (The critical reception of the existential philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger), completed in 1949, can begin to reveal both the kinds of 
philosophical questions the young Bachmann passionately wished to address 
and why neither Heidegger nor the Vienna Circle could provide the answer to 
them. Later interviews indicate that in some contrast to the Heidegger enthusi-
asts of the 1950s, Bachmann took Heidegger’s early support for the Nazis seri-
ously and was also prepared to connect his political opinions to his philosophy. 
In a 1973 interview she declared that she had refused to write a poem he had 
requested from her for the Festschrift on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, 
and it was still with some glee that she reported her certainty that her disserta-
tion had demolished his philosophy: “Because back then, at twenty-two, I 
believed I was now going to bring this man down!”(GuI 137). To the end of her 
life she stood by the critique of Heidegger she had formulated in the disserta-
tion. Until Bachmann’s personal papers become available in 2025 we will not 
know why, given her political reservations about Heidegger, she chose nonethe-
less to write her dissertation on him. On the basis of evidence in it as well as in 
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the body of her work, however, one might surmise that she was powerfully 
drawn to the kinds of questions Heidegger was asking but also realized that his 
answers were historically and politically inadequate; for all their alleged chal-
lenge to Western metaphysics, they were still deeply enmired in those ways of 
thinking which had led to the crimes and cultural crises of Europe in the twen-
tieth century. 
For my purposes, what is most important about Bachmann’s dissertation is 
the kind of critique she directs at Heidegger. The dissertation is structured as a 
sometimes rather cursory survey of Heidegger’s reception by various twentieth-
century German-speaking philosophical schools: logical positivism, historical 
materialism, neo-Kantianism, idealism, phenomenology, existentialism, neo-
Thomism, and so on. The two critiques with which Bachmann begins seem to 
be the most important determinants of her own position. Included first is logical 
positivism, and Bachmann outlines in some detail Rudolf Carnap’s analysis of 
the meaninglessness of Heidegger’s central argument in “What Is Metaphys-
ics?” Heidegger wants to explore the status of “nothing” in the following pas-
sage: “What should be examined are beings only, and besides that—nothing; 
beings alone, and further—nothing; solely beings, and beyond that—nothing. 
What about this nothing?” (Kritische 20; Heidegger 97). Carnap insists that 
grammatically the “nothing” of this sentence cannot be a “name of an object”; 
hence, the question is literally meaningless and there is nothing to investigate. 
(Bachmann was evidently quite taken by the conclusiveness of this argument 
and repeated it in “The Vienna Circle” as well as in her two published essays on 
Wittgenstein.) The specific argument is of course illustrative of Carnap’s general 
critique of Heidegger, “that science could not involve itself with a tangle of illog-
ical questions, as Heidegger demands from it” (Kritische 22). Nor is metaphysics 
adequate for the expression of a “feeling about life [Lebensgefühl],” for even in 
this instance metaphysics takes the form of a theory which attempts to speak of 
truth and falsehood. “The result of the investigation is: Metaphysics could be 
only an insufficient substitute for art and deceives itself when it believes in its 
theoretical content. That is true not only for Heidegger but for every speculative 
or intuitional metaphysics, every ethics or aesthetics as normative discipline but 
also for a metaphysics that begins with experience and on the basis of some kind 
of conclusions or other maintains it can recognize that which lies behind or 
beyond experience” (Kritische 24). In her initial argument Bachmann has thus 
shown why philosophy is incapable of answering any of the questions she cares 
about. Though logical positivism leaves a space for art, it is also at the cost of art’s 
claim that it can speak truly about the world. 
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The second perspective on Heidegger that Bachmann investigates in the dis-
sertation is that of historical materialism, basing her analysis on a book by 
Theodor Hartwig, Der Existenzialismus, published in Vienna in 1948. For 
Hartwig (as evidently for Bachmann), there is a connection between Heidegger’s 
existentialism and fascism. Quoting Hartwig, Bachmann explains: “That 
shouldn’t be understood as the claim that existentialism was born from fascist 
ideology, but rather both ideologies grew out of the same sociopolitical funda-
ment; they sprang from a social climate of conviction that developed out of the 
general economic crisis and the existential insecurity related to it” (Hartwig 9,
Kritische 25.) She continues, paraphrasing Hartwig: “Existentialism is not a phi-
losophy but rather a revolt of the threatened petty bourgeoisie in the guise of 
philosophy, which in its despair emphasizes all subjective values in order to work 
against modern collectivizing tendencies and to hold up the inexorable course of 
history” (Kritische 12). That this ideological reading of existentialism corresponds 
generally to Bachmann’s own is suggested by her statement on existentialism in 
“Philosophy of the Present,” this time in her own voice: “We are concerned in the 
main here with the transitory expression of European Angst that is rooted in the 
misery and distress of our continent after two world wars” (“Philosophie” 6).
To have thus ideologically comprehended the historical reasons for the appeal 
of existentialism has not, however, assuaged “European Angst . . . after two world 
wars.” In a brief summary at the end of the dissertation Bachmann attempts to 
arrive at her own conclusions about Heidegger. She is compelled to conclude 
from her own logical-positivist perspective as well as from the others she exam-
ines that Heidegger’s philosophy cannot legitimately make any claims to truth. 
Instead, she maintains, “the result will always be the dangerous half-rationaliza-
tion of a sphere that can be addressed with the words of Wittgenstein: ‘What we 
cannot speak about we must pass over in silence’”—and yet this conclusion has 
obviously not solved the problems for Bachmann, for she continues, “The funda-
mental experiences with which existentialism is concerned are in fact alive in the 
human being and demand expression” (Kritische 115). At most they can find their 
expression in art, which can make claim to neither science nor truth. Her dis-
sertation concludes on a deeply subjective note (recalling in this respect Christa 
T.’s master’s thesis in Christa Wolf’s The Quest for Christa T.) by citing a “linguis-
tic testimony to the most extreme representational possibilities of the communi-
cable”: Baudelaire’s sonnet “Le gouffre.” In its expression of horror before the 
ever-threatening void (“tout est abîme,—action, désir, rêve, Parole!”) as well as its 
powerlessness to escape a rationality which cannot address the void (“Ah! ne 
jamais sortir des Nombres et des Etres.” “‘Nombres,’ ‘Etres,’” Bachmann adds in 
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a footnote, “are things that have no consciousness but exist only numerically” 
[Kritische 117]), Baudelaire’s poem particularly gives voice to dilemmas Bach-
mann confronted upon completion of her dissertation, for she had proved there 
were no answers to the questions most important to her. In this respect her posi-
tion on Heidegger corresponds to Wittgenstein’s own, revealed in a discussion in 
1929 with members of the Vienna Circle: “I certainly can imagine what Hei-
degger meant by Being and Angst. The human being has an instinct to fight 
against the limits of language. Think for example of the astonishment that some-
thing exists. That astonishment can’t be expressed in the form of a question, and 
there also isn’t any answer at all. Everything that we’d like to say can a priori only 
be nonsense. Nevertheless we fight against the limits of language” (quoted in 
Waismann 68). 
Grasping that this was Wittgenstein’s dilemma (though we have no evidence 
that she was familiar with his specific comments on Heidegger), Bachmann thus 
stressed not his logical analyses but his ethical concerns, and his interest in “the 
mystical” about which we cannot speak, when she came to write about Wittgen-
stein directly. In her essay “Ludwig Wittgenstein—Concerning a Chapter of the 
Most Recent History of Philosophy,” first published in the Frankfurter Hefte in 
July 1953, she stressed that the Wittgenstein of whom she wrote was not the Brit-
ish language philosopher who had shaped analytic philosophy but an unknown 
Austrian: “Now, he wasn’t well known at all, he was in fact the least well-known 
philosopher of our time, a man to whom the words of his compatriot Karl Kraus 
apply, who once said about himself, ‘I’m famous, but it hasn’t gotten around yet’” 
(W 4: 12). Many sections of this essay are borrowed from writings already men-
tioned: the discussion of the Vienna Circle from the unpublished “Philosophie 
der Gegenwart” and “Der Wiener Kreis” and Carnap’s critique of Heidegger 
from the dissertation. The standpoint Bachmann represents here, similar to that 
of the radio essay “Der Wiener Kreis,” was probably written at about the same 
time. In this published essay, however, she places the work of the Vienna Circle 
and Wittgenstein more clearly in its Austro-German historical context as an 
endeavor to hold fast to an increasingly imperiled reason as the guiding principle 
of human activity. In 1929, she explained, the same year that the Vienna Circle 
declared itself publicly, “the second edition of Heidegger’s Being and Time
appeared, which seemed to show that the group was right in its struggle against 
the irrationalism which was spreading out from Germany, the land of depres-
sion. Conjoined to this in Vienna, and this was necessary, was the bitter opposi-
tion of the group to Austrian clericalism, for instance in the form of the doctrines 
of the state philosopher Othmar Spann” (W 4: 13–14).
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Particularly important here also is her perceptible impatience with the philo-
sophical poverty of the Vienna Circle, which “in its passion for the whole truth 
can only offer the dry, formulaic, ‘eternal’ truth of logic” (W 4: 21), and her prob-
ing of Wittgenstein’s work for possible alternatives. In the Tractatus, however, 
there is no solution, if “the world is the totality of facts” and “the limits [Grenzen]
of my language mean the limits of my world.” “We stand, think, speak on this 
side of the limit/border,” Bachmann tells us; “The way over the border is blocked 
to us.” We cannot utter ethical statements, “since a sentence cannot express any-
thing higher,” and we cannot act ethically in the world, “for the world [as a total-
ity of facts] is independent of our will.” She thus concludes correctly that “it 
[Wittgenstein’s philosophy] cannot answer any of the questions that we are accus-
tomed to direct to philosophy. With the question about the ‘meaning of being’ we 
are left to our own devices” (W 4: 20–21).
Bachmann recognizes in this essay that this solution was no more adequate 
for Wittgenstein than it is for her: “‘God does not reveal himself in the world’ 
(6.432) is one of the bitterest propositions of the Tractatus” (W 4: 22). Thus she 
wonders (though she finds it unlikely) whether Wittgenstein’s posthumous 
papers might reveal that he had taken the leap of faith to a certainty that reason 
did not allow him. For it is clear that in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein, writing out 
of his historical situation, was seeking ultimate truth and that no less would do, 
as Hanna Fenichel Pitkin has eloquently explained: 
Confronted with the modern predicament, with a universe in flux, lacking cen-
ter or meaning or stability, the Tractatus is essentially a failure of nerve, a retreat 
to what seems the only remaining solid ground, the one fortress that still seems 
defensible, ruthlessly abandoning whatever is outside the walls. If language 
defines our world, then for that world to retain any kind of stability language 
must be a system of fixed, exhaustive, systematic rules. If we stay within those 
rules, we will be safe, will save meaning and sense and reality. Of course, much 
will have to be given up. For all of art and esthetics, all of religion and ethics, all 
really of judgment, sensibility, and affect will have to be abandoned outside the 
fortress. Those things cannot be talked about, and if men continue to experience 
them they must do so in silence and therefore in isolation, in the wordless private 
world of dreams. Our language and our common life must be confined to the 
lucid, ordered crystal palace of mathematics, logic, science, a world secured 
against all ambiguity. That, I think, is the spirit of the Tractatus. (336–37)
As a philosopher the young Bachmann could not think beyond this cul-de-sac 
either, and Pitkin describes her dilemma as well as Wittgenstein’s. But Bachmann’s 
essay provocatively concludes with a sentence which the Tractatus could not 
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authorize (since there language is either empirical description or a tautological 
system independent of human use) but which suggests that she understands 
Wittgenstein’s historico-cultural situation to be the real source for a text such as 
the Tractatus: “Or did he also conclude that we have forfeited our language 
because it contains not a single word that matters?” (W 4: 23). 
Yet the sentence also points more perceptively in the direction of the kinds of 
answers Wittgenstein would explore in the Philosophical Investigations. Before 
Bachmann wrote her final Wittgenstein essay, a radio essay composed in 1953
and first broadcast on 16 September 1954 (W 4: 377), she was able, at least curso-
rily, to read that posthumously published work. As we know, Wittgenstein did 
not become a believer—on the contrary. But what Bachmann grasped, unlike 
the majority of Wittgenstein commentators, is the larger continuity of concern 
between his two works, despite the far-reaching critique to which Wittgenstein 
subjected the Tractatus in the later book. As James C. Edwards has explained, 
“There are at least two ways in which Wittgenstein’s lifework is a unity: the later 
writing is an attempt to take the measure of the earlier, and hence of the tradi-
tion which it culminates; and the later work tries to recast, to transmute, the 
ambition that gives rise to the tradition itself, to fulfill that ambition in spite of 
itself. . . . In both periods his essential ambition is an ethical one: to locate the 
sense of life; to answer the question of human being” (4). Or, as Bachmann put 
it in the radio essay, “The experience that lies at the basis of Heidegger’s mysti-
cism of Being may be similar to that which allowed Wittgenstein to speak of the 
mystical” (W 4: 114). 
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein moved beyond Western 
metaphysics, addressing the problems of philosophy by showing that those prob-
lems were simply wrongly conceived. He recognized that in the Tractatus he had 
posed the question falsely—“A picture held us captive” (48)—misunderstand-
ing the nature of language altogether. Language is not a perfectly coherent sys-
tem that is true either because it is tautological or because it corresponds to 
empirical reality. Instead, language is primarily speech, and “speaking of lan-
guage is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (11), deriving its meaning from 
whatever “language game” the speakers happen to be playing. Such language 
games are multiple and varied with no necessary coherence among them but, 
like the very different tools of a toolbox (another of Wittgenstein’s metaphors), 
nonetheless allowing humans to operate successfully in the world. To use Lévi-
Strauss’s and Derrida’s formulation, Wittgenstein has given up the perfectly 
coherent and abstract model of the engineer, within which every part can be 
explained as a component of a single system (the ambition of Western metaphys-
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ics since its beginnings), for the heterogeneity of bricolage (Derrida, “Structure” 
255–56). As Edwards has explained, Wittgenstein’s concern with language is 
really a concern with guaranteeing “rationality as representation,” another way 
of explaining the central problem that has plagued Western philosophy since the 
Greeks: “The Socratic-Platonic answer to the question of human being stressed 
our capacity for thinking, conceived as accurate representation of the real: knowl-
edge is (our) virtue, and knowledge is knowledge of universal definitions, repre-
sentations of the eternal Forms of which we here and now see only the shadows” 
(20). Some version of this project was still Wittgenstein’s ambition in the Tracta-
tus, but in the Philosophical Investigations he abandoned the entire endeavor to 
find that intersubjectively verifiable, coherent, ultimate Truth, and, as Pitkin 
explains, he substituted “partial overviews, developed ad hoc where they are 
needed, for the older vision of a single, dominating politico-theoretical system” 
(326). 
In her second essay on Wittgenstein, Bachmann shows that she understands 
exactly what was at stake in the Tractatus. According to the Tractatus, she 
explains, we are able to talk about reality at all, use “signs that mean something 
without having anything in common with that which is signified,” because real-
ity and language share “the logical form” (W 4: 110). Language can talk neither 
about this logical form itself nor about anything nonlogical—“outside logic 
everything is accidental” (Tractatus 137)—that is, not about the particular case, 
the nonessential, the specific, the contingent, or, of course, the ethical, the aes-
thetic, or any of the other questions of most crucial moment to humans. Thus, 
Bachmann asks, what has Wittgenstein actually accomplished? “He gives us the 
answer on one of the last pages of the Tractatus, which first allows us to grasp the 
adventure, the risk in which this book involved itself: ‘nothing at all’” (W 4: 113). 
He asserts a similar answer in a passage from the Philosophical Investigations
which Bachmann also cites: “A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a 
drop of grammar” (Phil. Investigations 222; W 4: 123). As Bachmann perceives, 
the move beyond the Tractatus in the Philosophical Investigations is to show “that 
the problems of philosophy are problems of language, that so to speak the mis-
firings of language create philosophical problems” (W 4: 123). By reconceiving 
how language functions, by abandoning the abstract level on which he analyzed 
language in the Tractatus, she continues, Wittgenstein can do away with the 
problems altogether: “He believes that we can silence the problems when our 
language functions well and sensibly, when it lives and breathes in use. Only 
where language, which is a form of life, is taken out of use, when it comes to a 
standstill—and it does that in his opinion when it is used to philosophize in the 
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conventional sense—do problems arise. These problems are not to be solved but 
rather eliminated” (W 4: 124). Language in use can be heterogeneous, multiple, 
nonsynchronous, particular, and in that practice and play of language the meta-
physical problems which have plagued the West are revealed, indeed, to be 
meaningless. 
Bachmann concludes her Wittgenstein essay by drawing from the Philosoph-
ical Investigations provocative citations and images that will resonate through the 
rest of her own work. Language is simultaneously a “system of signification” 
and a “multiplicity [Mannigfaltigkeit]” (W 4: 124), an almost Kristevan recogni-
tion of the multivalencies of language upon which particularly the “Ways of 
Death” novels draw. Language is “a labyrinth of paths” and an old city: “a maze 
of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions 
from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with 
straight regular streets and uniform houses” (Phil. Investigations 8; W 4: 124)— 
images that point toward Bachmann’s own later fascination with symbolic 
topography and her (and Freud’s) interest in archaeology as a metaphor for the 
layers of the psyche. She emphasizes as well Wittgenstein’s insistence that phi-
losophy “must be like a therapy, for philosophical problems are illnesses that 
must be healed. He demands not a solution but a healing” (W 4: 124). Encour-
aged by Wittgenstein, Bachmann thus seems to have grasped very early what 
has become a central insight of poststructuralism, that the psyche is constituted 
through language, Wittgenstein’s language games, a point she also made in a 
1961 interview discussing “Youth in an Austrian Town”: “The children—they 
entered into a game that somebody else was putting on. The I [of the story] 
leaves the game, unmasks the game as game; he or she has lost the innocence of 
these movements” (GuI 26). Moreover, present in germinal form in this Witt-
genstein citation is also Bachmann’s later concern with the connection of abso-
lutist ideological systems to the Western (male) psyche, the same sorts of men of 
whom the “I” says in Malina: “the whole approach of men toward women is 
diseased, moreover, each disease is so wholly unique that men will never be 
completely cured” (Malina 177).
Finally, what Bachmann understands as Wittgenstein’s particular kind of 
mysticism, his “points of invasion of that which shows itself or is experienced 
with belief, which affects what we do and leave undone” (W 4: 124), seems very 
close to what she has described (or shown) elsewhere in her work as the utopian, 
a vision of an almost-not-yet-imaginable, different way of being in the world. In 
this respect Wittgenstein succeeds in thought in moving beyond the limits/bor-
ders of the West, the analogues in thought to the terrible and terrifying practices 
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of our time, as Bachmann also recognized in this essay: “It is true that he like no 
one else recognized the solidifying antagonisms of thought of his century: irra-
tionalism and rationalism, held his own against them in his work, and already 
overcame them” (W 4: 126–127). If this is the case, Wittgenstein’s thought might 
represent for Bachmann the hope that the nightmare triumph of Western polit-
ical and cultural imperialism she envisioned in The Book of Franza might not 
have to come true after all: “The whites are coming. The whites are landing. 
And if they are driven back, then they will come again. No revolution and no 
resolution can prevent it, nor any controls over the currency. They will come 
again in spirit if there’s no other way for them to come. And they will resurrect 
themselves in a brown or black brain, which will become white once again. 
They will take over the world through such indirect means” (Franza 112). Witt-
genstein, after all, suggested in the introduction to his Philosophical Remarks that 
the spirit of his work “is a different one from that of the grand stream of Euro-
pean and American civilization in which we all exist” (7), and he prefaced the 
Philosophical Investigations with an epigraph from Nestroy: “Progress has 
altogether the quality that it looks much bigger than it is ([Überhaupt hat der 
Fortschritt das an sich, daß er viel größer ausschaut, als er wirklich ist]” (Phil. Inves-
tigations viii). In an essay on Musil, also written in the 1950s, Bachmann 
remarked, “Not just the case of Kakania showed that thinking in closed ideolo-
gies leads directly to war, and the permanent war of faith is still ongoing” (W 4:
27). Wittgenstein’s philosophy, beyond the closed systems of Western metaphys-
ics, may offer the hope and the possibility that the ever present war of the “Ways 
of Death” might cease. 
But a further affinity between Bachmann and Wittgenstein may also exist, 
not in these essays but in their lives and work. In the Philosophical Investigations
Wittgenstein said, “It [philosophy] leaves everything as it is,” and similarly in 
Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik (Remarks on the fundaments 
of mathematics): “The illness of a time is healed by a change in human beings’ 
way of living, and the illness of philosophical problems can only be healed by 
a changed way of thinking and living, not by a medicine that a single person 
invented” (57). About literature, Bachmann made much the same point in the 
Frankfurt lectures: “With a new language reality will always be encountered 
there where a moral, cognitive movement happens and not where someone tries 
to renew language all by itself. . . . A new language must have a new gait, and 
it has this new gait only when a new spirit inhabits it” (W 4: 192). Missing for 
both Wittgenstein and Bachmann was the practice which would enable their 
thoughts and images to guide an almost inconceivable transformation of the 
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world; indeed, their works were so distant from a practice that most of their 
readers could not grasp that these works dealt with transformation at all. Witt-
genstein stated gloomily in the introduction to the Philosophical Investigations (a 
passage which Bachmann quoted in her last essay): “It is not impossible that it 
should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, 
to bring light into one brain or another—but, of course, it is not likely” (Phil. 
Investigations vi; W 4: 122). Despite the few moments of utopian harmony in the 
“Ways of Death”—the “Secrets of the Princess of Kagran” in Malina, the silent 
meal at Wadi Halfa in The Book of Franza—Bachmann too can scarcely imag-
ine a mediation between the far-reaching critique of the later work and what she 
sometimes termed, borrowing Musil’s words from The Man without Qualities,
“the other condition,” a world where it would be altogether different. In one of 
her last interviews Bachmann addressed this problem:
And I don’t believe in this materialism, in this consumer society, in this capitalism, 
in this monstrosity that’s taking place here, and people who enrich themselves on 
us without having any right to do so. I really do believe in something, and I call 
it “A Day Will Come.” And one day it will come. Well, probably it won’t come, 
because it’s been destroyed for us so many times, for thousands of years it’s always 
been destroyed. It won’t come, and I believe in it nonetheless. For if I weren’t able 
to believe in it, then I couldn’t write any more. (GuI 145)
 But what Pitkin wrote about Wittgenstein’s philosophy is also true (as Bach-
mann knew) of literature: “Where philosophy succeeds, it reveals our concep-
tual system as it now exists, not its trivial and evanescent details, but its deep 
necessities. For philosophy is concerned with precisely those concepts that reflect 
our most central forms of life. To change these concepts, our forms of life would 
have to change; and that is not accomplished through philosophizing” (298). 
Inspired by Wittgenstein’s philosophy to understand the world differently, 
Bachmann also shared his gloom about changing it, as her work and her life 
reflect. Like the main character of Malina, Bachmann could not compose a book 
titled Exsultate Jubilate either, but instead wrote “Ways of Death.”
READING BACHMANN IN 1985
This essay was written in summer 1985 and published in a special issue of Mod-
ern Austrian Literature devoted to the “other,” feminist Bachmann. In that issue 
my essay was one of the few that did not address feminism or gender questions. 
As I observed in chapter 2, I believe now (though I probably would not have said 
so at the time) that my lack of attention to gender there expressed my general 
discontent with the cultural/French feminist reading of Bachmann that had 
by then become virtually hegemonic in Bachmann scholarship—a discontent 
that would become more general among feminist Bachmann scholars toward 
the end of the decade. I commented in chapter 2: “As in my own case, I am 
inclined instead to think that gender is missing in these studies because Bach-
mann scholars (who otherwise may well have identified themselves as feminists) 
wanted to pursue a range of aspects of her work apart from those addressed by 
1980s feminists and did not want to make use of the feminist methodology that 
had come to dominate Bachmann studies. Because feminist scholarship had not 
yet elaborated alternative methods that permit other kinds of literary-critical 
questions to be asked in gender-specific ways, these young Bachmann scholars 
did not know how to address the issues they wished to consider in ways that also 
took gender into account.” In August 1984 I had spent a month in Vienna con-
sulting Bachmann’s papers in the Nationalbibliothek, researching a project that 
I called “Philosophical Backgrounds to the ‘Ways of Death,’” one of the earliest 
versions of this book. Though I found virtually nothing in the archive useful 
for my project (if such material exists at all, it is in the personal correspondence 
and other materials in the portion of the archive closed until 2025), my focus 
here on Wittgenstein grew out of that complex of concerns. Though I am at 
present committed to the position that all experience is gendered, I would still 
today find myself at something of a loss for a method that could allow me to 
demonstrate definitively what was gender-specific about Bachmann’s reception 
of Wittgenstein. Two decades later, feminist scholarship has still not, I think, 
solved all its methodological conundrums.
My discontent with feminism in 1985 was not limited to Bachmann scholar-
ship. That spring, I had written an article on the current U.S. women’s move-
ment for the collection Frauen Literatur Geschichte (Women literature history), 
edited by Hiltrud Gnüg and Renate Möhrmann. My argument there is a harsh 
one: I assert that feminists of the 1970s had taken positions that led the move-
ment into the cul-de-sac of feminism in the mid-1980s. I maintain particularly 
that the separatist strategies of cultural feminism were predicated upon the class 
and race privilege of its participants, who did not have to concern themselves 
with securing resources to assure their basic survival and could focus on trans-
forming their own lives rather than the larger society. This privilege, I continue, 
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was also responsible for their lack of interest in, if not contempt for, campaigns 
of liberal feminism that focused on, say, assuring working women equal pay 
with men. The retreat from contestation in the political arena was precisely 
what had left feminists without strategies to combat the national and interna-
tional developments that they now observe with growing horror. After a lengthy 
disposition on the theoretical and literary variants on cultural feminist positions, 
I conclude by directing attention to the many English-speaking women writ-
ers who deny that their works are primarily concerned with women’s issues, 
who even go so far as to maintain—like the white South African writer Nadine 
Gordimer—that the problems of white women are not the most important in 
today’s world. Attempting to end my article on a positive note, I look for sources 
of inspiration for renewed feminist struggle from feminists now working in the 
Rainbow Coalition or supporting striking coal miners in England, from Third 
World women or women in trade unions who say, “I’m not a feminist, but . . ,” 
anywhere but from within the women’s movement itself. Given that attitude 
toward U.S. feminism, it is no wonder that I do not address feminist issues in 
my essay on Bachmann and Wittgenstein.
Yet though this essay scarcely mentions feminism or gender, it could not have 
been written without the developments in feminist scholarship chronicled in 
my commentaries on previous chapters. First, this chapter was an experiment 
in methodology. I complain in both “Gender, Race, and History” (chapter 5)
and this essay that feminist Bachmann scholars do not pay sufficient attention 
to history and culture. It was also clear to me that training in U.S. literary stud-
ies, at least, did not prepare one to do so. Under the influence of New Criti-
cism, the school of formalist criticism that flourished from the 1940s to the late 
1960s, and the various formalisms into which New Criticism mutated, includ-
ing the literary reception of poststructuralism by the Yale School (Paul de Man, 
Geoffrey Hartman, Hillis Miller, Harold Bloom), literary scholarship had 
been defined as literary criticism: a sensitive mind produces a reading of a text 
unconstrained by the conditions of the text’s production (the “genetic fallacy”) 
or the author’s intentions for it (the “intentional fallacy”). Particularly under 
Barthian and Derridean influence, that seemed to come to mean “anything 
goes,” the wilder and more ingenious the better. Clearly, historians had differ-
ent standards of evidence, as feminists’ historical studies in feminist journals 
had showed me. Backed into a corner by many feminist poststructuralists at the 
conference “Feminist Studies: Reconstituting Knowledge,” held at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin–Milwaukee in April 1985, feminist historian Linda Gordon 
had maintained: “It is wrong to conclude, as some have, that because there may 
be no objective truth possible, there are not objective lies” (22). Moreover, as I 
attended to the arguments about the importance of recognizing other women’s 
difference, I had increasingly come to feel that ripping a text out of the context 
of its historical and cultural conditions of production did violence to its author 
by failing to respect either the project she had set herself when she wrote it or 
the various social factors that informed her and her production. (I had been 
very indignant about an MLA talk by Sandra Gilbert addressing Zora Neale 
Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God, which removed Hurston from the 
context of black culture and anthropology to make her conform to the thesis of 
Gilbert’s book.) In this essay, therefore, I try to understand both Wittgenstein’s 
thought and Bachmann’s use of it as undertakings motivated by the concerns of 
their time. (Such a historically based approach is not in much favor among U.S.-
trained philosophers and political theorists, who often treat theoretical texts as if 
they all existed simultaneously in some ethereal realm detached from time and 
space.) My main secondary sources in this essay were thus written by intellectual 
historians. I also wanted to treat the thought of both figures as ideas that evolved 
over time, and I use my close reading skills (one aspect of U.S. literary training 
that still serves us well) to trace steps in Bachmann’s own intellectual growth as 
she interacted with Wittgenstein’s texts. In this regard I think the essay is true to 
the feminist goal of exploring women’s specificity as well as my own attempt to 
reinsert Bachmann into her own history and culture. 
But even more important, I think it was the development of feminist thought 
up to this point that allowed me to understand the rupture in the tradition of 
Western thought that Wittgenstein’s work represented and why it was so impor-
tant to Bachmann. Clearly, Wittgenstein was struggling with the problem that 
gained more currency when it was raised again by poststructuralism: how 
to guarantee the correspondence between reality and representation, how to 
anchor truth and morality securely. He concluded in the Tractatus that it was 
not to be done, that true statements can be made only about areas and aspects of 
human experience that are not very important. With this conclusion he bade a 
philosophical farewell to the theories we have come to call metanarratives (say, 
Marxism, Critical Theory, psychoanalysis, cultural feminism): there exists no 
“scientific” basis on which they could put in a claim to truth. Trained in logi-
cal positivism, Bachmann understood Wittgenstein’s argument, as well as his 
anguish about not being able to address in any way the issues that most urgently 
confronted him. But—and this is what feminists such as Donna Haraway 
helped me to grasp—Bachmann also understood the dangers of those impe-
rializing, totalizing theories (all “irrational” by definition, since they could not 
be proved “scientifically”), and that explains the vehemence of her rejection of 
Heidegger. It is a theme her works continued to pursue until her death. I am 
also pleased that even at this point, in emphasizing Bachmann’s condemnation 
of “the whites,” I understood the connection of totalizing theories and imperi-
alism that postcolonial studies would later stress. (So one might argue that the 
cultural feminist appropriation of Bachmann is a profound misrecognition of 
one of the issues she found it most important to pursue.) And what Bachmann 
also seems to have learned from the Philosophical Investigations is that possibili-
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ties exist beyond the constraints of total systems—though she could imagine 
that alternative only as a utopia quite detached from any mediation that could 
move from the present to the future. That is also a quality which derives from 
Bachmann’s historical situation and is a point at which it is up to feminists like 
Donna Haraway and like us to think beyond the point to which Bachmann 
herself was able to go.
Finally, I think the conclusion of this essay shows that I never repudiated 
my materialist roots—and still adhere to the 1966 historical materialist analy-
sis advanced by Christa Wolf. Whatever the brilliance of their insights, neither 
Wittgenstein nor Bachmann could change the world by ideas alone. To trans-
late theory into social transformation (Marx said in an early text, “Theory itself 
becomes a material force when it has seized the masses” [Tucker 60]), a social 
agent engaged in social practice is necessary. As Donna Haraway suggested in 
her cyborg myth, as I believed then (and probably still believe today), it’s not 
impossible that feminists might join with others to become such agents. Or, to 
echo Bachmann, to be able to write and act at all, I have to continue to believe 
that that will be possible. 
1987
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Reagan’s popularity continued unabated into his second term, and the Demo-
cratic Party seemed incapable of mounting any substantial opposition to Repub-
lican policies. One commentator observed: “By 1986, the White House and 
Senate were in Republican hands, and the Supreme Court was gradually shift-
ing rightward. The House of Representatives, though controlled by Democrats, 
agreed with the administration’s agenda more than half the time” (Kazin 115). 
Without significant outcry in response, Reagan successfully bombed Libya in 
April 1986, continued to lobby for financial support for the Nicaraguan contras, 
and sought billions of dollars for his “Star Wars” or Strategic Defense Initiative, 
a laser system intended to destroy incoming Soviet missiles in space which no 
one, including the military, was convinced would ever work. Increasing num-
bers of homeless people appeared on the streets of U.S. cities, a response to 
Reagan’s shifts in national priorities: cuts in social services, the deinstitutional-
ization of the mentally ill, and the growth of unemployment and poverty (Peter 
Marcuse). A new discourse on race emerged that focused on “reverse discrimi-
nation” against white men. As David Wellman commented: “The new political 
language certainly resonates with the tenor of the times. . . . Resentment is high 
and all-white bars and living rooms are thick with tales of ‘qualified’ Euro-
American males losing jobs to ‘the special interest’ of ‘affirmative-action candi-
dates.’ There is good reason to believe that attacks on inequality are not politi-
cally feasible during periods of belt-tightening” (58). Reagan’s reputation was 
tarnished only by the Iran-contra scandal—a system of covert operations begun 
in the first days of the Reagan regime but revealed only in late 1986—which 
involved an elaborate National Security Council scheme to sell arms to Iran in 
order to obtain funding for the contras. The congressional committees investi-
gating the scandal were, however, never able to determine what the president 
himself knew and when he knew it.
On the other hand, left-wing activism was not entirely dead during the 
period. The academic year 1985–1986 marked a high point in the national cam-
paign urging universities to divest themselves of their stock in companies doing 
business with South Africa, and in 1986–1987 students began to organize 
against CIA recruiting on campus. In April 1986 the founding convention of the 
National Rainbow Coalition was attended by nearly eight hundred delegates 
amid speculation about whether Jesse Jackson would again mount a campaign 
for the presidency. A number of large demonstrations took place in Washington, 
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DC: a rally supported reproductive rights in spring 1986; in April 1987 demon-
strators marched there and in San Francisco to oppose U.S. policy in southern 
Africa and Central America; and in October 1987 a huge National March for 
Lesbian and Gay Rights was addressed by speakers Eleanor Smeal of the 
National Organization for Women (NOW), Cesar Chavez of the United Farm 
Workers, and Jesse Jackson. A similar coalition of women’s groups, minority 
organizations, and labor united in fall 1987 to defeat the nomination of Judge 
Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. In an article called “A New New Left on 
Campus,” Maria Margaronis wrote: “The Reagan era isn’t over yet, and the 
children of the 1980s have a great deal to work out before they can build a 
national movement, for themselves and with what’s left of the left. But as the 
times begin to lean toward changing, such efforts deserve all the support they 
can get” (757).
Meanwhile, feminists were beset by external and internal political problems 
of their own. The far right exacerbated the Reagan regime’s assaults on a range 
of social programs benefiting women by intensifying their opposition to wom-
en’s access to abortion: in May 1987 a nationwide campaign called “Operation 
Rescue” was launched to picket, blockade, and ultimately shut down abortion 
clinics, while other right-wing groups were responsible for clinic bombings and 
arson. Conservative trends could also be discerned within the women’s move-
ment itself: cultural feminists Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon 
made common cause with conservatives in order to pass ordinances banning 
pornography in Minneapolis and Indianapolis, arguing that “pornography 
reveals that male pleasure is inextricably tied to victimizing, hurting, exploit-
ing” (Pally 795 citing Dworkin, Pornography). In a notorious sex discrimination 
case against Sears, Roebuck, one woman historian enraged many other feminist 
scholars by declaring that it was not necessarily Sears’s discriminatory policies 
but women’s commitment to traditional female values that explained why so 
few women held the higher-paying sales commission jobs: “Working women 
who are married are likely to put family and children first,” she argued, “and 
therefore, as the survey evidence of the Sears work force shows, are less willing 
to work evenings and weekends than men—evenings and weekends which are 
required of commission salespeople” (Wiener 178). Feminists were also increas-
ingly forced to wrestle with a phenomenon that journalists had christened “post-
feminism.” “Most frequently,” Deborah Rosenfelt and Judith Stacey explained, 
“journalists use this term to describe views expressed by relatively affluent and 
ambitious women in their late twenties and early thirties about the difficulties 
they face in attempting to combine satisfying careers and family life under pres-
ent social and economic conditions. More broadly, postfeminism demarcates an 
emerging culture and ideology that simultaneously incorporates, revises, and 
depoliticizes many of the fundamental issues advanced by Second Wave femi-
nism” (341). Rosenfelt and Stacey viewed postfeminism as, among other things, 
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indicative of a crisis in feminism occasioned by its inability to find adequate solu-
tions to the changed political and personal situation of feminists and other 
women in the Reagan era: “Defeats in the political arena coincide with signifi-
cant shifts in the personal needs and priorities of many who were in the van-
guard of Second Wave feminism, and together the public defeats and the per-
sonal changes have taken their toll on the confidence, vision, and solidarity of 
the left feminist community in the United States” (342).
For academics, the second Reagan administration also marked the begin-
ning of what would later be termed the “culture wars” or the “p.c. debates,” the 
right-wing assault on the changes in canons, curricula, methods, and topics of 
research that had been instituted by participants in the social movements of the 
1960s as they took on positions of responsibility in universities and colleges. The 
offensive was launched in 1984 in To Reclaim a Legacy: A Report on the Human-
ities in Higher Education, written by William Bennett, the Reagan-appointed 
chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities and later secretary of 
education. Bennett “argued that the classic texts of Western civilization were 
being replaced by works of lesser value in an attempt to produce a more inclusive 
curriculum and that as a result, American students were being deprived of their 
‘legacy’” (Ginsberg/Lennox 178). “Accuracy in Academe”—founded in 1985 as 
a spin-off of Reed Irvine’s self-proclaimed media watchdog organization “Accu-
racy in Media”—recruited classroom spies and began to compile a database on 
professors the organization considered “left-wing propagandists” (Diamond 
91–92). 
The year 1987 seemed to initiate a more intensified phase in the conservative 
campaign against changes in the academy. For example, it saw the founding of 
the first nationwide organization of right-wing faculty, the National Association 
of Scholars (NAS), which proclaimed that policies such as affirmative action 
and curricular focus on categories of “race, gender, and class . . . involve either 
the application of a double standard or the repudiation of appropriate intellec-
tual criteria” (National Association of Scholars 8) and called for their abolition. 
The analysis advanced by the NAS was also promoted by two widely read con-
servative texts published in 1987, E. D. Hirsch’s Cultural Literacy and Allan 
Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind, which attacked the recent “trendy 
relativism” in higher education as being responsible for the abandonment of 
what they regarded as enduring cultural values. Though multiculturalists are 
the main target of Bloom’s invective, feminists, the “latest enemy of the vitality 
of the classic texts” (Bloom 65), also figure prominently on his list of major vil-
lains, and he observed in a 1988 Time magazine interview: “Radical feminism 
tends to be present in the universities more than within the general society. 
. . . This is an agenda, and it has entered the university as a huge theoretical 
network. It is overwhelming in its power and its very angry passions” (“Most” 
74, cited in Ginsberg/Lennox 180).
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Of course such claims were quite absurd: Marxists, feminists, and multicul-
turalists were very far from assuming control of any campuses whatsoever, nor 
had universities jettisoned classical and canonical texts for those deemed more 
“politically correct”—though a range of previously neglected perspectives and 
works had indeed been added to the curriculum since the late 1960s. Clearly, 
the NAS and its friends were not wrong to discern that far-reaching (and to 
them deplorable) changes had taken place in the academy, nor in choosing 1987
as the year in which they began their major assault on their antagonists. By 
1987, even scholars less hostile to the social changes initiated in the 1960s had 
noticed that, at least in the humanities, a sea change had taken place as a con-
sequence of the encounter of a rather attenuated British Marxism with French 
poststructuralism (especially Foucault). Describing the genealogy of new his-
toricism, Louis Montrose, for instance, observed: “In various combinations and 
with varying degrees of consistency and effectiveness, the intellectual forces 
identifiable as new historicism or cultural poetics, cultural materialism, femi-
nism, and revisionist forms of Marxism have been engaged in redrawing the 
boundaries and restructuring the content of English and American literary 
studies during the past decade” (“New Historicism” 392). Hillis Miller, a lead-
ing Yale deconstructionist and then MLA president, devoted his presidential 
address (published in the May 1987 issue of PMLA) to decrying what he called 
“the resistance to theory” in the new directions he discerned in literary scholar-
ship: “As everyone knows, literary study in the past few years has undergone a 
sudden, almost universal turn away from theory in the sense of an orientation 
toward languages as such and has made a corresponding turn toward history, 
culture, society, politics, institutions, class and gender conditions, the social 
context, the material base in the sense of institutionalization, conditions of pro-
duction, technology, distribution, and consumption of ‘cultural products,’ 
among other products” (283). 
With even more alarm, in the lead article of the same issue of PMLA, Edward 
Pechter declared (echoing, of course, the Communist Manifesto), “A specter is 
haunting criticism—the specter of a new historicism.” Moreover, Pechter 
observed, “The new historicization of literary studies is equally a new politiciza-
tion, with interpretation judged as an expression of the political interests of the 
audience.” And though he conceded that many different and even contradictory 
critical practices were represented in new historicism, he maintained that “it is 
at its core—or, better, at its cutting edge—a kind of ‘Marxist criticism’” that is, 
moreover, “instrumental to social change, part of the project of making the 
world a better place” (292, 299). One might view the emergence of this new 
historical, Marxist-influenced methodology (committed, as Jonathan Dollimore 
and Alan Sinfield put it, “to the transformation of a social order which exploits 
people on the grounds of race, gender, and class” [viii]) as a somewhat displaced 
response on the part of a particular generation of academics to the depredations 
of the Reagan regime. Montrose notes that “the reorientation in the field under 
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way since at least the beginning of the 1980s is largely the work of critics whose 
values were formed while they were students during the culturally experimental 
and politically turbulent 1960s,” and he goes on to observe, “In general, these 
critics responded to the radically altered sociopolitical climate of the 1980s—
and, perhaps, for some of them, to the uneasy comfort they had now achieved 
within its academic establishment—with work that confronted ideologies and 
cultural politics of other times and places but resisted the articulation of its own 
assumptions and commitments” (“New Historicism” 393).
The feminist scholarship of this period still mostly held these new historical 
methodologies at arm’s length, as male neo-Marxists also continued to pay 
rather little attention to gender. In an article first published in Cultural Critique 
in July 1988 and widely reprinted, Judith Lowder Newton even denounced new 
historicism’s failure to acknowledge properly its real genealogy: “Barely alluded 
to in most of the histories of ‘new historicism’ so far are what were in fact the 
mother roots—the women’s movement and the feminist theory and feminist 
scholarship which grew from it” (153). Certainly, feminism played a central role 
in the challenge to universalist founding assumptions which culminated in the 
new methodologies of the 1990s. But I think Newton overstates feminism’s con-
tribution to the emergence of this specific approach, which was more attentive to 
historical context and reading strategies than much feminist literary analysis of 
this period and was in the early 1990s itself appropriated for feminist purposes. 
During Reagan’s second term, however, feminist scholars themselves were also 
embarked on the search for new methodologies. In Signs, Linda Alcoff explored 
the conflict between cultural feminism and poststructuralism and showed how 
major feminist thinkers such as Teresa de Lauretis and Denise Riley had been 
able to reconceptualize femininity so as to avoid essentialism while preserving 
the political utility of the category “woman.” Alcoff’s article also advances the 
important concept of “positionality,” which, as she elaborates it , has two dimen-
sions: first, “that the concept of woman is a relational term, identifiable only 
within a (constantly moving) context; but, second, that the position that women 
find themselves in can be actively utilized (rather than transcended) as a loca-
tion for the construction of meaning, a place from where meaning is constructed 
rather than simply the place where meaning can be discovered (the meaning of 
femaleness)” (434). (As the introduction to this book shows, “positionality” was 
to become a concept very important for my own thinking.) 
In a paper first presented at the American Historical Association convention 
and later published in the association’s journal, Joan Scott similarly elaborated 
the ways in which the concept of “gender” could be “a useful category of his-
torical analysis”:
“Gender” as a substitute for “women” is also used to suggest that information 
about women is necessarily information about men, that one implies the study of 
the other. This usage insists that the world of women is part of the world of men, 
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created in and by it. . . . In addition, gender is also used to designate social relations 
between the sexes. Its use explicitly rejects biological explanations, such as those 
that find a common denominator for diverse forms of female subordination in the 
facts that women have the capacity to give birth and men have greater muscular 
strength. Instead, gender becomes a way of denoting “cultural constructions”—
the entirely social creation of ideas about appropriate roles for women and men. It 
is a way of referring to the exclusively social origins of the subjective identities of 
men and women. (32)
One consequence of such advances was a more emphatic feminist insistence in 
empirical work that the received categories of male dominance and female victim-
hood did not match up with historical or contemporary reality, Niara Sudarkasa 
observing, for instance, “that a ‘neutral’ complementarity, rather than a super-
ordination/subordination, more accurately describes the relationship between 
certain female and male roles in various precolonial African societies” (101), and 
Barbara Harlow maintaining that the situation of Third World women throws 
into question the “convenient feminist categories of race, class, gender as well 
as ‘unified’ women’s experience” (Milkman/Stansell 450–451). As well, the new 
analytical models permitted a much more complex understanding of the produc-
tion and function of femininity, now conceived to be always inflected by other 
social categories, as Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, reviewing three books on women 
in the American South, observed: “The personal lives of southern women were 
profoundly political, that is, they were inscribed in a distinct social system that 
they also helped to shape and for which they bear the responsibilities of their gen-
der-, class-, and race-specific contributions” (162). Equally important, books like 
Claudia Koonz’s Mothers in the Fatherland showed how a definition of women 
as always part of men’s world and defined in relationship to men could resituate 
women as figures also possessing human agency and making their own gender-
specific contribution to history, whether for good or—as in the case of Koonz’s 
examination of women’s role in National Socialism—for very ill.
The new feminist paradigms elaborated in the late 1980s slowly began to 
shape literary analysis as well. In a Feminist Studies essay reviewing five surveys 
of feminist literary theory and criticism published in 1985, June Howard identi-
fied the process by which this transformation took place. The definition 
of “difference” was the terrain of struggle in those texts, she explained: did it 
refer to the constitution of meaning through difference, as French theory would 
have it; to differences among women, a primary concern for Americans; and/or 
to the feminist project of “making a difference” and which form of feminist lit-
erary analysis would best promote that end? “These books,” Howard observes, 
“are true to their moment, in presenting the relations between Anglo-American 
and French feminist criticism as a confrontation, even an impasse. But they also 
provide evidence that the moment is already passing, perhaps that it has already 
passed” (169). A perspective that Toril Moi’s influential Sexual/Textual Politics 
did not pursue, Marxist feminism, is in Howard’s view most likely to point the 
way out of a “static Anglo-American/French confrontation,” for (quoting Moi) 
“Marxist feminist cultural criticism enables the critic to link the literary work ‘to 
a specific historical context in which a whole set of different structures (ideo-
logical, economic, social, political) intersect to produce precisely those textual 
structures’ and opens up the possibility of ‘studying the historical construction of 
the categories of gender and . . . analysing the importance of culture in the rep-
resentation and transformation of those categories’” (Howard 175–76 citing Moi 
94). Howard particularly praised the “materialist feminist” approach of Judith 
Newton and Deborah Rosenfelt’s Feminist Criticism and Social Change, which, 
as they themselves note, “has much in common with ‘the new Marxist cultural 
theory and the work of [the Marxist literary scholars] Tony Bennet, Fredric 
Jameson, Michael Ryan, and Terry Eagleton’” (Howard 184 citing Newton/
Rosenfelt xxiv). The difficulties of attending to all the areas emphasized by the 
new materialist feminist approach are “vertiginous” and “formidable”: feminist 
literary scholars writing from a materialist feminist perspective must focus on 
“the power relations implied by gender and simultaneously of those implied by 
class, race, and sexual identification; an analysis of literature and an analysis of 
history and society; an analysis of the circumstances of cultural production and 
an analysis of the complexities with which at a given moment in history they are 
inscribed in the text” (Howard 186 citing Newton/Rosenfelt xix). “It is not sur-
prising,” Howard notes, “that brilliant critics like [Gayatri] Spivak and [Cora] 
Kaplan have published relatively fragmentary work over the past decade (186). 
Certainly, I might add, that is also the case for those of us far less illustrious, 
who also struggled throughout the 1980s to find an adequate method. By 1987,
however, it seems to me that the corner had been turned. Spurred to counter-
assault (at least within the academy) by the right-wing gains of the Reagan era, 
a range of progressives that included feminists had begun to elaborate analytical 
approaches that allowed them to address the “rainbow coalition” of concerns 
that had posed themselves in the 1980s, cobbling together a method that was 
historical and materialist and attentive to the theoretical advances of the past 
decades. Under the influence of Newton, Rosenfelt, and a host of other feminist 
scholars who had once called themselves Marxist feminists and socialist femi-
nists, feminist literary scholars increasingly termed their own variant of that 
method “materialist feminism.” As Howard presciently observed from her van-
tage point of 1987, “Both in its content and in its style, materialist feminism 
seems to me to offer the best hope for an approach that resists both the glamour 
of high theory and the comforting certainties of political correctness and com-
mon sense, for an approach that is theoretically rigorous, historically specific, 
and politically engaged” (186).
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CHAPTER 7
Bachmann Reading / Reading 
Bachmann
THE WOMAN IN WHITE IN THE “WAYS OF DEATH”
Sometimes it takes a coincidence,
sometimes intuition, to recognize the true stories 
that are happening behind the play-acting.
—Ingeborg Bachmann, “Todesarten-Projekt”
Only one single, brighter episode interrupts the dismal narrative of 
Ingeborg Bachmann’s unfinished novel, The Book of Franza: Franza’s recollection 
of May 1945, “the most beautiful spring.” The Book of Franza mostly details Fran-
za’s husband’s deliberate attempt to drive her mad, her escape from him into her 
brother’s care, their trip together to northern Africa, and her subsequent decline 
and death there. But Franza also remembers Austria’s liberation in May 1945, a 
month whose burgeoning splendor coincided with the unrest and excitement of 
her own adolescent body. The “miracle,” as she terms it, means peace, freedom, 
and hope for Franza, brought to her small village in the person of an English 
captain, Sir Perceval Glyde, “the first man in her life” (Franza 42). She joyfully 
accompanies her captain on his journeys through the countryside and receives 
her first kisses from him as he leaves to return to England. “With that, Franza’s 
first love came to an end” (Franza 45), Bachmann’s narrator tells us, apparently 
this bleak novel’s only example of a heterosexual romance that will not result in 
destruction and death—the “Ways of Death” of Bachmann’s final novel cycle.
Thus it is all the more surprising to discover that Bachmann had found a 
prior literary model for her romantic captain in a figure seemingly quite his 
opposite. For “Sir Perceval Glyde” is not a name original to Bachmann’s novel: 
before his appearance in The Book of Franza, Sir Perceval figures as the oppres-
sively masculine villain of Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White, a Victorian 
“sensation novel” which also otherwise shares many similar themes and struc-
tures with The Book of Franza. The comparison of their similarities (as well as 
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their striking differences) that Bachmann herself seems to have invited will 
reveal a good deal about Bachmann’s reading habits and her methods of com-
position, and it can also clarify some puzzling aspects of both The Book of 
Franza and Malina. As well, the presence of this disguised allusion to another 
literary work may caution Bachmann’s readers to be alert for other significant, 
if occluded, literary models for her fiction and in general to be aware of the 
importance of intertextuality for her own literary creations.
Like both Malina and The Book of Franza, The Woman in White is about gender, 
love, and politics, about sexual and social identity, about multiple doppelgängers 
and hints of incest, about male dominance and female submission, about confine-
ment and madness. The novel’s author, William Wilkie Collins (1824–1889), was a 
prolific writer of thrilling, suspenseful, and carefully plotted Victorian popular fic-
tion intended—like that of his friend and associate Charles Dickens—for middle-
brow, middle-class audiences. The Woman in White, his best-known work and one 
of the most widely read novels of the Victorian era, was published serially in 
Dickens’s All the Year Round from 26 November 1859 to 25 August 1860 and first 
appeared in volume form on 15 August 1860. As was the case with many other 
“sensation novels” as well, questions of gender stand at the center of The Woman in 
White, and the concern of sensation novels with the role of women is now acknowl-
edged to be one of the main reasons for the genre’s success (Helsinger et. al 122–
145). But, scholars argue, Collins, like other Victorian novelists, displays a deep 
ambivalence about the situation of women: “On the one hand, he creates characters, 
situations, and symbolic structures that implicitly indict a society that oppresses 
women. On the other hand, through his ambivalent depictions of those characters 
and situations, he stops short of acknowledging the basic premises of Victorian soci-
ety” (Barickman 148–149). Unlike Bachmann’s novels, Collins’s novel ends with 
the villains vanquished, evil properly punished, and the legitimate order of (benev-
olent) male dominance restored. Elaine Showalter, author of one of the first book-
length feminist studies of the British novel, can thus regard The Woman in White,
along with Collins’s other novels, as a mere apology for the system of gender rela-
tions Victorian men desired: “Like Dickens, Collins invariably ends his novels with 
sentimental happy marriages of patient woman and resolute man, marriages whose 
success is validated by the prompt appearance of male offspring” (Literature 162–
163). But Bachmann’s reading is more subtle and differentiated. To grasp how she 
appropriated this novel, we must read it, with her, “against the grain” to understand 
how she expands and explores the openings in the social and sexual order with 
which Collins tantalizingly plays, instead of closing them as Collins does in his 
conventionally Victorian happy ending.
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Collins’s four positive characters bear affinities to the central figures of both 
Malina and The Book of Franza. Three women stand in his novel’s center, all 
evidently aspects of a single figure. Laura Fairlie, a blond, beautiful, childlike, 
and submissive heiress, is the central love interest. Anne Catherick, the “Woman 
in White,” mysteriously resembles Laura (and is eventually revealed to be Laura’s 
half-sister via a liaison between her father and a housemaid) but is congenitally 
weak-minded and deranged, one symptom of which is her insistence on always 
clothing herself in white. Marian Halcombe, Laura’s half-sister on her mother’s 
side, is as dark and ugly as Laura is fair, so that the viewer, we are told, is “almost 
repelled by the masculine form and masculine look of [her] features” (Collins 
25), but she is endowed in return with masculine talents and a masculine asser-
tiveness uniformly admired by the novel’s other characters. Mad Anne dies; 
Laura marries, unhappily and then happily; Marian acts, is even permitted, in 
contrast to Anne and Laura, to narrate a section of the novel via her diary entries 
but in return is denied femininity and sexual fulfillment. The three half-sisters 
thus represent three irreconcilable possibilities for women. One might view these 
three partial women as a splitting of female possibilities like that displayed in the 
three major characters of Malina, the “I” representing female disruption and 
madness; the “I” in relationship to Ivan, a male-centered love; and the “I” in rela-
tionship to her doppelgänger Malina, ungendered, rational competence.
Affinities between Collins’s major positive male figure and Martin, Franza’s 
brother in The Book of Franza, are even more apparent. Though he is no blood 
kin to the sisters, the three disguise themselves for a time as siblings to escape 
villainous detection, and, until the time that his love for Laura is permitted to 
reveal itself, he describes his relationship to the sisters as brotherly. His name, 
Walter Hartright, tells all: like Martin, he is the good brother, nursing the 
deranged woman and protecting the weak; like Martin, he tells most of the 
story and attempts to unravel its mysteries. Yet, like Martin as well, he poses no 
threat at all to the order of male dominance and patriarchal inheritance: as must 
have been more apparent to Bachmann than to an English-speaking readership, 
Walter’s function is, benevolently, to walten, to administer and control. By the 
end of the novel, Walter has become the proper husband for the proper Victo-
rian heroine, and the book concludes with the birth of Walter’s and Laura’s son, 
another little Walter, proclaimed in the novel’s penultimate paragraph as the 
legitimate masculine successor to Laura’s properties—“the Heir of Limmer-
idge” (Collins 584). Like Walter, Martin is given the task of restoring threatened 
arrangements of male dominance, but Bachmann’s treatment of the good brother 
is more daring and complex. Hinting at an incestuous attachment of the siblings 
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(a relationship borrowed from Musil), Bachmann presents Martin as a figure 
once Franza’s friend and equal but now a man like any other. Yet because 
Martin is Franza’s brother by blood, he cannot marry her to restore the patri-
archal order, Bachmann thus showing that a man cannot be both equal and hus-
band to a woman. But if Martin does not succeed in reinserting Franza into 
patriarchy, he can easily enough forget the disruptions she represented: He 
“came home,” Bachmann tells us, “where he felt at home once again, there in 
the third district, and went to sleep and never thought this way again” (Franza
146, translation modified).
Apart from Sir Perceval’s name, Bachmann’s most obvious borrowing from 
The Woman in White are the two motifs around which Collins’s novel is struc-
tured, conflated by Bachmann in The Book of Franza. Like Franza, Anne Cath-
erick, the “Woman in White” of the title, is a woman unjustly confined to a 
private asylum by an evil man, that very Sir Perceval Glyde: “I have been cruelly 
used and cruelly wronged,” says Anne (Collins 22). Like Franza, Anne escapes, 
attempts to elude her male persecutor, and seeks the assistance of the kindly 
brother figure; indeed, it is her chance encounter with Walter as she flees which 
initiates the series of events with which the novel is concerned, just as Franza’s 
escape from the spa in Baden near Vienna into Martin’s care introduces The 
Book of Franza. Though Anne appears to be a secondary figure, both her appear-
ance in the title and her function as a double to Laura underline, even at the 
novel’s commencement, the significance there of madness and confinement for 
the fate of women. 
The mysterious meaning of the madwoman in white within the logic of Col-
lins’s book is clarified by a second confinement and escape midway in the novel 
upon which Bachmann also appears to draw for her account of Franza’s fate. In 
sorry financial straits, Sir Perceval realizes he will inherit his wife’s estate upon 
her death; because of her resemblance to Anne, he is able to imprison her in the 
asylum in Anne’s stead and arrange for Anne’s death, passed off as Laura’s. By 
the time Marian has accomplished Laura’s escape and entrusted her to Walter’s 
care, Laura herself is sorely weakened and deranged by the ordeal: her husband 
had wished to kill her and had almost succeeded in driving her mad—that is, in 
imposing Anne’s fate upon her. As well, her suffering has now so transformed 
her that she cannot be visually distinguished from Anne (for, as Walter had com-
mented earlier, “If ever sorrow and suffering set their profaning marks on the 
youth and beauty of Miss Fairlie’s face, then, and only then, Anne Catherick and 
she would be the twin-sisters of chance resemblance, the living reflexions of one 
another” [Collins 84]) and has no way of proving who she really is. 
bachmann reading / reading bachmann   { 227 }
Sir Perceval has thus stolen not just Laura’s possessions and her sanity but her 
very identity; as Nina Auerbach has put it, the “plot against Laura’s identity is a 
terrifying reminder of the jeopardy of any Victorian woman’s selfhood once she 
has attained the socially approved but psychically and legally menacing position of 
wife” (141). This is the second motif Bachmann seems to have drawn from The 
Woman in White: the evil husband who is not satisfied merely to control his wife 
but, to serve his own purposes, wants entirely to eradicate her. As Franza laments 
of her own husband, Leopold Jordan: “He took my goods away from me. My 
laughter, my tenderness, my capacity for joy, my compassion, my ability to help, my 
animal nature, my shining rays, for he stomped out everything that rose up until it 
could no longer rise again” (Franza 80, translation modified). Though both wives 
escape, they are permanently marked and unbalanced by their husbands’ persecu-
tion. 
Bachmann’s “Ways of Death” gives us every reason to believe that she found 
such oppression and tyranny, variously exercised, to be the normal state of hetero-
sexual relations under the present order of male dominance: men seek to destroy 
women, whose existence is evident only through their absence, as Franza herself 
commented of an Egyptian king’s effort to destroy all traces of his female prede-
cessor: “Look, she said, but the pharaoh forgot that though he had eradicated her, 
she was still there. It can still be read, because nothing is there where in fact 
something should be” (Franza 109). Somewhat remarkably, a very similar opin-
ion of male-female relations is voiced by Marian in Collins’s novel: “No man 
under heaven deserves these sacrifices from us women. Men! They are the ene-
mies of our innocence and our peace—they drag us away from our parents’ love 
and our sisters’ friendship—they take us body and soul to themselves, and fasten 
our helpless lives to theirs as they chain up a dog to his kennel” (Collins 162). Nor 
do the author’s depictions of women’s role in the Victorian marriages of his novel 
obscure the total subservience men demand from wives and to which their wives 
accede: as his editor remarks, “strict genteel etiquette . . . required absolute sub-
mission to the husband as a marital duty of the wife” (Collins 615). As well, Col-
lins perceptively depicts his characters’ problems as occasioned not by personal 
failings but by the social order: not who one is but how society regards one deter-
mines one’s place in society. Hence, Laura does not doubt her own identity but 
must have it socially acknowledged in order to resume her rightful place; Sir 
Perceval finally meets his downfall when the discovery that his father and mother 
were not married reveals him to be an illegitimate usurper of his father’s baron-
etcy—though he is indeed his father’s son. For Collins as for Bachmann, gender 
relations exist within a context of larger social relations determining their content 
{ 228 }   a history of reading bachmann
and the fate of the characters that must operate within their parameters. 
But despite his flirtations with far-reaching questions about gender arrange-
ments (present of course in far greater number in his novel than I have been able 
to detail here), Collins continues to uphold the gender conventions that his story 
has shown to be deeply problematic: as his commentators have observed, his novel 
is simultaneously both subversive and conventional (Loesberg 136). He restores 
the order the novel has drawn into question by unmasking the worst abusers of 
women there, including both Sir Perceval and his diabolical Italian associate, 
Count Fosco, as illegitimate holders of social power, suggesting that legitimate 
holders of male power would not so abuse their prerogatives. And he diffuses the 
critique of men’s power over women by permitting one of his three women, 
Laura, the weakest and most dependent and childlike, to be happy and satisfied 
in a benevolently paternalistic marriage with Walter, while killing off mad Anne 
and reducing powerful Marian to the status of maiden aunt. Bachmann’s appro-
priation of The Woman in White thus reveals some qualities of her own reading 
habits. It shows how she is able to read a relatively conventional novel against the 
grain, extracting from it the truths Collins finally obscures, the costs to women of 
such wedded bliss, the “ways of death” Collins did not wish to acknowledge.
As well, Bachmann’s own reading of Collins gives us readers some sugges-
tions about how we might best read her own work—also against the grain. As 
in Collins’s novel, subjected women do not speak as subjects in Bachmann, and 
she explained in an interview “that I can only narrate from a male standpoint” 
(GuI 99). The women’s voices we hear in her late works are either those of their 
madness and dreams; those of their identification with an ungendered (i.e., 
male) subject, as in Malina; or those of their “false consciousness,” their identifi-
cation with social roles imposed on women, as in many of the stories of Three 
Paths to the Lake. Bachmann thus requires that her readers remain as aware of 
the irony of her texts as she was of Collins’s, understanding more about them 
than do either the characters or her male narrator. (It may be that the complexity 
of the reader response she requires contributed to the initial misunderstanding 
of her works, prompting, for instance, even one of her early feminist critics to 
believe that Three Paths to the Lake illustrated its women characters’ Verzicht auf 
den Mann [renunciation of men] rather than, as we understand now, women’s 
total subjection to men [Summerfield 211–216].) In her appropriation of the 
themes and structures of The Woman in White, Bachmann probes into the most 
dense and problematic areas of the work, opening up and exploring exactly 
those themes whose investigation Collins, after titillating his readers with a 
glimpse into such dangerous reaches, wanted finally to foreclose.
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This is nowhere more the case than in the use Bachmann makes of two ele-
ments of Collins’s novel whose relationship to his main plot remains submerged 
and murky in the original work. First, Collins complicates the relationship of 
Laura and the evil Sir Perceval with the presence of his Italian friend Count 
Fosco, grotesque in appearance but more clever and possessing an even greater 
degree of male power, so that even Marian is forced to acknowledge, “He looks 
like a man who could tame anything. If he had married a tigress, instead of a 
woman, he would have tamed the tigress” (Collins 195). Collins takes great 
pains to differentiate Fosco’s violent Italian habits from more moderate English 
customs: another Italian tells Walter with respect to Italian politics, “It is not for 
you to say—you Englishmen, who have conquered your freedom so long ago, 
that you have conveniently forgotten what blood you shed, and what extremities 
you proceeded to in the conquering—it is not for you to say how far the worst of 
all exasperations may, or may not, carry the maddened men of an enslaved 
nation” (Collins 535). And Marian warns Fosco and Sir Perceval, “There are 
laws in England to protect women from cruelty and outrage” (Collins 267). 
(Fosco, in rejoinder, asserts that his slavishly obedient English wife is in fact fol-
lowing English dictates: “I remember that I was married in England—and I 
ask, if a woman’s marriage obligations, in this country, provide for her private 
opinion of her husband’s principles? No! They charge her unreservedly to love, 
honour, and obey him. That is exactly what my wife has done. I stand, here, on a 
supreme moral elevation; and I loftily assert her accurate performance of her con-
jugal duties. Silence, Calumny! Your sympathy, Wives of England, for Madame 
Fosco!” [Collins 570].) After Laura and Walter are safely married, Collins ap-
pends a subplot to account for Fosco’s mysteries: he is a spy for a reactionary Ital-
ian regime and finally, toward the novel’s end, is assassinated by members of an 
Italian brotherhood dedicated to Italian liberation. In his memory, his wife pens 
these words about her murdered husband: “His life was one long assertion of the 
rights of the aristocracy, and the sacred principles of Order—and he died a mar-
tyr to his cause” (Collins 582). But in the context of Collins’s novel this subplot 
appears something of an afterthought, not really motivated by or connected to its 
main concerns regarding the fate of the Woman in White. 
Writing a century later, Bachmann found it easier to show the connections of 
reactionary politics, male dominance, and female confinement and madness. 
The husband whose influence Franza cannot escape and who attempts to drive 
her mad has done his own research on the psychological consequences of intern-
ment (including medical experimentation) for former concentration camp 
inmates, and readers are obviously to connect Jordan’s research interests with his 
{ 230 }   a history of reading bachmann
“diabolical experiment” (Franza 63) to make a case study out of Franza. Franza’s 
brother terms Jordan’s treatment of her “fascist,” and Franza is prepared to 
agree: “You say fascism, but that sounds strange, for I’ve never heard that word 
used to describe a personal relationship. . . . But that’s an interesting idea, for it 
had to begin somewhere. Why does one only refer to fascism when it has to do 
with opinions or blatant acts” (Franza 75). Bachmann’s own perspective—as 
well as the hundred years of history and theory that separate her and Collins—
made it possible for her to grasp and depict the intimate connections between 
gender relationships and reactionary politics at a micropolitical level. As she 
explained in her preface to The Book of Franza:
[The virus of crime] cannot have simply disappeared from our world twenty years 
ago [i.e., in 1945], just because murder is no longer praised, desired, decorated with 
medals, and promoted. . . . Crimes that require a sharp mind [Geist], that tap our 
minds and less so our senses, those that most deeply affect us—there no blood 
flows, but rather the slaughter is granted a place within the morals and the cus-
toms of a society whose fragile nerves quake in the face of any such beastliness. Yet 
the crimes did not diminish, but rather they require greater refinement, another 
level of intelligence, and are themselves dreadful. (Franza 3–4)
Whether or not her novel draws in this respect directly on The Woman in White,
she succeeds in showing in the “Ways of Death” volumes relationships that Col-
lins only dimly perceived: how the order of authoritarian social regimes can 
also be tied to and rely upon an order of male dominance in the domestic realm 
deeply destructive to the women who are subject to its dictates. 
A second area that remains opaque in Collins’ novel but that Bachmann is 
able to clarify is the major mystery, foregrounded in the novel’s title but never 
satisfactorily resolved, as to why Anne Catherick insists on clothing herself only 
in white. The explicit reason given for Anne’s obsession, a chance remark of 
Laura’s mother to Anne as a child that white became her, has no real bearing on 
the issues of gender and power with which the novel is most centrally concerned. 
To Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar in The Madwoman in the Attic, white attire 
for women in the Victorian era (worn with frequency by women characters in 
Victorian novels) has a variety of meanings: bridal virginity, childlike innocence, 
feminine purity, passivity, vulnerability, submissiveness, the brightness of angels, 
the coldness of snow, the enigma of colorlessness, the pallor of death (615–621). 
Certainly all these meanings can be associated with the figure of Anne Cather-
ick and are consistent with her function. But I would submit that in a novel 
published the year before the American Civil War began, another meaning of 
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“white” is at least subliminally present in Collins’s complex association of prob-
lems of gender with color, and it is this meaning that Bachmann explores in The 
Book of Franza. For Bachmann, “white” is a racial designation, and the system 
of male power that results in Franza’s psychic devastation is also racially spe-
cific—as Martin comments, Franza’s state reveals to him “the psyche of the 
whites, which was obviously more threatened than he could imagine” (Franza
54, translation modified). Franza also associates white imperial ambitions with 
the attempt of white men to destroy her, fearing their power even as she seeks 
to escape them in Africa: “But the alibi of the whites is strong. Don’t forget 
that. They tried everything to eliminate you, to blow you to bits on their mine-
field of intelligence, which they misuse in order to make you serve their plans 
and schemes” (Franza 112). Raped by a white man at the Great Pyramid, Franza 
curses both whites and her husband with her dying breath: “The whites should. 
They should be damned. He should” (Franza 141–142). In this case as well, 
Bachmann is able in her appropriation of the themes of The Woman in White to 
tease out further meanings that remained implicit (if not altogether repressed) 
there, showing that the domination and subordination based on gender which 
both novels depict is culture-specific, connected in profound ways to white 
supremacy, a system of domination and subordination based on color.
So why did Bachmann name Franza’s romantic captain Sir Perceval Glyde? 
I suggest that in giving an apparently positive figure a name belonging to so 
negative an archvillain, Bachmann is telling us how to read this episode of her 
novel—once more, against the grain. In Franza’s memory, the liberation of her 
village by the English and her own first love take on both idyllic and utopian 
dimensions, and we readers (as Bachmann must have recognized) are inclined 
to read her account in this manner as well, as “a promise of peace that was 
betrayed.” But Franza’s own needs, desires, and expectations, even at fifteen, 
have already been shaped, formed, and deformed by her own male-dominant 
culture, socially constructed by a system of gender relations that requires women 
willingly to yield themselves to male control, even gladly to embrace male vio-
lence. Bachmann hints in this direction when she tells us that Franza (like the 
“I” of Malina) longs to be raped by victorious soldiers: “And ‘rape,’ that was 
another word that caused Franza to imagine things capable of taking away the 
spring, and, since there was no one she could speak to, rape and armies turned 
into longed-for heroes and troops who were on the march, which was for the 
good, since nothing ever happened in Galicien [her native village], only the vil-
lage dying out and the place belonging to her alone as she waited for a miracle 
and for something miraculous to occur” (Franza 38). In Franza’s eyes, the mira-
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cle occurs, embodied in that harbinger of peace and love, Sir Perceval Glyde. But 
we who are able to disencode Bachmann’s text know that this is a false promise 
of peace, as ideologically suspect as the happy endings and wedded bliss of Vic-
torian novels. In the world of the “ways of death” that Bachmann depicts, there 
is no peace at all, as the “I” of Malina learns in her dreams:
Malina: So you’ll never again say: War and Peace.
Me [“I”]: Never again.
It’s always war.
Here there is always violence
Here there is always struggle.
It is the eternal war. (Malina 155)
Examining Bachmann’s appropriation of a novel like Collins’s can thus teach 
us to read her own works with much greater subtlety. Because she believed that 
no language yet existed which would allow her female protagonists to reveal the 
true story of their own “ways of death,” the story she wishes to tell is almost 
always different from the surface narrative with which her novels present us. 
The example of The Woman in White alerts readers to watch for signals built 
into her texts (many not yet explained, many doubtless not yet even discovered) 
that all is not as it seems. Moreover, Bachmann’s own reading of Collins points 
out that many texts besides her own are not of a single piece, but instead (like the 
real world from which they derive) made up of contradictory and contending 
elements from which it is possible to derive both conventional and subversive 
meanings. This is a reading strategy that feminist (and other) literary scholars 
might do well to adopt, though it has not on the whole characterized our endeav-
ors so far. Showalter’s reading of The Woman in White attends only to its conven-
tional aspects, an interpretation for which she finds the novel’s first sentence 
paradigmatic: “The first sentence of The Woman in White announced Collins’ 
endorsement of Victorian sex-roles: ‘This is a story of what a Woman’s patience 
can endure, and what a Man’s resolution can achieve’” (Literature 162). But of 
course even Collins’s first sentence in The Woman in White is much more ambig-
uous than Showalter allows: read in another way, it could as easily describe 
Laura’s submission to the tyrannical Sir Perceval—or, for that matter, Leopold 
Jordan’s determination to destroy his wife and Franza’s willingness to yield to 
his power. Ahead of her critics, as she so often was, Bachmann has shown us 
how to recognize such ambiguities, to read both her own works and those of 
others so that they yield more of the multiplicities of meanings they contain. 
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READING BACHMANN IN 1987
This essay was written in summer 1987 and published in the spring 1988 issue 
of German Quarterly. Clearly, since writing the Wittgenstein essay two years 
before, I had found my way back to feminism, and this essay bears the marks of 
the methodological transition in which feminist literary scholarship, and literary 
analysis in general, was then engaged. Within my own experience, that transi-
tion did not occur without struggle. At the time I believed (of course) that I was 
on the “right” side of the contestation, though the position I assumed then now 
seems methodologically quite naive. At mid-decade, the response of some U.S. 
academic feminists (including me) to the dire political circumstances into which 
Reaganism had thrust women (and the world altogether) took the form of a 
repudiation of forms of high theory that seemed to have no application to prac-
tice: they looked at systems of signification, but we focused on “real women.” In 
her essay “Zwischenbilanz der feministischen Debatten [Interim assessment of 
the feminist debates]” in Frank Trommler’s Germanistik in den USA, Biddy 
Martin captured this moment within the organization Women in German 
(WIG): “Many articles in the [Women in German] Newsletter of 1986–87 con-
struct a division between West German and American feminist Germanists 
that reproduces . . . the opposition between political engagement, democratic 
process, and empirical reality on the one hand and theory, textuality, and fash-
ionable trends on the other. This perspective threatened to obscure the specific-
ity of the work of West German and American feminists by judging them solely 
on the basis of whether they were compatible with ‘our’ work or merely derive 
from the French” (170). As Martin goes on to observe, that divide never really 
existed even within WIG, whose members were in fact located on both sides of 
the debate, yet for a time the consequence for the organization was denuncia-
tions, hurt feelings, and tears on both sides. 
Within the Five College academic feminist community, too, the dispute was 
very apparent, crystallizing in a struggle over the meaning of “difference” like 
the one June Howard described, as we attempted to organize a series of five 
symposia on women and difference in connection with a faculty development 
project. In the last of the symposia, held in October 1987, “my” group took as 
its focus “Feminism and Activism: The Last Twenty-five Years”; the “theo-
rists” invited Gayatri Spivak to hold a series of seminars for local academic 
feminists. This is Ann Rosalind Jones’s account of a meeting preparing for 
Spivak’s visit:
Another incident, in 1986, brought the conflict to a head for me. Several organiz-
ers of the Five College seminar on women in the Third World decided to begin by 
reading Gayatri Spivak’s dense commentary on the short story “Draupadi” by a 
Bengali writer, Mahasetv Devi; at the last minute, we threw in an article by Mark 
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Cousins purporting to explain deconstruction. The meeting was a catastrophe. 
Women from various fields, some of them activists in their fifties, others new 
arrivals in the area, objected violently to the opacity of all three texts. . . . One 
women, an African-American literary critic, said, “I don’t mind difficult reading, 
but isn’t this approach finally just a way of focusing on the oppressor all over 
again?” Others asked, less temperately, how any of this theory was relevant to cli-
toridectomy in Ethiopia or the blindness of women working on assembly lines in 
“free” trade zones in the Philippines. Finally a woman who’d been a member of 
the previous study group [a feminist study group of the late 1970s in which Jones 
and I had both participated] stood up, declared, “Deconstruction is an empty yup-
pie theory; we need to read Fanon, not Derrida,” and left the room. (75)
I recall the event somewhat differently, and I hope I wasn’t the seminar par-
ticipant whom Jones remembers stomping out of the room, but I fear I might 
have been.
In October 1986 I elaborated my negative assessment of the state of contem-
porary feminism in a paper called “‘Is That All?’ Whatever Happened to the 
Women’s Liberation Movement? Reflections on the Course of American Femi-
nism,” repeating my talk at the 1987 MLA (and making many feminists mad at 
me, except for some old-time lefties: I was honored and pleased that Tillie Olsen 
came up after my talk to tell me how much she liked it). Like the Nation, though 
(which perhaps had influenced me), I ended by asserting that “even in these 
dark times we have already won some victories: in coalition we beat back Bork, 
over half a million gays and lesbians marched on Washington, and in this presi-
dential campaign the Rainbow Coalition offers the real possibility of building a 
broad-based movement. . . . At the risk of sounding voluntarist, I just have a 
feeling, the times might be a’changin—but at least in part, whether they change 
or not is up to us” (“Is That All?” 301). Certainly in that paper my tempered 
optimism about feminism pertained to practice, not theory. Otherwise I was a 
participant in many of the activist struggles of the mid-1980s, most of which 
were not especially feminist in emphasis: I attended the major demonstrations 
in Washington, DC; did support work for my students who had occupied cam-
pus buildings to support divestment from South Africa and oppose CIA recruit-
ing; again chaired the Five College Faculty and Staff Committee for Jesse Jack-
son as the 1988 Presidential campaign approached. In spring 1988 the program 
I direct celebrated its fifteenth anniversary with a faculty panel addressing a 
packed hall on the topic “The Opening of the American Mind,” taking on the 
premises of Allan Bloom’s book; I don’t think Accuracy in Academe ever spied 
on my classes (despite its presence elsewhere on the University of Massachusetts 
campus), though my program was attacked by the National Association of 
Scholars in the early 1990s.
Quite by chance, however, during the mid-1980s I was also a member of a 
study group dealing with new scholarly developments in anthropology. It was 
in that context that I first discovered Stuart Hall’s “Cultural Studies: Two Par-
adigms,” and my response was not unlike that of Christa Wolf when she found 
feminism: a “decisive change” in my “viewing lens” comparable only to my 
discovery of Marxism. I could almost feel the scales falling from my eyes: this 
was the method I had been looking for; this method would allow me to 
connect politics and literature again and could clearly be adapted to include 
gender, thus overcoming the impasse at which I felt feminism had arrived; 
since literature and its reception were forces that helped to consolidate or sub-
vert all social constructions, literary analysis could, from a quite different per-
spective from that of the early 1980s, be once again conceived of as a political 
intervention.
I had heard at the MLA early versions of the essays assembled in the New-
ton and Rosenfelt collection and found them still too indebted to the base-
superstructure model of old-time Marxist feminism. But the new historical 
methods of cultural studies and other approaches related to it, like new histori-
cism and cultural materialism, now provided far more sophisticated ways to 
think about the relationship of “the textuality of history and the historicity of 
texts,” to cite Montrose’s chiasmus once more (“Professing” 20). I thus set out to 
learn all I could about the new methodologies and to integrate them into my 
own feminist analysis by employing a favorite academic learning technique: 
teaching courses and giving papers on topics I didn’t know very much about. In 
fall 1987 I offered a graduate seminar on the intersection of feminist literary 
theory and feminist history which was enormously instructive to me and, I 
think, to my students; in June 1987 I gave a talk, “Anthropology and the Poli-
tics of Deconstruction,” at the National Women’s Studies Association confer-
ence (held at Spelman College in Atlanta as a gesture toward white feminism’s 
effort to integrate race into its theory and practice); in October 1987 I talked at 
the German Studies Association conference on what I had learned so far from 
my graduate seminar in a paper called “Reading Gender Historically: The 
Encounter of Feminist Literary Theory and Women’s History” (a presentation 
that would eventually become the article “Feminist Scholarship and German-
istik,” published in the first German Studies issue of German Quarterly in 
spring 1989); in March 1988 I gave a related paper, “Reading Women’s Biogra-
phies and Autobiographies: Feminist History and Feminist Literary Theory,” 
at the National Association of Ethnic Studies. At the same time I was working 
on an essay, “History in Uwe Johnson’s Jahrestage” (begun in summer 1984,
published in Germanic Review in winter 1989), which constituted a settling of 
accounts with the author on whom I had written my dissertation. That essay, 
however, did not really manifest the new method but is probably the most old-
style Marxist study I have ever written, and it occasioned (rather to my delight) 
some outrage among Johnson scholars and beyond. Eventually, in 1990, I pre-
sented a not very good paper on new historicism at a conference at Brown Uni-
versity and, in 1991, a much better one at Madison on feminism and new his-
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toricism which was published in Monatshefte in summer 1992—and by then I 
felt that I was capable of applying the new methods myself.
“Bachmann Reading/Reading Bachmann” was written as a very direct conse-
quence of that learning process. To prepare for my graduate course in fall 1987 and 
to understand how new historical methods could be applied to literary texts, I set 
about to read the back issues of Representations, a Berkeley journal associated with 
new historicism. In an article by D. A. Miller on Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in 
White I was startled to discover a name, Sir Perceval Glyde, that up to then I had 
associated only with The Book of Franza. I tracked down Wilkie Collins’s novel, 
devoured it with the relish that always accompanies my late-night forays into popu-
lar fiction (it was the summer, after all), never intending to treat that Victorian 
novel—not exactly within my area of expertise—in a scholarly study. But as I fin-
ished the book, so many new insights into Bachmann’s text and so many new ideas 
about how to treat it were whirling in my head that I could not resist. 
This essay is, I think, quite different in method from the first four articles in 
this archive of historical readings of Bachmann and displays a number of features 
of the new approaches I was trying to appropriate. First, it focuses on representa-
tion, understanding both Collins’s and Bachmann’s novels as neither (simply) 
realistic nor mimetic works but as arrangements of structures and figures used to 
achieve particular literary ends. As well, it conceives signification to be a product 
of intertextuality; thus in this case it considers Bachmann’s novel to be a rework-
ing of prior novelistic elements on which she was able and obliged to draw when 
she wrote her own text. The method’s close attention to structures and processes 
of signification is a consequence of the encounter of a historically based, more or 
less neo-Marxist approach with the techniques of structuralism/poststructural-
ism, and to the best of my knowledge no equivalent exists in earlier forms of 
Marxist analysis, despite the often very impressive examples of close reading they 
can offer. In effect, this aspect of the method is an expansion upon Marx’s obser-
vation in the Eighteenth Brumaire: “[People] make history, but they do not make 
it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by them-
selves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the 
past” (Tucker 595). Here I present Bachmann as possessing sufficient authorial 
agency to configure new meanings, but she is also constrained to construct those 
meanings out of the older textual building blocks available to her. 
What this approach further enables is a recognition of any text as polysemic, 
embodying a whole range of meanings, thus authorizing a wide range of read-
ings (including those “against the grain”) that will depend on the particular 
political, historical, and social stance of the reader. (That, evidently, is the in-
sight this whole book seeks to apply to readings of Bachmann’s texts.) In addi-
tion, as a consequence both of language’s inherent polysemic qualities and of 
the fact that a literary text is necessarily constructed out of the often not com-
mensurable discourses of the larger society, this method conceives texts to be 
sites where sometimes contradictory discourses intersect. The texts themselves 
are thus no longer seen as the somewhat mystical organic unities that romantics 
and New Critics believed they discerned but are able to be read as structures of 
patched-together contradictions whose incompatibilities authors try to recon-
cile. (This particular method of reading texts derives, I believe, from Pierre 
Macherey’s Theory of Literary Production, where he maintains, for instance: 
“The order which [the work] professes is merely an imagined order, projected 
onto disorder, the fictive resolution of ideological conflicts, a resolution so pre-
carious that it is obvious in the very letter of the text where incoherence and 
incompleteness burst forth” [155]. ) 
Finally, the method I have employed here conceives of literary texts as doing 
ideological work and, in the case of The Woman in White, arousing the reader’s 
interest by opening up major ideological fissures of the society and then relieving 
the anxiety produced by restoring social order at the end. This is almost certainly 
an idea I derived from Stephen Greenblatt (who in turn borrowed it from Fou-
cault), which finds its best expression in Greenblatt’s rather gloomy notion of 
“containment,” a function particularly of Shakespearean and other Renaissance 
texts: though the literary text may seem to draw into question, even subvert, 
dominant ordering paradigms in the course of its development, by the end of the 
work all is safely under control again, with an apparently natural order once 
more sweetly restored (see, e.g., Greenblatt’s Shakespearean Negotiations). I am 
very pleased that Bachmann’s text offers me a reading strategy that allows me to 
see—even more clearly than some professional Victorianists—how The Woman 
in White not only interrogates but finally forecloses one of the major ideological 
issues of Victorian society. For my own examination of Bachmann, this study 
also represented a kind of breakthrough, confirming my growing suspicions that 
Bachmann intended all portions of her “Ways of Death” to be read ironically, as 
the packaging of a range of social problems into narratives so conventional that 
the figures who inhabit them could have no clue how their problems could be 
addressed or sometimes even that those problems existed at all.
On the other hand, I don’t think it’s possible to call the approach of this essay 
either materialist or historical. To be sure, like Collins’s other feminist critics, I read 
The Woman in White in the context of Victorian gender conventions and sexual 
mores. I also gesture in the direction of history when I maintain that Bachmann 
could address this complex of concerns more satisfactorily because, writing a hun-
dred years later, she could more clearly see “the connections of reactionary politics, 
male dominance, and female confinement and madness.” But otherwise there’s not 
really anything historical about this reading at all, and I make use of the com-
mon convention within literary scholarship of using the author as apparent agent 
(“Bachmann’s reading is more subtle”; “Bachmann requires”; “Bachmann probes”) 
when I am of course merely talking about my reading. Except for the irrefutable 
presence of Sir Perceval Glyde’s name in the text, I have absolutely no historical 
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evidence that would speak to when, how, and why Bachmann turned to this text, 
and I particularly can’t substantiate my assertion that Bachmann deliberately trans-
formed the “white” of Collins’s title into a racial designation. Of course, it is not 
necessary that readings conform to the dictates of particular methods, historical or 
otherwise; they need only reveal something of interest about the text. In that respect 
I am quite fond of and pleased with what I still consider to be an ingenious and 
elegant little essay. In the larger context of my own appropriation of a new histori-
cally based methodology, however, in 1987 I still had some distance to go.
In contrast, chapters 8, 9, and 10 of this book’s part 3, “Reading Bachmann 
Historically,” illustrate my current appropriation of the historically based approach 
for which June Howard called in 1987. Though in quite different ways, the three 
final chapters understand Bachmann’s texts as complex responses to the histori-
cal situation that obtained when they were written. Gender is a central term in 
each chapter’s analysis, but it is understood as a historically specific category modu-
lated by other equally important social categories and always under pressure from 
a range of discursive and nondiscursive social forces. Though all three chapters 
acknowledge Bachmann’s agency as a writer and regard her texts as interventions 
into particular historical situations, I also consider her texts to be patched together 
out of the (frequently contradictory) discursive materials available to her when she 
wrote; they are thus often unable to transcend the limitations of her time. My abil-
ity to discern Bachmann’s historical blindnesses is mainly a consequence only of my 
changed historical positionality. As I try to clarify in each chapter’s introduction, 
my readings are also historically specific, enabled by the new methods elaborated 
by feminist and other cultural studies scholars since 1990. As well, each of these 
chapters explores Linda Alcoff’s assertion that “positionality” can designate not just 
a location “objectively” given but also a perspective “subjectively” chosen. By stress-
ing quite different aspects of Bachmann’s writing in the final three chapters, I want 
once more to emphasize that differently situated scholars asking differing questions 
about texts or topics will produce different kinds of answers that are not to be 
considered right or wrong, but simply—different.
PART III
Reading Bachmann Historically
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CHAPTER 8
Bachmann and Theories of 
Gender / Sexuality
FEMININITY IN “THE GOOD GOD OF MANHATTAN”
It would be best if women and men kept their distance 
and had nothing to do with each other until 
both had found their way out of the tangle and confusion, 
the discrepancy inherent in all relationships.
—Ingeborg Bachmann, Three Paths to the Lake
This chapter draws on recent advances in U.S. feminist theory to 
argue for a new kind of reading of Ingeborg Bachmann’s texts. Almost all U.S. 
feminist scholars now agree that femininity and masculinity are social construc-
tions that vary enormously across time and culture, and many recent scholars 
have focused their investigations on how definitions of femininity and mascu-
linity are generated, sustained, and transformed within particular societies. 
Feminist literary scholars have shown that literary texts contribute to the pro-
duction of gender as a discursive category by sustaining, modulating, and/or 
challenging their culture’s discourses of gender. As those scholars have demon-
strated, literary and other texts can also function as the sites of contests about 
definitions of gender (and of many other things), revealing social tensions and 
fissures because they are always pieced together out of the heterogeneous discur-
sive materials of the societies in which they originate. The reception of a literary 
text, feminist scholars argue, can be another locus of struggle around represen-
tations of femininity and masculinity, as readers with divergent interests empha-
size different aspects of the conflicting discourses present in the text. I attempt 
to apply to Bachmann’s writing these new methods elaborated by Anglo-Amer-
ican feminist scholars in order to show how her texts derive from the discursive 
constructions of a particular historical period. I argue that her work represents 
femininity in contradictory ways because it draws upon contending notions of 
gender which Bachmann was unable to reconcile. Her earlier feminist critics, I
finally maintain, produced readings of her works that corresponded to the par-
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ticular concerns of their era. My own reading, stressing different elements of her 
writing, is an effort to produce another interpretation of her texts more in accord 
with the feminist needs of the present. 
Specifically, I want here to investigate one of Bachmann’s early works, her 
radio play “The Good God of Manhattan,” written in 1957 and first broadcast 
in 1958. I argue that the radio play employs two quite different, even contradic-
tory, conceptions of the relationship of power, sexuality, and gender. Most obvi-
ously, Bachmann relies upon a notion of the relationship of civilization and 
Eros/femininity derived from the 1950s, one that recalls the writing of Herbert 
Marcuse: sexuality (particularly in alluring female form) is a force so threaten-
ing to the social order that civilization must repress sexuality in order to protect 
itself. The antagonists of Bachmann’s radio play are the Good God of Manhat-
tan, figured as a single omnipotent principle of social domination, and Jan and 
Jennifer, passionate lovers whose erotic transport threatens the stability of the 
God’s regime. When Jan, the male partner, reaffirms his allegiance to the God’s 
quotidian order, it is the woman, Jennifer alone, who becomes the embodiment 
of a subversive sexuality antithetical to civilization and is murdered by the God. 
Though this discourse of sexuality continued to inform Bachmann’s writing 
until her death and also shaped her feminist reception in the 1970s and 1980s, it 
rests on assumptions that many contemporary U.S. feminist scholars today, influ-
enced by the more recent writing of Michel Foucault on power and sexuality, 
now consider untenable. As I show here, however, within “The Good God of 
Manhattan” a second and somewhat submerged discourse coexists uneasily with 
the first, representing femininity and sexuality as products of the power that calls 
them into being: Jennifer is portrayed as a woman driven to the heights of ecstasy 
because Jan’s masculinist power allows her to adore a man who torments and 
debases her. Viewed from this perspective, “The Good God of Manhattan” can 
also be read as a text that probes the social construction of femininity. That strat-
egy of representation, much more in accord with current U.S. feminist thinking 
about sexuality and gender, would continue to inform Bachmann’s subsequent 
work, finally providing the central premise on which the “Ways of Death” was 
founded. “The Good God of Manhattan” can thus be viewed as a text where 
conflicting discourses of gender and sexuality contend. Though a reading of this 
radio play emphasizing that first, Marcusean discourse may consolidate and sta-
bilize a certain regime of sexuality or of gender by positing that sexuality or 
femininity is “naturally” subversive, another reading stressing the second dis-
course, I want finally to argue, can unsettle those oppositions again.
What connects Bachmann most centrally to Marcuse’s thought, particularly 
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as he elaborated it in Eros and Civilization (1955), is their common assumption 
of the fundamental opposition of power and erotic passion. Both Bachmann 
and Marcuse conceive of power as taking the form of what Marcuse calls dom-
ination, the product of a single, all-encompassing system of social control, 
imposed from without on individuals against their own desires and interests by 
means of what Marcuse calls repression, a term he used, as he explains in Eros 
and Civilization (8), “in the non-technical sense to designate both conscious and 
unconscious, external and internal processes of restraint, constraint, and sup-
pression.” Conversely, both Marcuse and Bachmann conceptualize Eros as a 
force anterior and exterior to domination, preserving a memory of and longing 
for gratification that can become the germ of rebellion against domination—a 
“Great Refusal,” Marcuse called it, that is “the protest against unnecessary 
repression, the struggle for the ultimate form of freedom” (Eros 149). To Mar-
cuse, women incarnate the promise of liberation from repression, since the 
(repressed) memory of the bliss of original union with the mother is preserved 
in every human psyche. For that reason Marcuse joins a long line of masculin-
ist thinkers in construing women as a potential threat to the present repressive 
social order: “The beauty of the woman and the happiness she promises are 
fatal in the work-world of civilization” (Eros 161). 
In the first volume of his History of Sexuality (1978), Michel Foucault pointed 
out that such notions of power, sexuality, and the sexualized female body are 
historically specific ones, arising in Europe in the early modern period and pre-
vailing into the time in which he himself wrote. He called the premise on which 
Marcuse’s and Bachmann’s ideas about domination and eroticism rest the 
“repressive hypothesis”: society’s relationship to sexuality is conceived (as Mar-
cuse had maintained) to be one of repression, sex taken to be a powerful instinc-
tual drive originating outside the social order that society must regulate and 
control. Indeed, for proponents of the repressive hypothesis, sexuality seems so 
hostile to society that even speaking about it (as Bachmann’s play does) can seem 
to be subversive: “If sex is repressed, that is, condemned to prohibition, nonexis-
tence, and silence,” Foucault explains, “then the mere fact that one is speaking 
about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression. A person who holds 
forth in such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of 
power; he upsets established law, he somehow anticipates the coming freedom” 
(History 6). Though the repressive hypothesis and ideas about power, sexuality, 
and gender connected to it have still not been entirely banished from contempo-
rary social analysis, many current cultural theorists—in good part thanks to 
Foucault’s influence—now reject the idea that anything at all (sexuality, femi-
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ninity, various marginal groups) occupies an innocent and uncontaminated site 
external to the operations of power whence a fundamental challenge to power 
could be launched. To many theorists, feminist and otherwise, appeals such as 
Marcuse’s and Bachmann’s to sexuality’s liberatory potential now seem to be 
painfully outmoded relics of an older time, “a blissful vision,” as Domna Stan-
ton put it in a survey of more recent scholarship on sexuality, “that seems decid-
edly dated at this postmodern twilight of the century” (41).
For what reasons would Bachmann have turned to a theory like Marcuse’s 
that conceives of power as a single monolithic system and imagines that resis-
tance can survive only in reaches to which power has no access? Though Fou-
cault has argued that a conception of power as “a general system of domination 
exerted by one group over another . . . whose effects pervade the general social 
body” (History 92) has prevailed in the West since the Renaissance, that model 
had particular saliency in the 1950s, the period from which both Eros and Civi-
lization and “The Good God of Manhattan” derive. Both texts were written at 
the height of the Cold War, when the entire world seemed subsumed under the 
control of two great power blocs, and many major German thinkers of Bach-
mann’s time—among the most prominent, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, 
and Hannah Arendt as well as Marcuse—were convinced that all mass indus-
trial societies (bourgeois democracy as well as fascism or Stalinism) tended 
toward totalitarianism (a bleak vision that was a kind of mirror image of the 
decade’s anticommunism, as Jost Hermand has remarked [66]). The postwar 
United States was conceived to be a “totally administered society” that secured 
its hegemony via the inexorable processes of technological rationality and the 
manipulation of consciousness by advertising and the mass media. Writers across 
the political spectrum decried mass culture’s baneful effects on the freedom and 
autonomy of individuals: to cite only one example, from 1954 through 1956
Jürgen Habermas and Günther Anders debated “Die Dialektik der Rational-
isierung” (the dialectic of rationalization), the “Mißverhältnis von Kultur und 
Konsum” (the discrepancy of culture and consumption), and “Die Welt als Phan-
tom und Matrize” (the world as phantom and matrix) in a series of articles in 
Merkur—an interchange with which Bachmann must have been familiar, since 
during that time period she published seven of her poems in the same journal. 
Bachmann was also directly familiar with Western efforts to elicit voluntary 
consent and eliminate dissent by controlling consciousness: from 1951 to 1953
she worked for the U.S. radio station Rot-Weiss-Rot in Vienna, whose explicit 
purpose was inducing Austrians to embrace the American way of life. (As one 
internal Rot-Weiss-Rot memorandum put it: “One of the more delicate func-
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tions of American personnel in Austria is not to encourage people to say what 
they feel . . . but rather, as well as we can, to suggest to them the right thing to 
think” [Wagnleitner “Irony” 287].) Her radio play was written under the 
impression of her own visit to the United States in summer 1955, where she 
attended a Harvard International Seminar led by Henry Kissinger and intended 
to teach “America’s deeper values” to “persons between twenty-five and forty 
who are about to attain positions of leadership in their country” (Harvard 2). 
(See chapter 10 for much more discussion of U.S. activities during the Cold War 
and Bachmann’s response to them.) It is thus quite understandable that Bach-
mann would figure domination as the omnipotent ruler of the largest city of the 
major Western superpower—the Good God of Manhattan. Conversely, at a 
time when, especially from a Central European perspective, any agent of social 
change that could oppose totalitarian control seemed absent or ineffective and 
domination seemed to have invaded the psyche itself, Bachmann, like Marcuse, 
looked for resistance in the one realm she could still imagine as uncontaminated 
by the social order: eroticism, the most intimate arena of private life. Similarly, 
in an era when women were strongly encouraged to withdraw from the public 
arena and define themselves as men’s opposites, Bachmann, like Marcuse, could 
imagine them as the antithesis of the social order that men controlled. Like 
Marcuse in search of an agent of rebellion against domination in a time of polit-
ical reaction, Bachmann makes eroticism that vehicle of liberation, and in her 
play the only force powerful enough to threaten the rule of the Good God is the 
passion of Jan and Jennifer, her ecstatic lovers.
There is a good deal of evidence for Bachmann’s familiarity with Marcuse’s 
thought in general and with Eros and Civilization in particular. She cites three 
works by Marcuse in the bibliography of her dissertation, though she does not 
discuss them in the text. And Robert Pichl, the administrator of the Bachmann 
archive, reports that at the time of her death her library contained several books 
by Marcuse published in the 1960s and 1970s (though not Eros and Civilization
in English or either of its two German translations [Pichl]). The composer Hans 
Werner Henze, Bachmann’s companion and housemate in the 1950s, reported 
in a 1988 interview that it was Bachmann who first brought Eros and Civilization
to his attention (Morris, interview), and though it is not clear when she first read 
it, one might surmise that she discussed it with Henze sometime before the end 
of 1958, when their close relationship ended (Hapkemeyer, Entwicklungslinien
99). In a 1999 interview Henze added, “Yes, we knew the author of that book. 
We often talked the whole evening about those things. It was quite wonderful 
[ganz schön]” (Morris, “Leben”). Eros and Civilization was published by Boston’s 
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Beacon Press in 1955, the year that Bachmann attended the Harvard summer 
seminar, and she might well have purchased an American copy. Perhaps Bach-
mann even met Marcuse during her visit to Boston, since he was teaching at 
Brandeis University then, and seminar participants were encouraged to pursue 
social contacts in the Boston community. Bachmann certainly had later Frank-
furt School connections: though Sigrid Weigel was unable to verify Kurt 
Bartsch’s claim that Bachmann stayed with Adorno while she prepared her 
Frankfurt lectures on poetics (Bartsch, Ingeborg 18), she documents Bachmann’s 
extensive relationship with Adorno from the time of the Frankfurt lectures 
onward (Weigel, Ingeborg 473). It is probably safe to assume some familiarity 
with Marcuse’s ideas among most left-liberal German-speaking intellectuals of 
Bachmann’s generation (whether they actually read his work or not), since Eros 
and Civilization played a major role in shaping the discourse on sexuality in 
Germany from the book’s publication in 1955 until well into the 1970s. In any 
case, as Foucault’s analysis of the repressive hypothesis suggests, Marcuse was to 
some degree merely a very talented compiler of some assumptions about power, 
sexuality, and femininity that were pervasive in the culture from which both 
Marcuse and Bachmann derived. 
Whenever it was that Bachmann first read Marcuse, it is apparent that some 
of the ideas she encountered in his work were ones at which she herself had 
already arrived independently. Her conception of love as an ecstatic, extrasocial 
“other condition” (W 1: 317) was influenced by Robert Musil, whose work she 
had first read in her teens (GuI 124) and with whose writing she again con-
cerned herself intensively in the early 1950s. Like Jan and Jennifer in “The Good 
God of Manhattan,” the protagonist of Bachmann’s first radio play, “A Business 
with Dreams” (1952, thus written before the publication of Eros and Civilization,
and also published in the Werke), also escapes from a debased reality into a realm 
of erotic fantasy and freedom. What is important for my argument here is not 
whether Marcuse influenced Bachmann (though I think he did) but rather how 
similarly they construct their discussions of particular problems. Following 
Foucault, that is what I mean by “discourse,” a term I use here to mean not just 
what is said about a topic such as domination, eroticism, or femininity but, more 
fundamentally, the largely unspoken rules that establish how, at any particular 
historical point, the topic can be conceptualized at all. Like a great many of their 
contemporaries, both Marcuse and Bachmann move within a discourse that 
rests upon the repressive hypothesis. They conceive of power and sexuality as 
binary opposites: power (in the form of domination) is a single, monolithic, all-
encompassing system of social control that endeavors to subsume all it surveys 
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and attempts to repress something conceived to be its opposite—sexuality, femi-
ninity—which originates in a realm outside of domination’s sway. 
The repressive hypothesis provides the structuring principles of “The Good 
God of Manhattan” and has also been central to many interpretations of Bach-
mann’s radio play. In a polemical 1970 exchange titled “War das Hörspiel der 
Fünfziger Jahre reaktionär? Eine Kontroverse am Beispiel von Ingeborg Bach-
manns ‘Der gute Gott von Manhattan’” (Was the radio play of the 1950s reac-
tionary? A controversy using the example of Ingeborg Bachmann’s “The Good 
God of Manhattan”), Wolf Wondratschek and Jürgen Becker (themselves both 
obviously influenced by the New Left rhetoric that was endemic to German cul-
tural criticism of that period) offered what might be regarded as a paradigmati-
cally Marcusean reading of Bachmann’s play. Both take for granted that the 
Good God embodies domination and that the lovers are his antagonists; what 
they debate is whether the play adequately explores why liberation is impossible 
in the world the play portrays. Wondratschek considers Bachmann’s radio play 
both reactionary and typical of its genre in the 1950s because it remains in the 
realm of dream and “leaves reality absolutely undamaged” (läßt allemal die 
Realität unbeschädigt, a phrase he borrows from Adorno). He faults Bachmann 
for failing to illuminate the objective conditions that were the real impediments 
to her doomed lovers’ happiness and charges her with addressing instead only the 
private realm of the emotions: “The author focuses completely on the no-man’s 
land of pure emotionality, though, to be sure, on its destruction, without investi-
gating existing forms of opposition to emotionality, which would clarify that that 
destruction is ‘of this world,’ as, after all, the reference to Manhattan in the title 
would seem to suggest” (190). But Becker comes to Bachmann’s defense. He sees 
in the figure of the Good God of Manhattan “the concretization of a very real 
and thoroughly social principle” (193) and understands that the play is not just 
about love but about liberation. It is because the radio play’s lovers anticipate an 
anarchic freedom from social constraints which the bourgeois order cannot toler-
ate, Becker argues, that the Good God must take action against them: “It’s not 
that love is destroyed, as Wondratschek puts it in his naive and bourgeois way, but 
rather that the interests of society, which is only willing to allow for happiness as 
a conventional existence in house slippers, prevail over the hopes, over the desires 
of individuals, who on behalf of everyone want not only to have achieved but also 
to practice a new consciousness of love and freedom.” Revealing the present social 
order’s profound hostility to the satisfaction of subjective needs, Bachmann’s radio 
play in Becker’s view thus accomplishes the political task most appropriate to lit-
erary works by drawing the legitimacy of that order into question “via the 
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destruction of the complicities that the present order of things produces in order 
to justify itself” (194).
As Wondratschek correctly perceives, Bachmann signals to her listeners that 
she is addressing contemporary concerns by making her God the ruler of Man-
hattan and by setting her play in a New York courtroom sometime in the 1950s.
“Manhattan” is a synecdochal representation of industrialized society in the 
West, “that city,” as Kurt Bartsch has put it, “that embodied the highest stan-
dard of Western civilization and the essence of progress for the bourgeois capi-
talist society of the 1950s” (Ingeborg 85). It’s possible as well that the “Manhat-
tan” of the title, especially when coupled with a bomb-throwing deity, recalls 
the Manhattan Project, which constructed the first atomic bomb, a technologi-
cal advance representing the highest pinnacle of “progress” that the Western 
civilization of the 1950s had achieved. Moreover, Bachmann’s lovers arrive in 
Manhattan by train, a figure in European literature for Western progress (“the 
engine of history”) since the invention of the railroad. 
Despite Wondratschek’s complaints about Bachmann’s lack of interest in 
social reality, by using anonymous voices to serve as the play’s chorus, her play 
thematizes the invasion of the public sphere by impersonal forces over which 
individuals have no control. As several commentators have pointed out, the 
voices evoke mass culture, endlessly repeating banal but vaguely ominous 
catchwords: “go at the green light proceed / remember as long as there is 
time / you can’t take it with you” (“GG” 9). Whether they are “an expres-
sion for the depersonalized rushing past one another and for the lack of human 
communication in the metropolis,” as Hilde Haider-Pregler argues (68), or, 
more likely, advertising slogans (as in Bachmann’s poem “Reklame” [Adver-
tisement, Storm 109]), they document American mass culture’s pervasive effects 
on daily life. As Andreas Hapkemeyer remarks (in rather highfalutin lan-
guage) of “Advertisement”: “Ingeborg Bachmann represents poetically what 
the philosopher and sociologist Herbert Marcuse, who lived in America for a 
long time, termed the magical, authoritarian, ritual elements of the media and 
advertising, which tend in the direction of preventing humans from pondering 
their most primordial questions, overlaying them with sham questions and 
answers” (Entwicklungslinien 85). When Jan, who has vowed to remain with 
Jennifer forever, drops into a bar on his way back from cashing-in his return 
ticket to Europe, the voices, emanating from the bar’s radio or television (and 
there identified explicitly as advertisements) demonstrate their efficacy as a 
mechanism of social control by successfully enticing him to reinvolve himself in 
the quotidian concerns of normal life.
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But apart from setting her play in a city that represents Western civilization’s 
furthest advance, Bachmann is otherwise not much interested in using it to 
explore the economic and political structures that sustain domination, as Won-
dratschek correctly observes. In “Die Wahrheit ist dem Menschen zumutbar” 
(Man can face the truth), the speech with which she accepted the “Hörspielpreis 
der Kriegsblinden” (Radio play prize of those blinded in wars) for this play, she 
explained that she wanted her writing to reveal the pain that is not so easily 
perceived: “That’s what art should bring about, that in this sense our eyes are 
opened” (W 1: 275). As she told an interviewer, she had intended that her radio 
play explore not “exterior” problems but what lay behind them: “In the great 
love dramas like, for instance, Romeo and Juliet or Tristan and Isolde, the destruc-
tion of the lovers is a consequence of external difficulties. I wanted to get rid of 
these external difficulties and show that something else stands behind them, a 
power that I have personified in the Good God” (GuI 56). In her Frankfurt 
lectures on poetics, she explained that in this century the subject [das Ich] stands 
in a different relationship than it had in earlier times to the historical conditions 
that produce it: “The first change that the subject experienced is that it no longer 
inhabits history but rather that recently history inhabits the subject” (W 4: 230). 
Exploring the consequences of the present form of social organization for sub-
jectivity, her writing was concerned with problems internal to the psyche; she 
explained in one of the prefaces to The Book of Franza that “the real settings” 
were “the interior ones, laboriously concealed over by the external” (Franza 4). 
This radio play thus addresses, as Hans Höller has pointed out, “interior events 
transposed to the outside,” “the objectification of love on the inner stage of the 
radio play” (“Szenen” 18). This is where Marcuse’s texts became useful for 
Bachmann: combining a social and a psychological analysis, his theory provided 
her with a discursive framework that allowed her to show how a historically 
specific social form might shape and deform subjectivity and what prospects 
might exist for eluding its grasp. 
Bachmann thus configures her Good God to correspond to the discourse of 
power on which Marcuse also drew. At the outset of the play, the old man ush-
ered into a New York courtroom on a hot August day in the 1950s appears to be 
a gangster or vagrant off the New York streets, on trial for committing what 
appear to be both senseless and brutal crimes: throwing bombs at a series of lov-
ers and most recently ordering the execution of a young American student 
named Jennifer, the victim of a bomb delivered to her hotel room by the God’s 
evil henchmen, the squirrels of Manhattan. But as the interrogation proceeds, the 
old man—whom the judge acknowledges to be “the Good God of Manhattan. 
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Others say the Good God of the Squirrels” (“GG” 57)— increasingly converses 
as an equal with the elderly judge. 
By the play’s end, the judge and the God agree that they are merely different 
incarnations of the same governing principle:
judge: There aren’t two judges here—just as there are not two orders.
good god: Then you must be in league with me, and I just don’t know it yet. 
Perhaps you didn’t intend to put me out of action but wanted to articulate 
something that is better left unsaid. Then the two keepers of order would 
be one and the same. (“GG” 91)
The God declares that he has committed violence against love to preserve the 
social order: “I did it so there would be peace and security, and so you could sit 
here quietly and observe your fingertips. So the way of all things remains the 
way we like it” (“GG” 90–91). Though the judge upholds the charge against 
the God—that is, acknowledges that he has committed the crime—no sen-
tence is passed, and the judge allows the God to leave by the side exit, thereby 
implicitly conceding that the God’s attacks on lovers were necessary to defend 
the single system which, two incarnations of the same principle, they both rep-
resent. The representation of power in this play thus conforms to the morphol-
ogy of power on which the repressive hypothesis depends. It is single, unitary, 
and total—“there are not two orders.” Explored via a courtroom trial, it is 
shown to take the rule of law (what Foucault called “juridico-discursive” [His-
tory 83]). It is a coherent system that stands in a negative relationship to those 
subject to it: it limits their freedom, demands their obedience to its general pre-
cepts, imposes prohibitions and sanctions and censorship, and punishes trans-
gressions. “Justice prevailed,” says the God (“GG” 80). Finally, figured as two 
male authority figures advanced in age in whom authority is embodied, power 
takes a shape that Foucault has termed monarchical: “At bottom, despite the 
differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained 
under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not 
cut off the head of the king” (History 88–89). 
The God thus might be regarded as something like Marcuse’s repressive per-
formance principle—his especially repressive incarnation of Freud’s reality prin-
ciple—which seeks to subdue Eros because it represents the “free gratification of 
man’s [sic] instinctual needs,” which is “incompatible with civilization” as pres-
ently organized (Eros 3). Toward the end of the play the God clarifies that love is 
the primary antagonist of his order in what he terms his “confession of faith”:
I believe in an order of things for everyone for every day that we live.
I believe in a great tradition and its great power, where all feelings and thoughts 
have a place, and I believe in death to its adversaries. I believe that love is on the 
dark side of the world, more destructive than any crime, than any heresy. I believe 
that, where it surfaces, a vortex forms like before the first day of Creation. I believe 
that love is innocent and leads to ruin, that you can only go on by accepting guilt 
and by operating through prescribed channels. (“GG” 90)
To ensure that the toil necessary to support civilization continues to be per-
formed, the performance principle must modify and channel humans’ origi-
nal desire for immediate pleasure: thus the God, mostly concerned with the 
regulation of subjectivity, demands that thoughts and feelings accommodate 
themselves to prevailing social arrangements—the “fixed order,” the “system of 
institutions, laws, agencies, things and customs” that are the “social content” of 
psychological processes (Marcuse, Eros 197). The God has no dispute with those 
who confine their sexuality to arrangements that serve the purposes of social 
reproduction: “But who cares about people who leave the straight and narrow 
for that freedom only to show instinct later. People who tamed that small, initial 
fire, who took it into their hands and built it into a cure for loneliness, a part-
nership, an economic interest group? A more acceptable status within society 
is thus created. Everything in balance and in order” (“GG” 90). (In Marcuse’s 
words: “The sex instincts bear the brunt of the reality principle. Their organi-
zation culminates in the subjection of the partial sex instincts to the primacy 
of genitality, and in their subjugation under the function of procreation” [Eros 
40].) But Love-as-Eros is a threat because it represents a form of psychic excess 
that always threatens to burst the bounds that the performance principle sets it, 
retaining a now-tabooed recollection of freedom and happiness against which 
the limited satisfactions of the present repressive order could be measured.
As the God’s confession of faith shows, love in this play is conceived of as an 
innate instinctual force prior to the law, “before the first day of Creation” on 
which the God brought his order into being, and for precisely that reason, 
because its innocent origins lie outside the law, the God considers love more 
dangerous than crimes or heresies that acknowledge the law while breaking it. 
The very incarnation of the principle of domination as a god, together with the 
religious language the God uses—”profession of faith,” “I believe,” “first day of 
Creation”—as well as the “hell” to which the squirrels earlier in the play con-
signed various other pairs of lovers, bestows metaphysical authority upon the 
God’s order and suggests the dire consequences of rebellion against it. Because 
chaos and disorder disrupt and subvert the order, the God declares that guilt—
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psychic violence turned inward— is necessary to tame the destructive force of 
love so that his order can survive. If this play is understood as an exteriorized 
account of events internal to the psyche, the God can be viewed as a figure for 
domination internalized within the psyche, repressing the sexual instincts by 
inflicting guilt in the manner that Marcuse described: “The restrictions imposed 
upon the libido . . . operate on the individual as external objective laws and as an 
internalized force: the societal authority is absorbed into the ‘conscience’ and 
into the unconscious of the individual and works as his own desire, morality, 
and fulfillment” (Eros 46). The Good God would thus become the embodiment 
of the “great Super Ego, exercising itself only in a negative way,” the terms in 
which Foucault (Power 59) described Marcuse’s concept of repression. 
Bachmann’s play constructs a complex series of images that elaborate upon the 
binary opposition on which the repressive hypothesis depends, counterposing the 
God’s single repressive principle of order to the lovers’ anarchic eroticism. Thus 
the God is associated with legality, territoriality, order, convention, and constraint, 
while the lovers are portrayed as exceeding the limits he sets. The God’s utilitar-
ian and pragmatic principles rule the day, but love is “on the dark side of the 
world” (“GG” 90) or even constitutes a different temporality altogether: “Anti-
time is now beginning” (“GG” 89). Often the lovers explicitly transgress the laws, 
regulations, or customs for which the God stands: they challenge the “rules of the 
game” (“GG” 69), “violated its every use” (“GG” 71), and threaten the “law of 
the world” (“GG” 85). Or the God’s realm is portrayed as a territory with par-
ticular demarcations whose borders the lovers transgress: they engage in “cross-
ing a boundary” (“GG” 89), break through “the crust of the earth” (“GG” 69), 
dissolve “the natural bounds” (90), and become a rebellious military force that 
fights for freedom: “Freedom. A mischief maker that takes possession of the 
legions of lovers and defends them blindly” (“GG” 78). Or they are even imag-
ined to be rare radioactive elements that contaminate the earth: “They are like 
those rare elements found here and there, those insane substances, with radioac-
tive and combustive power that destroy everything and call the world into ques-
tion. Even the memory of them contaminates the places they’ve touched” (“GG”
92–93). However it is figured, the love of Jan and Jennifer always functions as one 
pole of the opposition that structures the repressive hypothesis, simultaneously a 
destructive and disruptive force that negates the God’s values and a positive force 
that struggles for freedom against the God’s repressive order.
 Bachmann further underlines her play’s opposition of civilization and Eros 
by portraying love as a gypsy, drawing upon centuries of European projections 
onto gypsies that portray them as Western civilization’s negative and positive 
antagonists. Within the racist and orientalist discourses of Western Europe, 
gypsies’ status has some affinities to sexuality, embodying both a threat to social 
order and an imagined freedom from it. As “stereotypical figures of magic and 
menace,” Katie Trumpener has observed (849), they are used to figure whatever 
particular intellectual movements are regarded as civilization’s opposite: 
For neoclassicism they are there to symbolize a primitive democracy; for the late 
Enlightenment, an obstruction to the progress of civilization; for romanticism, 
resistance and the utopia of autonomy; for realism, a threat that throws the order 
and detail of everyday life into relief; for aestheticism and modernism, a primitive 
energy still left beneath the modern that drives art itself; and for socialist and post-
colonial fiction, finally, a reactionary or resistant cultural force that lingers outside 
of the welfare state or the imperial order. (874)
In her first appearance, approaching Jennifer in a nightclub to tell her fortune, 
the gypsy is already associated with other urban eccentrics and outcasts (a hand-
writing reader in the bar, a beggar on the steps) and marked by skin color and 
attitude as racially/ethnically other: “a real Gypsy,” says Jennifer, “brown, red, 
and so sad,” (in contrast to Jennifer herself, who is “pink and white” [“GG” 62,
76]). Representing herself as a fortuneteller, the gypsy is either a charlatan and 
fraud or one who can rupture the continuum of Western time to foretell the 
future, using magical talents quite at variance with the work skills demanded 
in a high-tech modern city. Later in the play the God makes the gypsy woman 
a trope for love itself, again constructed as his antagonist:
That’s why I’m on this Gypsy woman’s heels. For as long as I can remember, she 
doesn’t come from anywhere, she doesn’t live anywhere, and prefers this aerie. She 
walks with a stoop. But, then, without warning, she’ll take off up over the asphalt, 
up and away, without a trace—
Of love, I should say—
We can’t apprehend her and bring her here. And she will never give evidence. 
She’s nowhere to be found. Not even where she just was.
And I could swear that she still loved those two yesterday. She made the cactus 
bloom purple and the poplars loom in the darkness. And today she already loves 
two others and makes the mimosas tremble—
She has no conscience. Instead, she tightens up her black bodice, lets her red 
skirts swirl, then darkens someone else’s world with her immortally sad eyes. 
(“GG” 78–79)
Imagined to be immune from the effects of the order rather than bearing 
the marks of its treatment of her (a conception that must have been difficult 
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to sustain a decade after the Holocaust), Bachmann’s gypsy, like the marginal 
groups in Marcuse’s later works, is conceived of as the negation of a repressive 
civilization. Dressed in folkloristic attire inappropriate for a modern city (“black 
bodice,” “red skirts”), she is elusive (“we can’t apprehend her and bring her 
here”; “she’s nowhere to be found”); disrespectful of laws (“she will never give 
evidence”); without home or Heimat (“she doesn’t come from anywhere, she 
doesn’t live anywhere”); but attached to distant sensual realms (“purple cactus,” 
“mimosas”). This gypsy can even fly, suggesting that she shares some traits with 
the witch, another female figure discursively constructed as a threat to civilized 
order, and she dwells in an “aerie” with eagles, entirely beyond civilization’s 
reach. If there is only one order, this ethnic outsider is not part of it; like love, she 
is considered to be outside of culture altogether. The ease with which Bachmann 
can mobilize a discourse of ethnic otherness to support the repressive hypothesis 
may perhaps reveal an even more fundamental structure of binary opposition 
underlying Western thought—a central term counterposed to its threatening 
but alluring other—on which both discourses of ethnicity/nationhood and 
those of sexuality/gender depend.
As Bachmann’s play establishes the lovers’ and the God’s opposition, it also 
proceeds progressively to remove the lovers, as their passion grows, from arenas 
and activities that the God controls. The God never leaves the contained but 
public space of the courtroom (and he and the lovers never meet, since the 
squirrels act as his intermediaries). But the lovers first explore the four corners 
of Manhattan (the Bowery, Chinatown, Harlem, the Brooklyn Bridge) and 
then retreat to an alternative sphere that is both domestic and intensely private: 
a hotel room where they fry fish in the kitchenette, wash their socks in the 
bathroom sink and hang them over the shower bar, and glue broomstraw on 
the walls to make their retreat more nestlike: They “lock the door for the sec-
ond time” and then “get up still a third time to make sure it’s locked” (“GG”
79). Whereas the God is earthbound, the lovers escape into the heavens, seek-
ing the heights that the gypsy woman frequents: they spend their first night 
together on the ground floor of a “sleazy hotel” (“GG” 62) but move on subse-
quent nights to ever higher hotel rooms on the seventh, the thirtieth, and finally 
the fifty-seventh floor. As the God wryly comments, the higher they move, the 
more they leave the cares of daily life behind: “Everything sinks so visibly into 
the river bed below, with all its driftwood of further lovers, old burdens, help-
less raftsmen with short-term goals. A miniature version of everyday life is 
amusing. Observed from a distance, common sense shrinks down to size and, 
sadly, looks a lot like a speck of boredom” (“GG” 78). By the end of the play 
they have achieved their own version of heaven-on-earth, as Jan had predicted 
on the evening their affair began: 
jan: “You will spend this evening with Jennifer on this heavenly earth. . . .”
jennifer: Why “heavenly earth”?
jan: Because that’s the name here. Ma-na Hat-ta. That’s how some Indians 
explained it to me. (“GG” 61)
Jan and Jennifer thus associate themselves with the gypsy by also betaking 
themselves to a site of ethnic otherness, so that Manhattan stands no longer for 
New York City but for the oxymoronic “heavenly earth” of the Indians, the 
New World, the primeval virgin territory of innocent savages still uncorrupted 
by civilization.
Likewise, the activities in which the lovers engage challenge the God’s regime 
in ways that closely parallel Marcuse’s arguments. As they fall in love, they 
increasingly abandon purposive, goal-directed activity; their unmotivated laugh-
ter is the first indication that they will no longer accommodate themselves to the 
God’s order, as he recalls: “There was, for example, that laughter. Yes, to be 
exact, it began with that. (darkly) With that indescribable smile. Without any 
apparent provocation, they keep laughing. . . . They laugh in public but also in 
private. . . . That smile just sits there like a question mark, but it’s a very ruthless 
one” (“GG” 69). Their games, which serve no worthwhile end, are, the God 
tells the judge, the next sign: “Now they were at play. They played love. . . . But 
their playing was just like their laughter. They violated its every use” (“GG”
70–71). (As Marcuse observes, “Play is unproductive and useless precisely because 
it cancels the repressive and exploitive traits of labor and leisure” [Eros 195]). 
Increasingly the lovers’ relationship to language changes, as they replace rep-
resentational language with figuration. In the throes of passion, Jan proclaims 
the advent of a new language predicated upon the renunciation of purposive-
ness: “I know nothing else except that I want to live and die here with you. And 
speak to you in a new language. I no longer have a career, and I can no longer 
run a business. I’m not useful anymore and I must abandon everything. I want 
to divorce myself from everyone else” (“GG” 92). One might read the lovers’ lyri-
cal exchanges as an effort to retreat to a realm of imagination and art where they 
can reestablish contact with the pleasure principle that still rules the unconscious. 
Jan’s ecstatic prose poems affirm language as metaphor and reconfigure the 
boundedness of bodies as he probes Jennifer’s body parts and seeks a travel guide 
that will explain the wondrous delights of this strange new land: “And I want a 
book that tells what exists in you, your climate, flora and fauna, the causes of your 
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sicknesses, and their silent opponents in your blood. The organisms, the tiniest 
ones that I take in when I kiss you. I’d like just once to see what happens in the 
evening when your body is illuminated and warm and ready to celebrate. I can 
already see something now: transparent fruits and precious stones, carnelian and 
ruby, shining materials” (“GG” 87). As Judith Butler suggests of Monique 
Wittig’s The Lesbian Body, Jan’s disaggregation of Jennifer’s body is a protest 
against an order that insists upon impermeable bodily boundaries, “the decon-
struction of constructs that are always already a kind of violence against the bod-
ies’ possibilities” (Butler 126). In Marcusean terms, the body is “resexualized,” 
and this spread of the libido manifests itself “in a reactivation of all erotogenic 
zones and, consequently, in a resurgence of pregenital polymorphous sexuality 
and in a decline of genital supremacy. The body in its entirety [becomes] an 
object of cathexis, a thing to be enjoyed—an instrument of pleasure” (Eros 201).
Still, though Jan and Jennifer together establish their love as a counterrealm 
where the values of the performance principle no longer obtain, the play makes 
very clear that the lovers are far from equally willing to yield themselves to an 
eroticism that challenges civilization itself. It’s Jennifer who makes the first 
advances to Jan and very soon devotes herself entirely to her love for him, where-
as Jan is initially much more reluctant to involve himself in a relationship beyond 
the level of dalliance and sexual adventure—a posture that does not bother the 
God at all: “I have nothing against the frivolous, the bored and the lonely who 
break down now and then. They don’t want to be alone and just kill time” 
(“GG” 67). Jan maintains an ironic and often brutal distance from Jennifer’s 
efforts to elicit gestures of affection from him, demanding an “agreement on 
distance” (“GG” 69), treating language as a manipulable tool that helps him 
achieve his amorous ends: “Should I tell you something about a few women, or 
very many, about disappointments—that’s what you call it, right? Or unforget-
table experiences. I’m familiar with the vocabulary, and I’ve come up with a few 
versions of my past. Depending on the context” (“GG” 82).
As he finally recognizes that their love will transport him to a utopian realm 
that will leave the terms of his prior life far behind, he prepares himself for 
transfiguration: “I want to break free of all the years and all the thoughts of all 
the years. I want to tear down this structure that I am, and I want to be the 
other person I never was” (“GG” 84). Yet his attachment to daily life remains 
strong. Even after he has pledged himself to Jennifer and canceled his ship 
ticket back to Europe, he succumbs to the momentary temptation to stop at a 
bar, as the judge reports with satisfaction: 
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Because suddenly, once the decision had been made, he felt like being alone. He
wanted to sit alone for half an hour, think as he had thought before, and speak as 
he had spoken before, in places which meant nothing to him, and to people who 
meant nothing to him. He had lapsed. Routine stretched its hand out to him for 
a moment. He was normal, healthy, and honest like a man who has a quiet drink 
before dinner and has banished his lover’s whisper from his ear, her alluring scent 
from his nostrils—a man . . . whose eyes come to life again at the sight of news-
print, a man who has to dirty his hands at a bar again. (96).
So Jan is not in the hotel room when the Good God’s bomb explodes, it’s 
Jennifer alone who dies for love, and, in an ironic echo of the end of Faust the 
God can proclaim Jan “saved” (“GG” 189) because he has not fundamentally 
contravened the God’s order: “The earth had him back again” (96). 
The effect of the play’s ending is thus to associate Jan with the principle of 
power the God represents, despite Jan’s effusive assurances to the contrary, and 
domination is associated not just with modernity or rationalization but also 
with men. By default, a woman, Jennifer, whose erotic transport condemns her 
to death, remains as the embodiment of a subversive and transgressive sexuality 
that challenges the God’s performance principle. It was Jan for whom the gypsy 
woman foretold a long life (62), while Jennifer, extracted from the God’s tempo-
ral continuum, had no future to read. It is Jennifer alone who suffers the Liebes-
tod and enters into what Foucault calls another kind of Faustian pact, willing to 
risk life for love: “to exchange life in its entirety for sex itself, for the truth and 
sovereignty of sex. Sex is worth dying for” (History 156). Though Bachmann’s 
play began by posing Eros as the negation of and alternative to domination (the 
God spoke only of “couples” undistinguished by gender), it ends by aligning 
men/masculinity with the principle the God represents, and Jennifer becomes 
merely another exotic New World woman seduced and abandoned by the Euro-
pean conqueror. Though the play never explicitly thematizes gender, the conse-
quence of making Jennifer the figure that stands for sexual freedom is, as in 
Marcuse’s theory, to associate men with domination, while femininity (or female 
sexuality)—Jennifer and her mentor, the gypsy woman—embodies Eros con-
ceived of as the subversion of governing values, a principle of resistance so 
unwaveringly opposed to domination that Eros can never be recuperated. Fem-
inists will recognize this elision of femininity with sexuality as a familiar sexist 
notion that men have embraced for centuries: as Simone de Beauvoir put it in 
The Second Sex: “[Woman] is called ‘the sex,’ by which is meant that she appears 
essentially to the male as a sexual being. For him she is sex—absolute sex, no 
less” (xvi). Bachmann’s recourse to an essentialist conception of woman as civili-
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zation’s other once more reveals this play to be a product of the profoundly 
misogynist period in which it was written.
If Bachmann’s reliance on various elements of a theoretical model that more 
recent feminist theorists have called into question characterized only this single 
radio play, this chapter might be worth no more than a footnote in Bachmann 
studies. But in fact it can be shown that this same constellation structures much 
of her later writing; as Jürgen Seim remarked, it is “often the case in Ingeborg 
Bachmann’s work” that “the woman alone bears the suffering of love” (398). In
the later texts a patriarchal principle often imposes its control on an isolated 
female figure who serves as the repository of an alternative dream of freedom. 
Three related conceptions continue to shape Bachmann’s later writing: woman 
as “disloyal to civilization” (to use Adrienne Rich’s term), woman as embodi-
ment of Eros, and woman as victim. As Kurt Bartsch has noted: “The paradig-
matic opposition of masculine-rational and female-emotional, the failure to 
integrate reason and emotion as well as the ending (return to existing social 
constraints or destruction) characterize both the radio plays and the fiction of 
Ingeborg Bachmann, and there not just the stories that are obviously about 
women” (Ingeborg 88).
Undine of “Undine Goes” counterposes the marvelous accomplishments of 
civilization that a generic “Hans” has brought into being to the lure of liberation 
that she represents and, more feisty than most of Bachmann’s female characters, 
returns to her watery realm rather than accommodate herself to his terms. Ritta 
Jo Horsley maintains that “Undine Goes” is pervaded by a dualism that it never 
explicitly challenges: “On the contrary, by hypostatizing the traditional dichoto-
mies into male and female figures it reaffirms a dualistic model. The opposi-
tions of culture and nature; rationality and feeling; logical discourse and poetic 
utterance; social order and ecstasy of freedom; and masculine and feminine are 
assumed as given, and by their eloquent embodiment gain new power” (“Re-
reading” 234). In The Book of Franza Leopold Jordan stands for science, mascu-
linity, and whiteness; he seeks to eradicate all that can’t be contained within his 
categories, including his wife Franza’s subjectivity and sexuality as well as vari-
ous other victims that are associated with her, such as Jews and colonized peo-
ples. As Franza recalls: “He stole all of my possessions. . . . I am a Papua” (Franza
80; translation modified).
A number of critics have commented on the parallels between Malina and 
“The Good God of Manhattan.” Hans Mayer called his review of the novel 
“Malina oder Der große Gott von Wien” (Malina, or the Great God of Vienna) 
and remarked: “This first novel also addresses the fundamental old theme: the 
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irreconcilability of contemporary society with that which German classic-
ism wanted to understand as harmonious development of the personality. In
Ingeborg Bachmann’s well-known radio play, the Good God of Manhattan 
kills those who truly love because in the unconditionality of their emotions, 
they endanger the dominant order of alienation” (164). Angelika Mechtel sim-
ilarly observed in her review of Malina: “There are also parallels to Ingeborg 
Bachmann’s radio play The Good God of Manhattan. There nothing is allowed 
to exist in this administered and neatly arranged world except that which 
allows itself to be administered and arranged into its proper place, for instance, 
a love that leads to self-abandonment” (185). 
Even in Three Paths to the Lake, whose female characters seem most fully 
integrated into a society that is destroying them, some repressed aspect of their 
psyche rebels and cries out for help. Thus in “The Barking” the senile Frau 
Jordan believes she hears barking dogs that will avenge her ill treatment by her 
son. Miranda is the happy victim of a hysterical myopia that allows her not to see 
ugliness in “Eyes to Wonder,” a story dedicated to Georg Groddeck, who, sev-
eral decades before Freud, “discovered” the Id, the repressed component of the 
human psyche that actually controls human behavior. As Bachmann explained 
in her enthusiastic review of Groddeck’s Book of the It: “The Ego is a mark, the 
manner with which each of us goes around, and we are ruled by the Id, the Id
does it, and it speaks in symbols through sickness” (W 4: 352). It can thus be 
argued that the repressive hypothesis underlies much of the work that has 
brought Bachmann feminist renown in the years since she was rediscovered by 
the women’s movement in the late 1970s. Indeed, chapter 2 of this book provides 
a great deal of evidence to substantiate that argument, and chapter 3 illustrates 
how I myself fell prey to the repressive hypothesis.
As detailed in the commentaries to the chapters of Part Two, such feminist 
ideas about a single essential principle of womanhood uncontaminated by the 
characteristics of the culture from which particular women derive have more 
recently fallen into great disrepute. In part under the influence of Foucault, 
whose impact on Anglo-American feminist scholarship has been considerable, 
most feminist scholars in this country now repudiate the use of essentialism for 
anything but strategic purposes and regard women as the complexly structured 
products of the discursive and nondiscursive forces of the society in which they 
are situated. (Judith Butler has commented, for instance: “The female body that 
is freed from the shackles of the paternal law may well prove to be yet another 
incarnation of that law, posing as subversive but operating in the service of that 
law’s amplification and proliferation” [93].) Such analyses were much slower to 
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seep into Germany, and some German feminist scholars have suggested that 
German women have a particular investment in female victimhood because it 
allows them to ignore women’s complicity in German fascism (Frauen gegen 
Antisemitismus). Ingeborg Bachmann’s work (including her treatment of fascism) 
has played some role in allowing German women to situate themselves outside 
their own culture, whose crimes thus become the responsibility only of men. 
Thus, if my analysis of Bachmann’s writing here is correct, a feminist rethinking 
of Bachmann’s work might also assist in promoting some other much-needed 
changes in analyses produced by the German women’s movement.
Yet as I suggested at the outset of this chapter, interpretations of Bachmann 
that rest on the repressive hypothesis are not the only readings possible. It can 
also be argued that Bachmann’s representation of femininity and female sexual-
ity is much more complex than the foregoing account might seem to indicate. It
is a comment on several generations of this play’s readers that virtually no one 
before Peter Beicken (who has himself obviously been influenced by American 
feminism) mentioned the sadomasochistic elements of Jan and Jennifer’s rela-
tionship, which are not in conflict with but a necessary component of the inten-
sification of their love. Beicken has pointed out that from the beginning, their 
relationship is embedded in a violence that belies its presentation as an alterna-
tive to the God’s order:
The destructive influence of socially mediated violence also makes itself felt in the 
relationship between Jennifer and Jan. How much this violence is a counterpart to 
the love plot can be recognized in various statements, particularly by Jan, whose 
aggression extends beyond mere threats and has real violent physical acts as its 
consequence, as the scars on Jennifer’s hands prove. Psychic violence is also part 
of Jan’s normal behavioral norms. . . . One could speculate in various ways to get 
to the bottom of this question: for instance, does Jennifer accede to this because 
she’s prepared to suffer; because love is always a risk that includes injury and loss 
of self; because this female type in accord with the 1950s is prepared to accept male 
violence or inability to love as natural; because a women who loves is prepared to 
subordinate herself. (120–21)
Pursuing Beicken’s suggestions, one might read in this and other Bachmann 
texts stories of masculinity and femininity as a particular historical period con-
structs them. Beicken views Jan’s sadism as one more component of the God’s 
order: “What makes Jan receptive for the agency dealing with him, what finally 
makes him behave in accordance with the will of the Good God, is his internal-
ization of masculine role expectations that are also in conformity with the norms 
of social convention that the God represents” (“GG” 120). That may indeed be 
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the case. But what is more important for a new feminist reading of this play is 
that Bachmann shows submission to male power, female masochism, as the 
enabling condition of a female eroticism that is willing to embrace its own oblit-
eration and destruction (Jennifer declares: “Soon I’ll be nothing,” and “I would 
be free of myself” [“GG” 91]) in order to love. That construction of femininity 
and sexuality constitutes a second discourse in “The Good God of Manhattan” 
much at variance with the first, which offers the possibility of a quite different 
feminist reading of this play.
Jessica Benjamin’s study The Bonds of Love is very useful for thinking about 
the question of masochism from a feminist perspective. Benjamin also rejects 
the repressive hypothesis, the opposition between instinct and civilization, and 
draws on Foucault to maintain that desire is a production of power that func-
tions “not by denying our desire but by forming it, converting it into a willing 
retainer, its servant or representative” (4). Adapting a male-dominant Freudian 
psychoanalysis for feminist purposes, she argues that a society that configures 
the male and female psyche as ours does cannot permit the reconciliation of 
female agency and female desire. Instead, sexual complementarity, she main-
tains, demands that “man expresses desire and woman is the object of it.” Thus 
“woman’s missing desire often takes the form of adoring the man who possesses 
it,” and “women seem to have a propensity for what we may call ‘ideal love’—a 
love in which the woman submits to and adores an other who is what she cannot 
be” (86). Voluntary submission to the man’s erotic domination thus somewhat 
paradoxically allows the woman to achieve independence and gratification via 
obedience to and identification with the one who possesses it. The more she 
abandons herself to a man who transgresses her boundaries and violates her 
autonomy, the greater her satisfaction. Her pleasure derives from her knowledge 
of her subjugation by him, and her surrender to him confirms her connection to 
the power and desire she wishes to possess herself. Benjamin argues that in a 
male-dominant, gender-polarized society, where woman is, as de Beauvoir put 
it, “man’s primary other, his opposite—playing nature to his reason, immanence 
to his transcendence, primordial oneness to his individuated separateness, and 
object to his subject” (quoted in Benjamin 7), the fulfillment of female desire 
takes the form of submission to the male will, a structure of domination anchored 
deep within the female psyche.
Benjamin’s analysis makes it possible to read “The Good God of Manhattan” 
also as a story of the social construction of female desire. At the play’s outset, 
Jennifer is introduced as a modern woman (one reason it is necessary for her to 
be an American) who possesses agency and seems to control her own desire: she 
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is a student of political science (still not exactly a feminized field) who travels to 
New York on her own, makes the first sexual advances to Jan, a strange Euro-
pean man, casually recounts her own erotic adventures with a variety of men at 
college (“And Arthur kisses me goodnight, or Mark, or Truman”), and, though 
she knows it’s unorthodox (“One shouldn’t go into hotels with strangers. Isn’t 
that right?”), spends the night with Jan in a sleazy hotel (“GG” 63, 64). Yet from 
the beginning of their relationship, Jennifer wants Jan to hurt her, physically 
and psychically (that is, where her desire is at issue, she employs her agency to 
bring about his domination and her submission). She is responsible for urging 
Jan to dig his nails into her palms, as he reminds her when she complains of the 
pain: “You’re the one who’s been leading me on. I’ve never wanted to hurt some-
one like that” (“GG” 64). Once she’s fallen in love, this independent young 
woman yields the initiative to Jan entirely, and he takes the lead in determining 
the course of the love affair, deciding when they should remain together and 
when they should part; he teases and taunts her while she bows to his demands 
and whims. When he threatens to beat her because she has dared to agree to his 
demand that they part (“I should beat you in front of all these people—I’m 
going to beat you” [“GG” 170]), she agrees eagerly. Though, as I suggested 
earlier, Jan’s exploration of the flora and fauna of the far reaches of Jennifer’s 
body can be read as a challenge to genital supremacy and the boundedness of 
the body, it is also given the shape of a voyage of discovery, with Jan as the colo-
nial (European) master who takes possession of this virgin land (another read-
ing of Jennifer as representative of the New World), who willingly yields herself 
to him: “If only I could do more, tear myself open for you and give you my every 
fiber, every bone in my body, just as it should be,” says Jennifer (“GG” 88). Jan’s 
domination and Jennifer’s submission to it drive her, the play’s dialogue sug-
gests, to unknown heights of passion:
jan: Is that what’s become of you! Just look at you! From a pink girl with dia-
ries, good-night kisses, necking in cars with Truman and notebooks full of 
doodles under your arm, very nice, and how do you like it? . . .
jennifer: Save me! From you and from myself. . . .
jan: Are you crying? Go ahead and cry!
jennifer: Do you think we’re insane?
jan: Maybe.
jennifer: Do you despise me?
jan: Just a little. Just enough so you never cease to amaze me. (“GG” 81)
In their last scene together, Jennifer submits entirely to Jan—against his will!— 
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constructing him as a traditional patriarch to whom she wishes only to subor-
dinate herself: 
jennifer (slowly as she falls to her knees): Oh, it’s true. Never again.
jan: What are you doing? Don’t do that!
jennifer: Kneeling before you and kissing your feet? I’ll do it forever. And I’ll 
walk three steps behind you, wherever you go. I’ll drink only after you have 
drunk. I’ll eat after you’ve eaten. Wake, when you sleep. (“GG” 92)
The portrayal of Jennifer suggests that Bachmann, like Benjamin, views female 
autonomy and female desire as mutually exclusive. In the realm of eroticism, 
Jennifer uses her agency to bring about her own subordination. Though she 
is a victim in this play, it is a victimhood she actively seeks as the condition of 
her own erotic satisfaction. Within this discourse of sexual complementarity, 
women must become men’s sexual objects to meet their own erotic needs. To
realize her desire, Jennifer is willing to renounce her position as Jan’s equal and 
embrace her own subordination. 
The question of masochism (a subject that feminists have generally not been 
eager to address) needs much more investigation in Bachmann’s writing. A pas-
sage from an unpublished preface to The Book of Franza suggests that Bach-
mann connected issues of sadism and masochism to the questions her “Ways of 
Death” pursued: “I come from a country, without showing off about its geniuses, 
which has always concerned itself with those unknown beings, human beings, 
their unfathomability, profundity. I also don’t have any explanation for why a 
number of revolutionary discoveries have taken place in my country. I’m just 
acknowledging it. From the undiscovered Sacher Masoch to the greatest pio-
neer, Sigmund Freud, however historical he may also have been, this line has 
never broken off, this recherche” (TP 2: 16).
Perhaps some of the passages Bachmann underlined in her 1918 edition of 
Otto Weininger’s Geschlecht und Charakter (Sex and character) are also relevant 
to the construction of femininity within a discourse of sexual complementarity: 
“Woman is only sexual, man is also sexual” (114); “Coitus is the highest value of 
woman, she seeks to realize it always and everywhere” (354); “The female seeks 
her perfection as object” (396; Bothner 214). Pursuing these hints, one might 
argue that her play draws attention to the way that femininity is constituted at a 
particular historical juncture, thematizing what Foucault called the “hysteriza-
tion” or “sexualization” of women’s bodies, a conception of the feminine body 
that conceives it to be “thoroughly saturated with sexuality” (History 104). This 
interpretation would hold good whether the play is regarded as a representa-
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tion of the nature of social relations between men and women in “Manhattan” 
or as an exploration of intrapsychic reality, as Hapkemeyer has suggested: “Jan 
and Jennifer can be interpreted as lovers, but also as two components of the 
same personality, which the names already suggest, which derive from a com-
mon root” (Entwicklungslinien 87). (It’s not in fact true that the name “Jennifer” 
derives from “Jan”—it is a variant of “Winifred”—but Bachmann might well 
have wished to use the linguistic similarity of the two names to suggest that 
psychically Jennifer was a product of, dependent upon, or subordinate to Jan.) 
By portraying a female figure whose erotic satisfaction derives from her sexual 
subordination, Bachmann draws upon a discourse of sexuality that understands 
power as producing, proliferating, and intensifying sexuality rather than repress-
ing it. Instead of embodying a pre- or extrasocial sexuality, within that second 
discourse Jennifer is interpellated into an already gendered discourse of sexual-
ity within which female desire is defined as subordinate to men’s. Though it is 
certainly an exaggeration to say that this second discourse prefigures Foucault, 
the position Bachmann assumes in her treatment of Jennifer is close to what 
Foucault proposed when he argued, “We must not think that by saying yes to 
sex, one says no to power” (History 157). A reading of this play that stresses the 
second discourse (which is, I think, entirely irreconcilable with the first) makes 
it possible both to criticize aspects of this work which remain rooted in their 
time and to produce interpretations that speak to feminists of the present day. 
A reading of “The Good God of Manhattan” that investigates the work’s 
conflicts and tensions instead of attempting to produce a unitary interpretation 
might in addition identify a number of other discourses in the play which also 
contradict or undercut aspects of what I have identified as its dominant dis-
course. Bachmann’s representation of New York City is another site where con-
tradictory discourses intersect. If “Manhattan” stands for the single order of the 
God, Bachmann simultaneously portrays it as a locus of eclectic urban activity 
where everything is permitted and possible: “This city of cities, in its restlessness 
and agony, took in everyone. Anything could thrive here!” (“GG” 168). Although 
cultural critics such as Marcuse and other members of the Frankfurt School 
were appalled by American mass culture, Bachmann’s lovers are in contrast 
delighted by it: collecting plastic swizzle sticks from a bar and paper fans depict-
ing Catherine of Sienna from a church; playing music in a record shop in 
Harlem “in the company of several blacks”; riding a horse-drawn carriage in 
Central Park, where they are overtaken by drum majorettes leading a parade of 
war veterans (“GG” 68, 71). Far from being a location where all is reduced to a 
single uniform standard, Manhattan offers a variety of sensual pleasures: one can 
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eat “Italian and Chinese, Spanish and Russian”; stand “on Broadway under the 
Pepsi Cola waterfall, near the big Lucky Strike smoke ring” (“GG” 61 70); or 
purchase almost anything. 
Joseph Strutz has pointed out that the God himself depicts New York as a 
“site of social chaos” (381), using exuberant figurative language that recalls 
Georg Heym’s expressionist poem “Der Gott der Stadt” (The god of the city). 
Manhattan’s squirrels, the God’s henchmen, can perhaps even be read as simi-
larly ambiguous figures: their service to the God may underline that in the 
world the God controls, even nature has been brought under the sway of domi-
nation, yet these quirky talking animals also seem to derive from a magical 
realm (part Brothers Grimm, part Walt Disney) qualitatively distinct from the 
God’s grim rationalized regime. (On the other hand, if Bachmann’s inspiration 
for squirrels in the service of “Manhattan” derives from the U.S. plan in sum-
mer 1948 for provisioning Vienna in the event of a Soviet blockade, code-named 
“squirrel cage” [Bischof, “Austria Looks” 188], then the squirrels indeed serve 
the God’s totalitarian order.) Within the logic of this play, there seems to be no 
explanation for why the city of Manhattan is represented as a heterogeneous 
center of urban delights that escapes the God’s total power; after all, the God 
presents himself as the agent of an order that controls everything but love. It
thus seems necessary to view Bachmann’s play as existing at the intersection of 
two conflicting 1950s discourses on “America” (or its synecdochal representa-
tion, Manhattan), the one portraying the U.S. as the highest stage of a rational-
ized technological progress tending ever more toward totalitarianism, the other 
treating the United States as a land of unlimited possibilities for which Europe-
ans yearned.
A reading of “The Good God of Manhattan” stressing its contradictions offers 
another sort of insight into Bachmann’s later works. Viewed through the lens of 
newer feminist analyses, those texts can be read as representations of femininity 
as a particular period constructed it, instead of (or as well as) accounts of female 
victims extracted from time and space who are oppressed by all-powerful men. 
Bachmann’s female figures would then no longer seem to stand for a transhis-
torical, essentialized principle of womanhood but could be understood as prod-
ucts of the political systems of which their lives are part. The failure of Bach-
mann’s female figures to comprehend or challenge the power men exercise over 
them could be viewed as a representational strategy that allowed Bachmann to 
portray her women as they understood themselves. Indeed, Bachmann sug-
gested something of this sort when she maintained in the preface to Franza that 
her “ways of death” took place “at times, within the thinking that leads to 
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a crime, and at times, within that which leads to dying” (Franza 4): if a certain 
kind of (male) thinking allows men to destroy women, another and related 
kind of (female) thinking produces women who accede to, even embrace, their 
victimization. That construction of femininity assumes its clearest form in the 
relationship of the “I” of Malina to Ivan, who treats her as badly as Jan treats 
Jennifer and whose every wish she nonetheless desires to satisfy. Loving Ivan is 
the condition of her (female) existence (“I live in Ivan,” says the “I” [Malina
24]), and the end of Ivan’s love for her means her end, too: as Malina, her male 
doppelgänger, declares at the end of the novel, “There is no woman here” 
(Malina 224). That is how Bachmann’s writing represents “history within the 
I/psyche” (what Foucault called the “body totally imprinted by history” [Lan-
guage 148]): Bachmann’s female figures are completely congruent with the his-
torically specific discourses that call them into being. 
To understand Bachmann’s texts in this manner, it would be necessary to read 
her narrative standpoint as always an ironic one (as Irene Holeschofsky has sug-
gested of Three Paths to the Lake): though her female characters entirely affirm 
the categories that engender them and attempt to make the best of what they 
never even recognize as a bad situation, we readers are intended to understand 
the costs to them of the social circumstances to whose dictates they conform. 
That, I think, would provide a new and useful reading strategy for Bachmann’s 
“Ways of Death” and could also explain why she abandoned The Book of 
Franza—whose protagonist does understand and rebel against what has been 
done to her—for the more complex literary strategies of Malina and Three Paths 
to the Lake, whose female figures can never construct a narrative that allows them 
to talk about their own destruction: “I’m not telling, I won’t talk, I can’t,” says the 
“I” (Malina 172); “although all these stories were true, she omitted others because 
they were badly suited for telling,” thinks Elisabeth Matrei in “Three Paths to the 
Lake” (Paths 132; translation modified). What would still be missing from such 
an analysis, because feminist methodology as yet provides no tools to undertake 
it, is a reading of Bachmann’s figures’ psychological constitution as a product of a 
very specific historical period. That reading would not propose that Jennifer is a 
masochist or the female protagonist of Malina is murdered just because they are 
women living under modern Western patriarchy, but, more specifically, investi-
gate how Jennifer’s psychic makeup might be related to the cold war or how the 
“I” might be a product of Vienna in the 1960s. In chapter 10 I begin such an 
investigation; more generally, however, devising a methodology that would enable 
such inquires into the relationship of literary texts to extraliterary historical pro-
cesses and forces remains an unfinished project of feminist literary scholarship.
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Yet, even should such problems be solved, I would not attempt to argue that 
a reading of Bachmann’s texts based on current (or future) Anglo-American 
feminist thinking would be the correct one while all others are wrong. Nor do I
maintain that the first reading I advanced of Bachmann, based on the repressive 
hypothesis, is false. That aspect of Bachmann’s writing really is there, as I hope 
I have shown, and earlier feminists did not misread her when they underlined 
those dimensions of her work. Both of the readings I have proposed here can be 
supported by textual evidence and emphasize aspects of her play that continued 
to inform her writing through the “Ways of Death.” In fact, her works oscillate 
between these two conceptions of femininity, which cannot at all be harmo-
nized with each other. Rather, by emphasizing two disparate readings of this 
radio play, I want to make two larger methodological points. First, Bachmann’s 
texts (like almost everything else) are not of a single piece but sites where contra-
dictory discourses intersect; second, readings of Bachmann’s works, as of any 
text, are always interested, stressing what meets their readers’ needs and disre-
garding what seems of less utility (as I myself have done). I am arguing that it is 
now time for Bachmann’s feminist critics to undertake new readings of her 
works that would both question what is timebound, outmoded, and problem-
atic in her writing and explore ways in which her texts could be reread to address 
new feminist concerns. It seems very likely that the postulation of masculinity 
and femininity (or power and sex) as mutually exclusive oppositions both natu-
ralizes and stabilizes cultural constructions that are not in feminists’ interests 
and also prevents us from seeing an actually much more contradictory and 
unstable reality into which different kinds of political interventions would be 
necessary. If one reading of Bachmann may naturalize an essentialist conception 
of an inherently subversive sexuality or femininity, another reading can draw 
such notions into question again. As Judith Butler has suggested, “If the regula-
tory fictions of sex and gender are themselves multiply contested sites of mean-
ing, then the very multiplicity of their construction holds out the possibility of a 
disruption of their univocal posturing” (32). That could be a feminist strategy 
for reading Bachmann’s works, too. 
In endeavoring to reread Bachmann from a more historical perspective, fem-
inist critics who view her texts as products of a period that is now past would be 
doing no more than reacknowledging what Bachmann herself conceded in her 
Frankfurt lectures: “Thinking, rooted in time, also succumbs to time” (W 4:
195). She, too, for better or for worse, bore the imprint of the time that produced 
her as she struggled to meet the charge she set the writer: “In the best case, one 
can succeed at two things: to represent one’s times, and to present something 
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whose time hasn’t come yet” (W 4: 196). Perhaps also in a different way than 
she intended, Bachmann represented the thinking of her time, and some of 
those strategies of representation now seem no longer altogether adequate to 
our own. We feminist literary historians can nonetheless honor Bachmann’s 
radio play for its “resolute attempt to keep the space of emancipation open” (as 
Douglas Kellner remarked of Eros and Civilization [156]) in a time of political 
reaction, undertaking new feminist readings that do not abandon the emanci-
patory goal at which her text aimed.
CHAPTER 9
Bachmann and Postcolonial Theory
WHITE LADIES AND DARK CONTINENTS
. . . the psyche of the whites, which was 
obviously more threatened than he could 
imagine . . . 
—Ingeborg Bachmann, The Book of Franza
“[Austria] is different from all other little countries today because 
it was an empire and it’s possible to learn something from its history. And 
because the lack of activity into which one is forced there enormously sharpens 
one’s view of the big situation and of today’s empires,” Ingeborg Bachmann 
observed in a 1971 interview (GuI 106). The postcolonial theory developed since 
1990 helps to explain why and how Bachmann was able to use her Austrian 
vantage point as a privileged perspective from which to regard “today’s empires” 
and the forms of imperialism for which they have been responsible. For over a 
decade, postcolonial scholars have argued that European history cannot be 
detached from the history of Europe’s imperialist practices; as Anne McClintock 
puts it, “Imperialism is not something that happened elsewhere—a disagreeable 
fact of history external to Western identity. Rather, imperialism and the inven-
tion of race were fundamental aspects of Western industrial modernity” (5). 
Postcolonial theorists and a range of scholars investigating the construction 
of “whiteness” have recently begun to demonstrate that the racial formations of 
the imperial world were constitutive of white European identities in the metro-
pole as well as in the colonies, “race” thus helping to define the most intimate 
domains of modern life—including gender relations, the sexual politics of the 
private sphere, and sexuality itself. As I have emphasized in previous chapters, 
Bachmann maintained that in twentieth-century literary texts history could no 
longer be treated as an external medium in which figures acted but must instead 
be regarded as a force that configures the self: “history within the‘I’/psyche”
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(W 4: 230). Reading the “Ways of Death” through the lens offered by postcolo-
nial theory can show how Bachmann represents imperialism past and present as 
a component of history central to the constitution of her characters.
As its title suggests, this chapter focuses on how Bachmann represents the 
relationship of imperialism to the construction of the white female psyche in the 
“Ways of Death.” “White Lady” (in English) is a phrase Bachmann associates 
with Eka Kottwitz, one of the figures in a “Ways of Death” fragment (TP 1:
424; a point I explore in greater detail below); “Dark Continent” (in English) is 
the term Freud used in The Question of Lay Analysis to describe “the sexual life 
of adult women” (20: 212). Freud’s use of this image—the term Victorians 
applied to an Africa to which their own imperialist activities would bring light 
(Brantlinger)—reveals, Mary Ann Doane has argued, the imperial underpin-
nings of Freud’s theory: “The force of the category of race in the constitution of 
Otherness within psychoanalysis should not be underestimated. When Freud 
needs a trope for the unknowability of female sexuality, the dark continent is 
close at hand. Psychoanalysis can, from this point of view, be seen as a quite 
elaborate form of ethnography—as a writing of the ethnicity of the while psyche. 
Repression becomes the prerequisite for the construction of a white culture 
which stipulates that female sexuality act as the trace within of what has been 
excluded” (211).
From very early on, similar imperial imagery also shaped Bachmann’s writ-
ing. Her 1957 poem “Liebe: Dunkler Erdteil” (Love: Dark Continent) repre-
sents Africa as a lush and exotic realm of sexuality beyond the repressive 
boundaries established by Europeans, with black masculinity—“the black 
king”—figured as the agent of an erotic power before which the poem’s “you” 
prostrates herself and at whose mercy she conceives herself to be: “But there you 
always fall upon your knees, for he chooses and rejects you without grounds” 
(Songs 295). Bachmann’s poem might be regarded as a rather conventional 
European projection of orientalizing motifs onto a non-European geography, 
and such a reading would not be wrong. But by brushing this poem somewhat 
against the grain (to use Walter Benjamin’s phrase again), it is possible to advance 
a more interesting reading which treats this poem as a representation of the 
degree to which racialized and imperial fantasies are constituent elements of the 
European female psyche. Bachmann’s later treatment of the intersections of 
imperialism and female identity, I want to propose here, also oscillates between 
those two positions, sometimes projecting familiar European fantasies onto a 
non-European backdrop, at other times achieving a more profound interroga-
tion of the imperial underpinnings of Central European femininity. By inter-
rogating the literal encounters of Bachmann’s protagonists with (inhabitants 
of) the Dark Continent in two uncompleted portions of the “Ways of Death”—
The Book of Franza and the Eka Kottwitz fragment—I want to show how 
discourses of race and empire underwrite her female figures’ identities. Virtu-
ally alone among postwar women writing in German, I argue, Bachmann 
attempts to explore the racialized foundations of Central European fantasies, 
yet by continuing to project white fantasies onto non-European figures she her-
self does not always escape the racist structures her work attempts to challenge. 
Finally, I want to examine “Three Paths to the Lake,” the last text Bachmann 
wrote before her death, to show how she connects white women acting under 
postcolonial conditions, imperial Austria, and the “ways of death” of which her 
White Ladies are the victims. 
In an often quoted introduction to The Book of Franza, Bachmann provided 
instructions on how to read her book: “The real settings, the interior ones, labo-
riously concealed by the external, are elsewhere” (Franza 4). As I showed in 
chapter 2, the feminist scholars who rediscovered Bachmann’s writing in the 
1980s regarded The Book of Franza as an exploration of the location and func-
tion of femininity within discourse which provided the key to understanding 
Bachmann’s entire oeuvre; as Sigrid Weigel put it in her introduction to the 1984
text + kritik volume that became a landmark of feminist Bachmann criticism, 
“in [her texts] it is a question of a structural relationship between fascism, patri-
archy, ethno- and logocentrism and the central role of language/writing for this 
context, within which the ‘feminine’ as the embodiment of the repressed other 
is subjected to a wide variety of ways of death” (“Andere” 5). In this reading, 
Bachmann’s tale of Franza’s flight from her tyrannical Viennese husband into 
the North African desert in the company of her beloved brother, Martin, is an 
investigation of the mechanisms via which an oppressive Western order denies 
women and other “others” a voice. This analysis mainly conflates gender and 
race, viewing them as equally the product of a single system of subordination, 
and “the whites” against whom Franza inveighs are conceived to stand synec-
dochically for domination tout court. In Weigel’s words, “The whites thus stand 
for the insight that the history of colonization and the history of patriarchy have 
different victims but a single perpetrator” (“Ende” 82). That is clearly Franza’s 
own view of her situation, for she compares her husband’s brutal treatment of 
her to the colonial exploitation of native peoples and their indigenous treasures. 
Other evidence in the novel, however, suggests that Franza’s position should not 
be equated with Bachmann’s own (see Albrecht, “Sire”). For 1990s feminists, of 
course, forced by protests of women of color to acknowledge white women’s 
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racial privilege, readings that fail to disaggregate race and gender have become 
impossible. In its various unfinished versions, I want to show, Bachmann’s frag-
ment can be read as a contradictory text that at some points concurs with Fran-
za’s own conflation of gender and race but in other instances holds Franza’s 
treatment of race and empire up for examination. In neither case, I want to 
emphasize, is Bachmann’s unfinished novel about North Africa; rather it is 
about how a European woman (whether Franza or Bachmann herself) repre-
sents her orientalist encounter with it. 
Bachmann’s various accounts of her own trip to Egypt and the Sudan in 
spring 1964—which she initially wished to integrate into her Büchner Prize 
speech, then intended as a separate novel, to be called the “Wüstenbuch” (Desert 
book), and finally used as the basis for the North African sections of Franza—are 
all structured around a recurring leitmotif: “The whites are coming, I am of 
inferior race [Die Weißen kommen, ich bin von niedriger Rasse]” (TP 1: 180). As
she revealed in a draft introduction to Franza (TP 2: 73), these phrases are bor-
rowed from Rimbaud, specifically from Un saison en enfer, where Rimbaud main-
tains, “Je suis de race inférieure [I am of inferior race]” (95), and, somewhat later, 
“Les blancs débarquent. Le canon! Il faut se soutmettre au baptême, s’habiller, 
travailler [The whites are debarking. The cannon/canon! It is necessary to sub-
mit oneself to baptism, to get dressed, to work]” (98). As Christopher Miller 
observes, though Rimbaud later traveled to Africa (where he became a gunrun-
ner and possibly a slave trader), here his critique of “whites” and identification 
with Africans—(“Je suis une bête, un nègre [I am a beast, a Negro] [97])—are 
merely vehicles for advancing a critique of contemporary French civilization by 
drawing on Africanist motifs: “His artificial Africanness consists of an image 
that persists in European discourse, that of the free reign of desire, of removal 
from the mediation of language and the rule of repression” (C. Miller 152). (Later 
in this chapter I term that discourse the discourse of primitivism.) Dirk Göttsche 
has maintained that the structure of Franza reflects “Rimbaud’s conceptual 
world. Rationality, masculinity, and European culture are associated with the 
principle of the objectivizing domination of nature and humanity, while the 
magical, the feminine, and the Egyptian (colored [sic]) culture are associated 
with a subordinate but utopian counterprinciple” (“Schwarzkunst” 149–50). In
the final version of Franza, Bachmann expands Rimbaud’s remarks into a force-
ful denunciation of the hegemonic force of European cultural imperialism which, 
the editors of the critical edition observe (TP 2: 476), recalls the analysis of colo-
nialism in Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (and is so key a passage in 
Bachmann’s oeuvre that I have already cited it several times in this book: 
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The whites are coming. The whites are landing. And if they are driven back, then 
they will come again. No revolution or resolution can prevent it, nor any controls 
over the currency. They will come again in spirit if there’s no other way for them 
to come. And they will resurrect themselves in a brown or a black brain, which 
will become white once again. They will take over world through such indirect 
means. (Franza 112)
But despite the affinities of Bachmann’s statement with the analysis of one of 
the most renowned critics of Western imperialism, one might nonetheless main-
tain that for Bachmann, as for Rimbaud, these racialized images represent their 
own European instrumentalization of the language of empire: colonialist meta-
phors serve the primary function of providing a vivid trope for the all-pervasive 
force of a European rationality from which they endeavor to disengage them-
selves by aligning with that which Europe designates as its other. As Christo-
pher Miller puts it, “The gesture of reaching out to the most unknown part of 
the world and bringing it back as language . . . ultimately brings Europe face to 
face with nothing but itself, with the problems its own discourse imposes” (5).  
The earliest versions of The Book of Franza—drafts for Bachmann’s Büchner 
Prize speech and her “Wüstenbuch”—were written in the first person and to 
some extent still retain autobiographical elements (“they [her male Arab 
acquaintances and, as emerges later, her lovers] call me, with short peremptory 
syllables, always by my surname, while I only know their first names, bakma, 
how are you. I say, I am fine. I really am” [TP 1: 239]). Those drafts already 
revolve around European problems to which North Africa is considered to offer 
alternatives and answers (and already cite Rimbaud as the antecedent to Bach-
mann’s own approach). The ends to which Bachmann, at least at an early stage 
of the text’s composition, wished to turn the journey are evident in her initial 
plan for the account of her own trip to Egypt and the Sudan in spring 1964: as 
the editors of the critical edition point out, she first intended to contrast the 
“sickness” of “unloved Berlin” (ultimately the topic of her Büchner Prize speech: 
see chapter 10)—where she spent her fellowship year in 1963–64 as she attempted 
to recover from the devastating effects of the dissolution of her relationship with 
Max Frisch—and the “healing” she had experienced in the North African des-
ert. In the novel’s final version, Franza remains convinced that the desert will be 
a site of healing for her because, like Rimbaud, she takes it to be a location where 
“the whites” (i.e., the forms of European thought of which she conceives herself 
to be a victim) hold no sway. One can thus locate this text within a long line of 
narratives in which the orient is represented as corresponding or responding to 
the traveler’s own interior needs. For the “belated travelers” of the late nine-
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teenth century, as Ali Behdad observes, the trip to the Orient was a voyage of 
“romantic self-discovery” and a “solitary quest for elsewhere” in “response to the 
onset of modernity in Europe” (21, 16). 
It is then possible to read Franza’s journey to North Africa as what Behdad 
has identified as the contradictory discourse of “belated Orientalism.” That dis-
course, as Behdad describes it, often “vacillates between an insatiable search for 
a counterexperience in the Orient and the melancholic discovery of its impossi-
bility. . . . On the one hand, these texts identify themselves differentially against 
. . . the truth claims of official Orientalism by expressing an unease with classi-
fication and objectivity. On the other, they find it impossible to avoid the bag-
gage of Orientalist knowledge that has mediated the desire to produce another 
discourse on the Orient” (15). Franza’s experience of the orient is often explicitly 
shown as mediated by her European guidebooks, citations from which dot the 
text as recognizably foreign bodies. Though Franza appears to be entirely 
uninterested in the guidebooks, her response to Egypt takes the form of a roman-
tic repudiation of everything the guidebooks recommend, a defiantly dichoto-
mous reaction still negatively determined by the terms of the prescriptions it 
rejects. Franza fervently insists, as she travels deeper into North Africa, that she 
has left behind the entire canon of Western knowledge and eluded European 
power: “The whites. Finally they were nowhere to be seen” (Franza 94). She also 
warns herself that white cultural hegemony is not so easy to evade: “Thus will I
discover my rights. But the alibi of the whites is strong. Don’t forget that” (Franza
112). But exactly this representation of North Africa as a site of oriental other-
ness that can rescue Franza from Europe reveals itself to be a product of roman-
tic white fantasies that are themselves constructed by and mediated through the 
orientalist texts of earlier travelers.
How Franza’s (or Bachmann’s?) white female fantasies about the orient 
might be connected to the Dark Continent of white female sexuality is most 
clearly revealed in various accounts of an “orgy” in the “Wüstenbuch” (TP 2:
271), which survive in the novel’s final draft only in veiled allusions to the 
“embraces at the Nile” (Franza 143; translation modified) and the suggestion 
that Martin has slept with two Arab acquaintances. As Edward Said has 
remarked, “The Orient seems still to suggest not only fecundity but sexual 
promise (and threat), untiring sensuality, unlimited desire, deep generative ener-
gies”; to travelers the association between the orient and the freedom of licen-
tious sex meant that “the Orient was a place where one could look for sexual 
experience unobtainable in Europe. Virtually no European writer who wrote on 
or travelled to the Orient in the period after 1800 exempted himself or herself 
from this quest” (Orientalism 188, 190). The first-person narrator of the “Wüsten-
buch” conceives of her erotic encounter with Salah, Mahmed, and Abdu—
always framed by the Rimbaudian refrain, “The whites are coming. I am of 
inferior race”—as extracting her from whiteness altogether—“Three bodies 
that intertwine, the single satisfaction, the killing of the other race” (TP 1: 257). 
She also represents (à la Eldridge Cleaver) the transgressive sexual act as a gen-
dered act of revenge against domination by white men: “The white man is infe-
rior. And he’s afraid that I’ll say it out loud. I killed him in our bed, he will never 
forgive his inferiority. He needs the police against it, law, arrogance, he needs 
violence, because he can’t prevail in his bed” (TP 1: 283). As in “Love: Dark 
Continent” (or in “The Good God of Manhattan”), here too eroticism extracts 
the lovers from the ruling order and aligns them with the quintessential other-
ness for which the orient stands. 
As the journey to North Africa made it possible for Franza to construe bacte-
ria-induced illnesses as a danger only to whites, so similarly the “I” of the
“Wüstenbuch” imagines that venereal disease is of no concern to nonwhites: 
“The venereal diseases [Geschlechtskrankheiten] of the whites, I understand very 
well that no one knows them here” (TP 1: 240). Sex with her three Egyptian 
friends cures her of the “sexual illness” of white femininity: “I thought of it as an 
act of revenge, and it was not a revenge, but the repudiation of ridiculous notions. 
From now on the venereal diseases of the whites will only make me laugh” (TP
1: 272). Bachmann’s effort to combat white culture reproduces several of its core 
racial and sexual preconceptions: that the orient is a site of licentious and wanton 
sexuality; that men of color are particularly potent and gifted lovers who, in com-
petition with white men, lust especially after white women; that sexuality is out-
side of culture, thus associated with “others” also thought to be exterior to civili-
zation; and that through her sexual relationship with a man of color a white 
woman can declare herself “disloyal to civilization” and place herself outside its 
bounds. Paradoxically, one might maintain, Bachmann’s attempt to escape white-
ness proves how very white she is.
Yet a question might be asked of this novel fragment similar to the one asked 
of a novel that represents a much more viciously racist white consciousness, 
Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness: is this a racist novel or a novel about racism? 
Frequently, Bachmann’s text offers hints that readers should regard Franza’s 
own judgments with some skepticism. In one of the last drafts, Bachmann 
clearly pokes fun at Franza’s romantic notion that she is destined to become a 
heroic martyr whose (distinctly masochistic) sacrifices could save the Third 
World (surely a liberal and female variant of the Victorian conviction that Euro-
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pean efforts would bring light to the Dark Continent): “Perhaps she could do 
something, but it had to be something real, later Africa or Asia, under the hard-
est conditions, with sacrifice, with heroism, sacrifice definitely had to be part of 
it, and it should be grand, lots of effort, but glorious for her, with an early death, 
she would jump in after someone who was drowning, dash into a burning house 
and throw a child out the window into the blanket waiting to catch it and then 
burn to death, bandage a wounded man and then be shot by mistake in North 
Africa” (TP 2: 233–234).
Franza’s declaration that she has escaped the whites is somewhat undercut 
by the ubiquitous bottles of Coca-Cola she drinks along her journey; as the title 
of Reinhold Wagnleitner’s study of U.S. influence in Austria after 1945, Coca-
Colonization and the Cold War, suggests, Coca-Cola can readily serve as a pow-
erful and easily recognizable symbol of Western cultural imperialism. In the 
North Africa destined to save her from the whites, Franza encounters acts of 
brutality that do not fit her dichotomous model of evil Europe and the pristine 
orient: a woman bound by the hair at the Cairo train station, and a camel 
slaughtered at a wedding feast—both figures with whom she identifies (again 
appropriating non-European experiences as her own)—so inexplicable in their 
otherness that her European categories leave her at a loss to interpret them. 
One of the most striking indications that Franza’s appropriation of North 
Africa might be regarded as Bachmann’s attempt to represent white female 
fantasies about the orient is her mystical experience on a Red Sea beach, where 
she is convinced that she has seen God and her father when she is in fact con-
fronted with a dead tree trunk. Her response, “The Arabian desert is sur-
rounded by shattered visions of God” (Franza 119), the editors of the critical 
edition point out (TP 2: 486–487), is quite possibly borrowed from The Seven 
Pillars of Wisdom, written by one of the greatest of the romantic orientalists, T.
E. Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”). It is possible, then, that when Bachmann 
comments on a travel party of elderly American women, “all of them over sixty 
and decked out with canes and giant hats, . . . recalling renowned travelers an 
age gone by being served in style while traveling on a steamer up the Nile to the 
granite quarries and on to Elephantine” (Franza 105; translation modified), she 
means that description of the European woman traveler on her grand tour of 
the orient also to apply, mutatis mutandis, to Franza—who is in fact in an ear-
lier version of this same passage called a “Lady,” in English, by an Egyptian 
soldier in Luxor (TP 2: 103), underlining the fact that in the context of Egypt 
she, too, is a White Lady. 
One might thus maintain that Franza’s travel accounts, like those of many 
women travelers to the orient who preceded her, consist of the fantasies she 
projects onto North Africa, fantasies that are “interior settings” disguised as a 
travel narrative about real geographical sites. Perhaps one could even read 
Franza herself as the Dark Continent, her travel to North Africa thus con-
ceived of as a journey into the unknown territory of her own psyche. Bach-
mann’s description of Franza’s fascination with the monuments of Egyptian 
antiquity might then be seen as an elaboration of Freud’s imperial metaphor in 
his Aetiology of Hysteria, where he compares his own task to that of “an explorer 
arriv[ing] in a little-known region where his interest is aroused by an expanse 
of ruins with remains of walls, fragments of columns, and tablets with half-
effaced and unreadable inscriptions”: after questioning the region’s “perhaps 
semi-barbaric peoples” and excavating the site, the explorer may decipher and 
translate the inscriptions: “Saxa loquantur!” (3: 192)—The stones speak!—a 
passage that recalls Franza’s geologist brother’s effort to find a geological expla-
nation for the undiagnosed illness that causes his sister’s psychic and physical 
symptoms. 
On the other hand, even if it should be possible to read this contradictory text 
as an investigation of race and empire, it is not so clear that Bachmann’s meta-
phorizing of the imperial traveler— that is, using the journey to a real non-
European country as a vehicle for exploring the state of the European psyche— 
could not itself be regarded in some complex ways as an imperial gesture. One 
might then direct a critique against Bachmann’s use of North Africa similar to 
that which Susan Shapiro leveled at Jean-François Lyotard’s treatment of “the 
jews”: “‘The jews’ becomes a way for the European subject both to critique the 
(logo) center and identity with/as the margins of the West without changing its 
terms. It maintains the logic of the West by reducing otherness to a symbol of 
the limits of the West, its limit-text. . . . While it is clear that the jews is a con-
structed trope, the constructedness of the real Jews is effaced or forgotten. 
. . . [T]here is no space left in the West for the intervention of actual Jews in their 
multiple and conflicting identities” (190). It is very possible that the “sickness” 
from which Franza is suffering is that of whiteness, or white femininity, itself 
(“She had not arrived at Luxor,” writes Bachmann, “but instead at a point in her 
illness, not having traveled through the desert, but through her illness” [Franza 
105])—but that is not a malady to which Bachmann herself was entirely 
immune. Furthermore, even should this have been the reading of her novel that 
Bachmann intended, more than a decade of scholarship focused on Franza
shows that such an interpretation was not evident to most readers. Perhaps it was 
for such reasons, among others (see also chapter 10), that Bachmann finally 
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abandoned this novel fragment altogether. As she wrote to her editor in 1966,
“The manuscript seems to me like a helpless allusion to something that still 
needs to be written” (TP 2: 397).
In later “Ways of Death” texts, Bachmann developed more successful strate-
gies for representing the encounter of the White Lady and the Dark Continent. 
Where The Book of Franza had directly thematized the clash of race and gender 
categories, later texts merely display a female psyche constituted by historically 
specific discourses of race and gender, her figures so entirely the products of his-
tory that they are unable to advance a critique of their own circumstances beyond 
that which prevailing discourses would allow. One might even maintain that in 
certain respects the White Ladies in Bachmann’s later “Ways of Death” texts 
accede to a definition of themselves as the Dark Continent: that is, they accept the 
racial preconceptions that define white female sexuality as unexplored terrain, a 
riddle, an enigma, which white men wish to colonize but whose heart of dark-
ness neither men nor women (who in these texts remain mysteries to themselves) 
can fully plumb. Although White Ladies cannot be represented as the direct 
agents of imperialism, they are clearly implicated in its racial logic, as captive to 
racial fantasies and projections as white men (though implementing them in gen-
der-specific ways). One key component of their racial identity is thus their utter 
obliviousness to their own racial determinants. As well, contra scholars who 
attempt to exempt Germans and Austrians from orientalism because Germany 
and Austria had no direct national interests in the Middle East, the vantage point 
from which Bachmann views imperialism emphasizes the imbrication of all 
Europeans, not just those with an explicitly colonial past, in the imperial/neoco-
lonial and racial order of the West. Such a reading of Bachmann’s investigation of 
imperialism makes it possible to read her haughty rejoinder to criticisms of Malina
as something more than a feeble justification for that novel’s apparent lack of 
attention to politics: “If for example I say nothing in this book Malina about the 
Vietnam War, nothing about so and so many catastrophic conditions of our soci-
ety, then I know how to say it in a different way—or I hope that I know how to 
say it” (GuI 90–91). What Bachmann’s texts quite deliberately portray, one might 
maintain, is the kind of consciousness that made Vietnam possible.
A key incident in Bachmann’s Eka Kottwitz/Aga Rottwitz fragment, added 
to that unfinished novel in 1968–69, moves the violent encounter of race and 
gender to the center stage of the “Ways of Death.” An African student accompa-
nies Countess Kottwitz, a brilliant political journalist and the novel’s protagonist, 
home after a lecture and makes violent love to her. Although the countess, hith-
erto quite uninterested in lovemaking (“over thirty, she still . . . had . . . not a clue 
what an orgasm was” [TP 1: 419]), experiences the sexual encounter as a bestial 
assault, she finds it has left her sexually awakened and “completely transformed” 
(TP 1: 427). Yet even though the African declares his love for her, Countess 
Kottwitz, “who was no Lady Chatterley” (TP 1: 426), refuses to acknowledge her 
newly aroused passion for him. Instead, she proclaims she is now finally able to 
love her current boyfriend, Jung. When Jung leaves her for another woman, Eka 
throws herself from a window and is permanently paralyzed. The scene imme-
diately preceding the sexual encounter offers a clue to how Bachmann wanted 
her story to be read: sitting in a bar in the Hamburg hotel Vier Jahreszeiten, 
Countess Kottwitz orders a drink called a “White Lady” (TP 1: 424).
One might read this passage as a vivid illustration of the white female fantasy 
that Fanon describes in Black Skin, White Masks: “A Negro is raping me.” In
general, as Mary Ann Doane points out, Fanon views sexuality as a major arena 
for the articulation of racism. His analysis of this racialized fantasy is founded 
upon Helene Deutsch’s and Marie Bonaparte’s definitions of adult female sexu-
ality as fundamentally masochistic. That conception of femininity finds support 
in many passages in Bachmann’s writing: the “I” of Malina muses, for instance, 
“No normal man with normal drives has the obvious idea that a normal woman 
would like to be quite normally raped” (Malina 180). Following Freud, Fanon 
maintains that normal adult female sexuality requires the renunciation of 
aggression and the acceptance of properly female passive sexual aims. In a racist 
society, Fanon maintains, “the Negro becomes the predestined depository of this 
aggressiveness. If we go farther into the labyrinth, we discover that when a 
woman lives the fantasy to be raped by a Negro, it is in some way the fulfillment 
of a private dream, of an inner wish. Accomplishing the phenomenon of turn-
ing against self, it is the woman who rapes herself” (175). Doane’s gloss on this 
passage is useful: “Fanon finds that the fantasy of being raped by a Negro con-
stitutes the assimilation by the woman of a cultural treasurehouse of images 
concerning blackness and their incorporation within what is a basic structure of 
femininity” (231). Though Bachmann might have formulated Fanon’s explana-
tion somewhat differently, his is an analysis with which she might not funda-
mentally have disagreed. From “Love: The Dark Continent” and “The Good 
God of Manhattan” through Malina, her female figures seek out powerful men 
who hurt them and to whom they can submit themselves, and their sexual plea-
sure is greater if they can also see themselves as contravening social taboos. To
the White Lady, rape by a “Negro” optimally satisfies these criteria.
What makes the portrait of this White Lady far more compelling than those 
of Bachmann’s other figures who achieve a transgressive sexual satisfaction is 
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the careful delineation of how precisely the features of Countess Kottwitz’s 
character that make “rape” by a “Negro” especially exciting to her also prevent 
her from acknowledging this relationship as one that finally meets her sexual 
needs. The boyfriend Jung is represented as an indifferent lover who fails entirely 
to respond to Eka’s awkward attempts to arouse him:
Jung had kissed her a few times, in the early days, that was the single form of 
affection that occurred to him, otherwise he fell upon her occasionally, and Eka 
didn’t admit to herself that it was unbearable for her, that she expected something 
else, she just didn’t know what, and sometimes she was overcome by silly notions, 
she threw herself on him like [a] child and hugged him and pressed herself against 
him in the desperate hope that something would occur to him. Jung either shoved 
her away with a laugh [or] called her a silly teenager, while Eka’s face got grayer 
and grayer and more and more strained and had nothing at all in common with 
that of a teenager. (TP 1: 420)
The encounter with the African takes place as a consequence of mutual sex-
ual attraction, as Bachmann underlines in a passage that charmingly reproduces 
the confusion of swelling sexual passion: “Then he took her by the hand, and 
she saw his beautiful black hand, her beautiful white hand, both beautiful 
hands, slim, too long, hands too long, hands too much” (TP 1: 424). But as this 
enormously erudite woman has no idea where the student’s African homeland 
might be located (“He was from Somaliland, and Eka admitted to herself that 
she didn’t exactly know, for once not exactly, though she knew everything 
exactly” [TP 1: 424]), so the only terms Eka can find to describe their passion 
derive from a racist vocabulary that defines their erotic exchange as violent and 
barbaric: “In the next moment the Somali student had torn her from the arm-
chair, perhaps not exactly torn, but taken”(TP 1: 426); “in this situation that just 
seemed grotesque to her” (TP 1: 425); “it’s bestial, I’m dying, I’m dying” (TP 1:
425); “After he raped her once more he left” (TP 1: 427); “I was no longer a 
human being, I was an animal” (TP 1: 429). She can experience sexual pleasure 
with the African because the intensity of the sexual act disrupts her white inter-
pretive schema—“it was simply the end of all her preconceptions” (TP 1: 425)—
and it unsettles her ego boundaries: “her ego [Ich] was eradicated” (TP 1: 430). 
But once she reestablishes her psychic boundaries—“in the process of restoring 
her ego [dabei, ihr Ich wiederherzustellen]” (TP 1: 425)—she is convinced that 
she loves only Jung, a white man. In their commentary to this passage, the edi-
tors of the critical edition point to its affinities with the utopian “orgy” of the 
“Wüstenbuch,” a connection supported by a later version of this passage in which 
the “rapist” is called “Abdu,” also the name of one of the trio of Egyptian lovers. 
But what makes this fragment different from Bachmann’s other utopian evoca-
tions of erotic transport is Eka’s incapacity to transcend the cultural limitations 
that prevent her from embracing a sexual relationship proscribed by the culture 
of which she is part.
Of course, there is a way out for the White Lady, as Bachmann underlines 
via her allusion to D. H. Lawrence’s novel: to satisfy her sexual needs, Eka could 
follow the example of Connie Chatterley, jettison her miserable affair with Jung, 
and cast her lot with the Somali student. In a paper called “Do White Ladies 
Get the Blues? Nancy Cunard and Desire,” Sabine Broeck has shown that other 
twentieth-century White Ladies, such as Lady Nancy Cunard, heir to the 
Cunard steamship line fortune and patron of the Harlem Renaissance, made 
the decision to flout racial and sexual taboos. Yet not just racism but also her 
aristocratic fastidiousness make that impossible for Eka, in whom even bad taste 
in furniture occasions a physical reaction, and this student dares to call her Lieb-
chen and wants to sleep with her after they have made love: “sleep with her, now 
that was really the last straw [mit ihr schlafen, das war nun wirklich die Höhe]” 
(TP 1: 427). As Biddy Martin and Chandra Mohanty put it in a quite different 
context: “Change has to do with the transgression of boundaries, those bound-
aries so carefully, so tenaciously, so invisibly drawn around white identity” (203). 
Unable to transcend the definitions that constitute her, Eka instead constructs a 
story that allows her to remain who she is and affirm her sexuality, too: “I don’t 
love this Negro, I love Jung” (TP 1: 428). But as the editors of Powers of Desire: 
The Politics of Sexuality emphasize, the myth of the black rapist is a sexual story 
that white men tell each other to justify their violence toward black men and
their control over black and white women (Snitow et al. 328). By opting for that 
myth, Eka makes the choice to reinsert herself into a racist social order that also 
subordinates women. After Jung leaves her, even that narrative construction is 
no longer available to her, and there is no way for her both to remain a White 
Lady and to affirm her sexuality: she is paralyzed by her absence of choices. So
she leaps from the window, destroying the body that has betrayed her, and 
thenceforth is also really, not just metaphorically, paralyzed—confined for life 
to a wheelchair. In one of the introductions to The Book of Franza, Bachmann 
called her female figures’ implication in categories of their social order “think-
ing . . . that leads to dying” (Franza 4). Like the other “Ways of Death,” the Eka 
Kottwitz fragment reveals the self-destructive consequences of women’s com-
pliance with the dictates of the society that has called them into being. 
What conception of the formation of female subjectivity underlies the Eka 
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Kottwitz fragment? While criticizing Fanon’s flattening of the complex con-
cepts of sexual difference, desire, and sexuality, Gwen Bergner has argued that 
one of his major accomplishments in Black Skin, White Masks is adding race to 
the psychoanalytic explanation of the production of subjectivity: “Fanon trans-
poses psychoanalysis—a theory of subject formation based on sexual differ-
ence—to a register where it accounts for race as one of the fundamental differ-
ences that constitute subjectivity” (76). One might argue that that is also 
Bachmann’s achievement in this text, that that is how she represents “history 
within the I/psyche.” Anne McClintock, in pursuit of her project of developing 
a “situated psychoanalysis—a culturally contextualized psychoanalysis that is 
simultaneously a psychoanalytically informed history” (72), proposes that Julia 
Kristeva’s notion of “abjection” helps to explain the function of racist exclu-
sions in modern industrial societies. Following Freud, Kristeva also maintains 
that civilization is founded on the repudiation of those elements that society 
considers impure: “The abject is everything that the subject seeks to expunge 
in order to become social; it is also a symptom of the failure of this ambition. 
. . . the expelled abject haunts the subject as its inner constitutive boundary; that 
which is repudiated forms the self’s internal limit. The abject is ‘something 
rejected from which one does not part’” (McClintock 71 citing Kristeva, 9). 
This conception of abjection might help explain both the disruptive allure for 
Eka of sex with the Somali student and the urgency of her denial that she is 
aroused by him; the abject, Kristeva argues, “simultaneously beseeches and 
pulverizes the subject” (5). If the rejection of blackness and an active female 
sexuality is the guarantee of the stability of Eka’s white female psyche, acknowl-
edging the repressed and threatening otherness they represent could cause the 
whole racial-sexual edifice to come tumbling down. 
Yet though it is quite easy to advance a psychoanalytic explanation for the 
psychology of Eka and other “Ways of Death” figures, it may also be important 
to stress the limitations of such a Freudian model. Ann Laura Stoler has pointed 
out that much postcolonial analysis is based on “the premise that colonial power 
relations can be accounted for and explained as a sublimated expression of 
repressed desires in the West, of desires that resurface in moralizing missions, 
myths of the ‘wild woman,’ in a romance with the rural ‘primitive,’ or in other 
more violent, virile, substitute form” (167–68). It is exactly this “repressive hypoth-
esis,” however, that Foucauldian analysis has drawn into question. Though Bach-
mann clearly understands (female) desire as molded by social forces, much of her 
work seems also premised on the assumption that “desire is a basic biological 
drive, restricted and repressed by a ‘civilization’ that forces our sublimation of it,” 
to use Stoler’s formulation (171). Foucault would of course argue that desire was 
not repressed by or opposed to a (racialized) order of civilization but produced by 
it. The question that might then arise is to what degree notions of a natural and 
primordial desire which civilization needs to channel and regulate might relate to 
or even derive from imperial strategies developed to control unruly, oversexed 
natives (or white women, for that matter— a speculation that the application of 
the Dark Continent motif to white female sexuality would support). As Stoler 
puts it: “The nineteenth-century discourse on bourgeois sexuality may better be 
understood as a recuperation of a protracted discourse on race, for the discourse 
of sexuality contains many of the latter’s most salient elements. That discourse on 
sexuality was binary and contrastive, in its nineteenth-century variant always pit-
ting that middle-class respectable sexuality as a defense against an internal and 
external other that was at once essentially different but uncomfortably the same” 
(193). If there is merit to this argument, it could then be maintained that Bach-
mann’s attempt to grapple with the racialized foundations of female sexuality, by 
portraying a female figure whose repressed (or abject-ed) desire is loosed by her 
sexual encounter with a black man, might still remain captive to precisely the 
discourses of race, gender, and sexuality that her texts want to interrogate.
As well, one might again ask whether in this text Bachmann also contributes 
in a less complicated way to the perpetuation of racist stereotypes. Though the 
complex narrative stance of the fragment makes it difficult to determine to what 
degree Eka’s responses determine the representation of the sexual encounter, to 
what degree a (somewhat) more impartial narrator is speaking, the sexual act 
seems to be portrayed as violent, brutal, and lacking in reciprocity, the Somali 
student oblivious to Eka’s protests and cries of pain: “she noticed that he didn’t 
notice at all, not because he was a sadist to whom her tears, her despair gave 
pleasure, but rather because she was no one at all for him, not a person, merely 
an object” (TP 1: 425). The student himself is represented as a Noble Savage 
possessed of a wholeness unavailable to Europeans: “He was so at one with him-
self, with his body, with his will, that he simply didn’t hear this Eka, this blind 
woman, any longer.” And his sexual potency is nothing short of prodigious: 
“Then he lay down, after two hours, and said to her, . . . I’m very tired today, 
please forgive me” (TP 1: 426). Finally, the student is not treated as a subject in 
his own right: except in the very last draft he has no name and, though a student 
of political science in his fifth semester, is unable to express himself in German: 
“Eka . . . didn’t understand for a moment how somebody could speak German 
so badly and could study here nonetheless” (TP 1: 423). 
This text, one might thus argue, is not an account of the complexities and 
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misunderstandings of cross-cultural encounters but instead uses rather conven-
tional representations of a black figure to talk about the problems of white 
women. As Leslie Adelson inquired, faced with a not entirely dissimilar treat-
ment of black men in a text by a white German woman writer: “If the story is 
not about the relationship to blacks as persons, and it is not, then why use them 
as a symbol?” (52). Though it is always difficult to determine to what degree the 
perspectives of Bachmann’s figures and her own coincide, it appears that other 
portraits of black figures in her texts (leaving aside the embarrassing racist gaffe 
of her 1956 poem “Harlem”: “The black city rolls its white eyes” [W 1: 113]) suf-
fer from similar problems. In a passage omitted from the final version of Malina, 
the “I” seeks the sexual services of an otherwise mute black man during a trans-
atlantic crossing: “On the ship to America there was an arrogant young Negro 
at the bar, looking for work, dismissed from a French band, with a miserable 
vocabulary, he always came in the night, during the day we greeted each other 
fleetingly, he acted as if he didn’t know me, I also scarcely looked at him” (TP
3.2: 719). “Again and Again: Black and White,” an unpublished poem in the 
Bachmann archive, recalls the racial fantasies of “Love: The Dark Continent.” 
The poetic “I” imagines that her skin has absorbed the color of her black lover 
and fancies “that my young blackness derives from your old / from your age-old 
native blackness.” “You call me,” the poem concludes, “like the Queen of Zam-
bezi” (“Immer wieder”). Though Bachmann is clearly attempting to mobilize 
racial images for antiracist purposes, her appropriation of them to address the 
needs of white women seems to retain white women at the center with the 
resources of the rest of the world at their disposal—a practice suggesting that 
Bachmann herself is not altogether exempt from the criticism she directs at her 
figures. One might thus make the same point about Bachmann that Adelson 
has made of the portrait of violent black GIs in Anne Duden’s The Opening of 
the Mouth: “As to whether Opening explodes a racist premise or reproduces it, I
can only answer, yes, it does both” (54).
In “Three Paths to the Lake,” the final story of the collection Three Paths to the 
Lake, Bachmann makes the connection between postcoloniality and Austrian 
imperialism toward which she gestured in the interview I cited at the beginning 
of this chapter, assessing the consequences of participation in a colonial/postcolo-
nial paradigm for her white female protagonist and again showing how the 
imperial white psyche is implicated in the very “ways of death” responsible for its 
destruction. Toward the beginning of “Three Paths to the Lake,” Elisabeth 
Matrei, the story’s central figure, stranded in a London hotel without a ticket for 
a flight back home to Austria, discovers herself to be surrounded by postcolonial 
peoples: “Room service consisted of Indians, Filipinos, and Africans, once there 
had been an old Englishman, and all the guests, too, were from Asia and Africa, 
she rode in the large elevators in the midst of silent masses, the only white per-
son.” Dismayed that “her old London had disappeared, everything she had once 
enjoyed,” Elisabeth complains that the postcolonials do not even speak English 
properly: “The guests and employees communicated in an English limited to a 
handful of expressions, and using one more than the allotted number meant not 
being understood. It wasn’t a living language that was spoken, it was a kind of 
Esperanto . . .” (Edward Said has commented on such discomfited reactions to a 
postcolonial presence: “The world has changed . . . in ways that have surprised, 
and often alarmed, metropolitan Europeans and Americans, who now confront 
large non-white immigrant populations in their midst, and face an impressive 
roster of newly empowered voices asking for their narratives to be heard” [Cul-
ture xx].) A well-traveled cosmopolitan, Elisabeth adapts herself to her circum-
stances: “She quickly forgot her English, using that confounded Esperanto,” but 
she is surprised by her own discomfort in the postcolonial metropole. “She had 
never felt apprehension in Asia or Africa and had enjoyed being alone and leav-
ing the others when she traveled with a group, being the woman who rode away, 
but not here. In this place everything was so monotonous, the people were all 
completely mindless, nothing was right” (Paths 130, translation modified).
As the editors of the critical edition point out in their commentary, “The 
Woman Who Rode Away” is the title of a 1925 short story by D. H. Lawrence 
(TP 4: 630). Notorious at least since 1970, when Kate Millett denounced its sex-
ism in Sexual Politics (285–293), Lawrence’s story explores the consequences of 
the decision of a white American woman living in Mexico to leave her Euro-
pean husband and ride away in search of the “secret haunts of [the] timeless, 
mysterious, marvelous Indians of the mountains” who still maintain “their own 
savage customs and religion” (347). “She is weary of the white man’s God,” she 
tells the Indians she encounters in the mountains. “She would like to serve the 
gods of the Chilchui” (360). As Lawrence presents them, this group of Indians, 
latter-day descendants of the Aztecs, believe that whites have stolen the Indians’ 
power over their god, the sun, but as one member of the tribe explains, “When 
a white woman sacrifices herself to our gods, then our gods will begin to make 
the world again, and the white man’s gods will fall to pieces” (372). Held captive 
by the Indians for months, the woman scarcely minds, musing that “her kind of 
womanhood, intensely personal and individual, was to be obliterated again, and 
the great primeval symbols were to tower once again over the fallen individual 
independence of woman” (371). The story ends on the day of the winter solstice 
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as the woman, naked and spread-eagled upon a sacrificial altar in a deep cave, 
awaits the moment when the last rays of the setting sun enter the cave and the 
blind old priest plunges his flint knife into her heart.
Why does Elisabeth Matrei turn to the title of D. H. Lawrence’s story to char-
acterize her prior experience in the Third World, and what does Bachmann’s 
allusion to Lawrence’s text tell us about race, gender, sexuality, and postcolonial-
ity in her work? Here, as elsewhere in her writing (see also chapters 7 and 10), 
Bachmann employs a reference to another author’s text as an ironic device to 
establish the larger discursive context within which her character functions and 
thereby to tell her readers something about the character that the character her-
self does not know (for instance, that Eka Kottwitz, though “no Lady Chatter-
ley,” functions within discourses of sexuality similar to Lawrence’s). Even though 
Lawrence’s tale of a dissatisfied wife’s quest for obliteration might on first exami-
nation seem to have little relationship to the self-reflections of Elisabeth, a world-
renowned photojournalist, it can in fact be used as a kind of key to unlock several 
levels of meaning in Bachmann’s story. Elisabeth, like Lawrence, moves within a 
discursive universe premised upon the binary opposition between a universaliz-
ing Western modernity and an otherness comprising everything the West is not, 
and her distress about current events and her “imperialist nostalgia” (Rosaldo 70)
for the old Austro-Hungarian empire rest on another version of that binary para-
digm, her longing for a long-lost Austrian home contrasted to the postmodern 
rootlessness of a figure in the story borrowed from Joseph Roth’s Radetzkymarsch 
(Radetzky march) and Kapuzinergruft (Crypt of the Capuchins): Franz Joseph 
Eugen Trotta. Those fatal binaries are also linked to the causes of Elisabeth’s 
personal and sexual malaise, so dire that she declares, “It would be best if women 
and men kept their distance and had nothing to do with each other until both 
had found their way out of the tangle and confusion, the discrepancy inherent in 
all relationships” (Paths 175)—a quotation that, as the editors of the critical edi-
tion tell us, is also borrowed from D.H. Lawrence (TP 4: 633).
In Primitive Passions: Men, Women, and the Quest for Ecstasy, Marianna Tor-
govnick identifies “The Woman Who Rode Away” and Lawrence’s other late 
texts set in Mexico and New Mexico as examples of what she terms primitiv-
ism. “The West,” she argues, “has been engaged, almost continuously, in defin-
ing itself against a series of ‘primitive’ Others in its midst and without. . . . The 
primitive,” she continues, “is the sign and symbol of desires the West has sought 
to repress—desires for direct correspondence between experience and lan-
guage, direct correspondence between individual feelings and the collective life 
force. It is the sign and symbol of desire for a full and sated sense of the uni-
verse” (Primitive 8). In an earlier book, Going Primitive, Torgovnick connects 
the primitive to “going home”: “The metaphor of finding a home or being at 
home recurs over and over as a structuring pattern within Western primitiv-
ism. . . . Whatever form the primitive’s hominess takes, its strangeness salves 
our estrangement from ourselves and our culture” (Going 185). The primitive, 
Torgovnick concludes, thus becomes the solution to the “transcendental home-
lessness” that Georg Lukács considered to be the condition of the modern 
Western mind (Theory 41)—no doubt the reason Franza believed that in North 
Africa she would “come into [her] own.”
In a postmodern and postcolonial era, however we now recognize that though 
the quest for a return to origins, fullness of being, full presence, and “home” may 
be a founding myth of Western thought—in Novalis’s words, “Philosophy is 
actually homesickness, the urge to be everywhere at home” (135)—it is also only 
that, a myth. As Iain Chambers puts it, “We can never go home, return to the 
primal scene, the forgotten moment of our beginnings, and authenticity, for there 
is always something else in between. We cannot return to a bygone unity, for we 
can only know the past, memory, the unconscious, through its effects, that is, 
when it is brought into language” (Border 104). Moreover, we now know as well 
that the belief in such an imaginary unity, whether located in an archaic past or 
in other primitive peoples and places, is fundamentally an imperialist gesture 
that disregards the actual heterogeneity of that which is not modern or Western 
and places all of history and all the rest of the world at our own Western disposal. 
Or, as Chambers observes: “In absolute difference the rhetoric of alterity locates a 
pure otherness awaiting our words, like the ‘empty’ wilderness—from the Afri-
can veldt to the American West—waiting to be settled and domesticated and 
brought into the redemptive time of our history” (“Signs” 57–58).
Precisely this frame of reference explains Elisabeth Matrei. In many regards 
she can be regarded as the epitome of modernity. She is emancipated in the 
most literal sense: she is groomed by famous male photographers for her pro-
fession as a photojournalist and insists on assuming the position of men even on 
the most dangerous Third World assignments: “I can’t accept my being spared 
and not the men. It’s not like that anymore with other things, all that changed 
long ago!” (Paths 141). (Alternatively, one might maintain that as a photojour-
nalist Elisabeth, like other “emancipated” female figures in Bachmann’s writ-
ing—Nadja, a translator, in “Word for Word”; Charlotte, a pianist, in “A Step 
towards Gomorrah”—is consigned to the female realm of reproduction though 
paradoxically within the public arena, expected faithfully to reproduce the 
products, activities, and utterances of the subjects of world history—namely, 
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men.) At the end of the story she accepts an assignment a male photographer is 
unable to carry out and is preparing to fly to Saigon to photograph the Vietnam 
War. (One recalls again Bachmann’s statement that in Malina she was able to 
address the Vietnam War “in another way.”)
As a photojournalist, Elisabeth is committed to what the editor of Modernity 
and the Hegemony of Vision has termed “ocularcentrism,” “a distinctly modern 
historical form . . . allied with all the forces of our advanced technologies. The 
power to make visible is the power to control” (Levin 2-3, 7). (Photographs 
accompanying the accounts of explorers and anthropologists are one obvious 
example of how vision and technology have combined to document and control 
the world’s others, as the authors of Reading National Geographic, among many 
others, have pointed out [Lutz/Collins].) Enlightenment is evidently the process 
of making visible what is obscured, subjecting it to the clear light of reason, and 
Elisabeth is convinced that photojournalism performs precisely this task, pro-
ducing an enlightened understanding of world events such as the Algerian War 
and the Suez Crisis: “People had to be made aware of what was going on there, 
they needed to see those pictures to ‘wake up’ to reality” (Paths 140–141). Via her 
success at taking on the power of the male gaze, Elisabeth is able to assume the 
stance of the universal, disembodied (i.e., male) Enlightenment subject. But as 
Meyda Yegenoglu emphasizes: “Since the universal is conceived of on the basis 
of one and access to it is restricted, the only possible way for women to enter into 
this privileged space and enjoy its benefits is through imitating the male gesture.
In other words, they are allowed to enjoy the benefits of universality only if they 
assume a male position. The strange paradox here is that women’s acceptance of 
a share in the universalistic simultaneously implies a denial of their difference. 
There is then no affirmative entry to the universal for women as women” (105). 
That is to say, Elisabeth’s very assumption of universal subject status means 
precisely that she will be unable to attend to or even articulate her own female 
concerns: “She never said a word about the things that really upset her, because 
they weren’t fit to be put in any words at all” (Paths 172)—a point I explore in 
greater detail below.
This analysis can help us, I think, to explain Elisabeth’s discomfort in the 
new postcolonial London. Despite—or perhaps even because of—her avowed 
support for Third World liberation struggles, Elisabeth occupies a position 
paradigmatically that of the liberal Western subject who regards the model of 
progress and development advocated by the West as world-historical—a view 
that, as Leela Gandhi puts it, regards “‘history’ as the grand narrative through 
which Eurocentrism is totalised as the proper account of all humanity” (171). 
Within the liberal version of this narrative, the West’s others either become 
(like) Europeans or remain in their proper place. “Propelling itself forward in 
pursuit of linear redemption,” Chambers maintains, “ever newer, ever brighter, 
ever better, and constantly forgetting itself in order to overcome itself, Western 
modernity underwrites an alterity located elsewhere in backwardness, in a 
black cloth of darkness, to both underline and justify its movement” (“Signs” 
57). To be sure, that backward, primitive alterity can readily also become con-
ceptualized as object of desire, as Torgovnick emphasizes. But what this West-
ern subject cannot tolerate are others who refuse the site of alterity allocated to 
them. Rey Chow, for instance, argues that a neo-orientalist anxiety reveals 
itself in the desire—very like that of “the woman who rode away”—to retrieve 
and preserve the pure, authentic native. Chow continues, however, that under 
the conditions of globalization, like those Elisabeth encounters in London, the 
native is no longer available as “pure, unadulterated object” but is, rather, “con-
taminated by the West, dangerously un-Otherable” (Gandhi 127 citing Chow 
12). In effect, the Empire talks or writes back, as the title of a famous anthology 
would have it (Ashcroft et all). 
Chambers summarizes precisely the situation Elisabeth encounters in 
London: “So, a linguistic and literary context such as ‘English,’ which has 
historically stood in Britain, or at least in metropolitan London, for a specific 
cultural, historical, and national identity, comes to be re-written, re-routed, 
and re-sited. Inhabiting English, other stories, memories, and identities cause 
metropolitan authority to stumble. For they talk back to it, take the language 
elsewhere, and then return with it to interrupt the nation-narration at its very 
‘centre.’” (“Signs” 49). As Chambers details, the disruptions to the dominant 
paradigm of Western modernity occasioned by the emergence of the postco-
lonial subject are profound:
The proprietary rights of language, history and truth are no longer able to hide in 
the metaphysical mimicry of universal knowledge or national identity. Such 
accounts are now exposed through a radical historicity as partial and partisan. 
Such journeys among the uneven and unexplained effects of these “contact zones” 
that have now expanded to compose much of metropolitan culture throughout the 
world, challenge the myth of modernism as a homogeneous movement and 
moment, restricted to a centralised economic power and a particular geopolitical 
population and place. The predator of progress, establishing the ratio of the West, 
today encounters transmutation and travesty in the very languages it assumed 
were its own. (“Signs” 50, 57).
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Indeed, the woman who rode away has reason to be concerned—the universalis-
tic system of values that had founded her belief in the legitimacy and value of her 
actions is entirely drawn into question by the condition of postcoloniality.
Elisabeth’s is not, however, the only relationship to the new postcolonial cul-
ture represented in “Three Paths to the Lake.” One of the great loves of Elisa-
beth’s life, Franz Joseph Trotta, is also her philosophical and political antagonist 
in Bachmann’s story, and the challenge he poses to her positions makes it possi-
ble to bring this critique of Elisabeth back home to a postimperial Austria. The 
“home” in the small Austrian city to which Elisabeth returns on a visit to her 
father stands for the same sort of solace, familiarity, and Geborgenheit (security) 
that Torgovnick ascertained to be the fundamental structure of the Western 
desire for the primitive, and the lake that she can reach via none of the three 
hiking paths, since the new autobahn built for German tourists has cut off access 
to it, is a metonymic representation of the oceanic dissolution that Westerners 
hope the primitive will allow them to achieve. In contrast to the Esperanto of 
London, Elisabeth is soothed by the “familiar tones” (Paths 131; translation 
modified) of Austria and “that old civil-servant German” of her father, “always 
appropriate to himself, his idiom and his mood”: that is, his speech manifests a 
“direct correspondence between experience and language” (Paths 177). Elisa-
beth perceives the roots of the Austria she loves in the old Austro-Hungarian 
empire, “this gigantic, pointless empire which was more loved than hated” 
(Paths 170, translation modified); like her father she believes that Austria was 
most profoundly transformed not by National Socialism but by the dissolution 
of the empire, “that the year 1938 had not been a turning point: the split had 
occurred much earlier and everything that followed had been a consequence of 
this older split, and that his world—which he had hardly experienced after all—
was destroyed for good in 1914” (Paths 179). From the perspective of the present 
Elisabeth conceives her brother and herself to be condemned to estrangement 
because the empire is gone: “But what made them strangers wherever they went 
was their sensitivity, because they came from the periphery and thus their 
thoughts, feelings and actions were hopelessly bound to this ghostly empire of 
gigantic dimensions. The right passports didn’t exist for them, for it was a coun-
try which didn’t issue passports” (Paths 122–23).
From a postcolonial perspective it is possible to recognize this apparently 
benign nostalgia as in fact a desire for the restoration of the good old days of 
empire (and, connected to empire, perhaps, as Ellen Friedman has suggested, a 
longing for vanished master-narratives altogether, a “yearning for fathers, for 
past authority and sure knowledge that can no longer be supported’” [240].) It is 
the Rothian Trotta—originally a Slovenian, now a French citizen—who both 
embodies the postimperial condition and reveals what is most problematic about 
Elisabeth’s stance. For the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire has had an 
effect on Trotta like that of postcoloniality, as Claudio Magris comments more 
generally of Joseph Roth’s figures in his classic study Der habsburgische Mythos in 
der österreichischen Literatur (the Habsburg myth in Austrian literature) : “With 
the collapse of the empire all values, all guaranties for a strong secure life and 
the precious pleasure of everyday life seem to disappear. The Austrian-Hungar-
ian decline seems to mean the irretrievable end of all healthy, firmly established 
possibilities of life” (257–58). Trotta acknowledges his position as “a real exile, 
one of the lost ones” (Paths 139); rather than longing for the purity of an origi-
nary mother tongue, he speaks all languages of his exile equally well; uncon-
vinced that humanity is infinitely improvable, Trotta ridicules Elisabeth’s 
“fresh, strong faith” that her photographs will make people “see reason” (Paths
143); arguing that it is shameful to photograph human suffering for the amuse-
ment of newspaper readers, Trotta forces Elisabeth to recognize that her pro-
fession is implicated in the injustices she believes she is combatting. Most 
important, as a member of a subordinate group in rebellion against the old 
empire rather than of its ruling elite—that is, one of the empire’s others—
Trotta disrupts Elisabeth’s affection for an innocent Austria upon which Ger-
many preyed. Intimating that Austrians’ behavior after 1938 may be rooted in 
their imperial past, Trotta observes that, though the German soldiers in Hit-
ler’s army were only following orders, Austrian soldiers were genuinely 
depraved: “The enjoyment they got out of every kind of brutality imaginable 
was written clearly all over their ugly faces” (Paths 151). Whereas Elisabeth, 
like other Western subjects, longs and strives in many ways to return to an 
originary home, Trotta represents the position of Joseph Roth, who affirmed 
the diaspora, who asserted, “A human being is not a tree,” and who argued, 
“Wandering is not a curse but a blessing” (Gerhard 12 citing Roth, “Segen” 
532).
In this context, Elisabeth’s later relationship to a much younger lover, twenty-
eight-year-old Philippe, a veteran of the Paris events of May 1968, reinforces 
Trotta’s lessons. If 1968 can be regarded as a last great effort on the part of West-
erners themselves to combine a struggle against Western imperialism with a 
struggle for their own subjective self-realization, its failure might also be 
regarded as marking the end point of that Western quest for universal justice 
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and happiness. By the time of this story (probably summer 1971), Philippe’s out-
bursts of rage are no longer directed at “the regime, capitalism and imperialism, 
but at his comrades who had disintegrated into splinter groups and were bat-
tling against each other” (Paths 207), and his decision at the story’s end to leave 
Elisabeth and marry the pregnant, drug-addicted daughter of a rich mobster 
signals his—and others’—betrayal of the aims of 1968. “But where had the May 
gone?” wonders Elisabeth (Paths 212). Nor does the historical course of events 
in the non-European world prove Elisabeth right and Trotta wrong: Algeria 
after liberation also fails to become a shining exemplar of human progress 
toward universal emancipation. Dismayed at “what was threatening to become 
of that freedom,” Elisabeth suppresses her private doubts, maintains her public 
commitment to struggles of national liberation, and reports “all sorts of positive 
things with cautious reservations,” nonetheless aware that her article represents 
“her first conscious defection to the land of lies” (Paths 144–145). 
Over the course of subsequent decades, the example of Trotta’s postimperial 
displacement erodes Elisabeth’s confidence in the values on which her activities 
had been premised and compels her to acknowledge the contradictions of her 
own location. Once she relinquishes her belief that she is contributing to a proj-
ect of universal human liberation, she is finally forced into a kind of ontological 
exile like Trotta’s own: “He had left an impression on her . . . because he made 
her conscious of so many things, because of his origins and because he—a real 
exile, one of the lost ones—had made her—an adventuress who expected God 
knows what from the world during her lifetime—had made an exile of her: 
Long after his death he slowly pulled her down with him to ruin, alienating 
her from the miracles and allowing her to recognize this alienation as her des-
tiny” (Paths 139). In conjunction with the Lawrence citation, Trotta’s response 
to Elisabeth suggests a reading of this story that would locate Elisabeth, much 
in contrast to what she believes her intentions to be, within a discursive para-
digm that permits only one monolinear history, the history of the victors, and 
leaves no discursive space, no language even, for the conquered and colonized 
to tell their different story.
Finally, Elisabeth’s conception of herself as “the woman who rode away” has 
multiple consequences for the construction of her own femininity. In many ways 
“Three Paths to the Lake” is a refiguring of the constellation of characters in 
Malina, though Elisabeth combines in one person the cool, rational, masculine 
Malina and the distraught unnamed female “I” who can find no language to tell 
her own story. As I have already suggested, the universalistic, disembodied sub-
ject position Elisabeth assumes brings her fame and even some fortune but no 
happiness at all. At many points in her life she merely moves through the paces 
of her female role without any interior engagement: as a young woman “she had 
gone to bed unemotionally, only, as she had believed, to do a man a favor” (Paths 
138); after age forty, “her increasing success with men was directly related to her 
increasing indifference to them” (Paths 174). In effect, like the “I” of Malina, she 
is “really” a woman only when she is “really,” passionately, in love, and then she 
performs femininity according to a script men have passed down (the performer 
in her father’s play, as in Malina), loving only men (themselves tellingly from the 
old empire) who treat her badly and abandon her inexplicably, leaving her sob-
bing alone by the telephone. But “Three Paths to the Lake” is Malina with a 
difference: whereas the “I” of Malina acts almost exclusively within the private 
realm, here Elisabeth shows that the gender paradigm to which she conforms—
disembodied universal subject versus woman as man’s object—is also inade-
quate to deal with a postmodern and postcolonial public realm except from the 
perspective of the dominant order: that is, one diametrically opposed to what 
Elisabeth believes to be her own quest for justice. One might then inquire 
whether the quotation she borrows from Lawrence to characterize gender rela-
tions and her hopes for their future rectification may be likewise intended to 
critique her standpoint as a woman as profoundly as the allusion to “The Woman 
Who Rode Away” indicts her as a neocolonialist. Elisabeth muses of romantic 
heterosexual love, “Perhaps one day something else might come along but only 
then, and it would be strong and mysterious and have real greatness, something 
to which each could once again submit” (Paths 175). Here sexuality is postulated 
to be the alternative to her public, masculinist role—but perhaps here, too, she is 
subjecting herself to a mystical concept of love in the same way that the woman 
who rode away subjects herself to the flint knife in the icy cave; perhaps here she 
is once more trapped in fatal binaries that will destroy her as surely as the Good 
God of Manhattan blew Jennifer to bits and Eka Kottwitz is imprisoned in her 
wheelchair.
In a somewhat related context, as she interviews prestigious gynecologists to 
formulate the text for a photo-reportage on abortion and is appalled that the 
doctors understand nothing at all about what really concerns their women 
patients “with their problems and their men and their inability to say one single 
true word about their lives,” Elisabeth rages: “Why doesn’t someone ask me for 
a change, why not ask someone who thinks independently and dares to live, 
what have you done to me and so many others, you with your insane empathy 
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with every kind of problem, hasn’t it ever occurred to anyone that you kill people 
when you deprive them of the power of speech and with it the power to experi-
ence and think” (Paths 173). Not simply from the perspective of postcoloniality 
but also from the perspective of gender relations, Elisabeth’s conception of her-
self as the woman who rode away suggests that she has accommodated herself 
to, or is the discursive product of, conceptions about gender relations that are 
virtually assured not to meet her needs as a person or as a woman. 
And this, finally, may explain Bachmann’s own peculiar comment about 
women’s emancipation in a 1971 interview (that is, shortly before she published 
Three Paths to the Lake): “Perhaps that’s quite remarkable for you that precisely 
a woman who always earned her own money, who paid for her own university 
study, always lived alone, that she says that she doesn’t care at all about women’s 
emancipation. I’ve always found the pseudomodern woman with her tortured 
efficiency and energy completely strange and incomprehensible” (GuI 109). At
the end of the same interview Bachmann remarks that, as she wrote Malina, she 
had the feeling “that I’m writing against something. Against a persistent terror-
ism. After all, people don’t really die from illnesses. They die from what’s been 
done to them” (GuI 110). It may be that Elisabeth, precisely such an emanci-
pated, pseudomodern woman, is also a victim of the system that has made her a 
professional success, and, as Bachmann’s use of literary allusions in this story 
may demonstrate, that she is also incapable of saying a single true word about 
her life. In “Three Paths to the Lake,” Elisabeth’s reflections may record not just 
the bloody struggles that accompany movements for national liberation and 
decolonization but also, and unknown to her, the story of her “way of death.”
Yet again it’s necessary to ask how the bleakness of “Three Paths to the Lake” 
might be related to Bachmann’s own inability to extricate herself from the sys-
tem she wished to criticize. On the one hand, there is certainly nothing wrong 
with considering the problems of white women and men, even in a postcolonial 
era (though one might argue, as some critics have maintained of postmodern 
and even postcolonial theory, that this is a way to retain white people at the cen-
ter of consideration after real historical developments have displaced them). On
the other hand, Bachmann sees the problems of the era entirely from a white 
perspective—doubtless her point if she wished to show how history inscribes the 
white psyche. But the chaos and disorder Bachmann believes she perceives in the 
postcolonial world doubtless look rather different from the perspective of newly 
liberated peoples. In fact, as Homi Bhabha has pointed out, the sense of alien-
ation Bachmann’s characters feel when encountering new hybrid cultural forms 
is precisely a consequence of the subversive political intervention that such new 
cultural productions undertake, reversing “the effects of the colonial disavowal, 
so that other ‘denied’ knowledges enter upon the dominant discourse and 
estrange the basis of its authority” (156). Similarly, at least for non-Western peo-
ples, the status of exile might also be considered one of gain as well as loss, a 
position from which contemporary intellectual and political leadership could 
best be undertaken, as Said has underlined: “it is no exaggeration to say that 
liberation as an intellectual mission, born in the resistance and opposition to the 
confinements and ravages of imperialism, has now shifted from the settled, 
established, and domesticated dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentered, 
and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the migrant, and whose 
consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the political figure 
between domains, between forms, between homes, and between languages” 
(Culture 332). What one might thus conclude about these texts is that they dis-
play the White Lady who, though oppressed by gender, has enjoyed the racial 
privilege of the center stage of world history and now only most reluctantly and 
regretfully moves—or is pushed—aside. 
The 1966 essay by Christa Wolf that I have so often cited might, despite the 
very different historical context in which it was written, explain why Bachmann 
was not always able to overcome the limitations of her own white European 
standpoint. “She has never been in a position,” writes Wolf, “to search for affili-
ation with a progressive historical movement. She tends rather—or at any rate 
lets some of her characters tend—to step out of society, to track down, in despair-
ing isolation, the conditions which her society dictates to the individual, to seek 
out the price that naked existence demands and that is paid a million times 
over.” The solution to the problems Bachmann addresses cannot, Wolf argues, 
be solved by an author or texts alone but depends instead on “changes in society 
that would give his profession a new foundation and himself a new responsibil-
ity” (Reader 94). A decade and a half later, as the emergence of postcolonial 
peoples and their writing increasingly compelled Westerners to ponder their 
own complicity in imperialist postures and practices, Wolf asked in her third 
Cassandra lecture: “The literature of the West (I read) is the white man’s reflec-
tion on himself. So should it be supplemented by the white woman’s reflection 
on herself? And nothing more?” (Cassandra 225) Virtually alone among post-
war German-language writers—as Wolf noted in the Cassandra lectures—
Bachmann moved in the direction of the “something more” that Wolf was seek-
ing, reflecting on the White Lady in order to raise questions about the racialization 
of the white psyche. Precisely her own implication in the conditions she described 
permitted her to extrapolate from Austria’s imperial past to examine the dissolu-
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tion of other empires, and the persistence of imperial attitudes, in the present. By 
probing the racialized foundations of white female identity, exploring discon-
tents of the white female psyche that are also her own, Bachmann is thus able to 
show why merely appropriating the racial prerogatives of the white man will not 
suffice to meet the needs of the White Lady.
CHAPTER 10
Bachmann and Materialist Feminism
GENDER AND THE COLD WAR
Probably no one believes any more that 
writing literature takes place outside of the
historical situation—that even a single writer 
exists whose starting point isn’t determined
by the conditions of the time.
—Ingeborg Bachmann, Werke
Two apparently contradictory arguments underwrite this book 
which I want to address explicitly here. On the one hand, I have maintained that 
Bachmann’s writings should be read historically, though they often are not; on 
the other hand, I have asserted that all readings of Bachmann are necessarily
historical: that is, informed by the historically specific concerns of readers, 
whether or not readers are aware of it. Walter Benjamin again helps to reconcile 
this apparent contradiction. His “Theses on the Philosophy of History” helps us 
to understand that all readings are necessarily “presentist” in that they take from 
the text that which “flashes up in a moment of danger” (255); that is, they appro-
priate the text in a way that corresponds to the reader’s present needs. But Ben-
jamin seems to insist in addition that the “historical materialist” (the reader of 
history who understands the past as Benjamin recommends) needs to recognize 
the pastness of the past, for he or she is called upon to redeem the past, to prevent 
it from being lost forever by retrieving it for the present. Hence the danger of a 
reading that is only presentist: readers find in the text what is familiar but not 
what is strange or genuinely historical or different from the present. 
In my own view, readings that do not acknowledge the pastness of products 
of the past are something like ethnocentric readings that find only the familiar 
in other cultures’ artifacts: they betray, do violence to, the past because they 
do not permit the past its otherness. Benjamin writes: “Nothing that has ever 
happened should be regarded as lost for history. To be sure, only a redeemed 
mankind receives the fullness of its past—which is to say, only for a redeemed 
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mankind has the past become citable in all its moments” (254). “A redeemed 
[hu]mankind” I take as a (utopian) description of the state to which humanity 
accedes after “our” efforts to achieve qualitative social change have succeeded 
(“after the revolution,” as we used to say, or “when the Messiah comes”). The 
“historical materialists” of Benjamin’s “Theses” have, as he puts it, “a weak Mes-
sianic power, a power to which the past has a claim” (254). Our charge as “his-
torical materialist” historians or literary scholars is to fulfill our ethical obligation 
to the past by redeeming as much of the past as our “weak Messianic power” 
allows. Though we will always read historically in the one sense, producing read-
ings informed by the historical situations in which we are embedded (as I hope I 
have shown in part 2 of this book), in the other sense reading texts historically 
will always only be the outcome of a great effort to understand the historical situ-
ation from which they derive and to which they respond.
In this final chapter I want to read Bachmann’s texts historically, using the 
methodology of “materialist feminism,” a contemporary approach to cultural 
analysis that I regard as most akin to the historical materialism that Benjamin 
advocated and as best equipped to help us understand texts within their histori-
cal contexts. An approach calling itself materialist feminism first emerged in the 
late 1970s, often designating efforts to turn Marxist-derived methods to feminist 
ends, but by the 1990s the term had come to refer to a methodology that com-
bined post-Althusserian Marxism with postmodern discourse theories. Com-
mitted to a multifactor analysis of women’s complex social positioning, contem-
porary materialist feminists refuse to privilege gender oppression over other 
forms of domination under which women (and men) suffer. Materialist femi-
nism distinguishes itself from Marxist feminism in its refusal to construe the 
economic sphere as the prime mover of social change “in the last instance.” 
Instead, materialist feminists insist upon the crucial work done by discourse/
ideology, defined as “the array of sense making practices which constitute what 
counts as ‘the way things are’ in any historical moment” in constituting, calling 
into being, or “interpellating” human subjects within particular social relations 
(in the words of Rosemary Hennessy [14], a prominent materialist feminist). 
Materialist feminists would, however, also insist that discourse/ideology cannot 
be detached from material practices and conditions or even, except perhaps heu-
ristically, be understood as separate “spheres” at all (in the manner of the old 
base/superstructure division). Rather, all social practices are “overdetermined,” 
and all elements of the social order inflect and influence each other in complex 
and unpredictable ways. Materialist feminists understand literary and other 
texts—produced and read by discursively constructed subjects—as interven-
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tions into meaning-making practices that can variously support or unsettle pre-
vailing social arrangements. Signifying practices are thus imbricated within the 
historically specific social relations that produce them and that they (dialecti-
cally) help to produce, and a materialist feminist reading strategy takes the form 
of ideology critique, probing texts to discover how they work to support, docu-
ment, and/or challenge the existing social order. Materialist feminism’s insis-
tence on embedding cultural analysis within the historically specific conditions 
of cultural production should mean that materialist feminist literary scholars 
work in the closest collaboration with like-minded historians, but in my experi-
ence very few literary and cultural studies scholars are informed about current 
research or debates within the discipline of history. The investigation that fol-
lows constitutes my attempt to draw on recent historical scholarship both to read 
Bachmann in the context of the historical conditions that obtained when she 
wrote and to contribute to the further elaboration of the methodology of mate-
rialist feminism.
As this book has insisted (and as my epigraph to this chapter, taken from the 
1959 Frankfurt lectures, also suggests), Bachmann was, like every other writer, 
a product of the historical conditions of her time. Unlike many writers, she her-
self insisted upon the importance of history for literary production, maintaining 
in a 1973 interview, for instance: “History is essential for the writer. One can’t 
write when one doesn’t see the entire historical context that led to the present” 
(GuI 133). In a 1969 interview she explained that the massive writing project 
called “Ways of Death” on which she had embarked would focus upon contem-
porary history: “To me it’s not a novel, it’s a single long book. There will be 
several volumes, and first of all two that will probably appear at the same time. 
It’s called ‘Ways of Death’ and for me it’s a single large study of all the possible 
ways of death, a compendium, a manuale, as one would say here [in Italy], and 
at the same time I imagine that it could provide an illustration of the last twenty 
years, always with Vienna and Austria as the setting” (GuI 66). In this final 
chapter I examine Bachmann’s life and her texts in the context of the Cold War, 
which preeminently established the frame within which those “last twenty 
years”—that is to say, Austrian history since the end of World War II—must be 
situated. 
Though Austria was occupied by the four victor powers until the state treaty 
of 1955 that declared the country officially neutral, efforts to win Austria for the 
Western free-market system and to deter Soviet efforts to incorporate it into 
their own sphere of interest began even before the war’s end. According to 
Charles Maier, the primary vehicle integrating postwar European economies 
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into Western capitalism, the Marshall Plan, undertook to transform the ideo-
logical conflicts of Europe by bringing about a Western- and Central-Europe-
wide consensus on the value of economic productivity, efficiency, and growth, 
portrayed as politically neutral goals. As Maier puts it, the working-class parties 
of postwar Europe were to be induced “to abandon their claims to the redistri-
bution of property, income and power and to accept higher absolute earnings 
instead, thus to exchange greater equality for greater growth” (48); specifically, 
the parties of the working class were called upon to give up their aspirations for 
power at the state level and instead accept American-style, “nonpolitical” collec-
tive bargaining for specific benefits at the level of the individual enterprise 
(Tweraser 225–226). The economic recovery that the Marshall Plan promoted 
thus also necessitated a significant ideological and cultural readjustment, as 
Michael Hogan argues: “In the most profound sense, it involved the transfer of 
attitudes, habits and values as well, indeed, of a whole way of life that Marshall 
Planners associated with progress in the marketplace of politics and social rela-
tionships as much as they did with greater output in industry and agriculture. 
This was the American way of life. Through the technical-assistance program, 
in other words, the Marshall Planners aimed to implant in Western Europe the 
seed of a democratic neo-capitalism that had flourished in the United States” 
(415). Expanding on the Allies’ 1943 Moscow Declaration proclaiming Austria 
to be the first victim of National Socialism, Austrian politicians “invented a ver-
sion of history that would liberate them from the burdens of the past . . . [and] 
extricate the painful memory of the war from the complicity in a hideous race 
war against legions of innocent people,” as Günter Bischof has put it (Austria
x–xi). Political leaders cast their lot with the West from the outset but also 
shrewdly used the threat of a potential communist putsch to win more resources 
for their nation. Bischof maintains that the West won Austria via what the Brit-
ish historian David Reynolds had termed “containment by integration,” fending 
off communism in Austria by a “quasi-integration” of Austria into the West 
(Bischof, “Austria looks” 184), turning Austria despite its nominal neutrality 
into “ein geheimer Verbündeter des Westens”—a secret ally of the West (Bischof, 
“Österreich”). 
As Reinhold Wagnleitner has elaborated in Coca-Colonization and the Cold 
War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World 
War, U.S. efforts to win over Austrian hearts and minds to the cause of anti-
communism, the free-market economy, and the American way of life were also 
focused on the cultural sphere. Although the Allies, Wagnleitner explains, 
directed a policy of “reorientation” toward the defeated Austrians “softer” than 
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the reeducation measures imposed upon Germany, “American plans for Austria 
still contained a strict program of cultural control, denazification, and cultural 
reform” (Coca-Colonization 67). But, invoking increasingly popular notions about 
totalitarianism that equated the Nazi and communist systems as their justifica-
tion, U.S. efforts to assume control of Austrian cultural life by the late 1940s were 
directed in the main against the influence of an opponent the Americans now 
regarded as more insidious than recalcitrant Nazis: the Soviet Union. The U.S. 
“Country Plan for Austria” emphasized in 1950 that the goal of U.S. cultural 
engagement was now “to counteract totalitarian influences in Austria, whether 
from the communist left or the neo-Nazi right, and particularly to encourage 
democratic stability by exposing and attacking communist attempts to encroach 
upon the authority of the Austrian government” (Coca-Colonization 3). Together 
with economic initiatives such as the Marshall Plan, American occupation author-
ities undertook measures that affected every aspect of Austrian cultural life: the 
press (U.S. authorities licensed only those publications that hewed to the Ameri-
can line; provided news articles and photographs through the services of the 
Amerikanischer Nachrichtendienst, AP, and UPI; distributed a large range of 
specialized journals to special-interest groups; and trained Austrian journalists in 
U.S. journalistic techniques); radio (the American station Rot-Weiss-Rot had the 
strongest transmitters and enjoyed the greatest degree of public acceptance, hir-
ing, as a 1951 State Department memo put it, “high-caliber Austrian personnel” 
to make the station an “ideological weapon of major impact” that could also be 
aimed at German-speaking peoples “deep behind the iron curtain” [Coca-Colo-
nization 112–113]); book publication (there were twelve America Houses in Aus-
tria by 1953 plus a traveling bookmobile— circulating books that had been care-
fully selected for their anticommunist orientation—and subsidized translations 
of U.S. books); education (efforts were made to implement a redesigned Austrian 
school system and curricula based on the U.S. model); and film (propaganda 
films, newsreels, and a flood of Hollywood movies, including a large number 
with an explicitly anticommunist message). Such “Americanization,” Wagnleit-
ner asserts, describes “the development of a consumption-oriented social order 
within capitalist societies—the pursuit of happiness as the pursuit of consump-
tion” (Coca-Colonization 6–7). Despite some degree of Austrian contempt for the 
vulgar, bad-mannered Americans and their tasteless cultural forms, American 
cultural products (as well as consumer goods) were in the main eagerly welcomed 
by an Austrian public, whose embrace of the American way of life could also 
serve as a welcome alternative to National Socialist culture, allowing Austrians to 
move toward the future while forgetting—or repressing—the past. 
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Inge von Weidenbaum maintains that “Ingeborg Bachmann first started 
thinking historically in the strictest sense only when she began her studies in 
Vienna” (25). From then until she left Vienna in 1953, Bachmann’s activities 
were steeped in the atmosphere of the Cold War. Her first jobs after receiving 
her doctorate were in the secretariat of the American occupation forces, first, 
beginning in spring 1951, as a typist for Neues Österreich, a newspaper published 
by the Americans, then, from fall 1951 on, as a scriptwriter for the American 
radio station Rot-Weiss-Rot, located one flight up in the same building. “Rot-
Weiss-Rot,” Wagnleitner reports, “had become the most important propaganda 
medium for the United States in Austria by at least 1950” (Coca-Colonization
109). According to Andreas Hapkemeyer, Bachmann’s department was given the 
task “of evaluating, editing, and writing manuscripts both in the area of poli-
tics as well as in that of literature and entertainment” (Entwicklungslinien 43). 
Rot-Weiss-Rot broadcast several of her poems, her translations of Louis 
McNeice’s The Tower and Thomas Wolfe’s Mannerhouse, and her own radio 
play “A Business with Dreams” (Hapkemeyer, Entwicklungslinien 45). Joseph 
McVeigh has discovered that Bachmann was also coauthor of the Rot-Weiss-Rot 
radio series The Radio Family, fifteen of whose scripts she wrote entirely or in 
part, in collaboration with her colleagues Jörg Mauthe and Peter Weiser, in the 
period between early 1952 and summer 1953. In 1994 Weiser recalled how they 
had conceived of the series: “It will be a political radio series, though the listener 
won’t understand that; it will be a socially influential radio series, though the 
listener won’t understand that; and it will be a funny radio series, and that’s the 
only thing the listener will understand” (26). That was also precisely Rot-Weiss-
Rot’s program: of using entertainment as the vehicle to convey its Cold War 
message. 
As well, in the early 1950s Bachmann published a number of poems in Die 
Neue Zeitung, the American newspaper in Germany that was in the earliest 
years of occupation permitted an independent editorial policy but, as Jessica 
Gienow-Hecht explains in a study of the paper’s history, by 1949 had “turned 
into a more pro-American mouthpiece of the U.S. military government. . . . 
Now the Germans were told what was right and wrong and what their future 
was to be. . . . Virtually every major field of interest—including the coverage of 
television, advertising, politics, philosophy, and history—reflected the effort to 
propagandize a Western way of life, defended by the United States of America” 
(161–162). Bachmann also published poetry in the Viennese journal Stimmen 
der Gegenwart, a multiyear anthology edited by Hans Weigel (a Viennese Jew 
returned from exile in the United States and for a time Bachmann’s lover [Hans 
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Weigel]) with the encouragement of the Austrian branch of the Congress 
for Cultural Freedom, a CIA-sponsored, Europe-wide cultural initiative 
(Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization 63).
Nor was Bachmann able to escape Cold War pressures by her move to Italy. 
In 1954 her friend and sometime housemate Hans Werner Henze premiered 
his Boulevard Solitude at a dazzling two-week International Conference of 
Twentieth- Century Music sponsored by the Congress of Cultural Freedom, its 
promotion of avant-garde composition deriving from the fact that this was the 
kind of music Stalin expressly forbade (Saunders 221–223). Henze’s twelve-tone 
opera was so badly received by a loud and hostile audience that Bachmann 
fainted during the performance and had to be taken home (Henze 163). As
well, the radio reports on Italian politics that Bachmann prepared for Radio 
Bremen from September 1954 to summer 1955 draw upon familiar Cold War 
discourses: for instance, à la U.S. McCarthyism, Bachmann portrays the Italian 
Communist Party, supported by foreign powers, as engaged in infiltrating all 
areas of Italian society: “Investigations showed that the Communist Party has 
established a broad net of business connections throughout the whole country, 
facilitated and encouraged by political conspiracies within the administration 
and illegal communist-led infiltration of the administration, but also due to the 
‘complicity’ of certain private enterprises as well as the ‘support’ of foreign states” 
(Römische 32). Furthermore, as I noted in chapter 8, in 1955 Bachmann joined 
many other Austrian intellectuals participating in U.S. exchange programs by 
attending Henry Kissinger’s Harvard Summer School; as a State Department 
memo to the officer in charge of the American mission in Vienna underlined in 
1950, invitations to the United States were offered to individuals who were cho-
sen not “because of any specially urgent need on their part for psychological 
reconditioning but because they are considered especially useful in communi-
cating information about the United States and its democratic institutions to 
their fellow citizens, they themselves being already most favorably disposed in 
that direction” (Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization 77). And in 1962, Bachmann 
received a fellowship from the Ford Foundation (an organization, as Frances 
Stonor Saunders has shown, that frequently worked hand in hand with the 
CIA) to spend a year in Berlin. This consideration of Bachmann’s very full 
immersion in American cultural imperialism may provide a new perspective 
from which to read her oft-stated assertion that the very fact that Austria had 
stepped out of history offered her a privileged vantage point from which to 
view—and write about—contemporary events. If the post-1945 United States 
can be viewed as the metropole that has come to represent capitalist modernity, 
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Austria (subcolony of the colony Germany, as Wagnleitner remarks) offered 
Bachmann a smaller and more manageable stage on and from which to observe 
modernity’s effects. As she told an interviewer in 1971, “From the perspective of 
this small, decaying country one can see phenomena much more precisely that 
are obscured in large countries” (GuI 80).
For women, the Cold War had particular consequences that also left their 
imprint on Bachmann’s writing. Elaine Tyler May and many others have 
observed that a new emphasis on domesticity lay at the center of Cold War ideol-
ogy and practice; if containment of communism was the overarching principle 
guiding the foreign policy of the United States and its allies, a conception of 
domestic containment shaped policy on the home front, where women could 
now abandon their strenuous war-related efforts in the public arena and return 
to their “proper” sphere: the private realm, home, and family. In fact, as May 
shows, women’s “freedom” to remain in the home was taken as evidence for the 
superiority of the capitalist system to communism, where women were com-
pelled to work side by side with men. As Robert Moeller has detailed, the redo-
mestication of women was a hallmark of gender relations in the Federal Repub-
lic. Indeed, he notes, the restabilization and reprivatization of the family after 
the arduous rubble years could be hailed as evidence of West Germany’s repu-
diation of the Nazi past and superiority to the East German present (138). 
“Experts” such as sociologist Helmut Schelsky located the great “tenacity” of the 
family in “the biological ground of sexual relations and a mother’s existential 
care for the next generation”—that is, in universal, historically invariable struc-
tures of femininity and masculinity (Moeller 118)—so, often under the influ-
ence of postwar American sociology, such experts also privatized social conflicts, 
offering psychological, not political, explanations for social conflicts and thera-
peutic coping strategies to problems conceived of as private matters. “In this 
way,” as Elaine May puts it, “domestic containment and its therapeutic corollary 
undermined the potential for political activism and reinforced the chilling 
effects of anticommunism and the cold war consensus” (14). 
But more immediately, the German and Austrian fascination with Ameri-
can consumer goods also served Cold War needs. The “freedom to consume” 
enjoyed in postwar Germany and Austria was, their politicians maintained, a 
marker of those countries’ embrace of the values of Western democracies, and 
simultaneously, as Erica Carter puts it, “a strong economy in a stable society 
formed the most effective bastion against the Red threat” and offered a safe-
guard against communist encroachment (How 80). Increased access to a variety 
of consumer goods seemed conversely to prove that the free-market system could 
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deliver on its promises, as Schelsky observed in 1956: “Universal consumption of 
industrial and publicistic mass production is responsible for the fact that in all 
areas of life almost everybody can develop a feeling corresponding to his capaci-
ties that he isn’t ‘way at the bottom’ anymore, that he too is already sharing in the 
plenitude and luxury of existence” (“Gesellschaftlicher” 340). Ludwig Erhard, 
Konrad Adenauer’s economics minister and then German chancellor himself, 
drew direct connections between consumption and women’s domestic role, as 
Moeller has pointed out: “The ‘will to consume’ [Wille zum Verbrauch] was the 
engine that drove uninterrupted output, economic rationalization, efficiency, 
and gains in productivity; as ‘economics ministers’ of their families, women con-
trolled the throttle. . . . Only within this economic framework would the ‘state-
free sphere of the family’ be possible. The experience of totalitarian and com-
munist state-run economies, their attempts to subordinate families to their 
needs, was proof positive” (139–40). Within the domestic sphere, Carter has 
argued, women had the specific responsibility of presiding over consumption, 
the means whereby cultural order was restored and a specifically Western 
national identity was established. Even female management of this sphere appar-
ently extrinsic to politics was itself shaped by new U.S.-influenced patterns of 
consumption. For the housewife’s task was the production, at the level of every-
day life, of the assurance of continuing prosperity, as Michael Wildt observes in 
examining the transformation of the German diet over the course of the 1950s:
“The rhetoric of recipes pertained less to the kitchen as a site of food preparation 
than to the kitchen as the ‘factory of dreams’” (238). 
Elizabeth Heineman has shown that within the context of the restoration of 
traditional gender hierarchies and responsibilities, single women or “women 
standing alone” emerged as a particular problem, their superfluity in post war 
society captured in the term used to describe their excess numbers: Frauenüber-
schuß (surplus of women) beyond the available number of marriageable men. In 
a 1955 article in Merkur (where, as I noted in chapter 8, Bachmann also published 
a number of poems in the 1950s), “Die gelungene Emanzipation” (Successful 
emancipation), Schelsky cites experts who warn that desexualization threatens 
the woman who engages in the rationalized and impersonal activities of modern 
production and management so alien to her nature, transforming her into a neu-
ter or Abbild des Mannes (copy of a man) (“Gelungene” 364). And, paradoxically, 
single women could at the same time be seen as manifesting a dangerous hyper-
sexualization. To fend off the dangers of a female sexuality eluding male control, 
the female body itself was subjected to regulation and discipline. For the first 
time since the 1920s, the corset—or in more modern form the long-line bra and 
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girdle—was reintroduced, worn willingly by women of all ages and sizes, and 
valued as a sign of respectable femininity. Christian Dior’s enormously successful 
“New Look,” introduced in 1947, also served as a mechanism to refeminize 
women, who would thus repudiate the more androgynous garb of the war and 
postwar period: “The ‘New Woman’ with her wasp waist, high-heeled shoes, 
romantic flounces, and pale complexion now was to appear dependent, exclusive, 
fragile. . . . After wartime, the time of uniforms, women with wide boxer shoul-
ders doing compulsory service, Dior sketched flower-like women, waists slim as 
vines, wide skirts that opened like flower blossoms” (Delille/Grohn 108). The 
new foundation garments produced standardized curvaceous bodies to fit the 
new fashions. Other parts of the female body also needed the attention of con-
sumer products to achieve acceptability: “More and more products imported 
from America incited worries about body odor, bad breath, dandruff, broken 
nails, and gray hair. Women’s bodies were stringently disciplined via this ideal of 
cosmetic beauty” (Schmidt-Linsenhoff et al. 117). As Carter has maintained, for 
the female consumer in postwar West Germany, “the focal point of leisure, plea-
sure, and personal freedom [was] . . . the female body itself” (“Alice” 205). 
How do Bachmann’s texts document or, alternatively, contest German and 
Austrian collusion in Western Cold War policies and their particular aims for 
women, and to what degree do they remain blind to, implicated in, or even sup-
portive of those historical arrangements? As I have pointed out in other chap-
ters, 1950s journalists turned Bachmann into an “exemplum for [Germany’s] 
reconstruction, its reattainment of international standards, its reachievement of 
recognition in the world” (Hotz 72), and many conservative critics of that period 
denied that her poems had anything to do with politics whatsoever. In that 
respect, Bachmann’s lyric production coincided perfectly with the modernist 
directions promoted by the Congress for Cultural Freedom and its Cold War 
allies, altogether distinct from the accessible, realistic, and problem-oriented 
texts that characterized both the Kahlschlag (immediate postwar) period of West 
German writing and East German socialist realism. Of course, many subse-
quent Bachmann readers have distanced themselves vehemently from a 1950s
stance that viewed her writing as entirely unrelated to politics. In 1982, Hans 
Höller argued strenuously for the historicity and political relevance of her lyric 
poetry, declaring that the poems’ complex images thematize, for instance, the 
promises and perils of new beginnings, disappointment over the political direc-
tions taken; human alienation within a particular social context, the contamina-
tion of the German cultural heritage through its association with the Holocaust, 
and the repression of the memory of the violent past (“Gestundete”). Some 
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poems, of course, speak explicitly to or about contemporary political dilemmas: 
“Advertisement” about the lures of consumer society; “Safe Conduct” about the 
dangers of the bomb; “Early Noon” about Nazis’ resumption of powerful polit-
ical positions; “Every Day” perhaps about the Cold War itself. If the two poetry 
volumes thematize gender dilemmas of the 1950s, it was in formulations too 
subtle for the public of that era to decipher, and it has remained for later readers 
(e.g., Christa Wolf, Sabine Gölz) to elaborate the aspects of the poetry that speak 
to gender issues.
In contrast to her poems, Bachmann’s radio plays and stories of the 1950s
overtly address the social arrangements of that period and their subjective 
consequences, simultaneously contesting the decade’s social relations and to 
some degree also apparently uncritically reproducing them. Her great accom-
plishment in these texts was the challenge they posed to the privatization of 
social problems. Uta Poiger has argued that a particular “achievement” of West 
German Cold War liberalism in the late 1950s was its success at depoliticizing 
the issues of consumption, popular culture, and sexuality (in contrast to East 
Germans, ever alert to rebellion against Socialist Unity Party policies in those 
areas), portraying them as questions of lifestyle relevant only in the private arena 
(121). Not until the radical movements of the late 1960s, Poiger maintains, could 
such assumptions of Cold War liberalism be drawn into question, especially by 
feminists who insisted that “the personal is political” (219). Thus, for most of 
Bachmann’s Western readers, the absence of a language that would allow her to 
identify concretely what was wrong and how it might be changed occluded the 
social dimensions of her writing. This meant that reviewers with a very differ-
ent horizon of expectations took these texts to be—at best!—no more verbindlich
(connected to real life) than her poetry.
 Some of those texts brilliantly illuminate the instrumentalization of women 
to meet the needs of the Cold War period. “Among Murderers and Madmen,” 
set in Vienna in 1955, represents the domestic containment of women as part 
and parcel of the restoration of pre-1945 power relations and the repression of 
the fascist past. To understand the urgency that underwrote this text about the 
unmastered National Socialist past in Austria and the context in which Bach-
mann wrote it, it is probably important to know that in 1954 a number of former 
Nazi generals visited Austria to hold demonstrations and meetings of “Old 
Comrades’ Associations,” at which, dressed “in uniform and with all insignia 
and decorations,” they advocated a new German Anschluß of Austria (Lütgenau 
246–247). Focused on a Stammtischrunde (group of [male] friends who meet 
regularly at a pub), the story explicitly addresses the restoration of male author-
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ity and stabilization of male identity (enabled by the lies men tell each other 
about what happened before 1945). The story’s first sentence reads: “[The] men 
are on the way to themselves when they get together in the evening, drink and 
talk and express opinions” (TY 83). The frame for Bachmann’s investigation of 
the misrepresentations and betrayals that underwrite these men’s confident self-
presentations is the cost for women of men’s reassertion of themselves as “Titans 
and demigods” (TY 84). It is their wives at home who rage and suffer:
Barefoot or in slippers, with tied-up hair and tired faces, the women wandered 
round at home, turned off the gas and looked fearfully under the bed and in the 
cupboard, soothed the children with absent-minded words or sat dejectedly by 
the radio and then went to bed after all with thoughts of vengeance in the lonely 
house. The women lay there feeling like victims, with wide-open eyes in the dark-
ness, full of despair and malice. . . . And in the first dream they murdered their 
husbands, made them die in car crashes, of heart attacks and pneumonia; made 
them die quickly, or slowly and miserably, according to the magnitude of the 
reproach, and under their closed delicate eyelids tears welled up in sorrow for the 
death of their husbands. They were crying over their husbands who had gone out, 
ridden out, never come home, and finally they wept over themselves. They had 
come to their truest tears. (TY 84–85)
Bachmann perceptively shows that male activity in the public arena is enabled by 
women at home; however, in some contrast to her later texts, she also here tends 
to exempt women from accountability for the past and present social arrange-
ments for which she reproaches the men of her story. 
Though “Among Murderers and Madmen” most clearly connects the 1950s
redomestication of women to Austrians’ failure to address their complicity in 
National Socialism and Austria’s “remasculinization,” it is possible to derive a 
sustained, if somewhat subdued, critique of the decade’s gender arrangements 
and expectations from Bachmann’s texts of the period. The radio play “A Busi-
ness with Dreams” shows how fantasies of consumption that are focused on 
femininity stabilize class-based social relations, and the male protagonist of 
“The Thirtieth Year” cuts a wide swath through the surplus of women (“he 
loved a myriad [Milliarde] women, all at the same time and without distinction” 
[TY 26]), playing fast and loose with its somewhat interchangeable (all named 
some variant of “Helena”) embodiments: deceiving Eleni with another woman; 
leaving pregnant Leni alone in a ski hut while he cavorts with two blonde ski 
bunnies; politely making love to Helene whom he finds repulsive. Several other 
stories of The Thirtieth Year touch on the destructive consequences of bourgeois 
marriage for women. Here, too, Bachmann represents marriage as a sustaining 
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pillar of an entire social order; that is, the private realm is understood to be not 
extrinsic to the public but its necessary corollary. In “Undine Goes,” Undine 
mounts a frontal assault on the deadly repetitiveness of male-dominant, female-
submissive domestic partnerships wherein husbands control power and money 
in the public arena and expect loyal wives, in return for financial support, to 
create a nurturant private sphere:
You monsters with your phrases, you who seek the phrases of women so that you 
have all you need, so that the world is round. You who make women your mis-
tresses and wives, one-day wives, week-end wives, lifetime wives and let your-
selves be made into their husbands. . . . You with your jealousy of your women, 
with your arrogant forbearance and tyranny, your search for sanctuary with 
your women; you with your housekeeping money and your joint good-night 
conversations, those sources of new strength, of the conviction that you are right 
in your conflicts with the outside world, you with your helplessly skillful, help-
lessly absent-minded embraces. I was amazed to see that you give your wives 
money for the shopping and for clothes and for the summer holiday, then you 
invite them out (invite them, that means you pay, of course). You buy and let 
yourselves be bought. (TY 179–180)
In “A Step towards Gomorrah,” marriage is considered, to use Althusserian 
terminology, an ideological form that interpellates individuals into particular 
subject positions: “Wiser than Charlotte, [her husband] had long ago recognized 
marriage as a state that is stronger than the individuals who enter it, and which 
therefore also leaves more of a mark upon their partnership than they could 
have marked or even changed the marriage. However a marriage is conducted—
it cannot be conducted arbitrarily, inventively, it cannot tolerate innovation or 
change, because to enter into marriage already means to enter into its form” (TY
127). As many commentators have observed, the tragedy of this story derives 
from Charlotte’s own entrapment within ideological constructions that permit 
her to envision a romantic connection only within the parameters her era pro-
vides: “She would be able to subjugate Mara, to guide and push her. She would 
have . . . somebody for whom the only important thing was to take part in her 
life and for whom she was the measure of all things, somebody for whom it was 
more important to keep her linen in order, to turn back her bed, than to satisfy 
another ambition—somebody, above all, for whom it was more important to 
think with her thoughts than to have a thought of her own” (TY 125). In The 
Thirtieth Year it is already possible to perceive the connection between the banal-
ity of everyday male-female relationships and a social order that kills the spirit 
and, as in “Among Murderers and Madmen,” sometimes also the body as well.
On the other hand, it is difficult not to conclude (as I have argued in chapter 
8 and elsewhere) that Bachmann also simultaneously reproduces conventional 
1950s notions of femininity. With the exception of Charlotte of “A Step towards 
Gomorrah,” a concert pianist, and possibly Jennifer of “The Good God of Man-
hattan,” a student, all these women are confined to the private sphere, and even 
Charlotte is an obedient and attentive wife. In “Everything” and “A Wilder-
muth,” both male protagonists are granted a “good” and a “bad” woman part-
ner: a cheery, chatty bourgeois wife who happily fulfills her domestic obliga-
tions, and a proletarian mistress, Betty in “Everything,” “offhand, undemanding, 
subservient” (TY 75); silent, sultry Wanda in “A Wildermuth.” Neither “mis-
tress” is an emancipated or rebellious woman herself: it is their mere class, gen-
der, and sexual presence as an alternative to marriage that constitutes a disrup-
tion and a danger, their challenge to domesticity conceived of as the seductive 
threat of an uncontrolled female sexuality exuded by surplus women. The wives 
correspond to the worst of 1950s stereotypes, veritably “ditzy dames” in the 
manner of Lucille Ball in the television show I Love Lucy, and though Bach-
mann may thereby have been attempting a critique of the grim masculine pur-
suit of incontrovertible truth, the alternative she proposes is at women’s cost, 
drawing upon gender dichotomies that represent women as incapable of ratio-
nal thought. In “A Step towards Gomorrah,” Charlotte’s complaint about the 
language of women summarizes this position: “The language of men, insofar as 
it was applied to women, had been bad enough already and doubtful; but the 
language of women was even worse, more undignified—she had been shocked 
by it ever since she had seen through her mother, later through her sisters, girl 
friends and the wives of her men friends and had discovered that absolutely 
nothing, no insight, no observation corresponded to this language, to the frivo-
lous or pious maxims, the jumble of judgments and opinions or the sighed 
lament” (TY 133). Certainly the masculine identity of these figures is unstable as 
well, and in that respect these stories may also be understood as Bachmann’s 
far-reaching critiques of the culture of the West German economic miracle. But 
by exploring masculine insecurities as they are played out within relationships to 
women, by solving men’s problems at women’s cost, Bachmann also shows her-
self to be both influenced by and contributing to the reassertion of male control 
over women during the postwar years.
“A Step towards Gomorrah,” “Undine Goes,” and “The Good God of Man-
hattan” focus directly on autonomous female sexuality, and in all three cases 
Bachmann concludes, for somewhat different reasons, that an independent 
female sexuality is irreconcilable with the social order. Perhaps inadvertently 
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revealing the limitations of her own understanding of gender, Bachmann con-
ceded in a speech in 1959 with respect to “The Good God,” “It is also clear to me 
that we have to remain inside the [social] order, that there’s no escape from soci-
ety” (W 4: 276). Undine and Jennifer, akin to Wanda and Betty, show that the 
cost of female sexual self-determination is at best isolation and abandonment, at 
worst victimhood and death. Most clearly in “The Good God of Manhattan” 
(see chapter 8), Bachmann packages her assault on an Americanized, post-Hiro-
shima economic wonder in the very images that incited grave anxiety in that 
era, those of female sexuality out of control, and she simultaneously confirms 
dominant gender norms that contrast the public realm of masculinity to the 
intimate realm of women. Moreover, if, as May has argued, unfettered female 
sexuality was associated with atomic catastophe—the bikini was named after 
the atoll where atomic tests were carried out—Bachmann in contrast makes 
eroticism the antagonist of the Manhattan Project; if the containment of women 
is a mechanism to stave off totalitarianism, Bachmann makes female autonomy 
a threat to the all-embracing order that the God of Manhattan represents. Yet in 
merely reversing these images without deconstructing them altogether, Bach-
mann continues to show that she too is a creature of the discourses to which her 
characters fall victim; as Rita Felski puts it, “the nostalgia for such a nonalien-
ated plenitude is itself a product of modern dualistic schemas which positioned 
woman as an ineffable Other beyond the bounds of a masculine social and sym-
bolic order” (21). Bachmann’s formulation of the problem of female indepen-
dence, one might argue, by constructing both female autonomy and sexuality as 
indeed constituting a peril to social order which any society should endeavor to 
contain, already yields the terrain on which she might have wished to argue 
against 1950s gender conventions. Hence, though now it is possible to read these 
stories as glosses on gender relations which anticipate the “Ways of Death,” it is 
likely that readers of her period could read these texts only as a contribution to 
and confirmation of the reassertion of male control over women at which 1950s
gender discourses aimed. 
What assisted Bachmann in overcoming this impasse was a shift in the West 
German cultural climate in the late 1950s. As Anson Rabinbach has docu-
mented, from 1959 onward the Federal Republic experienced a “crisis of Vergan-
genheitsbewältigung [coming to terms with the past—the German euphemism 
for addressing the legacy of the Holocaust]” that involved its relationship both to 
the National Socialist past and to “the multiple sins of the Adenauer years” (52). 
Signaling this change was Theodor Adorno’s famous 1959 essay “What Does 
Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?” in which he maintained that “the con-
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tinued existence of National Socialism within democracy” was in his view 
“potentially more threatening than the continued existence of fascist tendencies 
against democracy” (Adorno, “What” 115). Adorno and, a few years later at a 
more popular level, Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich in The Inability to 
Mourn (1967) argued that the German relationship to the Nazi past had been 
characterized by repression, denial, the “loss of history,” the “eradication of” or 
“flight from memory”; it was the product of a “deep psychic debility” that left 
behind a “latent explosive potential for irrational behavior” (Rabinbach 54). As
Rabinbach notes, these arguments were premised on “a therapeutic model of 
historical discourse” (thus displaying some similarities to other social scientific 
explanatory paradigms of the 1950s) and placed more emphasis on elements of 
National Socialism that were not unique to National Socialism and could be 
discerned in the present: authoritarianism, anti-Semitism and racism, anticom-
munism, antiliberalism, elements of continuity or similarity between fascism 
and contemporary capitalism (52–57). The new antifascist critique of contem-
porary fascism (which would be picked up by the New Left of the 1960s and 
1970s) provided Bachmann with an explanation both of what was wrong with 
the present and of how and why it left its imprint on contemporary subjectivity. 
From the perspective of these developments, some otherwise puzzling aspects of 
Bachmann’s treatment of fascism become quite comprehensible. 
Bachmann’s organicist explanation of the causes of the “ways of death” that 
her novel cycle was to delineate bears a remarkable resemblance to Adorno’s 
statement on the survival of National Socialism into the present. In her preface 
to a reading from The Book of Franza in 1966, Bachmann represented the cause 
of National Socialist criminality as a virus that remained contagious in the post-
war period: “I’ve often wondered, and perhaps it has passed through your minds 
as well, just where the virus of crime escaped to—it cannot have simply disap-
peared from our world twenty years ago just because murder is no longer 
praised, desired, decorated with medals, and promoted. The massacres are 
indeed over, the murderers still among us” (Franza 3–4). Adorno similarly 
viewed National Socialism as an organic substance that continues to infect 
humans or their social relations: “National Socialism lives on, and to this day we 
don’t know whether it is only the ghost of what was so monstrous that it didn’t 
even die off with its own death, or whether it never died in the first place—
whether the readiness for unspeakable actions survived in people, as in the social 
conditions that hem them in” (“What” 115). If “National Socialism” or “fas-
cism” designates not a particular state form or social order but rather a set of 
more or less universal characteristics discernible in the individual psyche, as evi-
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dent today as in the past, then it is altogether reasonable for Bachmann to main-
tain in a 1973 statement that fascism “doesn’t start with the first bombs that are 
thrown, it doesn’t start with terrorism, which you can write about, in every 
newspaper. It starts in relationships between people. Fascism is the first thing in 
the relationship between a man and a woman (GuI 144). If Adorno’s explana-
tion is correct (as might, of course, be contested) that fascist personality types 
continue to impose their violent will on victims in the present, then the central 
metaphor of both The Book of Franza and Malina, the cemetery of the murdered 
daughters, is not an illegitimate appropriation of the suffering of National 
Socialism’s real victims by a contemporary woman of Germanic ancestry but an 
image that accurately captures the presence of the past in the present. 
Under the new conditions of the changed cultural climate in Germany, 
Bachmann’s first public fictional effort explicitly to thematize the relationship of 
politics to subjectivity (or, as the editors of the critical edition put it, the “juxta-
position of private history and ‘big history’” [TP 1: 524]), directly addressed the 
consequences of the Cold War. Her 1964 Büchner Prize speech, “A Site for 
Coincidences,” focuses on contemporary Berlin (a site, she had remarked in a 
draft eulogy to Gombrowicz, that “smells of sickness and death” [W 4: 326]), 
where she had spent the previous year on a fellowship from the Ford Founda-
tion. Bachmann’s comments on earlier drafts of the speech, included in the 
critical edition, clarify her intentions for this piece, and those intentions, I want 
to maintain here, continue to inform her writing practice in the “Ways of 
Death.” First, Bachmann declares herself always to be writing about politics 
even when the concerns of her texts seem very far away from contemporary 
political issues: “For me the realms can’t be separated; even if thinking doesn’t 
always show visibly that it’s political, sometimes it has to understand itself that 
way, not as a single statement but rather integrated, not an athletic activity in 
public, but as a constant infiltration” (TP 1: 177). Second, in a passage that cul-
minates in an allusion to one of the most terrifying moments of the Cold War, 
the U.S.-Soviet confrontation at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, Bachmann 
indicates that the politics she finds most threatening and dangerous are those of 
the postwar period, of the Cold War era: “And the threat doesn’t take place in 
war, not in times of naked violence, where survival is the main thing, but rather 
before and afterward, in peacetime, and I truly had only a suspicion, no cer-
tainty, when after the war I started to think and stopped trying to survive, now 
it seemed guaranteed, then the suspicion occurred to me, that peacetime would 
be harder for us. In the traumatic hours two years ago, was it Thursday, listen-
ing to the radio again, irony again and blasphemous cheerfulness, with the fear 
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we admitted to—who wasn’t fearless [angstlos, sic]. It looked like everything 
could end so easily, in a single stroke” (TP 1: 176). Finally, Bachmann advances 
a psychological/therapeutic explanation of how the Cold War division of Ger-
many as well as the after-effects and continuing presence of fascism affect the 
residents of Berlin. Like the title figure of Georg Büchner’s Lenz, references to 
whom accompanied Bachmann’s first efforts to formulate her address, Berliners 
had been made sick, driven mad, by contemporary social reality: “Sickness is in 
the time, it didn’t enter the world with Lenz, wandering, vegetating away.
. . . What made these people so sick, what made them half crazy? . . . Their 
craziness is nothing more that the physical, psychic expression for something 
unbearable, thus the expression of the fact that reality has defeated them. But it’s 
simultaneously the defeat of reality by the spirit, which would rather go crazy 
than give in, than let this be pounded into them” (TP 1: 175).
The political intervention Bachmann undertakes in the Büchner Prize 
speech can thus be understood as a response to Adorno’s dire analysis of the 
contemporary period. To Adorno, the totalitarian potential of his time arises 
from its demand for the total conformity of the populace to a hegemonic order: 
“If they want to live, they have no choice but to adapt themselves to the given 
circumstances, to conform; they have to put under erasure their status as auton-
omous subjects, which the idea of democracy appeals to; they can only maintain 
that status at the cost of renouncing it” (“What” 124). Bachmann concurs 
entirely with Adorno’s argument here and elsewhere about pressures on indi-
viduals to accommodate themselves to a dominant social order; indeed, as I will 
maintain shortly, that is a premise on which the “Ways of Death” is founded. 
Her textual strategy in “A Site for Coincidences” can be read as an effort to 
reveal the costs of such accommodation, to read the texts of culture against the 
grain to show the ruptures, disjunctures, lapses, and incoherences in a social 
system that alleges its superiority to its “totalitarian” adversaries. 
To understand how Bachmann here and in later texts exposes the underside 
of the Cold War order, it is useful to compare the textual practices of “A Site for 
Coincidences” with those of “To Die for Berlin” (an unfinished and unpub-
lished story that she wrote in November 1961 after a brief trip to Berlin, where 
the Berlin Wall had been erected three months earlier) and to read both as ante-
cedents to the various narrative strategies she would pursue in the “Ways of 
Death.” “To Die for Berlin” is a realistic third-person narrative told from the 
point of view of its unnamed, German-speaking male protagonist, who has 
traveled to Berlin from an unspecified non-German-speaking country to deliver 
a lecture. The title of the story, according to the editors of the critical edition, is 
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taken from the title of an article by Stewart Alsop in the 15 November 1961
Spiegel, “Sterben für Berlin? [To die for Berlin?]” in which Alsop discusses 
whether American forces would indeed be willing to defend Berlin if they 
thereby ran the risk of loosing an atomic war that might destroy all of human-
kind (TP 1: 523). Confronted in Berlin with the reality of the German past and 
present, the protagonist’s response is (in accord with Adorno’s arguments) denial 
and repression: on his visit he prefers not to listen to German, refuses to view 
Berlin’s sights or to attend its cultural events, to observe the Wall, to look into his 
hosts’ faces. To his own surprise he entertains himself in Berlin by spending the 
evening in a bar—where young Germans drink Coca-Cola—and by gazing at 
animals in the zoo. When he calls his French wife to tell her that fog has pre-
vented his flight from leaving, he reveals his anxiety about his presence in this 
cold war trouble spot when he thinks—but only in French!—“Peut-être je ne 
rentre plus, pensait-il, mais il ne le prononçait pas [Maybe I won’t return, he 
thought, but he didn’t say it]” (“To Die” 10). This story focuses, though only, it 
appears, by indirection, on the psychic distress that “Berlin”—here a trope for 
an entire world order as well as a real historical site—occasions in the protago-
nist and others, for even the football fans, in Berlin to attend the soccer playoffs 
between Sweden and Switzerland (neutral countries aligned with neither 
NATO nor the Warsaw Pact!) and who slug their buddy as they wait for their 
flight out, are brutalized by their exposure to “Berlin.” “This is a situation you 
couldn’t imagine existing anywhere else,” a Berliner tells the protagonist. “Can 
you imagine it even here? he retorted” (“To Die” 16). Bachmann expects readers 
of this understated story to comprehend what eludes its characters, that the 
political reality they are too frightened to confront directly has nonetheless 
inscribed itself upon them in ways they are not equipped to understand.
“A Site for Coincidences” in contrast resorts to expressionist or surrealist 
techniques to represent how “Berlin” leaves its mark on its inhabitants. In her 
introduction to the Büchner Prize speech, Bachmann explained that in Büch-
ner’s Lenz, “coincidence” (Zufall) was the term used to refer to Lenz’s attacks of 
madness. That madness, she continued, is a result of the “consistency” [Konse-
quenz] Lenz demanded from himself: “Consistency, the logical, in pursuing the 
crack [Riß]—the crack that ran through the world for Lenz.” Bachmann con-
cludes: “Consistency, the consistent is terrible in almost every case, and relief, 
consolation, the livable, that’s the inconsistent part” (TP 1: 228–229). In this text 
Bachmann pursues the effects on individual and collective consciousness of the 
crack that now runs through the world, Europe, Germany, and “Berlin.” She 
concludes her introduction by observing: “Madness can also come from outside 
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toward the individual, thus much earlier it went from inside the individual to 
the outside, then it turned around, in situations we’re familiar with, in the heri-
tage of this time [in den Erbschaften dieser Zeit]” (TP 1: 229)—the last phrase a 
reference to Ernst Bloch’s 1935 exploration of explanations for fascism’s mass 
appeal. This text is thus formulated so as to reproduce, from the collective per-
spective, on the one hand, of Berlin’s insane—those institutionalized and espe-
cially sensitive to a madness induced by external causes—and, on the other, per-
haps, of the totality of all Berliners. They live in the context of a nonsynchronous, 
violent, and omnipresent past: “At the sharp bend of the Koenigsallee, shots, 
now quite muffled, are fired at Rathenau [German-Jewish foreign minister 
assassinated by right-wing nationalists in 1922]. Hanging takes place in Plöt-
zensee” [the site where the 20 July 1944 conspirators against Hitler and others 
were executed]. They cannot avoid reminders of the defeat, occupation, and 
division of Germany—“an American, probably made of lead, with a short white 
helmet and a lowered automatic pistol, . . . the convoy of trucks with young 
ruddy-nosed Englishmen, . . . two Soviet sentries”—and the constant, through 
repressed, potential for conflict among them; the absurd suspicious rituals at 
border crossings between East and West: “Then you have to peel the paint off 
the car, it goes quickly, the paint comes off in strips like cold wax, then you have 
to knock on the metal three times, kick the tire once, then you get a mark, you 
have to throw it on the ground, heads or tails” (TP 1: 219–221). 
 Meanwhile, the patients are well cared for in the Berlin of the “economic 
miracle”: they participate in an orgy of consumption in the city’s great depart-
ment stores—“the escalators are jammed, the elevators are stuffed full with 
scarves and dresses and coats” (TP 1: 209)—crowd into Berlin’s many bars and 
night clubs, stuff themselves with cake. Women especially are susceptible to lav-
ish consumer excess: “In Café Kranzler the women pull their felt hats firmly 
down over their eyes, they chew and reach for more, like back then” (TP 1: 219). 
(In an earlier draft, Bachmann added the sentence “They eat their sweet secrets 
of twenty years ago [i.e., 1944, the Nazi period], they keep silent and get fat 
under their hats” [TP 1: 188].) Yet the consolations of consumption—“all the 
people are wrapped in waxed paper, . . . myriads of beer bottles” (TP 1: 206)
aside—the “Berlin” the patients confront is entirely unpredictable, threatening, 
and dangerous: “Once a minute an airplane flies through the room” (TP 1: 206); 
“in the next plane-free moment all the church bells of Berlin chime, churches 
spring up from the ground” (TP 1: 207); the roof of the S-Bahn collapses on 
them and they are saved only by the “huge muscles and hands” (TP 1: 211) of the 
East German woman conductor (one of those working women whom Western 
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women were so thankful not to have to emulate); and “owing to politics the 
streets rise forty-five degrees” (TP 1: 214). 
As the speech nears its end, Bachmann indicates that there is no solution, no 
cure, for this madness, yet the patients and their medical attendants refuse to 
confront the seriousness of their condition: “People don’t know if there’s hope, 
even if there isn’t any hope, it’s not really terrible, it’s not as bad as it was, it isn’t 
necessarily hope, it could be something less, it could be nothing, it’s nothing, it’s. 
. . . It was a little confusion, nothing else. It won’t happen again” (TP 1: 227). If, 
then, in “To Die for Berlin” Bachmann displays the impact of Cold War politics 
upon subjectivity from “without,” as it were, from a perspective that releases 
only information to which the figure in the story is prepared to allow himself 
conscious access, “A Site for Coincidences” reveals the repressed contents of con-
sciousnesses that have been subjected to similar conditions, devising images to 
represent a chaotic and contradictory intrapsychic reality that cannot be acknowl-
edged: “It’s nothing [Es war nichts],” says Bachmann here and elsewhere.
Thereafter, I want to argue here, Bachmann’s texts would oscillate between 
these two narrative approaches as she attempted to develop a textual strategy for 
the “Ways of Death” that would continue to allow her to address the evasions 
and anxieties of the post-1945 period. The novel Malina pursues the narrative 
strategy of “A Site for Coincidences” (particularly in its middle, dream chapter); 
“big history” is presented via the scars it has left on the psyche. This is why 
Bachmann needed Malina as the “overture” to her novel cycle: to show both how 
history deforms and cripples the psyche and why, in the “Ways of Death,” that 
damage will never again be so visible—since the “I,” the figure who cannot nar-
rate (erzählen) but can display her psychic wounds, disappears into the crack 
(Riß) in the wall at the novel’s end. Subsequent to the novel Malina, the figure 
Malina will in contrast take on the narrative standpoint of “To Die for Berlin” 
(as I detail later in this chapter): he will tell (erzählen), in the third person and 
past tense, stories in which neither the characters nor Malina himself will be 
able to reveal anything of which the characters are not consciously aware. One 
might maintain that Malina is the autonomous nineteenth-century bourgeois 
subject (now eroded by mass society) who assumes a narrative stance, that of the 
“self-assured, unbroken, unquestionable identical I/subject” (W 4: 220), which 
Bachmann’s Frankfurt lectures on poetics decreed to be no longer tenable in 
twentieth-century literature. Indeed, in a draft probably intended as an intro-
duction to the Eka Kottwitz or Fanny Goldmann fragment, Malina, speaking 
to a younger, more experimental writer at the Frankfurt Book Fair, describes 
himself as the custodian of an older language and (veritably Old Testament) 
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morality: “I obey an old language and old concepts, and I turn back like all 
people who gaze at what has happened and are turned to stone, and perhaps an 
angel will tell you in time, don’t look back, and then you won’t see Frankfurt 
consumed in smoke and brimstone as I see it consumed today and twice every 
year, for vengeance has come. Not my vengeance, because I came to tell and not 
to judge, but judgment haunts all the stories and lamentation in the smoke when 
it rises to heaven and is told” (TP 1: 364). Similarly, in an earlier draft of Malina,
the “I” remarks that unlike herself, anachronistic Malina hears (and presumably 
will recount) a univocal truth: “Malina is not à la page, not up to date, in his 
anachronistic museum he uses everything, also with me, that anachronism, and 
he waits, because it will appear, true and with the many visages of truth, Malina 
listens to truth’s single voice, and I don’t know that voice, only the many voices, 
all the variations, that swamp me, I don’t know the voice” (TP 3.1: 209).
Malina, one thus might argue, is the narrator of a novel cycle that Bach-
mann conceived as an ironic twentieth-century version of the nineteenth-cen-
tury realist novel à la Balzac. She herself suggested the proximity of the “Ways 
of Death” to the great novels of nineteenth-century realism such as Madame 
Bovary or Anna Karenina when she observed of Three Paths to the Lake: “It 
occurred to me that earlier the great writers, even the French, laid a lot of 
weight on something the Germans didn’t succeed at, showing the mores of a 
time via a series of women’s portraits” (GuI 140). Certainly, many of Bach-
mann’s parodic “speaking names”—Gernreich, the publisher; Fräulein Immer-
schön, the name given to the secretary of the “I” in early drafts of Malina;
Rappatz, initially called Geldern, one of the richest men in Austria in Gier—
strongly recall Dickens and other realist novelists. Similarly, Bachmann’s use of 
the Balzacian technique of recurring characters connects her both to novels of 
nineteenth-century realism and to twentieth-century novelists who have 
employed that strategy to mark the difference between realist novels and their 
own. For if in Balzac, the recurring characters of the Comédie humaine suggest 
that all of French society is a comprehensible social totality (one reason for 
Marxists’ fondness for Balzac’s novels), in authors like William Faulkner and 
Uwe Johnson they emphasize the disappearance of a familiar social world. One 
might maintain, then, that the recurring characters of Bachmann’s own cycle, 
“an image of the last twenty years . . . always with the setting Vienna and Aus-
tria” (GuI 66), were intended to convey a similar message, underlining the dis-
tinction between what appeared—also to most of her figures—to be a com-
fortable and familiar social world but was in fact the underside of the social 
order that National Socialism and the Cold War had created. As Malina 
bachmann and materialist feminism   { 319 }
remarked to the young avant-garde author, “I collect only stories that aren’t 
known, and only stories with a fatal outcome” (TP 1: 388).
 Malina thus presides over a social world in which subjects appear to be agents 
in control of their own fate, as in the realist novel (in Bachmann’s words: “the 
I/subject spends his time within history [das Ich hält sich in der Geschichte auf ],” 
W 4: 230) but in which they are in fact instead entirely products, creatures of that 
society (“die Geschichte im Ich [history within the I/psyche],” W 4: 230). Social 
theory has provided a variety of terms to describe the figures Bachmann con-
structs in the “Ways of Death”: in Frankfurt School terms, they consent to their 
own domination; in Althusser’s language, they are interpellated by ideology into 
particular subject positions; in Foucault-influenced theory they are discursively 
constructed subjects; in Antonio Gramsci’s words, they are products of hege-
mony—“that process,” as Terry Eagleton has put it, “whereby the particular 
subject so introjects a universal law as to consent to its imperatives in the form of 
consenting to his own deepest being” (32). That is, Bachmann attempted to rep-
resent figures who are, I want to argue here, totally constituted or called into 
being by dominant discourses; they are entirely congruent with hegemonic ide-
ologies (and that is why they have no capacity for resistance, as feminist readers 
have complained). From the perspective of this analysis of the “Ways of Death,”
it becomes easier to understand Bachmann’s dissatisfaction with The Book of 
Franza: Franza understood what was wrong with her and even, at the end, 
found the strength to say “no” to her tormentor, but Bachmann wanted to show 
instead how difficult it was for discursively constituted products of cold war 
society to understand not just what was wrong with their social order but even 
that anything was amiss at all. 
The political project of Malina might have been better grasped if, as the edi-
tors of the critical edition explain, Martin Walser, at the behest of the Suhrkamp 
Verlag, had not succeeded in convincing Bachmann to remove three critical sec-
tions from the novel that situate its story of love and death in the private arena of 
the Ungargasse within the larger political context of the late 1960s to early 1970s
in Vienna: “Sightseeing in an Old City,” the tour of Vienna taken by Malina 
and the “I” on a tourist bus; the Michael Frank episode, an account of a murder 
committed by a young neo-Nazi; and the flower power episode, Malina’s expla-
nation of young people’s politics in Vienna. 
“Sightseeing in an Old City” establishes the parameters of an Americanized 
Vienna in which the monuments and heroes of Austrian history are invisible 
and irrelevant. Though the tour guide boasts in hyperbolic pidgin English that 
Austria’s imperial accomplishments surpass those of the British Empire (“This 
{ 320 }   reading bachmann historically
was the biggest country which ever existed in the world and it gave a famous 
word, in this country the sun never goes down” [“Sightseeing” 5]), the Vienna 
he constructs for his customers is a land of operettas and the beautiful blue 
Danube. It is one that panders and corresponds to American expectations, a 
melange of fast food and drink, shoddy simulacra, and kitsch: fountains from 
which they drink “the most famous water in the world” (“Sightseeing” 3); “a 
dried-out imitation of Mozartkugeln from Salzburg” (“Sightseeing” 4); the 
“Doppelgänger of the emperor of peace” (“Sightseeing” 4) in Schönbrunn; con-
ceptions of femininity that hark back to invented Austrian tradition (“Sissy” 
films about the Empress Elisabeth popular in the 1950s, “Csárdás princesses,” 
“the merry widow”); yodelers and “Tales from the Vienna Woods” in the city’s 
night clubs (“Sightseeing” 5). This section thus situates Malina within the 
Americanized consumer culture—the Austria of the musical The Sound of 
Music (see Vansant), say—imposed upon and embraced by Austrians after 1945
as the United States attempted to win Austrian hearts and minds for the cause 
of anticommunism. 
The Michael Frank passage, on the other hand, shows that the imprint of the 
National Socialist past still remains vivid in Vienna. The seventeen-year-old 
Frank, whose grandfather had spent the entire war in a concentration camp and 
whose devout Catholic family had also suffered under the Nazis, had written in 
his journal: “One day I will kill myself, like HIM, with a revolver shot in the 
mouth. I admire and love that great ideal. My useless existence disgusts me. 
Suicide is a noble deed. All SS-men thought so, and I think so too” (TP 3.2: 715). 
Dressed in SS uniforms and insignia, Frank and two younger friends decide to 
carry out executions: “The youngest, Uli N., accepted the command, but it 
doesn’t say anywhere whose command, and shot Michael Frank dead” (TP 3.2:
714). This passage locates Malina in a social context in which the fascist “crime 
virus,” as Bachmann termed it, is still virulent. 
Finally, in the third excised section, three foreign visitors ask Malina and the 
“I” about “flower power” and “flower children” in Vienna. Malina replies that 
Viennese youth destroy flowers and demolish telephone booths: “You can’t really 
ask for more from the young people . . . In our areas especially you probably 
can’t expect the power of flowers any more. . . . Children are born too old here” 
(TP 3.2: 712). Bachmann is acknowledging that though her novel is set in a 
revolutionary period when young people elsewhere are demanding radical social 
change, opposition does not exist in the Vienna in which the Ungargasse of this 
novel is located. In the social world about which Malina will tell his stories, there 
are no radical alternatives to the present social order, no cultural revolutionaries 
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who might declare: “Be realistic, demand the impossible!” or proclaim, “All 
power to the imagination!”
Nonetheless, despite the omission of these three significant sections, Bach-
mann hoped and intended that her readers would understand her novel’s more 
limited focus as an effort to address contemporary political and social dilemmas, 
as she somewhat aggressively insisted to an interviewer shortly after Malina
appeared: “And didn’t you try to reproach me for isolating myself to this Ungar-
gasse, to these two figures? But that’s not isolation for me. Because, what does it 
actually mean to describe all of society, the nature of an era’s consciousness? 
That doesn’t mean that you repeat the sentences that society speaks, it has to be 
shown differently. And it has to be shown radically differently, because other-
wise nobody will know what our time was. And the sickness, the torment in it, 
and the sickness of the world, and the sickness of this person, that is the sickness 
of our time for me” (GuI 71–72). 
Following a suggestion by Helgard Mahrdt, I want to investigate Malina via 
the categories of private and public (Mahrdt, “Society”), which roughly corre-
spond to spheres allocated to women and men in the ideologies of the postwar 
period. From that perspective, it is possible to read this novel’s often-remarked 
unity of time and place in Vienna’s Ungargasse, where the “I,” her doppelgän-
ger Malina, and her lover all live, as emblems of the private sphere, protected 
from the invasive attentions of tourists and other strangers by its ordinariness: “a 
stranger would never lay eyes on it, as it is strictly residential and devoid of tour-
ist attractions [ein Fremder wird sie nie zu Gesicht bekommen, weil es in ihr nichts 
zu besichtigen gibt und man hier nur wohnen kann]” (Malina 3; TP 3.1: 281). The 
“Ungargasse” performs the function allotted to the home in the 1950s, protect-
ing its inhabitants from a hostile and alienating public sphere, the only arena 
where the “I” feels comfortable and safe. The “I” both concedes that “home” is 
not in fact extracted from the economic infrastructure and public affairs (of the 
Cold War!) and simultaneously proclaims her determination not to attend to 
them: “But Washington and Moscow and Berlin are merely impertinent places 
trying to make themselves important. In my country, in Ungargassenland no 
one takes them seriously . . . no longer can they have any impact on my life” 
(Malina 12). The attempt of the “I” to extract the Ungargasse from the larger 
sphere of “big history” can at least in part explain the “unity of time” in Malina,
why the novel is written in the present tense and takes place within an eternal 
“Today.” Conceived as a refuge from politics and history, the private sphere is 
alleged to be an arena whose activities of reproduction and nurturance never 
change; in effect, then, the private sphere could be represented as an on-going 
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present time. In addition, in Austria in the postwar period, as noted earlier, the 
private arena is specifically imagined as a refuge from the memory of National 
Socialism. That the “I” refuses to concern herself with either current events or 
history (“the past doesn’t interest me,” she remarks in an early draft [TP 3.1: 52]), 
will not remember the Nazi past, and occupies a realm which is not narratable 
because its characteristic activities consist of the eternal return of the same also 
helps to explain why the “I” continually laments: “I can’t narrate / I can’t tell my 
story [Ich kann nicht erzählen].” “There just isn’t any story/history in Malina,” 
Bachmann emphasized in an interview (GuI 73).
Within the private refuge of the Ungargasse, the “I,” though not a mother or 
wife, is nonetheless represented as completely a product of the gender discourses 
of the period in which Bachmann learned to be a woman. Alternatively, one 
might say, the “I” is the historically specific representation of what a particular 
era defined as feminine, and though the novel takes place in the mid-1960s, this 
is a notion of femininity derived from a period prior to 1960s upheavals: there 
are no flower children in this Vienna. As Bachmann emphasized frequently in 
interviews, in this “spiritual, imaginary autobiography” (GuI 73), she in fact 
conceived the “I” and Malina as two halves of a single person, each respectively 
possessing qualities that their author identified with femininity and masculini-
ty—another indication of the degree to which she also was a product of her age. 
In early Malina drafts the “I” laments that she is really a woman only when she 
is in bed with a man—“When I get up from a bed . . . I know that I belong to 
[the men] again, I was only gone, on the other side, because I was lying in the 
bed” (TP 3.1: 90)—and that she is really “two people, . . . a man and a woman” 
(TP 3.1: 134); in the final, printed version of Malina an astrologer tells her that 
she is split into male and female parts. It is instructive to relate this division of 
the personality or the psyche into masculine and feminine portions to the prob-
lems and experiences of the “woman standing alone” in Bachmann’s era; in car-
rying out the tasks of men as well as women, her figures may have felt that they 
too were at risk of succumbing to the fate that menaced the “emancipated 
woman”: metamorphosing into a “copy of a man.”
If the figures of Malina are indeed representatives of an era’s constructions of 
masculinity and femininity, then the appropriate reading strategy for Malina is 
not to identify with its female figure, as so many of Bachmann’s readers have 
done (probably because they themselves are products of the same gender dis-
courses as the “I”) but rather to read the text critically and ironically, attempting 
to discern how the figure of the “I” might manifest “the thinking that leads to 
dying,” how “big history” might have left its imprint on the “private history/
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story” of the “I.” Indeed, Bachmann has strewn Malina with a number of hints 
that readers should distance themselves from the standpoint the “I” assumes 
(what she termed her “self-irony” in the Kienlechner interview [GuI 98]). The 
most striking indication of Bachmann’s ironic distance from the “I” is perhaps 
the latter’s dismay that she, unlike other Austrian and German women at the end 
of the war, was not raped by Russian or black American soldiers (rapes that actu-
ally took place but, as Atina Grossmann has shown, were also discursively pre-
structured by Nazi ideology). “No normal man with normal drives has the obvi-
ous idea,” the “I” laments, “that a normal woman would like to be quite normally 
raped” (Malina 180). Grossmann has also suggested that the mass rapes con-
firmed German women’s conviction of their own victimization and Mißbrauch
(abuse, the contemporary euphemism for rape) by the Allies; this, together with 
men’s tribulations in prisoner-of-war camps, “construct[ed] a new national com-
munity of suffering that served not only to avoid confrontation with Nazi crimes, 
but also, of course, as a strategy for reauthorizing and reestablishing the unity of 
the Volk” (51). In Austria, where women were targets of rape especially by Soviet 
soldiers, as Bischof has shown (Austria 32–34), Austrians could construe them-
selves as double victims, the “first victims” of National Socialism and now sub-
jects of abuse by their liberators as well. The desire for rape expressed by the “I” 
may thus also be related to her repression of the Nazi past. In any case, since even 
antifeminist readers will find it difficult to believe that normal women in fact 
really want to be raped, Bachmann should be able to count on her readers’ recog-
nition of a distance between the views of her character and her own. 
A more difficult case is the often debated “mirror scene” of the first section, 
its interpretation particularly complicated by the discovery that Bachmann is 
probably replying to a Celan poem here (Weigel, Ingeborg 422–423): having 
bought herself a new dress, the “I” adorns herself and admires the result in the 
mirror, “fables removed from the men. For an hour I can live without time and 
space, deeply satisfied, carried off into a legend, where the aroma of the soap, the 
prickle of a facial tonic, the rustle of lingerie, the dipping of brushes into pots of 
powder, the thoughtful stroke of an eye-liner are the only reality. The result is a 
composition, a woman is to be created for a dress. In complete secrecy designs 
for a female are redrawn, it is like a genesis, with an aura for no one in particu-
lar” (Malina 86). Sigrid Schmid-Bortenschlager reads this passage as evidence of 
the degree to which Bachmann herself remained captive to the symbolic systems 
she wished to critique (“Spiegelszenen”). But Baackmann protests: “The site at 
which this scene takes place, the house, is not a unique, authentic site at which 
an identity independent of the other sex can be unfolded but rather already a 
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space allocated to women by men” (Erklär 810). The parapraxes of the “I”— 
Summermorde (summer murders/fashions), Wintermorde (winter murders/
fashions) (cf. Malina 137)—underline the destructive quality of women’s appar-
ently “natural” attention to such traditionally female concerns as fashion and 
cosmetics and the ways they are advertised (by 1958 the Bundesverband deutscher 
Zeitungsverleger [federal association of newspaper publishers] estimated that 
between 50 and 60 percent of German women were regular readers of newspa-
per advertisements [Carter, How 94]). In this case the “I” has embraced an 
image of female autonomy (located in the home, the preferred female realm of 
this antifeminist era) which is in fact the product of fashion designers, women’s 
magazines, and the cosmetics industry. 
That point is made even more clearly in a scene in Malina where the “I” 
attempts to prepare a gourmet dinner for Ivan while trying to remove the onion 
smell from her hands and to dress for the evening: “Ivan is only allowed to see 
the result: the table set and the candle burning, and Malina would be amazed 
that I’ve managed to chill the wine in time, warm the plates, and between bast-
ing and toasting the rolls I apply eye shadow and mascara in front of Malina’s 
shaving mirror, pluck my eyebrows to their proper shape, and this synchronized 
labor which no one appreciates is more strenuous than anything I’ve ever done 
before” (Malina 50). Carter maintains of the postwar period that “this, finally, 
was the defining element of the consumerized household: the erasure of the 
traces of strenuous labor—cooking smells, for instance . . . —not only from the 
domestic environment in general but, more particularly, from the body of a 
housewife who herself was to be transformed into a commoditized component 
of consumer lifestyle” (How 69–70). There is thus every reason to believe that 
even (or especially) when the “I” believes she is the autonomous, self-determined 
agent of her own actions, she is in fact obeying the dictates of a particular, his-
torically specific era, attempting to adapt herself to the given, as Adorno might 
have put it, consenting to the imperatives of hegemony in the form of consenting 
to her own deepest being, in Eagleton’s words (32).
In these apparently banal and benign images thus coalesce the social deter-
minants of female behavior in the postwar era: this is how history has left its 
imprint on female subjectivity of this period. In her love affair with Ivan the “I” 
is following the script the Cold War era (and many earlier time periods) wrote 
for women: of establishing a relationship with a man as woman’s highest prior-
ity; of female subordination and male dominance; of a femininity devoted 
entirely to the concerns of the private arena and interpersonal relations. Had 
Bachmann not changed the title of Malina’s first section, her readers might 
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more readily have understood that all was not as it seemed in the love affair of 
the “I”: before going into the page proofs, the novel’s first section was called 
“Sleeping Happily with Ivan [Glücklich schlafen mit Ivan],” though not a single 
instance of “sleeping” with Ivan in the sense either of sex or of rest is present in 
the chapter. Even the final title of that section, “Happy with Ivan,” should give 
pause to readers, for very little “happiness with Ivan” can be found here. But 
the “I” needs to love in order to exist as a woman at all: it is only in relationship 
to a man who loves her that her femininity is “awakened” (in the parlance of 
those times), becomes significant and meaningful. Bachmann herself suggests 
that Ivan and the “I” are playing discursively preordained roles when she 
remarks, “As I had to read that all again when I corrected it, I noticed that it’s 
not so easy with Ivan, that maybe he is also a doppelgänger or a triple figure” 
(GuI 88); that is, the “I” projects onto him the qualities the men whom she 
loves need to possess—qualities to which she then attempts to accommodate 
herself. (In the third section of the novel the “I” explains to Malina as if it were 
self-evident that women must adapt themselves to each new lover’s erotic 
whims, whereas men continue to behave just as they please.) That is why Ivan 
can be described as a sign or token (Zeichen): in Sigrid Weigel’s elegant phrase, 
he is a “place-holder for the cause of desire” (Bilder 13). 
Nonetheless, because in Bachmann’s view the eroticization of subordination 
and pain is a central component of socially constructed female desire, the “I” 
truly suffers because of how Ivan treats her, and she traces the lineage of this love 
affair, or perhaps of her whole character structure (“sometimes you really do 
know exactly when it began” [Malina 10]) to the boy on the Glan Bridge when 
she was six who promised to give her something and hit her in the face instead— 
her first experience “of someone else’s deep satisfaction in hitting” (Malina 10). 
Ivan thus joins the company of sadistic men who have mistreated the “I” (what 
Bachmann would doubtless call the fascism between women and men) via his 
“swearing sentences”: “Les hommes sont les cochons. Les femmes aiment les 
cochons [Men are pigs. Women love pigs],” says Ivan (Malina 52). In selecting 
the love affair as the central event of the overture to her “Ways of Death,” Bach-
mann makes the point that women and men are, for sociohistorical reasons, so 
constituted as to make the utopian connection at which they aim impossible.
There is thus every reason to treat the “Mysteries of the Princess of Kagran,” 
which the “I” spins out to explain why Ivan was the lover intended for her from 
the beginning of time, with as much skepticism as the love affair that takes place 
in the novel’s “Today.” Felski suggests that “‘the magical fictions’ of romantic 
fantasy should be seen less as an abandonment of the secularized, disenchanted 
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perspective of modernity than as another recurring dimension of the modern 
itself” (131). That is, such fantasies are projections of alternatives to a boring and 
banal quotidian reality (the daily life of the housewife, say) that are themselves 
generated by that reality. From this standpoint it is possible to find an explana-
tion for Bachmann’s otherwise mysterious plagiarism of Algernon Blackwood’s 
short story “The Willows” (1906) to provide the description of the Danube 
swamps through which the princess travels. To Bachmann, passages from others’ 
texts were of key importance, not to be regarded as quotations, as she announced 
somewhat cryptically: “There aren’t any quotations for me, but rather the few 
passages in literature that have always excited me, they are life for me” (GuI 69). 
I propose that like the name of Perceval Glyde, borrowed from Wilkie Collins’s 
Woman in White (see chapter 7), or the citation from D. H. Lawrence whose 
meanings I investigate in chapter 9, Bachmann’s appropriation of Blackwood’s 
story is one more indication that this text should be read against the grain, that 
here all is not as it seems. Or, to phrase this point differently, one could maintain 
that Bachmann’s many citations are ironic gestures to indicate that her own text 
moves within the discursive parameters of the works—by Wilkie Collins, 
Rimbaud, Lawrence, Barbey d’Aurevilly, and Blackwood, among many oth-
ers—from which she quotes and from which we as readers should distance our-
selves. Though Blackwood’s tale of a boat trip down the Danube begins as an 
idyll, it ends as a horror story in which the human actors are besieged by mysteri-
ous and ominous forces beyond their control (the “very ordinariness” of the land-
scape, the narrator in Blackwood’s story meditates, “masked what was malignant 
and hostile to us” [183]), and those forces finally demand a human sacrifice. Sim-
ilarly, one might maintain, the “real-life” romance of the “I” and Ivan, brushed 
against the grain, also reveals itself to be a tale of mounting terror and anxiety 
ending in death: love is murder.
It would nonetheless be wrong to conclude that love does not remain a uto-
pian state of being for Bachmann in the novel, if a historically very determinate 
one, and that is part of the poignancy of Malina. Bachmann never ceases to 
remind her readers that the utopia of luxe, calme et volupté, which was to inform 
the “beautiful book” that the “I” is incapable of writing, is her utopia, too, “when 
all mankind will have redgolden eyes and starry voices, when their hands will 
be gifted for love, and the poetry of their lineage shall be recreated” (Malina 88). 
In one of the last statements of her life she continued to maintain that “I don’t 
believe in this materialism, in this consumer society, in this capitalism, in this 
monstrosity that’s taking place here, and people who enrich themselves on us 
without having any right to do so. I really do believe in something, and I call it 
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‘A Day Will Come.’ And one day it will come. Well, probably it won’t come, 
because it’s been destroyed for us so many times, for thousands of years it’s been 
destroyed. It won’t come, but I believe in it nonetheless. For if I weren’t able to 
believe in it, then I couldn’t write any more” (GuI 145). There is no reason not 
to take seriously the sentence that ends the description of Bachmann’s novel on 
the dust jacket of its first edition: “Of its own accord, the book Malina protests 
that we are so murderously reasonable and laments that we are unable to love” 
(TP 3.2: 741)—though for Bachmann the incapacity to love is a consequence of 
causes far more social and political than Malina’s first reviewers were able to 
perceive. In a review with which Bachmann was very pleased (Albrecht, 
“Mann”), Hans Mayer chastised such critics: “In reviews people accused this 
‘heroine’ and her author of being someone who, in the midst of bourgeois pros-
perity, is only striving for individual happiness. The misery of the world didn’t 
seem to matter. Those who read that way have misunderstood the novel. The 
self-realization of the ‘I’ is prevented by the social conditions that always stand 
in the way of such fulfilled moments” (164). To Mayer, the female protagonist of 
this novel is a container for the hopes and dreams of the individual subject whose 
realization is thwarted by the present social order: “The female of this double 
ego represents the claim for a life filled with meaning in which feelings and 
thought achieve harmony. . . . Malina as male reason demonstrates to his female 
partner why this can’t be possibly in Vienna ‘today,’ that is, in an alienated world. 
Thus he brings about the death of this soul, who does not die of her own disorder 
but rather—like the lovers of Manhattan—of a disorderly world” (164–65).
Who or what is responsible for thwarting the utopia Bachmann envisions? 
Exploring that question was the task of the middle chapter of Malina, titled “The 
Third Man,” where Bachmann particularly draws upon the representational 
strategies she had first explored in “A Site for Coincidences.” Said Bachmann: 
“And for myself I’m very certain that everything frightful that happens in this 
time is in the dreams, and that we all are murdered” (GuI 70). What combina-
tion of forces, then, congeal in the figure that in the dreams persecutes and tor-
ments the “I”: the third man, the father, “this overpowerful father figure,” as 
Bachmann put it, “about whom we discover that this figure is the murderer, and 
more precisely, the murderer whom we all have” (GuI 89)? Like all dream sym-
bols, the father is “overdetermined”; a variety of “latent” concerns are displaced 
and condensed (to use Freud’s terminology) to form the “manifest” elements of 
the “dreams of this night” for the “I” (Malina 113). As Bachmann explained: “A
realist would probably tell about lots of frightful things that happen to a particu-
lar person or persons. Here it’s compressed into this big figure which carries out 
{ 328 }   reading bachmann historically
what society carries out” (GuI 97). In accordance with my argument here that 
Bachmann’s texts are suffused in a Cold War culture so natural to her characters 
that they are unable to recognize its damaging malevolence, it may be important 
to note first the connections of the father to “Amerika” and “Rußland.” In one of 
the earlier dreams, the father telephones from America and in a later dream has 
just returned from America. “I can hear America well,” says the “I” (Malina 117). 
Later the father also returns from Russia, where he has studied torture methods. 
Arnd Bohm, commenting on a version of this chapter given as a talk, suggested 
that references in Malina’s middle chapter to wintry weather, the frozen lake that 
borders the cemetery of the murdered daughters, and various kinds of ice are 
allusions to the cold war—a point that now seems so obvious that I am embar-
rassed I didn’t think of it myself. Perhaps the novel’s clearest explicit reference to 
the politics and social history of the postwar period, oddly enough virtually 
ignored by Bachmann scholarship, is the title of the dream chapter, “The Third 
Man,” borrowed from the 1949 film set in the ruins of postwar Vienna, starring 
Orson Welles and Joseph Cotton. Hermann Glaser has written: “The little trag-
edies of the black market years, which add up to the great guilt of the times, 
found their almost legendary formulation in the English film The Third Man
(directed by Carol Reed, script by Graham Greene). . . . The fact that the film, 
with Anton Karas’s nervous zither music, moved people of the rubble era deeply 
and spoke to them almost mythically was not the least because here an especially 
longed-for medicament [penicillin] was made the object of criminal manipula-
tion. The Americanization of life: that promised liberation from sickness and 
epidemics, of which there was no lack in defeated Germany” (76). 
Elsewhere in Malina, Bachmann emphasizes continuities between the cor-
ruption and deceit of the immediate postwar period, thematized in The Third 
Man, and the present, clearly intended as a critique of Austria’s embrace of the 
Western capitalist system: 
I would never have thought that everything would first have to be plundered, sto-
len, pawned and then bought and sold three times around the corner. The biggest 
black market was supposedly at the Resselpark, because of its many dangers you 
had to give it plenty of room, beginning in the late afternoon, all the way up to 
Karlsplatz. One day the black market ostensibly ceased to exist. But I’m not con-
vinced. A universal black market resulted, and whenever I buy cigarettes or eggs, 
I know—but really only as of today—that they come from the black market. Any-
way the whole market is black through and through, it can’t have been that black 
before because it still lacked a universal density. (Malina 173)
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The allusion the “I” makes to the “universal prostitution” (Malina 172) of the 
postwar period is multivalenced. On the one hand, it is the phrase Marx used in 
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts to describe wage labor under capi-
talism (Tucker 82). The “I” ponders, “Everyone who worked was a prostitute 
without knowing it, where have I heard that before?” (Malina 172). Moreover, 
“universal prostitution” refers to the ubiquitous spying that characterized the 
occupying powers’ machinations in pre-1955 Cold War Vienna, Viennese sell-
ing themselves off to the highest Allied bidder: “Everyone was working for some 
side or another, without even knowing it. No side revealed its true identity” 
(Malina 172). And finally, “universal prostitution” describes the sexual chaos of 
the postwar period, when, as the “I” puts it, “the whole city participated in this 
universal prostitution, everybody must have lain on the trampled lawn with 
everyone else or else they leaned against the walls, moaning and groaning, pant-
ing, sometimes several at a time, by turns, promiscuously” (Malina 181). 
In fact, the high value placed on penicillin in this period was due not just to 
its utility for healing sick children, as the film delicately puts it, but because (as 
the East German literary scholar Eva Kaufmann informed me) it could cure 
venereal disease: 19,000 new cases were reported in Vienna in 1946 (the year 
Bachmann came to Vienna), and, apparently as a result of the carryings-on 
Malina recounts, in 1948 one of every five young Viennese women between 
thirteen and twenty-one was infected with V.D. (Mattl, “Frauen” 111). In this 
reading, the “third man,” the corrupt black market manipulator of penicillin, 
is a metonymic representative of an entire postwar economic, social, and sexual 
order that entered with the occupying forces and prizes profits over all other 
forms of human connection, and the “frightful things” perpetrated in the 
dreams by the “murderer whom we all have” are displaced and/or condensed 
images of the atrocities that order makes possible. 
But a further peculiarity about Carol Reed’s film is that nowhere does it 
address the reason why Vienna lay in ruins in 1947; in this film National Social-
ism is entirely repressed. This “disappearing” of the reasons why an American-
ized “universal black market” had the opportunity to seize control of Austria 
suggests an additional interpretation of the forces figured in the third impor-
tant man in the life of the “I,” the powerful and violent father. In The Inability 
to Mourn (1967) Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich suggest that the 
defeated Germanic peoples of the Third Reich refused to come to grips with 
the fact of their own support for National Socialism, the Allies’ victory over 
Germany, and “the enormity of the catastrophe that lay behind them” (11). 
Instead, they sought father figures apart from Hitler—such as the aged father 
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figure Konrad Adenauer (or possibly “Uncle Sam”?)—upon whom to project 
their libidinal attachments, identified with the victors, and stylized themselves
into victims—of National Socialism, Hitler, rape, prisoner-of-war camps, and 
so on. The Mitscherlich analysis provides a framework for understanding the 
first two dreams of the “I,” one concerned with the cemetery of the murdered 
daughters, the other, with a gas chamber in which her father has enclosed her. 
One might posit that what Bachmann is revealing here (whether deliberately 
or not is not very relevant) are precisely the moves of the post-Holocaust Ger-
man or Austrian psyche that enabled it conveniently to “forget” the Holo-
caust. I am not attempting to suggest that the “I” is not a “victim” of male 
dominance or of fascistoid elements that survive into the postwar period; 
rather, I want to maintain that (unconsciously—as the Mitscherliches argue) 
she represents her historically occasioned distress in ways common to other 
Germans and Austrians of the period, thus virtually assuring that she, like her 
compatriots, will be incapable of either understanding or alleviating it. Bach-
mann recalled that it was the National Socialist conquest of Austria that began 
her own process of remembering: “There was a particular moment that 
destroyed my childhood. Hitler’s troops’ invasion of Klagenfurt. It was so 
horrible that my memory begins on this day. The enormous brutality that you 
could feel, the shouting, singing, and marching. . . . A whole army entered our 
quiet, peaceful Carinthia” (GuI 111). But Gerhard Botz observes that Bach-
mann here also succumbs to some degree to the “Austria as first Nazi victim” 
myth, since the commotion was most likely in fact made by the large Nazi
population of Kärnten (201). Botz’s argument is strongly supported by Hans
Höller’s revelation that Bachmann’s own father joined the Nazi party in 1932
(Ingeborg [1999] 25), though Bachmann herself never acknowledged that she 
was raised in a Nazi family; perhaps, as the foregoing quotation suggests, she 
even invested some effort in obscuring her own Nazi connections. One might 
speculate that one reason the “I” can’t remember what she needs to know to 
tell her story is that she, like many of her country’s people in the postwar 
period, can’t—or won’t—remember her own relationship to the Holocaust,
and is then haunted in her dreams by her own unmastered past. That might 
also explain repeated dreams the “I” has of sex with her father, which from a 
psychoanalytic perspective are an indication that she has accepted her place in 
the sex/gender system over which her (or the) father presides—and accepted 
all the other values that the father represents. Baackmann suggests what the 
consequences of this reading of the incest dreams might be: “The father is 
ever more clearly recognizable as the principle of an omnipotent authority to 
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which the daughter submits herself unconditionally, to be sure in the belief 
that she is rebelling against his power” (Erklär 87). “I wouldn’t have betrayed 
you,” says the “I” to her father (Malina 114). Malina tells the “I,” “Maybe you 
didn’t know, but you were in agreement” (Malina 145).
It appears, then, that the dream chapter of Malina, focused on the most inte-
riorized processes of the psyche, also reveals “history within the I/psyche”: here 
the “I” is like Claudia Koonz’s German women in Mothers in the Fatherland,
who are not just products but also proponents of the social order that subordi-
nates them. This reading of Bachmann’s notion of femininity is substantiated 
by a striking scene from an early draft of Franza, whose protagonist has mostly 
been viewed as fascist patriarchy’s innocent victim par excellence. Her psycho-
analyst husband (in this early version called “Baronig”) alleged that his earliest 
scholarly publication had appeared in 1948, but Franza, whom he has unspar-
ingly put to work as his research assistant, by chance discovers an earlier publi-
cation “on a card in the [library] card catalogue, . . . 1941, 1942, though with a 
harmless title. It would have been wrong to say that Franza had a violent reac-
tion then, on the contrary, she didn’t even think much about it, but went back 
two weeks later and removed the card without looking to see whether the pub-
lication could have been incriminating or not. She didn’t want to know, and 
even less did she want to tell her Baron about it or ask him a question” (TP 2:
47). Later in the same draft, in a passage narrated from Franza’s perspective, 
Bachmann further underlines Franza’s unwillingness to confront her husband’s 
possible Nazi affiliations before 1945: “I found it, when I was working on Rie-
del, I took the card out of the catalogue in the Nationalbibliothek. I don’t know 
if this work was incriminating for him or not, but I took it away, no, carried it 
around in my purse for two days, then I threw it away, in Frau Rosi’s garbage 
can between the old lettuce and the bread crust. And then I looked in the gar-
bage can again and got the card out and dropped it into the sewer, through the 
slots, now it’s floating in the sewer pipes, and I don’t know, was it something or 
was it nothing. 1941. Now I’ll never know, and nobody can ever look for it. 
What kind of an article it was and for which medical journal, I don’t know any 
more, I swear. I never wanted to know. . . . I never wanted to know anything” 
(TP 2: 64). Here Franza, by this point in the novel already a victim of her hus-
band’s “fascist” treatment of her, colludes nonetheless in what Götz Aly has 
called the “unwritten code of silence” about academic support for Nazi policies 
and practices (154). Sigrid Weigel has astutely observed of all the murdered 
daughters: “In Bachmann’s depiction the daughters participate in the ‘eternal 
war.’ Not only as a victim or as someone affected—because there isn’t a female 
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refuge outside of history. But rather war continues within themselves, as in all 
subjects” (Bilder 141).
Another passage characterized by “self-irony,” which I quote at some length, 
unites these several themes and also shows how, though in the bourgeois novel 
women represent subjectivity and in postwar society women are responsible for 
consumption, the story of the “I” told in Malina could also be relevant for men:
Malina asks: Have you never thought how much trouble other people have gone to 
because of you? I nod thankfully. They have indeed, they didn’t spare themselves 
the trouble of providing me with character traits, they equipped me with stories, 
and even with money as well, so that I can run around in clothes and eat leftovers, 
so that I continue to make do and so it won’t be too obvious how I am doing [damit 
es weitergeht mit mir und nicht auffällt, wie es weitergeht]. Too quickly tired I can 
sit down in the Café Museum and leaf through newspapers and magazines. Hope 
returns to me, I am excited, incited because there is now a direct flight to Canada 
twice a week, you can fly to Australia in comfort on Qantas, safaris are getting 
cheaper, in Vienna we should soon see Doro-coffee with its unique aroma from 
the high sunny plains of Central America, Kenya is advertised, Henkell Rosée lets 
you flirt with a new world, no building is too high for Hitachi elevators, books for 
and by men are now available which are just as inspiring for women. So that your 
world never gets too small for you, there’s prestige, a sea breeze from a far horizon. 
Everyone is talking about mortgages. You’re in good hands with us, proclaims a 
Mortgage-Bank, you’ll go a long way in tarraco shoes. We coat your Venetian 
blinds twice so you’ll never have to varnish them again, a call-computer is never 
alone! And then the Antilles, le bon voyage. That’s why the Bosch exquisite is 
one of the best dishwashers in the world. The moment of truth is coming when 
customers ask our experts questions, when management technique, calculation, 
net profits, packaging machines, delivery times are all up for debate. viviopal for 
those who can’t remember a thing. Take it in the morning . . . and the day belongs 
to you! So all I need is Viviopal. (Malina 165–66)
First, the “I” clearly acknowledges that she is a product of, has been inserted 
into, and has embraced the ideological models and narratives that “other peo-
ple” have provided for her and that the task such discourses preeminently per-
form is allowing her to continue to perform the social functions prescribed for 
her without understanding or even noticing their cost to her (“so it won’t be too 
obvious how I am doing”). What she receives in return for her compliance is 
access to the consumer paradise of postwar capitalism, served up to her by the 
postwar media, another “dream factory” that dazzles her with endless, ever new 
consumer possibilities (“Hope returns to me,” “flirt with a new world”) and on 
which she, queen of household consumption, is expected to be an expert—hence 
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the necessity of advertising (“when customers ask our experts questions”). And 
the possibilities available to her are those of the economic miracle of postwar 
capitalism that the United States promised to deliver to Western Europe: the 
home (via a mortgage), clothing, cosmetics, exotic articles to eat and drink, 
fancy household items. The availability of consumer goods from across the 
world emphasizes that capitalism is a global system dependent on a world mar-
ket (anticipating, as do Bachmann’s stories “Word for Word” and “Three Paths 
to the Lake,” today’s concerns about globalization). Moreover, postwar con-
sumer capitalism puts the entire world at the disposal of the Western tourist, 
with a particular emphasis on formerly colonized countries: Canada, Austra-
lia, Kenya, the Antilles. The “I”—that is, the postwar subjectivity of which she 
is a metonymic representation—has thus been granted and has accepted mem-
bership in (“has bought into,” so to speak) an entire economic, political, and 
cultural system with race, class, and gender implications. All that is asked of 
her is that she not “remember a thing”—about the Austrian past that led to this 
world of wonders, about the global present to which she is now subjected. “So 
all I need is Viviopal,” the “I” muses; perhaps then nothing will disturb her 
memory and she will be able to tell her story. But precisely her ironic tone 
underlines the cost, for men and women, of embracing the postwar capitalist 
order, their containment by and complicity in a system that is not at all dedi-
cated to the purpose of meeting human needs. 
After the “I” has bared scars on her soul for which even she can not account, 
what does it mean that she disappears into a crack in the wall at the end of this 
novel? How should we understand the last sentence, “It was murder” (Malina
225)? For many, many feminist scholars the answer has seemed simple: as I 
myself wrote in a 1980 essay (chapter 3 of this book): “Even the most superficial 
reading of Bachmann’s late prose should make clear who is being killed in 
these various ways (and also that death can be the death of the spirit as well as 
of the body): women.” But here I would like to make a somewhat different 
argument that begins by taking seriously Bachmann’s own argument that both 
Malina and Ivan are doubles of the “I.” As detailed in chapter 8, the cold war 
encouraged dualisms of many sorts, and even progressive thinkers of that 
period (as, indeed, of our own) constructed women as reason’s or the male 
subject’s other; and, as I maintained earlier in this chapter, the apparently natu-
ral opposition of men and women was one of the foundations on which the 
normative heterosexuality of cold war culture rested. Of course, discursive con-
structions of this sort do not in fact precisely describe (though they certainly 
profoundly influence) what “real people” “actually” are and do. In the cold war 
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period, “real” female subjects were nodes at which mutually irreconcilable dis-
courses intersected. In the period during which Bachmann wrote, it seemed 
perhaps literally inconceivable that one could be the kind of person who could 
both love ecstatically and pay one’s bills on time. The “I” thus performs gender 
burlesques like those of Lucille Ball or Gracie Allen when she tries to operate 
in a man’s world, and only Malina can keep her life in order as she performs 
prechoreographed steps in her elaborate ballroom dance with Ivan. But just as 
Bachmann herself was described as (for a time at least) sovereignly managing a 
difficult balancing act, being charmingly inept at dealing with the conditions 
of daily life yet extremely savvy about her business affairs, similarly it is impor-
tant to stress that all of these figures, Ivan, Malina, and the “I,” constitute the 
radically disunified self of the woman, or at least the woman intellectual, of 
this period (see Bird). It is not necessary to make Malina a villain in order to 
understand the claim of the “I” that “I have lived in Ivan and die in Malina” 
(Malina 223). After Ivan decamps, the capacity of the “I” to love—which, in the 
discursive frame within which this novel moves, means her femininity, is no 
longer evoked, and she is reabsorbed in Malina. But, as Bachmann repeatedly 
emphasized, the “I” of course is Malina. Or: Malina is she.
How were the “Ways of Death” to continue after the “I” disappears into the 
wall and Malina becomes their narrator, as the “I” had requested (“Go ahead 
and take over all the stories which make up history [die große Geschichte]. Take 
them all away from me” (Malina 221)? Bachmann commented in a “plot sum-
mary”: “The whole book is directed toward the emergence of the figure of 
Malina, who is objective and sovereign, while the “I” is subject [sic] and useless. 
For that reason the questionable narrative perspective later disappears, then the 
narration is total because Malina knows everything and can decide what to do 
with the characters” (TP 3.2: 740). In conformance with this and numerous 
other remarks by Bachmann, I propose here, as I suggested earlier, that in sub-
sequent “Ways of Death,” abandoning the “questionable narrative perspective” 
of Malina, Bachmann would return to the apparently realistic narrative form of 
“To Die for Berlin” and its seemingly sovereign and all-knowing narrator—the 
second of the two narrative strategies between which her later writing oscillates. 
Subsequent “Ways of Death” volumes, I further want to argue, would take a 
form similar to the stories of Three Paths to the Lake (which I consider to be part 
of the “Ways of Death” cycle), of “Rosamunde,” of “Greed,” of Requiem for 
Fanny Goldmann, and of the Eka Kottwitz fragment. Bachmann, I maintain, 
changes narrative strategies for reasons very much related to her conception of 
the production of subjectivity in the cold war period: she resorts to the realist 
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form because, in order to represent figures entirely subjected to the hegemonic 
ideologies/discourses of their period, she cannot allow them to perceive the 
cracks and crevices of the order that constrains them (cracks perhaps like those 
of the wall into which the “I” disappears). Instead, she falls back to a narrative 
form corresponding to the ideology of bourgeois individualism on which the 
postwar period depended, premised upon the notion of an exterior world exist-
ing independently of the perceiving subject, as well as that of a subject who is a 
rational, unified, and coherent bearer of consciousness and conceives itself to be 
able to act autonomously and to control its own destiny. Though a sympathetic 
figure, Malina is constructed as a subject who is a creature of such ideologies, 
and he will thus be able to tell only those parts of the stories for which there are 
words in the discourse of which he is part (which is why the figures of those texts 
so often remark to themselves, “It was nothing” or “It couldn’t be told”). 
Moreover, the figures of these later “Ways of Death,” captives of hegemonic 
ideologies or discourses, will be shown to understand themselves as the same 
sort of self-determined, autonomous subjects as Malina himself, quite unaware 
of the historical forces and social pressures inscribed upon them and the actual 
nature of their own situation. The narrator of the story “Word for Word” makes 
this point very emphatically when he (!) remarks of the interpreter Nadja and 
her boyfriend Frankel off for a romantic fling to southern Italy: “What was 
going on in the world these next few days basically had nothing to do with 
them, how everything changed and how hopeless it all was [warum es immer 
auswegsloser wurde]” (Paths 14–15; TP 4: 117). Almut Dippel has determined 
that this story takes place in August 1968, at the time of another major event in 
the history of the cold war: the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the crush-
ing of the Prague Spring’s attempts to develop a “socialism with a human face” 
(18). Thus what can’t and won’t be revealed in this and other stories of Three 
Paths to the Lake are the constituents of subjectivity that emerge in Malina, “his-
tory within the I/psyche”—and that is why Malina was the necessary overture to 
Bachmann’s novel cycle, to reveal what would be much more difficult to discover 
in other “Ways of Death.” Marcel Reich-Ranicki’s judgment of the stories of 
Three Paths to the Lake in his 1972 review was thus not entirely off base—though 
for reasons quite different from those he advanced: “Are these stories, in which 
the chic and the stylish predominate, the worldly and the melodramatic tri-
umph, and excessive sentimentality is mixed with snob appeal, are these stories 
perhaps not supposed to be anything more than reading matter for those ladies 
who flip through magazines at the hairdresser’s or in the dentist’s waiting 
room? That is, consciously and cynically intended to be popular fiction [Trivi-
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alliteratur]?” (191–192). Precisely: Bachmann’s figures are exactly such “ladies” 
whose self-understanding is prefabricated by the categories by which popular 
fiction is also informed.
As I observed of “Three Paths to the Lake” in the preceding chapter, the two 
frame stories of Three Paths to the Lake repeat the constellation of Malina—with 
a difference: here the female protagonists are shown to have succeeded bril-
liantly in the public, male, arena, while in the private realm they are entirely 
unable to articulate why or even that they are unhappy. “Hasn’t it ever occurred 
to anyone,” Elisabeth Matrei rages, not understanding that she is talking about 
herself, “that you kill people when you deprive them of the power of speech and 
with it the power to experience and think?” (Paths 173). The three interior sto-
ries deal only with the private, female sphere, “their own world,” Tanja Schmidt 
declares, “which they defend in their retreat to complete privacy” (494). As
women in the private arena, even in the late 1960s and early 1970s they conform 
to the dictates of cold war femininity, as the “I” had observed: “Women always 
have their heads full of feelings and stories about their man or men. Such 
thoughts really do consume the greatest part of every woman’s time” (Malina
178). Bachmann guides the reading of the stories of Three Paths to the Lake,
however, so as to reveal the gaps, inconsistencies, ruptures, and incoherences of 
hegemonic ideologies of which her figures themselves, products of those ideolo-
gies, are not aware. Beatrix in “Problems Problems,” for instance, is utterly 
impatient with the political engagement of Jeanne, a young French veteran of 
1968: “It had always been on the tip to her tongue to tell Jeanne that her Parisian 
head was full of confused ideas and nothing more, you couldn’t be a hippie and 
go to the opera at the same time, ride the ferris wheel and revolutionize the 
world, at least not in Vienna” (Paths 42). Love is as tormented and unsatisfying 
for the female figures of Three Paths to the Lake as for the “I,” and though they 
try to conceive of themselves as being in charge of their erotic fortunes—Elisa-
beth coolly picking out a man to deflower her; Miranda managing her lover’s 
betrayal of her so she will not appear to be his victim—in fact, they too are at the 
mercy of the men they need to love them. Because there is really no function in 
the private sphere for a woman who does not head a household, Beatrix can find 
nothing to do, apart from the beauty parlor, except sleep; old Frau Jordan vege-
tates in a tiny apartment on her way toward senility; and Miranda drives female 
inattention to the public realm to a comic pitch by refusing to wear glasses so she 
sees nothing of it at all. As Bachmann wrote in a draft of a letter to her publisher, 
“they’re playing with the wrong cards, but the game they’re playing does them 
more honor than the crude vulgarities of other women” (TP 4: 12). In these 
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stories, as in Malina, we see virtually nothing of the historical conditions in 
which the lives of the figures are embedded, only their consequences for women 
who have been instructed not to attend to them. As in Malina, even the utopias 
of the Three Paths figures are formulated in the impoverished terms available to 
them: Nadja in the arms of Christ, Beatrix in the beauty parlor, Elisabeth in her 
hopeless quest for the New Man. I observed in my introduction that Adorno’s 
painful observation about the conditions of existence in the post-Holocaust, 
postwar period might do for the figures of the “Ways of Death,” too: “There’s 
no right way to live when the world is wrong [Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im 
falschen]” (Minima Moralia 42); like Adorno’s Minima Moralia, Bachmann’s 
“Ways of Death” stories are “Reflections from a Damaged Life.”
Historians have termed the period about which Bachmann wrote—from the 
end of what she called “the first postwar era” in Malina (172) to the beginning of 
the student movement—die Langen Fünfziger Jahre, “the long fifty years” 
(Abelshauser), because of the economic, political, and social homogeneity of that 
era. Bachmann set herself the task of viewing her times through a gendered 
perspective in order to illuminate the condition of female subjectivity, perhaps 
even of human subjectivity altogether. As Irene Heidelberger-Leonard puts it: 
“It’s Bachmann’s undisputed accomplishment to have conjoined the political 
and the private spheres so inextricably. . . . She sharpens our perception of every-
day history by reversing the perspectives of crime and normality. In so doing she 
doesn’t make the criminal banal, but she certainly makes the everyday criminal” 
(“Ernst” 88). In her series of prefaces to The Book of Franza, Bachmann con-
nected the “crime virus” that had not disappeared from the world following the 
defeat of National Socialism to a passage from Barbey D’Aurevilly’s “Vengeance 
d’une femme,” which declared, “Those crimes appeal less to the senses, they 
appeal more to the intellect; and the intellect, after all, is the deepest part of us 
. . . [and there] no blood was spilt, and the murder was within the domain of 
sentiment and custom” (TP 2: 73). What clearly both deterred Bachmann in her 
effort to compose her “Ways of Death” and detracted from her readers’ ability to 
understand what she had written was that the “long 1950s” were a period in 
which nothing (excepting, of course, the communist threat), was supposed to be 
wrong at all—especially in the private sphere, now decreed to be the prime source 
of human happiness and satisfaction, to which women had been restored. 
Other talented women of Bachmann’s generation were also broken by an era 
whose vicious qualities they struggled to delineate. In a 1962 poem Sylvia Plath 
(1932–1963), of German ancestry, identified herself with Jewish victims and 
condemned her father as a fascist. Her autobiographical novel The Bell Jar (1963)
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locates her account of a young girl’s breakdown in the context of the cold war 
by beginning it with a reference to the Rosenbergs’ execution in 1953. In a 1968
draft of a review of The Bell Jar, Bachmann wrote of the protagonist: “She is 
destroyed [verunglückt] in such an undiscernible way that one asks oneself after 
the third reading where this secret unhappiness starts and how, and I am 
inclined to consider that, like everything you can’t find evidence for in a book, 
as the best and strangest” (W 4: 358). In a 1963 poem Anne Sexton (1928–1974)
wrote: “I was tired of being a woman / tired of the spoons and the pots / tired 
of my mouth and my breasts, tired of the cosmetics and the silks” (1995). Anne 
Parsons (1930–1964), a talented researcher in the social sciences and daughter 
of the famous sociologist Talcott Parsons (who influenced Helmut Schelsky), 
wrote after endless psychoanalytic sessions: “All I do know is that my own life 
became more and more of a void symbolized by the long spaces between my 
apartment and the suburban houses where I occasionally got invited for dinner 
to hear about the local school system and within which none of the messages 
from myself which I sent out in increasingly desperate ways ever came back 
with more than an echo of ‘you, you, you just don’t want to be a woman at all.’ 
I began to wish that someone would call me names or throw stones or threaten 
to send me to a concentration camp so that at least I would know for certain 
that the world was against me” (quoted in Breines 178). Marilyn Monroe 
(1926–1962) was born in the same month and year as Bachmann and commit-
ted suicide like Plath, Sexton, and Parsons. In her ex-husband Arthur Miller’s 
play After the Fall (which Bachmann may have seen in Berlin in spring 1965
[Kohn-Waechter, Verschwinden 196]) the character possibly modeled on Mon-
roe says: “I have been hurt by a long line of men but I have cooperated with my 
persecutors” (234). Meanwhile in West Germany, three notable women writers 
of the period, Marie Luise Kaschnitz, Ilse Langner, and Oda Schaefer, pro-
claimed to the Darmstadt Academy for Language and Literature in 1957 that 
women have an affinity for the world of dreams, the unconscious, and irratio-
nality (Kaschnitz); that the patient, suffering, passive character of women was 
the determining element in their writing (Schaefer); and that the drama of 
women’s lives, particularly childbirth, made them uninterested in writing 
drama (Langner) (quoted in Bullivant/Rice 229). We can imagine the cemetery 
of the murdered daughters as a fitting final resting place for these talented and 
beleaguered women. 
In The Feminine Mystique (1963), Betty Friedan began to identify “the prob-
lem that had no name,” but her account, like those of some other subsequent 
feminists (including many of Bachmann’s readers and commentators), limited 
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and to some extent trivialized women’s problems by reducing the cause of those 
problems only to their treatment by men and a male-dominated society. I turn 
one final time to Christa Wolf, who in 1966 wrote of Bachmann’s texts: “Sud-
denly we see what cannot be seen but must be there because it produces effects. 
We see the past within the present, for instance. Or the boundless desires we 
always suppress, which can gush out in anyone at any moment. . . . But above all 
vision means seeing the unity and meaning behind seemingly unrelated and 
meaningless events. The discovery of what animates them all, and of what really 
is destroying them—regardless of what they may pretend” (Reader 103). Situat-
ing her texts in the context of a social reality whose lineaments are discernable 
only in their effects on her figures, Bachmann represents a “historical situation” 
in which their condition cannot be ameliorated until, as Christa Wolf knew, 
everything is changed.
Materialist feminism regards all readings as political, as interventions into 
the process of meaning-making which establishes the discursive boundaries of 
what counts as “the way things are.” My own readings in this chapter, as in this 
book altogether, are intended as an intervention into discussions about feminist 
methodology as well as about the interpretation of Ingeborg Bachmann’s texts. 
I have tried to show that women’s lives (as well as representations of them) are 
always situated within a historical context shaped by a multiplicity of discursive 
and nondiscursive historical forces. My project here is to amend feminist meth-
odology by, as it were, decentering gender, showing it to be an analytical cate-
gory always necessary yet never sufficient for an understanding of women’s and 
men’s lives. I want thereby to extend feminism’s oppositional reach by contribut-
ing to a feminist effort to elaborate more complex theoretical frameworks capa-
ble of grasping all the determinants that shape women’s (and men’s) lives at any 
historical moment. Via such new theoretical paradigms, feminists and other 
oppositional groupings may be better able both to comprehend and subsequently 
to contend against destructive social forces such as those responsible for produc-
ing the disastrous social constellations that Bachmann tried to describe. Because 
I believe that feminist scholarship should assist in transforming the world as 
well as interpreting it, I hope the analysis I advance here may make some contri-
bution to producing the kinds of new social arrangements in which Bachmann 
would no longer have needed to write her “Ways of Death.” 
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